The Open Field System and Beyond: A Property Rights Analysis of an Economic InstitutionCambridge University Press, 1980年5月15日 - 234 頁 In this book, Professor Dahlman applies modern economic methodology to an old historical problem. He demonstrates how the quaint institutions of the ancient English open field system of agriculture can be understood as an intelligent and rational adaptation to a particular problem of production and to certain historical circumstances. He argues that the two major characteristics of this type of agriculture - scattered strips owned by individual peasants and extensive areas of common land - both fulfilled vital economic functions. This overturns the traditional view of the open field system as inefficient and rigidly bound by tradition, and throws light on the behaviour of medeival peasants. Professor Dahlman also offers some generalisations about the economic theory of institutions and institutional change, refuting the idea that an economic analysis of institutions must necessarily be deterministic. As a challenge to some of the fundamental criticisms of the application of economic theory to historical problems, the book will be of great interest to agrarian historians and to economic historians generally, as well as to specialists in the medieval period. |
內容
Theories of the open field system | 16 |
Property rights transaction costs and institutions | 65 |
scattered strips | 93 |
The economics of enclosure | 146 |
Some extensions and generalizations | 200 |
Bibliography | 223 |
229 | |
常見字詞
Agricultural Revolution allocation alternative analysis animals arable fields argument asset behavior Butlin cliometric collective decisionmaking collective ownership common fields communal grazing communal ownership consistent consolidation context court crop rotations decision decisionmaking rights Demsetz Economic History economic institutions economic theory efficient element enclosed farms enclosure movements England establish existence explanation exploitation fallow farmers firm grain grazing areas imply important incentive income increase individual inefficient Joan Thirsk labor land London lord manor manorial Marxian McCloskey medieval methods modern nature open field system open field village organization outputs owner ownership rights partible inheritance pasture peasants ploughing private ownership private property rights problem production of livestock property rights property rights approach reason rent returns to scale rotating husbandry rules scattered strips soil specialization structure stylized facts surplus value techniques tenants tion trade transaction costs village community W. G. Hoskins waste wealth maximization wool