existent laws of nature, that whenever the seed is duly deposited in the earth, the plant (except for accidental impediments) will in course of time grow up; and conversely also, that the plant will never grow up, unless seed has first been duly deposited in the earth. But there is no ground that we know of for accounting it inconsistent with the existent laws of nature, that some other method be discovered, entirely different from ploughing, whereby earth and seed shall be brought into due contact.

Our two last remarks have been made by us (as we said) with no other purpose, than that of more familiarizing the inquirer's mind with Mr. Mill's interpretation of the word "cause." And if our readers think that our attempted vindication of him has been unsuccessful-that he is obliged in consistency to account night the cause of day, and to deny all distinction between cause and condition,-they are perfectly welcome to think so: they will in no way, by so thinking, be placed out of harmony with our own general argument. We will now however without further episode pursue that argument. The sense then in which intuitionists use the word "cause" is so fundamentally different from Mr. Mill's, that it would be impossible to contend against phenomenists without inextricable confusion, unless we first close this inexhaustible inlet of misapprehension. Indeed we are confident-as we shall presently argue that the phenomenistic tenet on causation could never have been persistently held by men even of average intelligence, had they not veiled from themselves the true nature of their tenet by their equivocal terminology. For this reason we entirely decline, in argument with Mr. Mill, to use the word " cause " in his sense; and we must at once therefore look about for some term, which shall sufficiently express his idea. On reflection we think it will be satisfactory, if we use the word " prevenant" to denote what he calls "cause"; "postvenant" to denote what he calls "effect"; "" prevenance to denote what he calls "causation." think it not only no inconvenience but on the contrary a very great advantage, that these words, being invented by ourselves for the occasion, can have no other than a technical sense. It is becoming a more and more common complaint, that so much confusion of thought finds entrance into philosophical discussion, through words of ordinary use being employed to express important philosophical ideas: it is becoming more and more commonly felt, that no word can endure the rough handling of every-day colloquialism, without acquiring considerable ambiguity of sense. On our own side we must explain to our Catholic readers, that the "cause," with which our reasoning

We

concerns itself throughout, is what Catholic philosophical works call "the efficient cause."*

These verbal preliminaries having been laid down, we are now to maintain, that "the principle of causation" is selfevidently cognizable, as a necessary ampliative truth. The "principle of causation," or (as we shall sometimes call it) "the causation doctrine," is expressed in the statement, that "whatever has a commencement has a cause"; or (which is equivalent) that "every new existence or new mode of existence has a cause." Our readers will of course ask for some explanation, as to the sense in which we on our side use this word "cause." We at once admit, that such explanation is most reasonably required at our hands; and this explanation indeed will occupy a prominent place in the course of our argument. But before entering on our argument at all, we wish to avow frankly that we base our conclusion, not on grounds of experience, but of intuition; that we shall appeal to experience, only as testifying the universality of a certain intuition. And if phenomenists promptly exclaim, as they are sure to do, that "intuition" means only "my private persuasion,"-and that my own private persuasion can be no evidence of objective

*Catholic philosophers indeed usually include "moral" cause under the head of "efficient." But this sense is here excluded. A moment's consideration will show, that when these philosophers enounce "the principle of causation," they do not at all include "moral" causation.

+ Some Catholics may possibly doubt, whether we have laid a sufficiently broad foundation for the Theistic argument in our way of stating the principle of causation. Thus Dr. Mivart, whose authority on such a question is very great, supplements the principle of causation as expressed in the text by another, which he accounts "equally evident": viz. that "everything must be either absolute or caused"; that is, that every contingent thing is caused ("Lessons from Nature," p. 356). He adds this supplement, because of his holding, with S. Thomas, that reason cannot by itself disprove with certitude the eternity of matter. It will be desirable therefore that we briefly place before our Catholic readers the position on this subject, which we are ourselves prepared in due course to sustain.

Now Liberatore, who himself also holds S. Thomas's doctrine, admits nevertheless that some scholastics and "almost all modern philosophers" are against him ("Cosmologia," n. 30). Petavius (de Deo, l. iii. c. 6, n. 1) declares it to be the universal patristic doctrine, used constantly in controversy with the Arians, that the notion of an eternal creature is cognizable by reason as intrinsically repugnant. It may be worth while further to add, that Liberatore himself ("Logic," n. 230) defines an effect" as that which advances from the state of possibility to the state of existence"; or in other words, which has a commencement.

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With sincere deference then to those eminent Catholics who on this matter follow S. Thomas, we cannot do so ourselves. Nay, we regard the thesis that "all contingent things have a commencement" as more obtrusively (if we may so speak) axiomatic, than the thesis that "all contingent things have a cause.'

truth,*our answer to this objection has been stated again and again. It is only through intuition, that either phenomenists or any one else can possess experience of phenomena. Those particular intuitions, which are called acts of memory, are literally the only basis they can allege, for any one experience which they cite. In truth each man's act of memory may be called his own "private persuasion" or "internal feeling," in a much more simple and literal sense than can those intuitions of causality to which we shall now appeal. For each man's memory of his past experience is strictly peculiar to himself; whereas the intuitions, which we shall here allege, are common (as we maintain) to all mankind.

Now as to what is the genuine positive sense of that word cause "which is the centre of our argument,-this is a question which we are presently to consider, with as much accuracy and completeness as we can. But the first fact to which we would draw attention, should be noted anteriorly to this consideration. It is most evident on even a superficial examination of facts, that a certain idea of causation which is at all events fundamentally different from the idea of prevenance-and a belief in the widely-spread existence of causation as so apprehended-that this idea and belief (we say) prevail generally among mankind. Indeed we are able to call Mr. Mill himself into court, as a signal example of the thoroughly false intellectual position in which any one is placed, who attempts to identify causation with prevenance. His professed theory is of course most intelligible. In no case of causation, he says ("On Hamilton," p. 377), "have we evidence of anything more than what experience informs us of: and it informs us of nothing except immediate, invariable, and unconditional sequence." And the context shows, even if it could be otherwise doubtful, that by "sequence" he here means sequence of phenomena. Yet in his work on "Logic" the following remarks are to be found; remarks which, as coming from Mr. Mill, may be characterized as not less than astounding. He is speaking about the question of miracles; and we italicize a word or two:

In order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of the alleged miracle, the assertion is

* Certain persons, says Mr. Mill," addict themselves with intolerant zeal to those forms of philosophy, in which intuition usurps the place of evidence, and internal feeling is made the test of objective truth." ligion," p. 72.

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Essays on Re

the exact opposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence but in consequence of a counteracting cause; namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some being who has power over nature. A miracle is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect: it is a new effect supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause (ii. 167, 8). ;

In the eighth edition of his "Logic," when answering a criticism of ours, Mr. Mill introduced a similar remark into an earlier page:

I admit no other uniformity in the laws of nature, than the law of causation; and a miracle is no exception to that law. In every case of alleged miracle a new antecedent is affirmed to exist, a counteracting cause: viz., the volition of a supernatural being (p. 110).

But his professed theory is, that "between the phenomena which exist at any instant and the phenomena which exist at the succeeding instant there is an invariable order of succession." Mr. Mill cannot surely mean to call a volition of the Invisible God by the name of a phenomenon: and we must account then for this extraordinary logical collapse, by the impossibility which Mr. Mill himself experienced, of expelling from his mind that idea which so clamorously presents itself to all men-the idea of true causation.

And this collapse is the more significant, if we consider what absolute havoc it makes of those very philosophical principles, which he accounted more essential than any other. Mr. Mill did not admit the existence of any science except experimental; and no one felt more strongly than he, that the uniformity of nature is a doctrine absolutely indispensable to the very existence of experimental science, whether physical or psychological. Take any one of the million truths firmly established by such science: say e. g. the truth, that "all diamonds are combustible." How is it possible for me to acquire reasonable proof of this truth? I know by experience, that those diamonds are combustible on which I have made the experiment; and I know by the testimony of others, that those diamonds are combustible on which they have made the experiment. But I have not the shadow of ground for extending my proposition to all diamonds, unless I have sufficient proof that nature proceeds uniformly. So keenly indeed did Mr. Mill feel the justice of this remark, that he elaborated with great care a proof of what he called "the law of universal causation," as being

*It may most fairly be asked, how belief in the Catholic miracles is con sistent with belief in the certainty of physical science. We answered this question directly and expressly in April, 1867, pp. 291–294.

the one corner-stone of his whole philosophical edifice. Yet suddenly it appears, that he held no doctrine at all of "universal" phenomenal "causation." Suddenly it appears, that he held no doctrine on the uniformity of nature inconsistent with his supposing, that there may be as many deities on Olympus as Homer himself believed in, and that each one of these deities is arbitrarily interfering with the course of nature every minute of every day. In every one such case, "the volition of a supernatural being" would count with him as "a new antecedent," as a "counteracting cause": so that every arbitrary and irregular phenomenon so brought about would be, in his view, "" a case of the law of universal causation," "and not a deviation from it." If we could trust what he says in the two passages we have quoted,he never intended to defend "the law of universal causation " in any such sense whatever, as to imply that nature proceeds uniformly; or in any such sense whatever, as would represent that law to be a sufficient foundation for experimental science. How, it may be asked, do we account for this amazing bewilderment of thought? We reply, that even in the case of Mr. Mill his intuitional element is too strong for him. "Naturam expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret.' The existence of a causality, entirely distinct from prevenance, is so clamorous a dictate of human intelligence, that even Mr. Mill cannot be always shutting his ears to it.*

And this lands us in a further comment. It is a favourite topic of the phenomenistic controversialist, that intuitionists are self-condemned, by the very fact of their admitting the existence of an opposite party. "How can you say," he asks,

* Mr. Mill speaks with very far greater reflection on this matter, in hi posthumously published "Essays on Religion," pp. 224-6.

As to the passages cited in the text, our main comment on them there expressed is simply undeniable. By admitting the possibility of a miracle, Mr. Mill really admits-in opposition to the one fundamental principle of his philosophy-that what he calls "the law of universal causation " is not proved; and yet he entirely fails to see that such is his virtual admission. For ourselves, we have no doubt at all that the true explanation of this amazing oversight is what we have given in the text; viz. that, in spite of his theoretical disclaimer, Mr. Mill could not practically rid himself of the idea of true causation. And accordingly he speaks of "some being who has power over nature" evidently meaning (we should say) what intuitionists would call "causative" power. At the same time we admit, that our own theory of what was in his mind is not rigorously demonstrable from his words. It is possible in the abstract (though we are confident no such refinement ever crossed his mind) that he may not have had in his mind the idea of true causation, when he wrote those passages; that he may have intended to describe divine volitions, not as causative of" (in our sense), but only as "invariably and unconditionally antecedent to" what follows them.

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