decisions tyrannical and unjust? Or I am hastening on an errand of what I think urgent importance; and my conscience dictates, that I ought to take a short cut for the purpose over some one else's property: is the policeman bound to respect this conscience? Ten thousand analogous cases will present themselves to every one's mind; and it is no exaggeration to say with Dr. Whately, that the whole fabric of society would be subverted, if the legislature were insane enough to accept any such principle as is here suggested.

On

But there is a qualification, on which Dr. Mivart will certainly insist in meeting our criticism, and which is implied indeed in some of the passages already cited by us. He will say, that the State may most justly prohibit an act, however strongly dictated by the individual conscience,-which would inflict serious injury on others. We do not see indeed at the moment, in what way the Hindoo widow's voluntary endurance of combustion need necessarily inflict injury on others; though on this we will not insist. But we would urge two objections against Dr. Mivart's doctrine, even as so qualified. Firstly, by this very large exception, he altogether takes away from his proposition that quasi-axiomatic character, with which he has sought to invest it. The individual is under a strict obligation of obeying his genuine conscience, however great may be the injury to others involved in that obedience. Dr. Mivart's own showing then, the proposition is very far indeed from universally true, that the State's obligation of permitting acts is co-extensive with the individual's obligation of performing them. And if the proposition be not universally true-if it be not a kind of axiom-we do not see what reason Dr. Mivart has given for thinking that it contains any truth at all. But secondly, by introducing this qualification, he takes from his argument its entire efficacy as against persecution. Every persecuting sovereign thinks that the acts which he prohibits are gravely injurious to the true interest of his people. And even if Dr. Mivart held (we are delighted to say we see no sign of his holding) that the civil ruler has no concern with the people's spiritual welfare, our objection is not affected. It is not the spiritual so much as the temporal welfare of Germany, which Prince Bismarck considers to be grievously injured by the submission of Catholics to Papal authority. It was not spiritual but temporal peril to the Roman Empire, which successive heathen Emperors dreaded from Christianity.

*We use of course the word "genuine" to express a dictate of conscience, which is either correct or invincibly erroneous.

We think however, that a far more plausible version of Dr. Mivart's principle than either of the preceding may be suggested, if we bear in mind a certain distinction, which is of fundamental importance in our present inquiry. In order to keep this distinction more emphatically before our readers' mind, we will use certain expressions in a somewhat technical sense. To those laws, which require some citizen to do what his conscience disapproves, we will give the name of "conscience-disregarding" laws, as regards that citizen. And we divide such laws into two classes: those which "acquit," and those which "militate against," his

conscience.

By the latter term we designate those laws, which put serious pressure on me, towards my doing what my conscience under existent circumstances disapproves. For instance. I sincerely think that God prohibits all taking of oaths; and yet, some law threatens me with serious penalties, in the event of my refusing to take an oath as witness in this pending trial. And generally, not every law only, but every act or fact, "militates against my conscience," which presents to me a notable inducement, towards transgressing what my conscience dictates as obligatory under existent circumstances.

But there are many "conscience-disregarding " laws, which do not "militate against," but on the contrary "acquit " my conscience. To illustrate this, we will begin with a matter of every-day occurrence in England. Certain sectaries account all war sinful; and they account it therefore sinful voluntarily to pay taxes, the produce of which is partly devoted to the support of an army. Still, the tax-collector has no great trouble in the matter; for when he proceeds with what is theoretically called a distrainment of their goods, he makes his first visit to one particular portion of the premises, in which he well knows he shall find the money ready counted out for him. No one who gives the thing a thought will doubt, that these sectaries herein do all which their principle requires. Suppose I am entrusted by a friend with some precious deposit, and fall among brigands while it is in my possession. The deposit may be of such importance, that I ought to fight for it persistently so long as there remains even a faint hope of successful resistance: but if I am absolutely overpowered by numbers and the deposit will quite certainly be taken from me, I am not bound to give the ruffians my life into the bargain. Similarly with these sectaries. The secular arm is entirely irresistible: they have fulfilled everything which conscience reasonably requires of them under their circumstances, if (1) they decline to pay the tax voluntarily; and (2) make it

clear that they so decline. Can such a legal enactment then as that which offends them be said to "militate against" their conscience? Evidently not. They entirely satisfy their conscience, by openly refusing voluntary payment; and it cannot be said that the law threatens them with any kind of violence, in the event of their obeying that conscientious dictate.

The same thing may be said e. g. as to the law which prohibited Suttee. If that law had not been enacted, the Hindoo widow would doubtless have thought herself bound in conscience to endure combustion. But when that consummation became to her a matter of physical impossibility, she did not think herself conscientiously bound to exert her whole physical strength, for the purpose of pressing her way towards the funeral pile against the combined resistance of English officials. The law, which "disregarded" her conscience, at the same time "acquitted" it.

All this being understood, Dr. Mivart may probably say that, though the sovereign can justly enough enact laws which disregard" conscience, he cannot justly enact laws which "militate against it"; laws which constitute a strong inducement to the individual, towards his transgressing what is a sincere dictate of his conscience under existent circumstances. And Dr. Mivart will add perhaps, that if this golden maxim were but carefully borne in mind, the days of persecution and spiritual tyranny would be at an end. But with his theory, even so limited, we cannot concur. We reply to it in the first place, that the civil ruler can easily, without any militation whatever against conscience, perpetrate the very extremity of spiritual tyranny. And in the second place we cannot admit as a universal principle, that a civil ruler is forbidden by justice to enforce enactments, which may militate against the conscience of some of his subjects.

Firstly then we maintain that, without any militation whatever against conscience, the very extremity of spiritual .tyranny might be inflicted by a civil ruler. We will put our case thus. Some sovereign arises, more ferociously antiCatholic than Bismarck himself. He shuts up every Catholic church and Catholic school, and expels from the country every Catholic priest, of which his officials can discover the existence giving the latter however sufficient provision for comfortable subsistence in other countries. All the Catholic children, as soon as they arrive at a proper age, are carried off from their parents, and sent to schools where they are taught that the Pope is Anti-Christ and the Catholic Church a sink of iniquity. All Catholic meetings for the purpose of protest are prevented or brought to an end by the strong arm of the

law. The sovereign's officials keep vigilant watch along the frontier, that no Catholic priests enter: but at the same time, when any individual priest is found to have eluded this vigilance, no kind of punishment is inflicted on him, except that of being with perfect politeness conveyed back again. There could not easily be a more effective means for the gradual extirpation of Catholicity, than would be provided by such legislation: yet how can you say that any part of it "militates against conscience"? How can you say that any one of these enactments threatens any one Catholic with any kind of violence, in the event of his obeying what under the circumstances is the dictate of his conscience? The most plausible of negative replies to this question might be founded on the case of priests. It might be maintained, that their conscience obliges them to make every effort towards revisiting their flocks; and that the law nevertheless threatens them with penalties, in the event of their obeying that obligation. But the law does not so threaten them. "You are perfectly welcome to make such efforts," says the sovereign: "I shall never punish you for making them all I shall do will be to thwart them."

:

This then is our first reply to Dr. Mivart. It is certainly not worth while, we say, to strain any point with the view of investing his theory with plausibility; because, even if that theory were universally admitted, it would be of no service whatever for the very purpose he wishes it put to. It would be of no service whatever, as a barrier against the State's spiritual tyranny. But now secondly we maintain, that the theory itself (whatever might have been its practical utility) is inadmissible. Take at once a most obvious case. No one will doubt, that the civil ruler should require his subjects to bear witness on due occasion in a court of justice. Yet no one on the other hand will doubt, that cases may easily arise, in which some summoned witness is under strict conscientious obligation of silence.* Here indeed is violent militation against conscience. It is my indefeasible duty to set the civil enactment at defiance; while on the other hand the civil authorities would fail grievously in their duty, if they did not punish me severely for my disobedience. Justice could not by possibility be administered to the people at large, if every individual were permitted to plead scruples of conscience, as exempting him

* We are not referring to the obligatory silence of priests on what th may know through Sacramental Confession; because we do not admit in that case the State has a right of requiring them to speak.

from the obligation to speak; and yet, in this or that particular case, many a man is under the indefeasible obligation of remaining silent. Nay, not the State alone, but the Church herself is bound to enact laws, which may militate against conscience with even fearful force. Take a case which we have cited of late more than once. Bertha knows facts within her own personal experience, which make it absolutely certain that, according to Catholic doctrine, she is not Titius's wife; but she is unable to convince the ecclesiastical court that these facts are true. She receives accordingly an ecclesiastical injunction, requiring her under heaviest spiritual penalties to place herself, in regard to Titius, under circumstances, under which it is mortally sinful for her to place herself, knowing that she is not his wife. Such ecclesiastical precept militates against her conscience (as we have said) with fearful force; and places her in a position, in which she needs almost heroic singleness of intention and fortitude, that she may remain faithful to her Creator. Yet Dr. Mivart will at once see that the Church-not having received the gift of judicial infallibility-is under a strict obligation of issuing precepts, which may possibly produce such a result. And the two instances we have given one of civil, the other of ecclesiastical government-suggest such an indefinite number of others, that it would be merely wearisome to say more on this particular branch of the subject. And the strength of our case will become even more conspicuous, if our readers will remember that (as we have already said) a conscience, hic et nunc invincibly erroneous, has precisely the same claim as a true conscience, of indefeasible authority over the individual's action. Let it once be understood that the civil ruler will not enforce on the individual any law which militates against his conscience,--there is absolutely no limit to the wild vagaries, which he will sincerely persuade himself to regard as conscientious scruples.

One word more however, on militations against conscience. Dr. Mivart's tone would give an impression, that these are rare and exceptional facts in the visible order of things; and that they would hardly exist indeed, if human law treated conscience with due respect. But the fact is, that such militations assail man on every side during his whole career on earth. In truth what are 66 the world" and "the flesh," except one vast series of phenomena militating against conscience? Surely on a general view, the militations against conscience, introduced by the most ill-advised of human laws, cannot be compared for a moment in multitude or magnitude, with those which inevitably occur under the ordained course of God's Providence.