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the definition is clearly obvious to the objection that many ordinary events without the sphere of human activity, such for instance as the succession of the seasons, are impressed with a purpose, or what comes of the argument from design? It is only fair to add that elsewhere our author insists upon the design in nature as a presupposition for miracles," but this is no excuse for a faulty definition. Secondly, we object that "outside the sphere of man's activity" is hardly distinct enough for a note. We desiderate some indication of what is "outside the sphere of man's activity," and this was precisely what the formula "contra naturam," which our author discards, was meant to supply. By "contra naturam" it was intended to express an interruption of the order of nature, i.e. of the normal interaction of the natural forces in possession, man included. The question is whether this formula does not express an important truth essential to the rationale of miracles, and which therefore must be maintained in spite of its liability to misconstruction. We think it does; for what is the necessary condition of all human action upon nature? Is it not an initial submission in order to gain its ends? Its action is never "contra naturam." It serves that it may control; it invokes one force to balance, to counteract another; it is a government by parties. Our author ventures to put the invention of the submarine telegraph and the raising of Lazarus in the same category as regards the forces directly employed. They are both, he considers, results of the adaptation of natural laws, the combination of natural forces, although the one has lately been found to be within the sphere of man's activity, the other is certainly without that sphere. On the contrary, we should insist that the first is an adaptation, the second an act of absolute control involving the immediate subjugation of the whole assemblage of the natural forces in possession, not merely a fresh combination of them. Unless we can say this, what is to prevent an adversary maintaining that we may find out some day the art of raising the dead, just as we found out the other day the art of submarine telegraphing, which a hundred and fifty years ago would have looked so beyond us? Such an idea is quite alien from our author's intention, but by getting rid of the precise note which stereotypes, so to speak, the sphere of man's activity, he has made it hard to show why the conception of this sphere should not expand with the experience of miracles.

Again, exceptionality, contrariety, is necessary in order to mark this very purpose or design upon which our author lays such stress. For surely, abstracting from this exceptionality, the phenomenon of the miracle is anything but a conspicuous example of design, a bending of means to an end; such intelligent adaptation is precisely what is wanting. We have indeed the earnest expression of a wish, but the achievement is unconnected with it by any intelligent process. We require the note of contrariety to the order of nature, of abnormal exceptionality, in order to mark out the particular purpose as distinct from the general purposes of the order of nature. We should be inclined then to substitute for our author's definition one that shall combine the note of purpose with the note of "contra naturam," thus: a miracle is "an act of absolute control with a manifestly intelligent purpose, of the natural forces in possession, on

behalf of certain individuals." The exceptional character, the exemption for the nonce of an individual, or collection of individuals, from the operation of a general rule we regard as essential to the idea of a miracle. The great First Cause has created and preserves in being a vast system of causalia-that is to say, of beings distinct from, and having a causative power distinct from, although in intimate dependence upon, their Creator. The interaction of these beings, man included, is in strict subordination to the natures of the whole collection of agents. This great system is impressed throughout with the Creator's purpose. Through it in many ways God speaks to the understanding: but it is of law, of necessary sequence, that He speaks; of man in his external relations, as an assemblage of certain qualities developing thus and thus under certain circumstances. On the other hand, God speaks to the individual soul in the consciousness of freedom, in the voice of conscience, in the communion of grace, of a system of spiritual relations between the Creator and the individual in which none other partakes. The miracle holds, in a certain sense, an intermediate position between the general and the individual, the sensible and the spiritual. In the miracle the Author of both systems vindicates on the field of sense the superiority of spirit, and subordinates the sensible determinations of law to the higher, because spiritual, relations of the individual. Where there is a revelation the miracle performs the twofold function of confirming the faith of the recipient of the revelation and of promulgating the revelation; but even as the subject-matter of the miracle is individual, so is its evidential action individual also. It does not turn a private and individual revelation into a public and general one, but it is an instrument for increasing the number of individuals partaking in the revelation made to one.

A miracle is the impression of a fresh purpose, but it is also an interference so far as the established order is concerned, even although it is itself a manifestation of a higher order, in which God does not merely speak by general laws to the race, but by exceptions to certain favoured persons. Man, who possesses the largest share of originating power in nature, cannot do more than, as it were, set the sail of his intent at different angles, so as to catch and use the prevailing force. A boat floats down the stream a passive victim to the general laws of nature; a second boat moves up the stream by means of machinery intelligently adapted to set the resistance of the water against the action of the current. This second has the impress of man's purpose; the law of the current's action is not suspended, its force is not directly coerced, it is counterbalanced and overbalanced. A third boat laden with bread, unmanned, without machinery, moves up the stream to a famine-stricken village in deference to a whispered prayer; an intelligent superhuman force is exerted on it pro hac vice for a distinct purpose. What is it that puts this last phenomenon outside the sphere of man's activity? Is it not in the initial non-submission to the presentation of the rationale of the miracle?

Although we can trace the depreciatory view of the evidential office of miracles in the formation of the definition, we are disposed to think that an acceptance of the latter might be combined with the common view of

the office of miracles. We regard the definition-always excepting the accidental non-exclusion of natural design-as a true presentation, as far as it goes, of the miracle, i.e., as a description answering to the miracle and to nothing else, and so as affording a useful controversial platform. What we have wished to insist upon is that the rejection of the note "contra naturam" at least involves an acquiescence in a so far imperfect forces in possession involved in the neglect of adequate means? No one can deny that such contrariety does in fact form part of the phenomenon of a miracle, and it is surely gratuitous to suppose that our Lord, for instance, was not doing what He seemed to be doing when He raised Lazarus with the cry of "Lazarus, come forth," that instead of exercising an altum dominium over the forces in possession He was only enacting the part of a subtle chemist, and combining them afresh. In one sense, of course, nothing that God does can be "contra naturam," because no created nature has any wall of separation in respect to its Creator. On the other hand, God may act "contra naturam" as originally constituted by making any given nature for the nonce do something more than it was originally qualified to do.

We hardly think men of science will be in any degree conciliated by the line our author has taken. What offends them is precisely the phenomenal non-naturalness which remains just where it was. Again, to make a miracle the immediate result of a combination of existent natural forces, to which, however, natural science cannot attain, has the effect of obtruding the miracle further into the domain of science without lessening its antagonism. We think then this rejection of the "contra naturam a failure as a reconciliation with science, and as at least suggesting very imperfect ideas of God's relations to His creatures. For man indeed certain paths are traced amongst the forces of nature outside which he cannot move a step, but to God the whole of nature is pervious.

We have felt ourselves obliged to dwell at considerable length upon these important points of disagreement, but we cannot close our eyes to much that is exceedingly good in this essay. Nothing, for instance, can be better than the very complete and clever exposure of the way in which the scientific opponents of miracles-nominatim Professor Tyndall and the author of Supernatural Religion—play fast and loose with the à priori and "sense" philosophies. They oppose, he points out (p. 38), the inference as to the existence of God by dissevering the tie between cause and effect, whereas in dealing with miracles they have "tightened the tie to such a degree as to render miracles impossible."

Notices of Books.

Ecclesiastical Discourses delivered on Special Occasions. By BISHOP ULLATHORNE. London: Burns & Oates. 1876.

"THE

HESE Discourses," the venerable author writes, "are called Ecclesiastical, because they were either addressed to ecclesiastics or treat on ecclesiastical subjects"; but he trusts, and with good reason, "there is that in them which may offer a solid instruction to thoughtful Catholic laymen." We may say that we have never seen so much pastoral theology effectively taught, in the same compass, as in some of the "Discourses " of this work. Each one is a thesis, well and most likely long studied, and enforced with a power of eloquence, a wealth of learning and ardour of piety that leave their impression when the book is laid aside. Few, we imagine, who heard the discourse delivered at the Diocesan Synod of Birmingham (1875) on the Divine Rule of Missionary Life, but wished to have the written words that so ably portrayed the inner life, the disinterested spirit, the preaching, and other characteristics of the missionary priest.

Again, if we look at the three sermons on "Science and Wisdom," delivered to the clerics of St. Bernard's Seminary (1875), we cannot help feeling elated at the thought that we have such "teachers in Israel." In the first of these discourses on "Science and Wisdom,” we find words of reproach that are directed straight to the mark, but, we venture to say are not wholly deserved :

:

"And here I pause to express a surprise that has held me for so many years, and will never, I think, abandon me. It is wonderful how few clerics in comparison with their numbers ever enter into the delight of this science, or return to it after their course of study is over. So true, as a rule, is it, that the last thing a man is inclined to is to reflect upon his own nature, and the last thing he cares to know is himself" (p. 156).

We venture to think, however, that many, looking back upon the past, could say a word in their own defence. Pressure of circumstances not very unfrequently prevents philosophical instruction from being what it might be. Students can sometimes fairly say that it is not their fault, if, in later years, their philosophical studies are not a pleasing recollection, and fail to invite a renewal of them amidst the many occupations of a missionary life. Many students see only the dry bones of the science: they hardly hear of the soul. They are ushered into the year's course without a word of preparation, as if a door were suddenly opened within

which they had never a previous glimpse, and before they are at home, or have learned to appreciate the meaning of the novelties around them, pass on to a course of dogmatic theology, in which the name “philosophy" finds hardly a place, and the science has not much bearing. Not impossibly the student passes from mathematical studies with their assentcompelling axioms and mechanical demonstrations, into his term of philosophy, and never comprehends to the end that although the terminology of the sciences be in part the same, its meaning is different, and that, for the first time in life, a large demand is made on his power of common sense. The clerics who listened to these discourses of the venerable prelate were more highly favoured. They were taught the grave reasons "why a priest should possess himself of that sound philosophy which the grave thinkers of the Church have matured," and saw practically how mental and moral philosophy helps the soul to a knowledge of God and of itself. The first reason given is, that the training imparted by the study of philosophy facilitates successful—that is, quick, accurate, and full knowledge of other subjects, and especially of theology. The second is the need of the age, as witnessed in the conflict of the Church "with false philosophies," and proved by the action of the Church in "the first dogmatic constitution of the Vatican Council." We give, in the author's own words, "the third and most important reason":

"As a director of souls the priest ought to be intimately conversant with the interior powers of man, with the nature of their operations, with their mutual dependencies, and the action and reaction upon each other of the spiritual and sensual forces. He who best understands the complicated elements that move in man will best guide him on the spiritual path; and, supposing him to be a spiritual man, will the most ably guide him through his difficulties. If S. Thomas borrowed so much light from philosophy to illustrate theology, S. John of the Cross and S. Francis of Sales are almost as deeply indebted to that science for the explanation of God's interior ways in the soul. And who that knows the history of S. Teresa, does not remember that interesting moment of her life, when at last she got the key to the understanding of herself from a devout scientific director, who explained to her that the imagination comes not of the intellect but of the corporal senses"? (p. 158).

There is one discourse that we should wish to see brought home to the understanding of every Catholic in the land, namely, an "Instruction on Mixed Marriages," delivered in 1869, and now printed with considerable additions. It is not a pleasant thing to hear a Bishop say :

"The number of mixed marriages that we are called upon to celebrate increases to an alarming degree. And the mischief to souls, and the not unfrequent apostasies from the faith, that come of these unions between Catholics and persons who are not Catholics, call for the gravest reflections, both from the clergy and the laity. Would to God some means could be devised that would effectually discourage these unholy unions" (p. 55).

Copious extracts from instructions sent by the Holy See, from the teaching of Councils, and from the writings of the Fathers, manifest unmistakably the unchangeable view of the Church with respect to mixed