Mr. PORTER. The Philippines, Korea, United States, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and Vietnam; the troop-contributing nations, in effect, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. PORTER. Allied withdrawals were to take place not later than 6 months after fulfillment of these conditions. While Korean troops are in Vietnam at the request of the Vietnamese Government and will withdraw when requested to do so by that Government, I anticipate that their eventual withdrawal will come after tripartite consultations including the U.S. Government. On the basis of the history of our relationships with Korea, I have no reason to believe that any difficulties will arise in this connection. We have not so far suggested that any of the Korean troop units in Vietnam be reduced or withdrawn. Nor have they been.

ALLEGED EXCESSES COMMITTED BY ROK FORCES AGAINST VIETNAM CIVILIANS

The committee has asked for comment on allegations that Korean forces in Vietnam have committed excesses against the civilian population. I can say from personal knowledge that the leaders of Korea are deeply disturbed by these charges because of pride in their forces and anxiety to preserve the good name of their country. Standing Korean directives to the troops stress the necessity of "protecting innocent citizens even if thereby Vietcong manage to escape." I discussed this before I left Seoul and was told that Korean policy remains unchanged the troops must do everything possible to spare civilians. Government officials said that the government does not condone excesses, and that it takes corrective action when the reports are substantiated. They noted, however, that there are "great gaps" between allegations in the press and available facts. They also observed that in all wars troops will fire back at villages from which they are receiving fire, and that everybody knows the Vietcong mix with the civilian population.

Mr. PAUL. I would also suggest that General Michaelis read a couple of paragraphs from his statement-the last paragraph on page 89, and the matter on pages 98-99.

OPERATIONS OF ROK FORCES IN VIETNAM

General MICHAELIS. The ROK forces in Vietnam have acquitted themselves well. They operate in two different corps tactical zones (CTZ). In I CTZ, four battalions of the ROK 2d Marine Brigade operate in the vicinity of Hoi An. In II CTZ, 18 battalions from the Capitol and 9th Infantry Divisions operate along the coast from north of Qui Nhon southward to Phan Rang. ROK operations in Vietnam have been characterized by a combination of combat operations and pacification activities. In both I and II CTZ's, enemy-initiated activity has declined in those areas in which ROK forces operate. The activity of ROK and United States/Republic of Vietnam Army forces, as measured by contacts, casualties, and weapons captured has similarly declined. Cumulative ROK casualties as of February 7, 1970, are: KIA, 3,094; WIA, 3,051; MIA, four. Cumulative enemy casualties in the ROK area of operations are: KIA, 30,070.

Mr. PAUL. If you would turn to page 98, General Michaelis, and read from the middle of the third paragraph that starts, "The military impact in the Republic of Korea," over to page 99.

MILITARY IMPACT IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA OF VIETNAM ACTIVITIES

General MICHAELIS. The military impact in the Republic of Korea of furnishing ground forces to the Republic of Vietnam include the following:

(a) Reduction of ROK Army forces in Korea. Only one division was reconstituted in the Republic of Korea when two divisions were withdrawn and deployed to Vietnam. Offsetting this disadvantage is the assumption that the two combat-ready divisions in Vietnam would return to the Republic of Korea if the military situation so dictated.

(b) Reduction of material operational capabilities. The suspension of MAP transfer has forced the expenditure since the suspension to date of approximately $65 million of MAP funds for commercial consumables such as POL, construction supplies, packing materials, industrial raw materials, clothing, and individual equipment. A more serious consequence is procurement of badly needed [deleted] equipment has been suspended. Restoration of the MAP transfer program would free approximately 3 million MAP dollars in the first year and 6 million in the second year of resumption and $49.6 million per year in 5 years.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is a vote, gentlemen, if you will excuse us, we will come right back.

(Short recess.)

Senator SYMINGTON. We will resume.

Will you proceed, Mr. Counsel?

Mr. PAUL. I have a few questions on this same subject unless the committee has other questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Please go ahead.

INFLUENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON ROK TROOP DECISION

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, concerning the reasons why the Koreans sent their forces to Vietnam, paragraph No. 1, in the letter of the South Korean Defense Minister dated January 8, 1965, to General Howze, which is quoted in the Defense Department's statement on page 81, says as follows:

There is strong public opinion in Korea to the effect that the sending of ROK troops to Vietnam should not result in weakening the defense capability in Korea. Therefore, it is necessary that a formal guarantee in any form for continued maintenance of the U.S. Forces in Korea at current level be made by the U.S. before ROK troops are sent to Vietnam, and that such guarantee be duly publicized.

I believe there are other references in the running correspondence to this factor of a Korean desire for the continuation of a U.S. military presence in Korea in connection with their sending troops to Vietnam. In light of these items, how important would you say in their decision to send troops to Vietnam was a desire to induce the United States to continue its own troop levels in Korea?

Mr. PORTER. Certainly the Koreans had then, as they have now, a desire to see the United States maintain its force levels in Korea. I

think they were endeavoring at that point to strengthen assurances that we had given, that they would not-that our forces would not, be drawn down or withdrawn without consultation.

They were hoping for more than that. But, in effect, Mr. Paul, they did not get it. We never gave them a commitment that we would not withdraw troops. We said we would not withdraw without consultation. They were aiming at, perhaps, a little more than that.

Mr. PAUL. But nonetheless, isn't there an intangible moral commitment between the presence of their troops in Vietnam and the continuation of our troops in Korea?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir. We do not consider that there is another commitment to the Korean state on the part of the U.S. Government as a result of their having sent troops to Vietnam.

PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCE LEVEL

Mr. PAUL. Now, you have said that we agreed that we would enter into prior consultations before reducing our force level in Korea. In other contexts we have seen that the term "prior consultation" can have a variety of meanings. What does it mean in this situation?

Mr. PORTER. I think it means the normal and natural process of consultation between friendly states when, as in this case, one wishes to withdraw or if one wishes to withdraw forces.

Mr. PAUL. What I read you says that the Koreans were anxious to publicize a guarantee that the United States was going to keep its forces in Korea, but they did not get such a guarantee.

Have they publicized the prior consultation arrangement which was agreed to?

Mr. PORTER. I am not sure whether they publicized it or not.

Mr. BROWN. I think we have said that publicly on some occasions. I am sure we have.

Mr. PORTER. We have said so. They sometimes don't emphasize those points as they are not as strong as they would like.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR SECOND ROK COMBAT DIVISION IN VIETNAM

Mr. PAUL. To make the record clear, I think you mentioned that formal discussions for sending a second combat division commenced in February 1966. Weren't there earlier more informal negotiations with respect to sending a second unit to Vietnam?

Mr. BROWN. The subject was discussed in general from January, I cannot remember exactly when.

U.S. SUPPORT COSTS FOR ROK SÓLDIER IN VIETNAM

Mr. PAUL. The Defense Department statement on page 92 says that the cost to support a single American soldier in Vietnam is $13,000, but that the cost for a single Korean soldier cannot be isolated.

The Washington Star, on December 11, 1969, copies of which I believe I gave vou ahead of the hearing, calculated on the basis of publicly released testimony the costs to the United States for support of a Korean soldier at about $7,800. In the Philippine hearings which we held we received a figure for the overall cost for supporting the

Philippine noncombatants, whom the chairman has referred to earlier. From this one could calculate how much per Philippine noncombatant it cost the United States to maintain those personnel in Vietnam. If I did it correctly, I arrive at a figure less than $7,000. Why can you not calculate what it costs the United States to support a single Korean soldier in Vietnam from information which MACV could supply you? Could you speak to that, General Michaelis?

General MICHAELIS. Insofar as there are expenditures, of course, in Vietnam for those soldiers. I do not have those figures.

Mr. PAUL. But MACV does?

General MICHAELIS. MACV does.

Mr. PAUL. Could you supply for the record then what it is. One would add the costs incurred in Vietnam to the costs that are related to this force in Korea connected with the Brown letter and any other related costs in Korea for sending the troops.

General MICHAELIS. I will endeavor to get it. (The information referred to follows:)

U.S. SUPPORT COSTS FOR ONE ROK SOLDIER IN VIETNAM

The total estimated FY 70 amount contained in the Military Functions appropriation to support ROK forces in Vietnam and Related Costs is about $250 million. This amount does not include U.S. costs for maintaining the logistics organization necessary to provide support, nor the costs of providing combat support, such as air strikes, helo lift, etc.

There are currently about 50,000 ROK forces in Vietnam. By dividing this number into $250 million one can say that the support costs to the U.S. to maintain one ROK soldier in Vietnam in FY 70 was approximately $5,000.

IS ROK FORCE REDUCTION IN VIETNAM CONTEMPLATED?

Mr. PAUL. Has there been any indication on the part of the Koreans that they are contemplating reducing their forces in Vietnam, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir.

ROK UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING TROOP WITHDRAWALS

Senator FULBRIGHT. I was not quite clear about this previously. It is related to this question. Do you believe that the Koreans understand so long as they keep troops in Vietnam that we will not withdraw our troops from Korea?

Mr. PORTER. There is no reason for the Koreans to believe that, sir. There is no

Do

Senator FULBRIGHT. There is no reason for them. Do they believe it? you have a view about it?

Mr. PORTER. I do not think they believe it. I don't think

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then may I have your assurance that when this record comes to be published you will not insist on taking your statement out?

Mr. PORTER. I would personally not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I mean your department. This is the sort of thing about which I think there ought to be an understanding. It is my own view that the Koreans believe that we have no power to make them bring their troops home from Vietnam, and so long as they have troops

in Vietnam we will keep our troops in Korea, and that really we are immobilized.

General MICHAELIS. May I comment here?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, I am asking for comment. I have to try to elicit these. If you don't agree and it is not true, I want you to say so. General MICHAELIS. I have actually heard the President on the activation of the 151st Fighter Squadron of new F-4's in a public ceremony state the day is approaching when "we know the U.S. forces will have to be withdrawn."

Senator FULBRIGHT. From Korea?

General MICHAELIS. From Korea. I have heard the Prime Minister personally tell us that on several occasions. They look forward to that day, sir, but they don't want it now.

Senator SYMINGTON. The same thing is true with the German and also the South Vietnamese government. I do not say that sarcastically, but sincerely.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do they indicate any time they think would be proper?

NORTH AND SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY STRENGTH

May I ask this? Doesn't South Korea have more troops under arms than North Korea?

General MICHAELIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How much more?

General MICHAELIS. The size of the North Korean Army is

Senator FULBRIGHT. Roughly.

General MICHAELIS (continuing). About 350,000. The South Korean Army is about 500,000.

Senator FULBRIGHT. With ours it is about 550,000.
General MICHAELIS. 550,000 approximately.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't understand this. Are the North Koreans much more dangerous and better fighters than the South Koreans? General MICHAELIS. Sir, it is a question of terrain, it is a question of lack of mobility. The terrain of this portion of the DMZ, sir, is brutal, and the North Koreans, because they will be the attacker, have the economy of the force. He can assemble force in any one area and drive a wedge in there, there is no question, so it takes many more men to defend all areas.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Soviets have given the North Koreans a very powerful air force, more powerful than South Korea's; isn't that correct?

General MICHAELIS. The North Korean air force is the major threat. Senator SYMINGTON. When the Pueblo problem came up we had some six planes available. As I remember, the North Koreans have some [deleted] MIG-21's out of 400-some fighters; and they were just laying back at Wonsan hoping we would try to protect or rescue the Pueblo crew. Actually North Korea, as a military force, even without their air force, is considerably stronger than North Vietnam, is it not? General MICHAELIS. It is the fourth largest Communist army in the world.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Pardon?