Honor, Symbols, and War

封面
University of Michigan Press, 2001 - 344 頁
Nelson Mandela's presidential inauguration invitation to his former jailer; the construction and destruction of the Berlin Wall; the Gulf War's yellow ribbons. While the symbolic nuances of words and actions such as these are regular concerns for foreign policy practitioners, the subject has never been emphasized in international relations theory. That will change with the publication of this exceptionally original work.
Many practitioners see symbolism as peripheral compared to resources, interests, military power, and alliances. Those who theorize about norms, ideas, and institutions tend to be open to the importance of symbolism, but they have not drawn out its details. Barry O'Neill's Honor, Symbols, and War puts symbolism at the center of the discussion. O'Neill uses the mathematical theory of games to study a network of concepts important in international negotiation and conflict resolution: symbolism, honor, face, prestige, insults, and apologies. His analysis clarifies the symbolic dynamics of several phenomena, including leadership, prenegotiation maneuvers, crisis tension, and arms-control agreements.
This book will be of interest to political scientists, in particular those involved with game theory and international relations. Its findings also will prove useful to students of cultural anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and political behavior.
Barry O'Neill is Associate Professor of Politics, School of Management, Yale University.
 

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內容

Symbolism Introduction
3
Message Symbols in Practice
9
The Database
10
Scenarios and Metaphors
11
Getting Ones Action Recognized as Symbolic
18
The Symbolic Use of Language
19
Ceremonies and Awards
22
Conclusion
23
The Definition of an Insult
146
How to Recognize an Insult
150
Definition of Face
152
A Model of a Hierarchy of Face
154
Commitments Based on Face
165
The War of Face
166
Simple Signaling Contests
169
Is the War of Face an Efficient Way to Settle a Conflict?
171

Message Symbols in Theory
25
Definition of a Communicative Act
26
The Interaction of Metaphors Prototypes and Metonymies in Message Symbols
28
The SymbolConvention Continuum
36
Why Say It Symbolically?
41
Focal Symbols
45
Focal Symbols Compared with Message Symbols
46
Focal Symbols Compared with Focal Points
47
How Focal Symbols Get Noticed
50
How Focal Symbols Evoke or Construct Their Meaning
51
Symbolic Leadership
54
Ceremonies
58
Focal Symbolism in Prenegotiation
61
International Tension and Trust
63
Symbolic Events and International Tension
64
Tension as an Explanation in International Relations Theory
65
Tension in ChickenBased Crisis Models
68
Tension in Stag HuntBased Crisis Models
72
The Value of Arms Agreements
78
The Tension Metaphor
79
The Role of Public Events
80
What Is National Honor?
85
The Elements of Honor
86
The Basic Game of Honor
92
Is Honor Personal or Social?
97
Challenges to Honor
101
Do States Really Challenge Each Others Honor?
102
The Nature of Challenges to Honor
107
Semiforceful Challenges
112
How Challenges Lose Force Sir Gawain and the Green Knight
120
How to Stop a Challenge from Starting a Fight The Feast of Bricriu
124
Commitments Based on Honor
127
The Difference between Commitments Promises and Threats
128
Promising on Ones Honor
129
Committing Oneself to Defend an Interest
131
Real versus Virtual Honor
133
Commitments to Those outside the Honor Group
135
HonorBased Commitments and Offensive Advantage
136
Insults as Assaults on Face
139
Insults That Led to War
141
Variants of the War of Face
172
Dangers in the Diplomacy of Insults
174
Apologies
177
A Budget of International Apologies
178
How International Apologies Differ from Interpersonal Ones
181
A Prototypical Scenario of Apologizing
182
A Partial Order for Partial Apologies
185
Symbols and Metaphors in Apologies
188
Models of Apologizing Based on Face and Honor
191
Prestige Normative Regimes and Moral Authority
193
The Relationship of Prestige to Symbolism
194
Normative Prestige and Moral Authority
196
Social Norms and Normative Regimes
197
Normative Regimes for a Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
198
Normative Regimes as Game Equilibria
200
Diagramming a Normative Regime
202
Moral Authority
208
Nuclear ThoughtStyles and Nuclear Symbolism
215
Organizational ThoughtStyles and Symbolism
216
The INF Debate
225
Rationales for the INF Missiles
227
The Interaction of Nuclear ThoughtStyles and Nuclear Symbolism
239
Conclusion
241
Honor Commitments and Challenges
244
Face Insults and Apologies
246
Prestige and Moral Authority
248
Game Theory and Intangibles in International Relations
253
The Shift from Objective to Subjective Probability
257
Assumptions about Players Knowledge
258
Game Theory Rational Choice Theory and Constructivism
259
Coordination through Learning and Communication
261
Some Basic Game Concepts
263
Nash Equilibria of a Stag Hunt
266
Chicken with Incomplete Information
267
Rationales for the Nash Equilibrium
270
Interactive Belief Systems
274
Methods of Calculation and Proofs
287
References
303
Index
323
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