NO PRECEDENT FOR U.S. PAYMENT OF PERSONAL ALLOWANCES TO

ROK FORCES

Senator FULBRIGHT. In this case the point I am trying to make is that I am not referring to arms or equipment or subsistence which we provided in other wars. I am referring only to these personal allowances to each soldier, which would seem to me to be designed, if we could use the parlance of the capitalistic system, to make a profit on the war.

Mr. PORTFR. I think the Korean government was attempting to get the best possible conditions for its soldiers; yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know of any other war, any precedent, where we have paid allowances of this character to individual soldiers of another country?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir. But there are precedents of other governments doing it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. No. I mean our government. Do you know of any precedent?

Mr. PORTER. In our government I don't know of any.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't either. In this particular character of it, I am trying to get at the bottom of the significance of this relationship because here again I think this is a matter about which the Congress and the people ought to know. They ought not to be under illusions of this character involving so much money. This is all a part of the question of whether what we are doing in Vietnam is in the interests of the United States. This is a part of that picture. It is a peripheral part, it is true, but it is a part of it, and this has been used by the previous Administration-not this one, so far as I know-to try to justify the policy which they were following.

I think it is a relevant question and one that we ought to try to understand, not only for the conclusion of this war, which is far from over, but it may be considered in connection with the burgeoning war in Laos or in Thailand.

It is something we ought to understand. We are not experts. We have not had a long history in the hiring of mercenaries; have we? We have helped countries in Europe, but I don't know of a precedent of this kind where we double the salary of the foreign troops to volunteer, as they call it, to fight for us. This is the precedent for which I was asking.

Do you know of any or do you, General?

General MICHAELIS. None, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. BROWN. No, I don't.'

Mr. PORTER. If I may make a remark here, sir-
Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. PORTER (continuing). We who are very close to that situation, maintain that the principal motive was not financial reward. After negotiating the terms of the conditions under which their troops would go or what we could do for them financially, in the way of allowances or other support, the Koreans have never harassed us about funds in the sense that somebody else was getting more from the war than they were.

Senator FULBRIGHT. No one was.

Mr. PORTER. That question has never-
Senator FULBRIGHT. No one was that I know of.

Mr. PORTER. I think there were several countries, not participating in the war; did a little better in terms of financial reward. Senator FULBRIGHT. What do you mean? Who were?

BENEFITS TO JAPANESE FROM VIETNAM WAR

Mr. PORTER. The Japanese, for example.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We had no agreement of this kind with the Japanese.

Mr. PORTER. No; but in terms of financial return for our services supplied during the Vietnam war and connected with the Vietnam

war.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The Japanese were not used as an example of great support for this misguided policy in Vietnam. They were in commerce. The Japanese make no bones about being in commerce. Mr. PORTER. But my point is, sir, the Koreans, once the terms were set, never harassed us as to who was getting what from the Vietnam war in terms of economic benefits.

U.S. PAYMENT OF OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES FOR ROK FORCES

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I want to read one paragraph of General Beach's reply to Minister Kim, to complete this part of the record. The paragraph reads as follows:

"The U.S. would agree to pay the cost of Overseas Allowances at the same rates now in effect for ROK Forces presently in Vietnam. The current rates which were established by your Government are apparently ample for the purpose intended. As you are aware, at current rates at least half of the allowances now being paid are being remitted back to Korea with consequent substantial benefits to the Korean foreign exchange position."

I want to add that our assistance to England, France or even to Russia during World War II or those troops in Korea was not quite the same as this where we have undertaken to pay the allowances for the individual troops. In World War II that was aid to Great Britain and aid to France. It was in a different form and did not involve special allowance. Those countries paid their own troops on their own schedule. We simply picked up the deficits in their balance of purchases, primarily of purchases of goods in this country. That, I think, was a principal difference.

I know of no precedent. I don't think there are real precedents for what we have done in Korea.

Mr. BROWN. May I say, Senator, I don't think the Korean Government considers nor did the Korean people consider that they were mercenaries. I think they considered their presence in Vietnam was something that was a source to them of pride and satisfaction, and that has had a very important effect in the development of their country.

CONFLICT BETWEEN ROK MOTIVATION AND U.S. PAYMENT OF ROK FORCES

Senator FULBRIGHT. If that is a fact, then it seems to me the fact that we paid them on this basis is all the more inexcusable. I see no

reason for doubling their salaries, if they figure they are not mercenary, if they are doing their duty under their national honor, if you want to call it that. I think that only makes our agreement all the more improvident unless you are trying to give them more aid and using this as a guise.

Mr. BROWN. No, sir. I think they feel that putting their lives on the line is a contribution.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't know how you reconcile the two motives. It is either one or the other. If the pay which is described in General Kim's letter, and the psychology of getting them to volunteer-I don't think you can have it both ways. You have to take your choice.

Mr. PORTER. Sir, it seems to us, If I may say so, that it would be impossible for this Government or any government of Korea to send troops to a foreign country, something they have never done in their history, purely for the sake of financial benefits. Neither the Assembly nor the people would stand for that.

The motivation, is something else, of course, the fact that we could support the costs was important.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is the purpose of our Government in doling out these huudreds of millions of dollars then? If that is true, what excuse do you have for doing this? This is what I meant in the beginning. If that is true, then it is very improvident. If it was not necessary to give them these double allowances, then why did you do it? How then do you support what would seem to me to be the clear improvidence of the Brown agreement if your motive is correct?

I am saying you seem to want to have it both ways. They want to go to Vietnam only to show their devotion to freedom and democracy in the United States. If that is true why do you insist on giving them double their pay?

Mr. BROWN. To treat them like everybody else.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We didn't treat them like anyone else. Who else have you treated this way? I asked if there were any precedent, and the General said he didn't know of any.

General MICHAELIS. Could I add here a figure: This is already in our statement, the private in the ROK Army gets $1.60 a month, just to buy cigarettes and small necessities. Some type of supply would have had to be given him.

Senator SYMINGTON. We found out in the Philippines that the amount each Philippine soldier bought at the PX, where he had permission to buy, was considerably more than his total annual salary. General MICHAELIS. I understand, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. For available information regarding remittances to Korea, from January 1, 1969, to December 31, 1969, they sent back almost $29 million out of the allowances through the Government of Korea. January, 1970, one month, is $1,855,000. I don't see how you gentlemen can argue both ways. If they don't regard themselves as mercenaries and if they went for patriotic reasons, why did we make such an agreement?

(The following information was submitted for the record.)

CHRONOLOGY OF KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAM AND AMERICAN SUPPORT Korean participation in Vietnam began in 1964 when a ROK Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) and ten Taekwondo instructors were dispatched to Vietnam. Initially the ROK Government paid base pay, allowances and trans

portation to Vietnam. [Deleted.]

In late 1964 discussions were undertaken by the United States and Korean Governments with respect to sending additional units to Vietnam in early 1965. In these discussions, the United States agreed to pay subsistence, maintenance and operation costs, and allowances at the following rates:

In June 1965 the Korean Government received a formal request from the Republic of Vietnam for a combat division. The Korean Regional Assembly approved the dispatch on August 13, and the first Korean combat troops arrived in Vietnam in October.

Definitive discussions between the U.S. and ROK authorities on the troop despatch began immediately after receipt of the RVN request. The ROKG sought to insure that the troop despatch would not impair Korean defense nor adversely affect the level of U.S. military assistance. It also sought agreement on the terms of U.S. support for the troops in Vietnam.

The U.S. agreed to the following commitments:

(a) No U.S. or ROK force reductions in Korea without prior consultation. (b) MAP level for FY 66 not be affected by the deployment.

(c) MAP level for FY 66 to include a $7 million add-on to provide active division equipment status for the three ready reserve divisions.

(d) MAP transfer program to be suspended for FY 66 and transfer items in the program to be procured by MAP in Korea.

(e) ROK forces in Korea to be modernized in fire power, communications and mobility.

(f) The U.S. will provide equipment, logistical support, construction, training, transportation, subsistence, overseas allowances, funds for any legitimate noncombatant claim which may be brought against ROKFV in RVN, and restitution of ROKFV cash losses not resulting from ROKV negligence.

Allowances for these troops (the Tiger Division and the Marine Brigade) were set at the same rates as those for the MASH and Dove Units. Since the Division was to be commanded by a Major General, a rate for the rank ($7.50 per day) was also established.

In February 1966 additional ROK troops were requested by RVN. On February 28, 1966, the ROKG announced that additional troops would be sent to Vietnam; the National Assembly approved the despatch on March 30, 1966; and the first troops began to deploy in April.

In negotiations with the ROKG on the troop despatch, the U.S. took the position that it should not impair the security of Korea and that it should not impose any economic burden on the country.

The Brown Letter of March 4, 1966 established the arrangements under which these troops would be despatched to Vietnam. Some of the daily allowance rates for enlisted men were then amended as follows, effective July 1, 1966:

In the course of correspondence preceding this raise in allowances, Korean Defense Minister Kim stated that the prospect of an increase in allowances was, among other things, an important element in attracting volunteers. In 1966 the United States assumed, as it had with the earlier division, the costs of transportation, overseas maintenance of the forces deployed, overseas allowances, and

payment of non-combatant claims. Death gratuities and wounded-in-action benefits were also to be paid by the United States.

The American support was summed up in a letter from General Dwight E. Beach, the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command to the Minister of National Defense dated 18 January 1966. As of July 1966, the rates for Korean forces in Vietnam were as follows:

In subsequent agreements the United States agreed to use special letters of credit to supplement the ROKS for their forces in Vietnam. This was agreed to in the summer of 1967 and finalized in October 1967.

In June 1967 the ROK Government proposed to send an additional 3,000 men to Vietnam to round out their forces there. These departed for Vietnam in July of that year.

In all the ROK Government has deployed 47,872 military personnel to the Republic of Vietnam in four major increments.

The ROK Forces in Vietnam have acquitted themselves well. They operate in two different Corps tactical zones (CTZ). In I CTZ, [deleted] battalions of the ROK 2d Marine Brigade operate in the vicinity of Hoi An. In II CTZ, [deleted] battalions from the Capitol and 9th Infantry Divisions operate along the coast from north of Qui Nhon southward to Phan Rang. ROK operations in Vietnam have been characterized by a combination of combat operations and pacification activities. In both I and II CTZ's, enemy initiated activity has declined in those areas in which ROK Forces operate. The activity of ROK and US/Republic of Vietnam Army forces, as measured by contacts, casualties, and weapons captured has similarly declined. Cumulative ROK casualties as of 7 February 1970 are: KIA-3,094; WIA-6,051; MIA-4. Cumulative casualties in the ROK area of operations are: KIA-30,070.

The cost of supporting a single U.S. soldier in Vietnam is $13,000 a year. The cost of supporting a single Korean soldier in Vietnam cannot be isolated. The ROKG deployed a force of 47,872 military personnel to RVN in four major increments as listed below: