Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy Toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954-1963

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Stanford University Press, 2003 - 286 頁
Based on extensive research in the Russian archives, this book examines the Soviet approach to the Vietnam conflict between the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina and late 1963, when the overthrow of the South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem and the assassination of John F. Kennedy radically transformed the conflict.

The author finds that the USSR attributed no geostrategic importance to Indochina and did not want the crisis there to disrupt détente. The Russians had high hopes that the Geneva accords would bring years of peace in the region. Gradually disillusioned, they tried to strengthen North Vietnam, but would not support unification of North and South. By the early 1960s, however, they felt obliged to counter the American embrace of an aggressively anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam and the hostility of its former ally, the People's Republic of China. Finally, Moscow decided to disengage from Vietnam, disappointed that its efforts to avert an international crisis there had failed.

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內容

The Origins
1
To Divide or Not to Divide
12
Making Peace at Geneva
28
From Support to Cooperation
54
Neither Peace nor War
69
If the Fractured Friendship Collapses
98
Crisis in Laos
122
Back to Geneva
157
A Disposition to War
181
Conclusion
205
Bibliography
212
Notes
220
Index
265
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關於作者 (2003)

Ilya Gaiduk is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of General History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

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