ROK FORCES ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS COMMAND

Mr. Ambassador, in your statement you pointed out, I believe, that the Koreans placed their men under the operational control of the commander in chief of the United Nations Command on May 26, 1961. Had they been under CINCUNC's command before this date? TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM J. PORTER, AMBASSADOR, U.S. EMBASSY, SEOUL, KOREA; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. JOHN H. MICHAELIS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMUSK, COMMANDING GENERAL, 8TH ARMY; GEN. LELAND G. CAGWIN, FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL, 2D INFANTRY DIVISION; MAJ. GEN. LIVINGSTON N. TAYLOR, CHIEF, JOINT MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, KOREA; AND BRIG. GEN. ARTHUR W. HOLDERNESS, JR., COMMANDER, 314TH AIR DIVISION, PACAF

Mr. PORTER. Yes, they had been under CINCUNC prior to that time, but during the coup d'etat period of 1961, certain of them did not respond to ČINCUNC direction. And then subsequent to the takeover by the forces under new President Park, the forces of the Korean Republic were placed under CINCUNC operational control once more. Mr. PAUL. What were the circumstances that led up to the understanding that was reached on May 26, 1961?

Mr. PORTER. Well, the circumstances involved conversations as to whether this was a desirable thing to do. In effect, it was decided that CINCUNC would assume control and that the Republic of Korea did place its forces under OPCON.

Mr. PAUL. What were the reasons and circumstances leading to the agreement of September 20, 1961, providing for temporary withdrawal from that control?

Mr. PORTER. May I see if General Michaelis wishes to say something on this one. Do you want to say something.

General MICHAELIS. I am sorry, I didn't hear the question.

Mr. PAUL. What are the arrangements, General, under which the Korean forces may be removed from your operational control and what were the reasons and circumstances leading up to these arrangements that are dated September 20, 1961?

General MICHAELIS. ROK forces may be temporarily removed from OPCON in the event of national emergencies such as flood, fire emergencies of that nature. ROK troops were used during the coup d'etat for defense of the capital, Seoul, without the authority of CINCUNC. Again in 1961 ROK forces were placed under OPCON or CINCUNC, at which time the ROKG agreed that ROK forces would not be withdrawn without written approval of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. This, of course, is with the exception of emergency conditions I have just cited which could be handled by telephone and confirmed in writing.

Mr. PAUL. Do these emergency conditions also include civil disorders?

General MICHAELIS. They have. May I look at the exact verbiage. Mr. PORTER. Emergency conditions.

General MICHAELIS. May I read this to you, "Emergency conditions: Requests may be by telephone call by the assistant minister to the chief of staff, United Nations Command, including the nature of the emergency, specific units to be used, approximate period the units are needed. A telephone call must be followed by a written request to CINCUNC and include the information required under normal conditions. The normal conditions, the purpose of the request, specific units to be used, the approximate strength, specific time, the effect on the operational readiness or training and when applicable reasons why an extension may be necessary."

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, when you said they did not respond to CINCUNC's command or operational control, was this a reference to the circumstances during the coup in which they were pulled out to defend the capital?

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

MUTUAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN NORTH KOREA, SOVIET UNION, AND RED CHINA

Mr. PAUL. Turning to the other side of the 38th parallel, does North Korea have a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union or Communist China?

Mr. PORTER. Yes; they have a mutual defense arrangement, treaties with both powers.

Mr. PAUL. The committee understands that the operative language in the treaty with the Soviet Union, and perhaps with Communist China reads:

Should either of the contracting parties suffer armed attack by any state or coalition of states, and thus find itself in a state of war, the other contracting party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.

COMPARISON OF DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

If this is a correct statement of the relevant language, how does that compare, Mr. Ambassador, with our defense treaty with Korea? Is it defensive or offensive, and what is the obligation of the great power that is involved.

Mr. PORTER. Well, the agreements which North Korea has with the Soviet Union and the CPR, are limited to defense against armed attack as in the case of the mutual defense treaty which we have with the Republic of Korea. The language in the North Korean agreements seem strong and definitive. There are some possible ambiguities, however.

We have no way of knowing, for example, what the parties may mean or what meaning the parties may attach to the critical phrases "find itself in a state of war," "military and other assistance," and "all means at its disposal."

Mr. PAUL. Does the Soviet Union or Communist China regularly reconfirm this commitment publicly as we have done with our treaty with South Korea?

Mr. PORTER. I wouldn't say they confirm it regularly. There have been periodic references to the bonds which unite one party or the other with North Korea, none in recent times that I recall out of the Chinese, but on certain occasions such as holidays and when visits are

exchanged there are references to their arrangements. If not specific then in general terms?

Mr. PAUL. Just for clarity what do you mean by "in general terms". Mr. PORTER. I mean to the bonds that unite them, sometimes without reference or particular mention of the treaty itself.

REASONS FOR U.S. COMMITMENT TO ROK

Mr. PAUL. Finally, just so the record is complete at this point, Mr. Ambassador, what would you say are the reasons why we should be committed to the defense of Korea?

Mr. PORTER. I believe it is in our interest to maintain our basic commitment to the Korean Republic, first, because it involves matters of confidence which extend far beyond the borders of Korea. It was one of our first undertakings with respect to the development and protection of the free Asians in the face of considerable Communist power, it reassures the Korean people themselves who have turned into a stout ally as well as a recipient of assistance, that their association. with the United States will continue to be, continue to help them, and reassures them that their development will go on in the atmosphere of confidence which results from the existence of the mutual security treaty.

It is a commitment of the United States to the freedom and development of the Korean people which, as I say, has attracted the attention and even the admiration of a very great part of Asia and other parts of the world.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.N. COMMAND AND UNITED NATIONS

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, what is the practical relationship today between the U.N. Command and the United Nations in New York? Mr. PORTER. The relationship, of course, is one that has found reaffirmation in the outcome of annual resolutions in the United Nations. In voting down resolutions introduced by friends of North Korea calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic of Korea, the United Nations, in effect, confirms the existence and its approval of the U.N. Command under a commander designated by the United States in accordance with the 1950 U.N. resolution.

SECURITY THREAT

Mr. PAUL. I would like to turn now to the subject of the security threat to South Korea, if that is satisfactory, Mr. Chairman. In this connection I would ask Ambassador Porter to read (page 1705) and then (pages 1709 to 1710) of his statement, and then ask General Michaelis to read (pages 1728 to 1729) of his statement.

Mr. PORTER. The armistice of 1953 was not a peace settlement. It laid down the conditions of cease-fire and recommended a political settlement, which has never been reached. North and South Korea remain, therefore, two parts of a divided country and have no relations of any kind. In consequence, almost a million men have faced each other along and near the 38th parallel since that year, including a sizable contingent of American troops. At present, Koreans of the South regard this situation with anxiety, not because they fear the North on a man-to-man basis today, but because they know that Kim Il Sung is

committed to reunification of the peninsula by force if necessary and because they recall all too vividly that the North Korean attack in 1950 received support both from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The American forces still remaining in Korea are not only an important military part of the defense shield for South Korea but their presence is of considerable psychological importance in maintaining the sense of confidence which is responsible for so much of Korea's development. They are tangible visible evidence of continued U.S. support. The presence of some of our forces on the DMZ has confirmed, to both North and South, our commitment to defend Korea in accordance with the terms of the treaty. We have never proposed the withdrawal of our forces from the DMZ.

The North Koreans have made many efforts to infiltrate agents through the DMZ or by sea further south. The most dramatic of these was their attempted assassination of President Park on January 21, 1968. In almost every case these agents have been detected, killed, or captured. The Koreans who have come into contact with these agents almost immediately inform the police, even in cases involving members of their own families. Their memories of North Korean actions during the Korean war are bitter. Additionally, bonuses equal to $660 are paid to anyone except a government officer who provides information leading to capture or killing of an enemy agent.

The Koreans have developed a very widespread and quite efficient counter-insurgency capability. We have helped them in this endeavor by providing training and such material as communications equipment, transportation, and small arms.

The effectiveness of anti-infiltration measures, both in terms of organization and equipment, which have been put into effect, is undoubtedly responsible, at least to a considerable extent, for the fact that this effort has tapered off notably over the past year, and that at this time the situation generally is calmer than it has been for many years. But, the North and South still face each other in mute and menacing distrust.

U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SPLIT COUNTRIES

Senator SYMINGTON. Before you go to the next heading, Mr. Ambassador, you are one of the more experienced professionals in this field. We have now gone to country splitting, you might say. First we split Germany. Then we split China. We stay with billions and billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of people in the case of Germany, China we stay with billions of dollars and thousands of people. Then we split Korea, and stay there with billions of dollars and tens of thousands of military, all at heavy cost to the American taxpayer. Then we split Vietnam, go in there with hundreds of thousands of people and tens of billions of dollars. Now we split Laos, and go in there with hundreds of millions of dollars and lots of people. Do you know of any other country we plan to split pretty soon?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. This has been quite an interesting policy, hasn't it, over the years?

The countries split. We get into the picture with people and treasure. Then we go on, year after year, pouring out assets abroad that we need

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so badly here at home. How long have you been in the State Department?

Mr. PORTER. About 32 years, sir.

Senator GORE. Will the Chairman yield?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would be glad to yield.

Senator GORE. The Senator, I am sure, means no slight; but I want to recall that my grand fathers tried to split our own country.

Senator SyMINGTON. That was an internal problem.

Senator GORE. Excuse the interruption.

Senator SYMINGTON, I welcome the able senior Senator from Tennessee. Any time he has any questions or comments I would hope he would give us the benefit of either.

U.S. POLICY ON SPLIT COUNTRIES

But getting on with this, what is the reason for this incredible policy? What is it all about, aside from the fact it is bringing our economy to its knees. You are under oath and I would like your frank opinion.

Mr. Porter. Well, I don't mind giving you my own opinion, as an official. I hope I have learned something over the years, Senator.

It seems to me that most of these splits which you mentioned, which are serious and enduring have not been brought about mainly because of our effort to achieve splits. There have been other parties very deeply involved, I mean third parties. The Korean people of the North soon found that the Russians, for example, when we went in there, did not intend to unify the country or permit a United Nations supervised election in any form. In that particular case the split. I think it can be honesty said from a close reading of history, should be attributed

The Vietnam case is more complex. I don't feel competent at this time to go into that extensively. It is not in the area where I function. Serater Syvxorex. But you were the Deputy Ambassador out Few and you told me more about Vernam in one night than I learned Use Week