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Senator FULBRIGHT. Were they seeking an American force level guarantee or something of that nature, for which these letters were the response, or what exactly?

Mr. PORTER. They were naturally seeking assurances that we would not, without consultation, take moves which they felt might endanger their security.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Counsel, Secretary Brown is here. If we are going to discuss what the letters said, it might be well to have him answer directly, inasmuch as he signed them under instructions from his Government.

Mr. BROWN. Well, Mr. Chairman, this was part of the general reassurance process that Ambassador Porter has just described. We kept telling the Koreans that our commitment in the defense treaty was still valid and they were peculiarly sensitive about it at the time they were considering forces to Vietnam, an action which they thought might increase the threat from the north and might perhaps weaken their own defenses. So they were interested in having a statement that our defense commitment under the treaty was still valid even though it was the same commitment that we had always given them and that is about what the purpose of those two letters was.

ROK CONFIDENCE IN U.S. TREATY COMMITMENT

Mr. PAUL. Then, Secretary Brown, is it fair to say that the Koreans were not entirely confident in their reliance on our commitment just as it was stated in the treaty and they wanted some further reassurance, is that what you are saying?

Mr. BROWN. They are always nervous about it, and they like to be reassured from time to time. We tell them the same thing; I have forgotten how many times it has been done, but quite a great number. Mr. PAUL. Does this show then that a commitment in a treaty such as the Korean one, once stated and never repeated for 15 or so years, is not as strong or is it as strong

Mr. BROWN. No, it does not in any way change the commitment, but what it does change is the public awareness of the commitment.

PUBLIC AWARENESS OF AMBASSADOR BROWN'S LETTERS

Senator FULBRIGHT. What awareness?

Mr. BROWN. Public awareness.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were these letters made public to the Korean people?

Mr. BROWN. I think those two were.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were they made public to the American people?

Mr. BROWN. I don't remember.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does anybody remember?

Senator FULBRIGHT. This letter was marked "classified.” I have it marked "classified." Who marked it "classified?"

Mr. BROWN. I would have to check that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am sure this committee did not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Both are classified, I think.

Mr. PAUL. They are only classified "Limited Official Use."

35-205-70-pt. 6

Senator SYMINGTON. That is classified. You cannot release it to the public.

Would you find out Mr. Secretary, whether these letters were released to the Korean people; and also whether they were released to the people of the United States?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

SUBJECT: "WHY WERE THE BROWN LETTERS OF MARCH 7 AND 8, 1966, WRITTEN, AND WERE THEY RELEASED?"

These letters were written at the request of the Republic of Korea Government for use in answering questions in the National Assembly on the state of the ROK's own security should Korea despatch additional forces to Viet-Nam. Their purpose was to reassure Assemblymen that the U.S. commitment to the ROK under the Mutual Defense Treaty remained valid. Since they were not intended for public use, they were marked "Limited Official Use" which calls for administrative control but is different from a classification such as "Confidential" or "Secret." The ROKG used them in discussions with a National Assembly Committee but so far as we know they have not been made public in Korea or in the United States.

(The following from the Korea Herald of Mar. 8, 1966, was placed in the record by the committee:)

KOREA-UNITED STATES TALKS END ON TERMS FOR DISPATCH OF TROOPS

Korea and the United States yesterday put an end to months-long negotiations over the conditions to dispatching expeditionary ROK combat forces to south Vietnam by exchanging notes between Foreign Minister Tong-won Lee and U.S. Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown at the Foreign Ministry.

The U.S. commitments to the Korea-proposed conditions include, among others, substantial modernization of The ROK forces, the equipment of complete replacement of additional forces deployed to south Vietnam, the improvement of the nation's anti-infiltration capability, the suspension of Military Assistance Program (MAP) transfer project, the grant of additional AID loans, and the procurement in Korea of supplies, services and equipment for use in Vietnam.

The notes were exchanged in a meeting held at the ministry earlier in the day which was also attended by Vice Foreign Minister Young-choo Kim, U.S. MinisterCounselor Edward W. Doherty and Sang-mun Chang, director of the ministry America-Europe Bureau. After the meeting Minister Lee directly proceeded to the Blue House to report the outcome of the conference to President Chung Hee Park. The notes said: "To improve the defense capability and military efficiency of the ROK armed forces, the United States will provide over the next few years substantial items of equipment for modernization of ROK forces in Korea which includes complete equipping for three ready divisions and plans to expedite the modernization of 17 army divisions and one marine division."

It also stipulates that the United States will provide necessary equipment to expand, as expeditiously as practicable, the ROK arsenal for the increased ammunition production in Korea.

The United States promised that it will furnish the nation in Korean won all the net additional costs incurred for the deployment of additional Korean forces to south Vietnam as well as for the mobilization and maintenance in Korea of one reserve division, one brigade and their supporting units.

With a view to save the nation's foreign exchange reserve, the U.S. government will procure in Korea, for the use of the ROK forces, the items of supplies so suspended under MAP transfer program in the fiscal year 1966 plus those on the fiscal year 1967 list, thus purchasing Korean products in dollars not American products.

In addition to the $150 million AID loans already committed to Korea by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson last year, the United States will provide additional AID loans to support the economic development of the nation as suitable projects are developed under the same spirit and considerations as apply to the $150 million commitment.

U.S. COMMITMENTS ON DISPATCH OF TROOPS OUTLINED IN STATEMENT

The following is the full text of notes exchanged yesterday between Foreign Minister Tong-won Lee and U.S. Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown on deployment of Korean troops to the Republic of Vietnam.-Editor.

The government of the Republic of Korea notified the government of the United States of its cabinet decision of Feb. 28, 1966, to dispatch additional Republic of Korea forces to the Republic of Vietnam.

After receipt of the notification from the government of the Republic of Korea, the government of the United States, noting that the decision of the government of the Republic of Korea on the deployment of additional forces to the Republic of Vietnam should in no way affect the security and economic development of the Republic of Korea, proposed to the government of the Republic of Korea the following measures to ensure that the integrity of Korea's defense is maintained and strengthened and that Korea's economic progress, which is closely related to defense capability, is further promoted.

These military and economic measures include, among others, substantial modernization of Republic of Korea forces, the equipment of complete replacement of additional forces deployed to the Republic of Vietnam, the improvement of the Republic of Korea antiinfiltration capability, the suspension of the MAP transfer program, the grant of additional Agency for International Development (AID) loans and the procurement in Korea of supplies, services and equipment for use in Vietnam.

The government of the Republic of Korea, noting these measures to be appropriate and timely, has decided to accept the proposals for military and economic measures.

This assistance includes the following measures:

1. To improve the defense capability and military efficiency of the Republic of Korea armed forces, the United States will provide over the next few years substantial items of equipment for the modernization of Republic of Korea forces in Korea. This measure will include the complete equipping of three ready divisions and plans to expedite the modernization of seventeen army divisions and one marine division.

2. The United States will provide, as necessary, all equipment including weapons to, and finance in order to relieve any financial burden on the Korean budget, all additional won costs of, the additional forces to be deployed by the government of the Republic of Korea in compliance with its decision to the Republic of Vietnam.

3. The United States, noting especially that, facing the north Korean Communist forces across the Demilitarized Zone, the combat readiness of the Republic of Korea armed forces to defend the Republic of Korea should in no way be deteriorated due to the deployment of additional Republic of Korea forces to the Republic of Vietnam, will equip, provide for the training and finance complete replacement of the additional forces deployed in Vietnam.

4. To cope effectively with the recently stepped up attempts by the north Korean Communists to infiltrate, by land and sea, Communist spies into all segments of the Republic of Korea in the hope of disturbing political and economic stability, the United States will contribute to filling all the requirements determined by our two governments to be necessary, following completion of a joint Republic of Korea-U.S. study, for the improvement of the Republic of Korea antiinfiltration capability.

5. In view of the fact that a considerable portion of present ammunition supplies for the Republic of Korea armed forces is supplied by the United States, the United States will provide necessary equipment to expand, as expeditiously as practicable, the Republic of Korea arsenal for increased ammu nition production in Korea.

6. Noting that speedy communication between the government of the Republic of Korea and its forces deployed to the Republic of Vietnam is vital to the efficient performance of their military mission in Vietnam, the United States will provide communications facilities for exclusive Republic of Korea use which will meet requirements for communication between the government of the Republic of Korea and its forces in Vietnam.

7. The United States will provide the Republic of Korea in Korean won all of the net additional costs incurred for the deployment of additional Korean forces to Vietnam as well as for the mobilization and maintenance in Korea

of one reserve division, one brigade and their supporting units, and the government of the Republic of Korea will incorporate additionally these costs in its budget.

8. At the request of the Korean government for saving its foreign currency reserves and conserving budgetary resources, the U.S. government agreed to partly amend the MAP transfer program in 1965 and to review the program annually in its implementation in light of the Korean economic situation.

The U.S. government, however, will suspend the MAP transfer program for as long as there are substantial Republic of Korea forces in the Republic of Vietnam. With a view moreover to increasing Korean foreign currency reserve, the U.S. government will procure in Korea, for the use of Republic of Korea forces, the items of supplies so suspended under the MAP transfer program in fiscal year 1966 plus those on the fiscal year 1967 list, thus purchasing Korean products in U.S. dollars, not American products.

9. For the use and disposition of the Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam, requirements for supplies, services and equipment will be procured in Korea insofar as practicable, and selected types of procurement for U.S. and Republic of Vietnam forces will be directed to Korea in cases in which Korea has the production capability, Korea can meet specifications and delivery schedules and Korean prices are appropriate.

10. The United States will procure in Korea as much as Korea can provide in time and at a reasonable price of goods being purchased by AID for use in its projects programs for rural construction, pacification, relief, logistics and so forth, in the Republic of Vietnam.

11. The United States will provide, to the extent permitted by the Republic of Vietnam, Korean contractors expanded opportunities to participate in various construction projects undertaken by the U.S. government and by U.S. contractors in the Republic of Vietnam and other services, including employment of skilled Korean civilians in the Republic of Vietnam.

12. The United States will expand its technical assistance to the Republic of Korea in the general field of export promotion.

13. In addition to the $150 million AID loans already committed to the Republic of Korea on the occasion of President Chung Hee Park's visit to the United States in May 1965, the United States will provide additional AID loans to support the economic development of the Republic of Korea as suitable projects are developed under the same spirit and considerations as apply to the $150 million commitment.

14. The United States will provide the Republic of Korea $15 million of program loans in this year, which will be used for the support of Korean exports to the Republic of Vietnam, and for other development needs, subject to performance under the 1966 Stabilization Program of the Republic of Korea.

OPPOSITION IN SOUTH KOREA

Senator AIKEN. I am on (page 1706). I do not know if I am going too fast, but it says, "The opposition considers it its duty to oppose, often regardless of the merits of the issue." What makes South Korea different in that respect?

Senator FULBRIGHT. From what document are you reading?

Senator AIKEN. I am reading from your statement. Maybe I am ahead of it.

Mr. PORTER. My statement (page 1706).

Senator AIKEN. Your statement (page 1706).

They do that in other countries, too, you know. The opposition opposes regardless of the merits of the question.

STRENGTH OF U.S. TREATY COMMITMENTS

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Brown, returning to the question that I raised earlier, do you say that a commitment such as the treaty we have with Korea, once stated and never reconfirmed for 15 or so years, is just as strong

as the same treaty commitment reconfirmed every year or so by the President and the Secretary of State?

Mr. BROWN. The contract speaks for itself.

Mr. PAUL. Is that the nature of international relations, is it the same as contracts in this regard?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

ROK NEED FOR REASSURANCE OF U.S. COMMITMENT

Mr. PAUL. Also, on this point, I would like to mention that the statement that Vice President Humphrey made and you read, Mr. Ambassador, is dated February 23, 1966, in other words, 2 weeks before these letters that Ambassador Brown issued to similar effect.

Why did they need to be reassured so soon after the Vice President's statement if that were the whole significance of it?

Mr. PORTER. I am not familiar with the reason nor the connection with these two statements. Certainly the proximity in time is worth noting. It is a feature, if I may say, Mr. Paul, it is a feature of life in Korea that they do want to hear, both government and public, periodic reiterations of our commitment to them. This is due to a number of factors.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What are they?

Mr. PORTER. Geography for one thing, their proximity, their geographic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and Red China. The fact that their relations with the Japanese have not yet progressed to the point where they really can feel they can look for comfort in that direction. And, of course, basically because they greatly value this relationship that has developed with the United States, sir, not merely as a matter of selfish interest but one that they want to remain, one they want to see remain in effect for as long as they can see into the future. In their whole history they have never had a relationship like this. Senator FULBRIGHT. Not many people have.

Mr. PORTER. That is right. And they try to reciprocate, sir, with what they have. It is an unusual place in that sense.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is

very unusual.

Mr. PORTER. In that sense it is.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I cannot recall in history any other country taking on the responsibilities that we have in this case, not particularly in this letter, but especially your later letter to which we are coming. I know of no precedent for it.

I really do not think there was any authority for it, but we will come to that letter. You are coming to that, are you not, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. PAUL. Yes, I thought it would be when we take up Vietnam specifically which is another day.

USE OF VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY'S STATEMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. You said a moment ago that Vice President Humphrey's statement is of no significance. You only referred to it because we asked you to.

Why was it put in this letter? We did not ask Mr. Brown to put it in these letters. Apparently there is a feeling that these extravagant statements by political leaders in some way fortify the political commitment. Why else would Mr. Brown put it in?

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