Honor, Symbols, and WarUniversity of Michigan Press, 2001 - 344 頁 Nelson Mandela's presidential inauguration invitation to his former jailer; the construction and destruction of the Berlin Wall; the Gulf War's yellow ribbons. While the symbolic nuances of words and actions such as these are regular concerns for foreign policy practitioners, the subject has never been emphasized in international relations theory. That will change with the publication of this exceptionally original work. Many practitioners see symbolism as peripheral compared to resources, interests, military power, and alliances. Those who theorize about norms, ideas, and institutions tend to be open to the importance of symbolism, but they have not drawn out its details. Barry O'Neill's Honor, Symbols, and War puts symbolism at the center of the discussion. O'Neill uses the mathematical theory of games to study a network of concepts important in international negotiation and conflict resolution: symbolism, honor, face, prestige, insults, and apologies. His analysis clarifies the symbolic dynamics of several phenomena, including leadership, prenegotiation maneuvers, crisis tension, and arms-control agreements. This book will be of interest to political scientists, in particular those involved with game theory and international relations. Its findings also will prove useful to students of cultural anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and political behavior. Barry O'Neill is Associate Professor of Politics, School of Management, Yale University. |
內容
Symbolism Introduction | 3 |
Message Symbols in Practice | 9 |
The Database | 10 |
Scenarios and Metaphors | 11 |
Getting Ones Action Recognized as Symbolic | 18 |
The Symbolic Use of Language | 19 |
Ceremonies and Awards | 22 |
Conclusion | 23 |
The Definition of an Insult | 146 |
How to Recognize an Insult | 150 |
Definition of Face | 152 |
A Model of a Hierarchy of Face | 154 |
Commitments Based on Face | 165 |
The War of Face | 166 |
Simple Signaling Contests | 169 |
Is the War of Face an Efficient Way to Settle a Conflict? | 171 |
Message Symbols in Theory | 25 |
Definition of a Communicative Act | 26 |
The Interaction of Metaphors Prototypes and Metonymies in Message Symbols | 28 |
The SymbolConvention Continuum | 36 |
Why Say It Symbolically? | 41 |
Focal Symbols | 45 |
Focal Symbols Compared with Message Symbols | 46 |
Focal Symbols Compared with Focal Points | 47 |
How Focal Symbols Get Noticed | 50 |
How Focal Symbols Evoke or Construct Their Meaning | 51 |
Symbolic Leadership | 54 |
Ceremonies | 58 |
Focal Symbolism in Prenegotiation | 61 |
International Tension and Trust | 63 |
Symbolic Events and International Tension | 64 |
Tension as an Explanation in International Relations Theory | 65 |
Tension in ChickenBased Crisis Models | 68 |
Tension in Stag HuntBased Crisis Models | 72 |
The Value of Arms Agreements | 78 |
The Tension Metaphor | 79 |
The Role of Public Events | 80 |
What Is National Honor? | 85 |
The Elements of Honor | 86 |
The Basic Game of Honor | 92 |
Is Honor Personal or Social? | 97 |
Challenges to Honor | 101 |
Do States Really Challenge Each Others Honor? | 102 |
The Nature of Challenges to Honor | 107 |
Semiforceful Challenges | 112 |
How Challenges Lose Force Sir Gawain and the Green Knight | 120 |
How to Stop a Challenge from Starting a Fight The Feast of Bricriu | 124 |
Commitments Based on Honor | 127 |
The Difference between Commitments Promises and Threats | 128 |
Promising on Ones Honor | 129 |
Committing Oneself to Defend an Interest | 131 |
Real versus Virtual Honor | 133 |
Commitments to Those outside the Honor Group | 135 |
HonorBased Commitments and Offensive Advantage | 136 |
Insults as Assaults on Face | 139 |
Insults That Led to War | 141 |
Variants of the War of Face | 172 |
Dangers in the Diplomacy of Insults | 174 |
Apologies | 177 |
A Budget of International Apologies | 178 |
How International Apologies Differ from Interpersonal Ones | 181 |
A Prototypical Scenario of Apologizing | 182 |
A Partial Order for Partial Apologies | 185 |
Symbols and Metaphors in Apologies | 188 |
Models of Apologizing Based on Face and Honor | 191 |
Prestige Normative Regimes and Moral Authority | 193 |
The Relationship of Prestige to Symbolism | 194 |
Normative Prestige and Moral Authority | 196 |
Social Norms and Normative Regimes | 197 |
Normative Regimes for a Repeated Prisoners Dilemma | 198 |
Normative Regimes as Game Equilibria | 200 |
Diagramming a Normative Regime | 202 |
Moral Authority | 208 |
Nuclear ThoughtStyles and Nuclear Symbolism | 215 |
Organizational ThoughtStyles and Symbolism | 216 |
The INF Debate | 225 |
Rationales for the INF Missiles | 227 |
The Interaction of Nuclear ThoughtStyles and Nuclear Symbolism | 239 |
Conclusion | 241 |
Honor Commitments and Challenges | 244 |
Face Insults and Apologies | 246 |
Prestige and Moral Authority | 248 |
Game Theory and Intangibles in International Relations | 253 |
The Shift from Objective to Subjective Probability | 257 |
Assumptions about Players Knowledge | 258 |
Game Theory Rational Choice Theory and Constructivism | 259 |
Coordination through Learning and Communication | 261 |
Some Basic Game Concepts | 263 |
Nash Equilibria of a Stag Hunt | 266 |
Chicken with Incomplete Information | 267 |
Rationales for the Nash Equilibrium | 270 |
Interactive Belief Systems | 274 |
Methods of Calculation and Proofs | 287 |
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常見字詞
a₁ action attack audience behavior ceremonies Challengee's chapter Chicken game choose commitment common knowledge communicative act concept conceptual metaphor context conventional cost credibility crisis culture deference defined definition deterrence element example expected focal point focal symbolism force function game models game theory gives goals graph Gulf Gulf War higher hold illocutionary point individual insult international apologies involves irrationality Joust knows leaders matrix meaning message symbols metaphor metonymy military missiles mixed strategy moral authority move Nash equilibrium NATO normative regime nuclear weapons objective one's other's outcome payoff peace person player President prestige Prisoner's Dilemma prize probability promise prospective tension prototypical scenario punishment pure strategy rationale Saddam sender shows situation social someone song Soviet Union speech act Stag Hunt subgame perfect equilibrium suggests symbolic message symmetrical equilibrium thought-styles tion treaty United utility violates yellow ribbons