THE GENESIS OF THE MISSION

NOME understanding of the cross-currents

Sand

and conflicting purposes inevitable in the conduct of such a governmental system as that of China may be derived from a perusal of the correspondence already examined. Since the opening of Peking the government and dominant class in China had striven tenaciously against foreign aggression, and if little had been gained, in their estimation, the foreigners had, at all events, been halted in their advance and secured no further concessions of territory or privilege. But while the Chinese were a unit in opposing any advent of foreign control, there were variations both in attitude and purpose among their parties. As Prince Kung and his coadjutors in the Tsung-li Yamên had received enlightenment through personal intercourse with the official representatives of foreign states, so the tradesmen at the ports, through a profitable interchange of commodities, had acquired some appreciation of the value of the foreigner's trade, and even some toleration for his mechanical con

trivances and standards of material comfort. Between these two groups lay the vast bolus of an educated but unenlightened China, ignorant alike of the substantive weakness of their own country and of the strength of others, satisfied with a culture which had dominated half a continent for thirty centuries, as fiercely jealous of the native who conceded a single point to the adversary as of the enemy himself and his hateful conceits. And as far above all of these as the inscrutable proletariat was below, stood the palace, invisible to the eye of the outsider as it was inviolable to every new idea, a nursery of corruption, powerful in exalting or demolishing individuals, but incapable, through its ignorance of real conditions, of pursuing a consistent policy. The actual governing power was thus rendered impersonal, and shuffled from hand to hand, with no one who could be held specifically responsible for its effectiveness.

The end of the decade was to bring with it the date upon which a general revision of the commercial provisions of the British treaty of Tientsin might be demanded.1 The British Government does not appear to have been eager to

1 The French treaty gave twelve years from the date of its ratification, which would have made its revision due in 1873. Of course the mostfavoured-nation clause made any advantages secured by one nation the common possession of all. In this case the others proposed to stand by and let her Majesty's representative negotiate.

attack a problem hedged about with difficulties, nor did its envoy, Sir Rutherford Alcock, advocate the attempt. "The question arises," he argues, "if nothing is to be gained by demanding a revision which may not be as well obtained without - whether much would not be lost, and an opportunity thrown away which might, by reserving the right, be turned to better account when the Emperor's majority is declared. I believe the true policy of foreign powers would be to wait." 1

Such revision as the foreigners contemplated necessarily involved correction of abuses and further privileges that implicated the provincial governments and affected the settled polity of China. No great constitutional change can be rightly estimated from one stand-point alone. There are always at least two aspects: its immediate effects, which may be partially foreseen, and the indirect results of the new forces set in motion, which no one can measure. The matter is further complicated if cognisance must be taken of extraneous pressure. In the case of

1 Alcock to Lord Stanley, November 15, 1867. "Correspondence Respecting the Revision of the Treaty of Tientsin," 1871, p. 56 — a dispatch full of wisdom. "No nation," he declares in the same paper, "likes the interference of a foreign power in its internal affairs, however well-intentioned it may be, and China is no exception to the rule. On the contrary, their pride of race, and what they conceive to be a real superiority in civilisation to all outside nations, renders them peculiarly restive under the goad of foreign impulsion."

China the uncertainty of any fundamental alteration brought about through foreign dictation has been greatly increased by their ignorance of her real needs and their indifference to the sensibilities of the people. However imperfect their administrative system in the eyes of Europeans, the fact remains that it has served its purpose and its people extraordinarily well. Its service and long continuance are not, indeed, reasons for leaving it untouched by new influences, but the gravity of altering the relations between rulers and people in such a vast commonwealth demands extreme precautions. First among these would seem to be the necessity of recognising the fact that despite her autocratic forms China is really ruled with the consent of the governed. The mass of the common population believe profoundly in their ancient traditions and in customs and "superstitions" which Western peoples deride. In view of their independence and of the enormous resisting power of this mass the imposition of great innovations against its desire induces fierce and persistent opposition directly menacing the existence of the government. The small group of enlightened officials who were willing to encourage the introduction of such foreign inventions as might be adapted to the needs of China found them

selves, then, confronted not by a theory but by a situation. To force these changes upon the economic and social life of the Emperor's subjects before either rulers or people were prepared for them was to court revolution. Not only was the reluctance of these advanced officials justified, but it became the duty of the representatives of those foreign nations who wished to see the unity of China preserved, to assist them in withstanding proposals that might discredit and ruin the empire. Short of this the diplomatic body in Peking could not stop consistently, with the Burlingame policy of "let alone" openly avowed by the Four B's and approved by their governments. To act otherwise was to plunge China once more into the abyss of anarchy from which their own statesmanship in the Tai-ping rebellion had rescued her.

If, however, the alternative of a break-up of China was discarded as it had been there remained the other course, that of intervention to secure necessary reforms. As official corruption and popular prejudices were the underlying obstacles to a proper observance of the treaties, the domestic politics of the empire became an object of concern to the foreign powers. Success in so delicate a business as this, confronted as they were by the superciliousness of