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KIMCHI RATION PROBLEM

Mr. PORTER. The Korean troops in Vietnam, as I understand it, were encountering something of a food problem, and it was considered by the command that this could and should be ameliorated by an effort to provide them with food more to their taste and liking. This really is the famous Kimchi ration problem. Essentially it was a canning problem. It had to be determined that Kimchi could be contained in any kind of can, and eventually that was achieved, and a contract was negotiated and procurement started.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is Kimchi?

Mr. PORTER. It is that combination of pickled cabbage with fish and garlic and other items which are extremely important in the Korea diet, sir. It develops into sort of a protein material after it has been ripening for a few months.

Senator AIKEN. They could go to Vietnam and get rancid fish oil instead.

Mr. PORTER. This is of that nature.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said something about it fermenting. Mr. PORTER. It ferments very definitely.

May I continue?

ROK REQUEST FOR OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES FOR DOVE UNIT

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could I ask one or two questions? Did the Koreans ask us to pay overseas allowances for the Dove unit?

Mr. PORTER. General Michaelis.

General MICHAELIS. They did, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. When did they first do this?

(The information referred to appears on p. 1569.)

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did we originally agree to those allowances? It was in the fall of 1964.

General MICHAELIS. 1965. I have a table which shows that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I thought this matter was discussed in 1964. Wasn't it?

Mr. PORTER. December 1964.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It was before this January date.

Mr. PORTER. The reference to it, negotiations started in December of 1964; that is correct, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. General, when they first asked for the Dove allowances, did we initially agree?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; we did not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We did not; we turned it down?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In 1964 did not General Howze write Defense Minister Kim, and I quote:

I have been informed the position of the U.S. Government is that based on worldwide practice payment of per diem and allowances for the Republic of Korean personnel to be assigned to Vietnam should be supported by your Government. This action would be a further demonstration of the willingness of your country to assist the Republic of Vietnam to maintain its independence. Isn't that what he wrote in 1964? That leads to the question of why did we change it?

Mr. BROWN. I think the reason we changed, sir, was this a couple of hundred men which was this original request. It would not have been appropriate for our Government to meet it then. But when it came to several thousand men, 50,000, 55,000 people, then it was a burden which they could not legitimately be asked to undertake, and rather than have just a couple of hundred men different from all others, a different form of procedure was adopted.

U.S. SOLICITATION OF SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM POLICY

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Ambassador, isn't it a fact that the United States was urging all its friends and dependencies and clients toward approval of our policy in Vietnam? Is that a fact?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You know that is a fact. This request for troops really initiated with the United States. They asked the Vietnamese to ask for these troops; didn't they?

Mr. BROWN. It was certainly our policy to encourage support from other countries so that the United States would not be carrying the entire burden.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Sure it was. We asked everyone. We went all over the world and we solicited some sign of approval of our policy. The Secretary of State used to come to this committee and say 36 countries are assisting us and are allied with us in Vietnam. Is that not true? Don't you remember such statements? Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

REASON FOR ROK DISPATCH OF TROOPS TO VIETNAM

Senator FULBRIGHT. This all has sort of an unreal flavor, you know, when you come in and give the self-serving statement that the Koreans are high and mighty people. The United States was urging these people to do so. We were requesting the Vietnamese to ask them in order to support the righteousness of our policy. That is what really was going on; wasn't it, Mr. Ambassador? You have stated already that this is what was done. The Secretary of State came here himself and testified. Then when you looked into it, more than half of those countries were contributing less than $25,000 a year, and he was making public statements that this showed allegiance and support for the policy of intervention in Vietnam.

It does not really add up very well that this is a great gesture of self-sacrifice on the part of Korea to pay their obligation. They were simply making a good business dea! at our request and urging. I don't blame the Koreans for doing it at all, but I think the fact of the matter is that is what was happening. That is what actually happened.

Senator SYMINGTON. The fact of the matter is that the people of the United States were deceived as to the degree of the desire to participate in the South Vietnamese venture. That is the fact of the matter. Whether it was right or wrong we did not know about it even in the Congress, let alone the people of the country. President Nixon said on November 3 that no nation will support a war unless they are given the truth about it, and we just didn't know what the facts were with respect to these transactions, and that is what we are interested in finding out, not in an effort to blame the past. The

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past is the past, but in the hope that we do not get into this kind of a situation in the future, if possible.

Mr. BROWN. Sir, I can only say that I agree with Ambassador Porter, that the Koreans did want to help, felt they had an obligation to us in our country.

I remember when I went up to visit the headquarters of the Tiger Division, which was the first one which was being sent, and as it was being mobilized

Senator FULBRIGHT. When was this?

Mr. BROWN. In 1965.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What time?

Mr. BROWN. Spring, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The spring of 1965.

Mr. BROWN. April or May, after they had decided to do it, and I said to General Choe, I said I think this is a fine thing the Koreans are doing, sending a division to fight in Vietnam, and he said, "No, no, Mr. Ambassador, we are just paying back part of the debt which we owe you and other countries of the free world when you came to our help," and then he went right on talking about something else. It was a quite undramatic statement of fact.

Senator SYMINGTON. I visited General Kim in Vietnam and had the privilege of talking to his officers, recently received a fine letter from him. He went back to being chief of staff, did he not?

Mr. PORTER. Commander of the Second Army.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the Koreans would have made the Vietnam deal without the money they received?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; because they could not support the expenses

involved.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is a fair answer.

SECRECY OF U.S. FUNDING OF ROK OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why did the United States take the position that secrecy was so essential? Was it to keep it from the Congress? Mr. BROWN. I do not know the answer to that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You ought to know it.

I want to read into the record a letter dated March 8, 1965:
DEAR GENERAL KIM-

Is this the same general you are talking about?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT (continues reading):

DEAR GENERAL KIM: This is to inform you that the United States Government has agreed, effective 1 March 1965, to assume the cost of overseas allowances for the ROK MASH and Taekkwondo instructors on the same basis as the newly deployed ROKMAG-V in Vietnam.

Arrangements will be made shortly with the Finance Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense for the necessary funding of the overseas allowances for the ROKMAG-V, including the ROK MASH.

As we have indicated previously to you and other officials of MND, the United States Government attaches considerable importance to maintaining as confidential information the fact that it is assuming these costs.

Sincerely,

(Signed and delivered) HAMILTON H. HOWZE, General, U.S. Army Commander.

Since we represent the taxpayers who have to pay for it, this doesn't seem very reasonable to us. Why was it so important to keep it secret? Wasn't that to further support the illusion they were doing this out of the goodness of their hearts? If that isn't the proper explanation, you ought to have an alternative one that is equally persuasive.

General, do you have one? You were advising him. He can't think

of one.

General MICHAELIS. No, sir; I conjectured that they were negotiating with other nations on allowances and probably did not want one nation to know what other nations were receiving.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't think they had the Congress in mind? General MICHAELIS. I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Knaur, would you find out what the instructions were?

Mr. PORTER. I agree with the general. I don't think they had the Congress in mind. I think it was the other aspect he mentioned, negotiation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Negotiation with whom?

Mr. PORTER. With other countries about troops, possibly at that time the Filipinos, the Thais; I don't know, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Were we paying the Filipinos more than we were paying the Koreans?

Mr. PORTER. That I don't know.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If it were the going rate, then why should it be kept secret? The Ford Motor Co., puts the price of their car out on the front page and everyone is supposed to pay the same price.

Unless you have some knowledge that there was such a reason, why isn't it that they wanted to keep it secret from the Congress because what they were doing was deceiving the Congress as best they could during this period and prior thereto. I think they were misrepresenting the facts.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Knaur, would you find out? I am confident General Howze would not put it in unless he was instructed. In any let us find out.

case,

Mr. KNAUR. Yes, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION

The note concerning classification contained in the letter from General Howze was not an effort to keep secrets from Congress. For example, on 20 January 1966, in his appearance before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Senate Appropriations Committee, former Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara said, among other things, concerning the salaries of Korean forces in Vietnam, "Their compensation comes in two parts, two segments. One is what you would call their normal compensation and basically that is paid by the Korean Government. The other is what you would call temporary duty compensation and essentially that is being paid by us, not directly to the soldiers but by additional payments made by us to their government which their government in turn uses to pay them."

Senator SYMINGTON. Again in defense of the Koreans, we have provisions, General Michaelis, to pay bonuses to combat troops, have we not?

General MICHAELIS. That is correct.
Mr. PORTER. Shall I continue, sir?
Senator SYMINGTON. Will you?

U.S. AGREEMENTS WITH REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT CONCERNING FORCES IN VIETNAM

Mr. PORTER. Subsequently the United States agreed to use special letters of credit to compensate the Korean Government for a Korean combat ration to be supplied to its forces in Vietnam. This was tentatively agreed upon in the summer of 1967 and arrangements were completed in October of that year.

Other agreements, in addition to that regarding kimchi, which were made in the spirit of the March 4 letter, were an undertaking by the United States to procure certain goods and services in Korea for U.S. forces in Korea and to provide Military Sea Transport Service contracts to Korean suppliers.

In June 1967 the Republic of Korea Government proposed to send an additional 3,000 men to Vietnam to round out their forces there. These men left Korea for Vietnam in July. This was the last dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam. No new commitments were made since the provisions of the March 4 letter applied to them as far as U.S. support was concerned.

In a letter dated March 7, 1966, Ambassador Brown assured the Korean Government that there had been no change in the United States' position stated in the joint communique issued at the close of President Park's visit to Washington a year before, as follows:

The United States will continue to maintain powerful forces in Korea at the request of the Korean Government and will assist in maintaining Korean forces at levels sufficient, in conjunction with United States forces, to insure Korea's security.

Senator SYMINGTON. That word "powerful" is often used. What is the definition, were you ever told, of powerful forces?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir; I have not seen that word used in other communiques, to the best of my knowledge.

Senator SYMINGTON. General Michaelis, do you know?
General MICHAELIS. No, sir; I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you proceed?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS

Along with other troop contribution nations, the Koreans will share in the discussions leading to an eventual settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. What the Korean role will be will depend on the circumstances and nature of the settlement. The Koreans have not, however, asked to take part in the Paris talks. For our part we have sought to keep them and our other allies informed regarding the course of the negotiations.

ALLIED COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM

All of the allies are committed to withdraw from Vietnam as soon as their support is no longer required. Specifically, in the Manila Communique of 1966, the seven nations declared that their forces would be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdrew its forces, ceased infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsided. Senator SYMINGTON. What were the seven nations?

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