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Mr. PORTER. Ky was boss by the summer and had been in power several weeks, as I recall, by the time I arrived there in 1965.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is only a couple or 3 weeks before the President ordered our own initial bombing of the North, when we really opened up on them; isn't that correct? It was February 7, 1965, wasn't it? General, you remember that; don't you?

General MICHAELIS. I am not sure of the date.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Isn't that correct, Mr. Ambassador? Mr. PORTER. I think it is correct, sir. I could not swear to it. Senator FULBRIGHT. This is just in anticipation of that. Our Government was then very concerned about the collapse of the South Vietnamese Government. It seems, without knowing the facts firsthand, it is very likely that is what happened. We instructed them to put all this in writing and to have it, but were very much less formal about our own reactions. We have no request in writing because I asked the State Department. They searched from top to bottom and were unable to find it, much to their chagrin. I thought perhaps they might have manufactured it as a captured document.

They were unable to find it and they didn't submit it to the Congress for approval either.

U.S. PAYMENT OF ROK COMBAT TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask this question, Mr. Secretary? As was the case in other countries for noncombat troops, did we pay a substantial bonus to combat troops who went to Vietnam from Korea?

Mr. BROWN. The combat troops had an overseas allowance.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was that in proportion to their rank, as in the Philippines?

Mr. BROWN. I believe so.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you supply the information for the record? I don't say this in criticism because these were men who went over there and fought bravely. I had the privilege of going up and visiting them in Vietnam and was much impressed without any reservation. We are just trying to get the facts, the nature of the commitments. Would you file for the record what the arrangements were? Mr. BROWN. I think we have an answer to some of the committee's questions in the materials already submitted. (The information referred to appears on p. 1530.) Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Counsel, we are in this now,

any questions.

ROK PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM WAR

if

you

have

Mr. PAUL. I would suggest, if the committee wants that we could take up this subject of the Korean participation in the war in Vietnam at this time. To lay the foundation for our discussion, I would suggest that Ambassador Porter read that portion of his statement that relates to this matter, which I would think would be on (pages 1707 to 1709). Then I would ask General Michaelis to read a small portion of his statement after that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you proceed on that basis, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

DISPATCH OF ROK TROOPS TO VIETNAM

Also in 1965, the Government decided to send a division of combat troops to South Vietnam at the request of the South Vietnamese and United States Governments. This contribution to the free world effort in Asia was a major element in creating an intangible but most significant sense of self-confidence. The Koreans were no longer simply the dependent recipients of outside aid but were making a substantial contribution themselves to a common effort.

It has been suggested that the Korean motivation in sending troops to Vietnam was to some extent based on a desire to acquire benefits of U.S. support for the costs of sending them. It was perfectly clear to all when negotiations took place that Korea would benefit from foreign exchange remittances due her for troop costs and civilian services, but in my opinion the Korean Government and people were moved principally by other motives. These were, first, to answer the South Vietnamese and American calls for assistance. They desired to repay in this manner sacrifices that Americans and others had made for them in Korea in 1950. Secondly, they would have found it difficult indeed to ignore an appeal to assist in holding back a Communist takeover in another East Asian country.

In explaining this to the Korean people

U.S. REQUESTS FOR ROK TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Did we write the South Koreans and ask them to send troops to South Vietnam?

Mr. PORTER. Did we write to them?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. I am not sure whether a note was submitted or not at that point. Do you recall?

Mr. BROWN. No; the request from us was oral.

Senator SYMINGTON. Oral?

Mr. PORTER. Oral.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who made it?

Mr. BROWN. I believe it was discussed in rather general terms between President Johnson and President Park when he visited here in 1965, and I conveyed the request made by President Park.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In 1965 ?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; for combat troops.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you saying that was not discussed prior to that time with the Koreans?

Mr. BROWN. Noncombat troops; yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. When was that first one?

Mr. PORTER. The first one was on the date I gave you before, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT. What date?

Mr. PORTER. January 5, 1965.

Senator FULBRIGHT. OK.

Mr. PORTER. That was the Dove unit, noncombat, I believe, type battalion : am I correct in that, General?

General MICHAELIS. YES.

Mr. PORTER. Combat engineer battalion, transportation company, a security unit.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then to the best of your knowledge, Mr. Secretary, there was no written request. It was verbal and, to the best of your knowledge, it was a verbal agreement between President Johnson and President Park in May of 1965 re combat troops; is that correct? Mr. BROWN. No, sir. I say they discussed the question, no conclusions. Senator SYMINGTON. When were conclusions reached?

Mr. BROWN. June, 1965.

Senator SYMINGTON. When were the first troops sent?
Mr. BROWN. In the fall of that year.

Senator SYMINGTON. How did you know they decided to send combat troops in June of 1965?

Mr. BROWN. Because they told me they were going to do it, and they asked the National Assembly to vote on it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did they write you that, or tell you verbally? Mr. BROWN. Verbally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was it a matter of knowledge that the Korean Assembly had approved the decision?

Mr. BROWN. It was very widely publicized.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. PORTER. May I continue?

PRESIDENT PARK'S EXPLANATION OF SENDING ROK TROOPS TO VIETNAM

In explaining this to the Korean people, President Park, at a farewell rally in February 1965, for 2,000 noncombat Korean troops who were going to Vietnam said in part:

The Republic of Vietnam asked this nation for military assistance to enable her to defend herself against Communist Vietnam guerrillas supported by Communist China. In response to this request, the Government made careful analysis of the Vietnam situation, and decided to extend help based on the viewpoint that such action would not only solidify our own national security but also contribute toward strengthening the anti-communist front of the Free world * * *.

Needless to say, the Government decision to send you men to South Vietnam can be ascribed, in the first place, to our judgment that the action is part of our moral responsibility in furtherance of Asia's collective security. It would be almost inevitable if Vietnam were to succumb to communist infiltration, that the entire Asian region would be subject to the growing communist threats. *** In view of this, the proposed military assistance is an indirect national defense of this country. Finally, when we were confronted with the communist aggression fourteen years ago, the fate of this country was saved by sixteen Free World allies headed by the United States. We *** cannot sit on our hands and see one of our friendly allies become prey to communist invasion.

He made the same explanation to the National Assembly when he asked for its approval for the dispatch of the first combat division.

FUNDAMENTAL BASIS ON WHICH ROK TROOPS WERE DISPATCHED

The fundamental basis on which these troops were sent to Vietnam was that their dispatch should not significantly degrade the security of Korea in terms of the undiminished threat from the north, which might even have been augmented by this action, and that it should not impose a significant economic burden on a country whose economy still required substantial infusions of outside economic aid and whose budgetary capacity to maintain and develop its economy was still very inadequate. The Koreans did not have the necessary financial resources

but they gave what they had excellent and highly motivated man

power.

THE U.S. PAYMENT OF COSTS RESULTING FROM ROK FORCES IN VIETNAM

Therefore, it was agreed that the United States would meet all of the extra costs, both in won and foreign exchange, which would accrue as a result of the dispatch of these forces to South Vietnam. Senator SYMINGTON. How much was that?

Mr. PORTER. We will submit the figures.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you submit them at this point in the record?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

(The information referred to follows:)

The cost of supporting a single U.S. soldier in Vietnam is $13,000 a year. The cost of supporting a single Korean soldier in Vietnam cannot be isolated. The ROKG deployed a force of 47,872 military personnel to RVN in four major increments as listed below:

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The type of U.S. support provided, associated with each of the four major deployments, is reflected in the following table:

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1 Costs of troop and military equipment shipments are not available to this headquarters but are maintained by the Military Airlift Command, Scott AFB, Illinois 62225, and Department of the Navy, Military Sea Transportation Service, Washington, D.C. 20390

2 Costs included in $10,000,000 add-on to fiscal year 1966 Korea MAP as shown in Item h.

3 These costs controlled by COMUSMACV.

4 In addition, $9.200,000 were absorbed within the two $10,000,000 add-on packages of fiscal year 1966 and fiscal year 1967 as shown in item h.

5 An additional $1,700,000 was absorbed in the $10,000,000 added-on in fiscal year 1967; an additional $900,000 was absorbed in fiscal year 1968 MAP.

6 In addition to being a U.S. Budetary Cost these programs involve a Goldflow.

7 Costs not available by fiscal year.

Note. There were no U.S. costs in Korea during fiscal year 1964 in support of ROK forces deployed to Vietnam. Fiscal year 1970 figures reflect the costs from July 1, 1969 through Dec. 31, 1969

ROK ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM WAR

Mr. PORTER. The war in Vietnam, as is the case with all wars, created a substantial demand for goods and services. The Koreans made it clear that they wanted to be assured an opportunity, provided they were competitive, to provide as much as they could of these goods and services. Koreans remembered that during the Korean War, Japan benefited economically to a very large extent by providing goods and services necessary to the support of that war. The same was true with respect to Japan in connection with the struggle in Vietnam. The Koreans felt it only reasonable that if they were sending men in large numbers to fight in Vietnam, they should be allowed to share in markets created by the war. In other words, they wanted to participate in the opportunities as well as the risks.

In fact, Korea's earnings from U.S. procurement for Vietnam plus its earnings from exports to Vietnam have been substantially less

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