to maintain U.S. forces of any kind in the peninsula or for any period of time. We have, however, agreed with the Koreans that we would consult with them before substantially reducing the number of our Armed Forces in Korea.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

First, for the record, it is a pleasure to see you here, and also my respected friend, General Michaelis.

SUBCOMMITTEE INTEREST IN U.S. COMMITMENTS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

We have had these hearings. It has gotten around that we were critical of some of these countries. Some we have been critical of. Others, however, we have not. There was no effort on our part to go beyond finding out what the commitments are. I personally have great respect for the Korean people. They have shed a great amount of blood, not only for themselves, but also in defense of whatever it is we are trying to do in South Vietnam. They are brave fighting people, willing to sacrifice. That is not true of all the countries. I say that because I wanted to dispel any idea that there is anything hostile about this request of the subcommittee to find out what our commitments are with respect to Korea. This interest is accelerated, if I may make one more observation, by the high cost of our foreign military adventures that is giving us so many serious financial problems.

Mr. Chairman, if you and Senator Aiken approve, counsel will now ask some questions against what has been said by the Ambassador; but if you all would prefer to ask some

Senator FULBRIGHT. No, only I wanted to agree or say amen to what the Senator from Missouri has said, not only about this hearing but others. If there is any criticism, it is not directed against the foreign country. If there is any criticism at all in this or any other hearing, it is of the improvident agreements that this country has made from our point of view. I was not speaking specifically of Korea. The same would be said for Taiwan, Thailand, Laos, or Spain. When we had the Spanish bases problem, I was not criticizing the Spanish. I was criticizing the improvidence of our own negotiators. So I do not think anyone should be sensitive about the country to which they are assigned.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Paul, it is now time for you to ask some questions.

MONROE DOCTRINE FORMULA

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, first, to make the record clear, you stated (on page 1704) that the language of our treaty with Korea is written in the so-called Monroe Doctrine formula. What do you mean when you say that it is written in the Monroe Doctrine formula?

Mr. PORTER. This is a descriptive phrase bearing on the commitment. It is really a legal description of a resemblance to the Monroe Doctrine language, more of a resemblance to that language than to certain other treaties or commitments. I would have to seek the legal explanation for the difference or the legal statement as to the exact difference intended. Mr. PAUL. If you would like to supplement that for the record, that will be fine.

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

(The information referred to follows:)

Es

MEANING OF "MONROE DOCTRINE" FORMULA

The Committee on Foreign Relations in its report of January 21, 1954 to the Senate on the Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea, beginning at page 5, described the "Monroe Doctrine" formula as follows:

"MONROE DOCTRINE" FORMULA

The second element to be noted in the formula of Article III is its replacement of the specific commitment language used in the North Atlantic Treaty, by what Secretary Dulles has called the "Monroe Doctrine" principle. Thus, each party, in Article III, recognizes that the armed attack referred to therein would be dangerous to its own peace and safety. The action to be taken would then be determined in accordance with its constitutional process. By contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty formula makes an attack upon one tantamount to an attack upon all, so that such an attack, which might not take place against the United States itself, is nevertheless so regarded. Because of the constitutional issues which the approach suggests, for example, whether an attack upon another member gives the President the same inherent right to act as an attack upon United States territory, the language of President Monroe was regarded by Secretary Dulles as preferable when he negotiated the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand Pacts, and is reproduced in the Korean Treaty.

In short, the phraseology of Article III of the Korean Pact permits the United States to take any action we deem appropriate by our constitutional processes, and gives adequate assurance of support to the other country which may be the victim of an attack. It has the additional advantage of never having been challenged throughout our history, from the constitutional standpoint, as altering the balance of power between the President and Congress.

Secretary Dulles said during that period that the practical difference between the NATO formula and Monroe Doctrine formula was not appreciable from the standpoint of giving security to the other parties in the later treaties and that it was better to avoid a formula which would reopen the constitutional debate.

Article 11 of the NATO Treaty reads in part, "This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

COMMUNIQUES AND STATEMENTS AS INTERPRETATION OF
U.S. TREATY OBLIGATION

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, joint communiques that were issued on November 2, 1966, and March 14, 1967, in connection with visits by high officials of one country to another stated in identical words:

President Johnson reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.

A very similar statement was also made on April 18, 1968.

Do you consider this a carefully drawn interpretation of our defense obligation under the Mutual Defense Treaty?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, I think it adhered carefully to article III of the Defense Treaty, the provisions of that article, and there is similarity, as you say, and a certain reiteration is or seems to have been necessary, from the Korean side, from time to time. Therefore, communiques have generally tended to restate the commitment that we would meet it in effect in accordance with our constitutional processes.

U.S. OBLIGATION IN CASE OF OVERT ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA

Mr. PAUL. Then do I understand that you are saying that we have an obligation to defeat an overt attack against South Korea? They used the word "defeat" in these communiques.

Mr. PORTER. Our obligation is to consult in accordance with our constitutional processes at home and with the Koreans to meet the common danger. It does not necessarily mean that that would be a counterattack. What we propose to do is stay with our constitutional processes, and we have made that clear to the Koreans on many occasions, including those you mentioned.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said that does not necessarily mean we could counterattack. With that premise, does it mean that there are circumstances where, as you understand it, we could cross the DMZ line and counterattack, or does it not?

Mr. PORTER. No specific measure is envisaged prior to consultation, Senator. The route might be the Security Council in New York. It might be some other course of action that would seem advisable.

Mr. PAUL. That would not be constitutional process, would it? Mr. PORTER. Well, there would be consultation back here in the event we decided to meet what was in effect an all-out armed attack. But it is the consultation period in accordance with our constitutional processes which would, I suppose, really determine the course of our action. Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, assuming the constitutional processes are satisfied, I would just like to see if we could be clear whether the treaty imposes on the United States the obligation to see that an attack is defeated if South Korea's forces themselves are unable to do so, or is it something less, such as to assist South Korea without any determination as to the ultimate success of the assistance?

Mr. PORTER. If it were determined that armed force was needed to counter the attack threat, I would assume that that would be one of the measures approved. Whether to hold an attack or to push it back, one cannot say at this point. In effect what you would be trying to do is to determine the best course of action to keep-obviously to keep the military response on our side to the minimum required to protect the territory we recognize as being lawfully under the administration of the Republic of Korea.

DEFENSE OF U.S. OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF ARMISTICE LINE

Senator SYMINGTON. General Michaelis, the last time I was in Korea, about 4 years ago, we had certain sections of the line. Is that still the way it is?

General MICHAELIS. The line is 151 miles long. We occupy 18 miles of the western portion.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you were attacked on your 18-mile section of the line, are you allowed to defend first and then cross the DMZ for the purpose of counterattack or is there a North Vietnamese protectorate situation?

General MICHAELIS. Sir, a prudent commander has contingency plans, and that is a subject which I have been directed not to discuss. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

PROMPT U.S. ASSISTANCE

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, another of these joint communiques use the term "prompt" with respect to the form our assistance would take. Is this an attempt to satisfy a Korean desire for a near automatic response on the part of the United States?

Mr. PORTER. The Koreans have always been interested, Mr. Paul, in making the response as automatic as possible. We have never been able, of course, to agree with that. We have assured them that the consultative process would begin promptly. The word is, in effect, our effort to satisfy Korean wishes, but to which would enable us nevertheless to stay within the processes we are required to observe.

SIXTEEN-NATION DECLARATION ON KOREA

Mr. PAUL. Turning to another document which bears on our relationship with Korea, the 16-nation declaration by the United Nations members who were fighting in the Korean war which you referred to on (page 1705) of your statement, Mr. Ambassador. Do we understand that this declaration is still in effect and bears on our role in Korea?

Mr. PORTER. I understand the declaration is still in effect, Mr. Paul. It has never been denounced or retracted. I think that it, in effect, was a statement of policy, not a commitment. It did, as you note, predate our own treaty which of course is overriding insofar as the situation in Korea pertains to us or our action.

Mr. PAUL. You mention (on page 1705) that that declaration warned that a breach of the armistice would be so grave that it probably would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea. What does this mean for our defense relationship with Korea?

Mr. PORTER. Looking at it at this date, I would say that it was an expression of fear that it might not be confined. It did not change the essential nature of the declaration which is a policy statement on the part of the 16. It did not and it does not, in my opinion, affect the requirements or those placed on the United States by the defense treaty.

NEED FOR BILATERAL TREATY WITH SOUTH KOREA

Mr. PAUL. In light of the United Nations resolutions that you referred to and this declaration by the 16 United Nations members and the continuing United Nations interest in Korea, why do we need a bilateral treaty with Korea as well?

Mr. PORTER. First of all, in practical terms, the United Nations backing is not in the eyes of the Koreans or ourselves a substitute for a specific treaty. It is an extremely desirable thing to have, but it is not one and the same thing.

PURPOSE OF AMBASSADOR BROWN'S LETTERS TO ROK FOREIGN MINISTER

Mr. PAUL. Turning to another dimension of our obligation, I should like to place in the record the letters written by Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, dated March 7 and March 8, 1966, to Foreign Minister Tong Won Lee with respect to the continued U.S. commitment to Korea and the level of U.S. forces in Korea. These were written in connection with the dispatch of the 2d Korean Combat Division to Vietnam. They are a recitation of earlier statements made by President Johnson, Vice President Humphrey, and Secretary Rusk. (The information referred to follows:)

SEOUL, KOREA, March 7, 1966.

DEAR MR. MINISTER: The position of the United States with respect to the defense of the Republic of Korea has been stated many times and most recently

by President Johnson in the Joint Communique of May 18, 1965, at the time of President Park's visit to Washington. I am under instructions from my Government to assure you that there is no change in that position, which President Johnson stated in the following words:

"The United States will continue to maintain powerful forces in Korea at the request of the Korean Government and will assist in maintaining Korean forces at levels sufficient, in conjunction with United States forces, to insure Korea's security."

I trust that this statement of our policy will set at rest any apprehensions that may exist among your people as to the determination of the United States to insure the defense of Korea.

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency TONG WON LEE,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Seoul.

WINTHROP G. BROWN, Ambassador.

SEOUL, KOREA, March 8, 1966.

His Excellency TONG WON LEE, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seoul.

DEAR MR. MINISTER: The position of the United States with respect to a possible attack upon the Republic of Korea has been clearly set forth on numerous occasions by United States leaders. In May 1965, for example, President Johnson, in his joint communique with President Park, "reaffirmed the determination and readiness of the United States to render forthwith and effectively all possible assistance including the use of armed forces, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, to meet the common danger occasioned by an armed attack on the Republic of Korea. He said that the United States will continue to maintain powerful forces in Korea at the request of the Korean Government, and will assist in maintaining Korean forces at levels sufficient, in conjunction with U.S. forces, to ensure Korea's security."

Secretary Rusk, in January 1964, in a joint communique with President Park, agreed "that powerful Korean and United States forces adequate to the defense of the Republic of Korea would be maintained in order to meet the continuing Communist menace in the Far East."

As recently as last month, Vice President Humphrey stated, "The United States Government and the people of the United States have a firm commitment to the defense of Korea. As long as there is one American soldier on the line of the border, the demarkation line, the whole and the entire power of the United States of America is commited to the security and defense of Korea. Korea today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. America today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. We are allies, we are friends, you should have no questions, no doubts."

I believe, Mr. Minister, that reference to these statements by the highest United States authorities should set at rest any apprehensions that may exist among your people as to the determination of the United States to come promptly to the defense of Korea in the event of attack.

Sincerely yours,

WINTHROP G. BROWN, Ambassador.

Mr. PAUL. I would like to ask you what it was that the Koreans wanted for which these letters were written?

Mr. PORTER. I am familiar with the letters, of course, Mr. Paul. The letters were written to clarify a situation which existed at the time; the matter of the dispatch of troops to Korea was being considered.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What dispatch of troops?

Mr. PORTER. The dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam-I am sorry was being considered. That was the purpose of the letter. Certain points were under discussion, and I have, of course, with me Ambassador Brown who can speak more authoritatively than I perhaps on that subject.

But in effect that was their purpose, to state positions and understandings and to recall to Korean attention assurances, since they were at that time preoccupied by the problems of their own security.