Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Brown is here.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It goes further than the treaty. I think it would be clearly interpreted by any nontechnical man outside the State Department as going further. It is a complete amalgamation of our interests; it goes even further than the NATO Treaty.

Mr. BROWN. Sir, at the time we made explicitly clear to the Koreans that we would not make it automatic, would not make it an automatic response. We would not make commitments as to how long we should have our troops here.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why do you use this kind of language and specifically include it in your letter?

Mr. BROWN. Because we wanted to reaffirm the fact that this treaty had been

Senator FULBRIGHT. It goes further than the treaty. I don't know any reasonable interpretation that would not say this goes further than the treaty. I think this language is extravagant. This particular gentleman, of course, made similar communiques in Bangkok, as I recall, that were just about as uncalled for as this. It is not unique with him, but I don't know why you should reiterate it or go out of your way to reiterate it as an official document with your endorsement. I think the language in the last sentence in that paragraph is flamboyant rhetoric.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will put it in the record at this point. (The information referred to appears on p. 1530.)

Senator FULBRIGHT. "Korea today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. America today is as strong as the United States and Korea put together. We are allies, we are friends, you should have no questions, no doubts."

I have never seen a treaty expressed in quite such flamboyant language. I don't think any treaty with that language in it has ever passed the Senate of the United States. The nearest thing would be the NATO Treaty, and it is much more restrained than that.

This is a habit that has arisen. This is not the only instance of it, but I want to discourage it if I can.

TO WHAT DID AMBASSADOR BROWN'S LETTERS RESPOND?

Senator SYMINGTON. You say, you wrote a letter on March 7 of reassurance to His Excellency Tong Won Lee, then on March 8 you wrote him another, a little longer letter on assurances. Why was the first one not good enough?

Mr. BROWN. I wondered about that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just 1 day apart.

Mr. BROWN. I wondered about that myself.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have to hold their hands every day. Mr. PAUL. What was it that the Koreans wanted, Mr. Brown, for which these letters were a response?

Mr. BROWN. I cannot remember specifically what it was in that connection, but they always have wished that they could get our response to be much more automatic than it is in the treaty. They have always wanted to, and they always wanted to be assured that we would not take our troops out of Korea without their consent, and this is something which we refused to give them.

Mr. PAUL. Could you say anything more as to why they were not

satisfied with Vice President Humphrey's statement 2 weeks before and why they needed these further letters.

Mr. BROWN. I do not remember.

Mr. PAUL. Did these letters show, perhaps, still another thing? They were written in connection with the Korean decision to send troops, a second combat division to Vietnam. Does this show that our commitment to countries such as Korea can be made more concrete, more precise, or more binding as a result of what the other country does, such as in this case their sending troops to Vietnam?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

Mr. PAUL. Why do you come to that conclusion?

Mr. BROWN. Because what all those letters say is exactly what was said in the treaty.

Mr. PAUL. And you don't feel they at least evidence a moral obligation being generated by the Korean troops going to Vietnam? Mr. BROWN. No.

Mr. PAUL. Do you feel that the basis for part of the reason for their wanting these commitments be confirmed, and for the reason that some feel that the treaty, once stated is not as good as a treaty that is often restated, is because the treaty itself is quite ambiguous?

Mr. BROWN. I suggest that, perhaps, this discussion would be more profitable if it were made after we talked about the conditions under which the troops were sent to Vietnam and the reasons which the Koreans had for doing so.

Mr. PAUL, Very good.

But this particular last question does not necessarily have to do with the sending of the troops to Vietnam. It really has to do with all of these continual recitations of the treaty, every year or so. You said the contract speaks for itself, but the contract is very ambiguous. Mr. BROWN. Surely. The contract does not specify what the response would be, and that is the way it should be.

Mr. PAUL. Then the recitations do not add anything to it?
Mr. BROWN. No.

CHANGES IN COMMUNIQUES ON U.S. DEFENSE OBLIGATION

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, we have discussed earlier the joint communiques under President Johnson's administration with respect to the defense obligation. Typical of them was the following:

President Johnson reaffirmed the readiness and determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.

Now, when President Park visited President Nixon in California. in August of 1969, the joint communique that was issued said this on the same point:

The two Presidents reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to meet armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty.

Is there any significance in the change of language between the two administrations?

Mr. PORTER. No significance so far as our commitment is concerned. Mr. PAUL. Was there any particular reason why the interpolation that appeared so frequently during the Johnson administration with

respect to prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed attack was left out when it came to writing a joint communique during the Nixon administration?

Mr. PORTER. At the time of the earlier communiques, the Koreans were engaged in one of their periodic efforts to induce us to accept a more automatic response in the event of attack. We obviously could not do that. We could not leave the consultative process, and there was less pressure of that nature, as I recall, definitely less, at the time President Park met with President Nixon.

Mr. PAUL. Another comparison between the Johnson administration communique issued in 1968, and the one under Nixon: The 1968 communique makes specific reference to the 16 nation United Nations Declaration. Neither the ones before it nor the Nixon communique after it makes such a reference. Why was it done at the time it was? Mr. PORTER. I do not recall precisely, but I believe it was in connection with an effort to reassure or bring reassuring material into the communique in lieu of stronger language which the Koreans wanted. Mr. PAUL. Does it have any committing significance on our part? Mr. PORTER. Not so far as the basic commitment is concerned. Mr. PAUL. When you say stronger language, in what dimension did they want stronger language?

Mr. PORTER. They always were seeking a more automatic response.

ASSURANCE OF U.S. DEFENSE COMMITMENT

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, in your opinion, which provides the Koreans in their view the greater assurance of American commitment to their defense, the treaty or our troops in Korea?

Mr. PORTER. Oh, I think that the treaty is very definitely more important in terms of commitment.

Mr. PAUL. And they feel this way, too?
Mr. PORTER. I cannot say, but I think so.

MAINTENANCE OF U.S. FORCE LEVEL

Mr. PAUL. You point out on (page 1705) of your statement that there is no U.S. commitment to maintain the present level of forces in Korea. In this connection I would like to read the following statement in a letter written January 11, 1965, by General Howze, who was then the commander of U.N. forces, to further document the record. His letter was written to the South Korean Defense Minister. It was part of the continuing correspondence with respect to troops going to Vietnam.

General Howze writes:

I cannot provide you a formal guarantee for continued maintenance of the U.S. Forces in Korea at current level. I can, however, refer you to the statements made by Mr. Bundy to you on his recent visit here and the assertions of the U.S. Ambassador on the subject.

What were these earlier statements? I suppose he was referring to you, Ambassador Brown, so could you tell us what these earlier

statements were?

Mr. BROWN. Those were statements that we would not significantly reduce our forces without consultation with the ROK Government.

EFFORT TO OBTAIN ROK TROOPS FOR VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. I remember when you were there, and I had the privilege of seeing you in Korea in 1965. We know the nature of the procedure to get troops into Vietnam from other countries.

Would you tell us how this effort to obtain Korean troops started? Give us a summary of what was told you by State and/or the executive branch so as to get the South Koreans to send troops to South Vietnam.

Mr. BROWN. Very simply, sir; the request came from the Government of Vietnam for troops. We supported that request, and they said they would like to help, and they then proceeded to do so.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I asked you to summarize it and you took me at my word [Laughter.]

You say we supported it. Whose instructions did you operate under to support it?

Mr. BROWN. Instructions from Washington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who in Washington?

Mr. BROWN. My instructions were signed by the Secretary of State. Senator SYMINGTON. They are all signed by the Secretary of State. Who was your contact? Assistant Secretary for the Far East? Mr. BROWN. He was my most direct contact.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you discuss it at all prior to that or were you just told to do it and took it from there?

Mr. BROWN. I was instructed to go ahead with it and I took it from there.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many military did they ask that you get? Mr. BROWN. It started, first of all, with a hospital unit, and then there was an engineer unit, about 2,000 men, as I remember, all noncombat.

Then there was a request for a combat division, and then about a year later a second combat division. That was the sum total. Senator SYMINGTON. What was the time?

Mr. PORTER. The combat division, the Tiger Division, was dispatched in 1965. The ROK Government received a formal request from the Government of Vietnam for a combat division on June 21, 1965.

The first elements arrived-the Assembly approved the dispatch on August 13, and the first units arrived-in Vietnam in October 1965. Senator FULBRIGHT. When was the first request from the Vietnamese Government to the ROK Government?

Mr. BROWN. It is in the statement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What was the nature and who was the government in Vietnam at that time? Are you coming to this, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. PAUL. We have a session on that later this week, if that suits your convenience.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes; it does. We seemed to be coming to it. I simply don't want you to overlook it.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is probably my fault because I asked the question of the Secretary as to how it evolved. If we are going to discuss it later I withdraw the question.

Mr. PAUL. This is currently scheduled for Friday morning.

WRITTEN REQUEST FOR ROK TROOPS BUT NOT FOR U.S. TROOPS

Senator AIKEN. Was there any written request for Korean troops in Vietnam?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. There was no written request for American troops in Vietnam. I was wondering what happened.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Maybe we ought to let it go, but this is a very crucial question.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you and Senator Aiken are interested as to who signed the request for Vietnam

Senator AIKEN. General Ky told me himself that he never requested any American troops. Later the State Department went through all the papers they had and they could not find any written request. It was probably an oral request by General Westmoreland or someone. I was wondering why there was a written request for Korean troops and not for American troops.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I suppose the Americans instructed the Vietnam Government to make the request in writing in anticipation of Ambassador Brown's letter. Who can speak to that?

Mr. PORTER. I was not in Vietnam nor in Korea at the time. I do know that a request for the unit

Senator FULBRIGHT. The first unit.

Mr. PORTER (continuing). From the Vietnamese Government of which I have a record was received January 5, 1965. This was called the Dove Unit, sir.

Senator AIKEN. That is a good name.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Who was then the head of the government in Vietnam?

Mr. BROWN. I think Quat was Prime Minister.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did we ask him to put that request in writing? Mr. BROWN. He did. I don't know whether we asked him or not. Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't know. That was submitted to the Assembly of Korea?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Isn't it odd we neither had a written agreement, nor was the problem of something fruitful submitted to the Senate. It is a very odd way to do business; isn't it? Why were they so meticulous about having a written request to their Assembly. This is a very odd way of doing business. Do you think Mr. Quat thought up that request by himself?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You never heard Mr. Bundy or anyone else discuss this. You never heard any discussion of the origin of that request?

Mr. BROWN. I was in Seoul at the time.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I know you were in Seoul. Had you no subsequent conversations about this matter? Was Mr. Bundy then the Assistant Secretary for the Far East?

Mr. PORTER. I think Quat was Prime Minister. There were a series of coups d'etat early in 1965, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Ky was boss then. I don't know what his title was.