Senator SYMINGTON. Nor has our military presence prevented war in Vietnam nor in Laos. Nor will it prevent, in the long run, war between Taiwan and Red China, if we continue present policy. I just don't understand, and am talking more from a military standpoint, not from a political standpoint. It is a totally new concept of how to use your military and financial resources. No other country has done this. The British in their era of Pax Brittanica as against ours of Pax Americana, turned the job over to the local forces. They did relatively little fighting and made a good profit out of their investments in other countries. I am of course talking about the small wars of the 18th and 19th centuries.

We are anxious to do the fighting but we never take the offensive, so listening to the story about the fact they can't hit the people who hit them unless they get our approval to me is the ultimate în lack of logic. Senator FULBRIGHT. Have there been no raids from the South to the North. No action?

Mr. PORTER. Nothing on the scale that could be called as provocative as that which, for example, the North launched in 1968 against the residence of the President of South Korea.

PROVOCATIONS AND INFILTRATION BY NORTH KOREA

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is the only one I heard about; is that the only incident?

Mr. PORTER. There have been other North Korean provocations. Some of our installations on the DMZ have been occasionally attacked and blown up.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I hadn't heard of any serious ones other than the so-called attempt at assassination of the President.

Mr. PORTER. There have been other infiltrations too, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And we have not, the Koreans have not infiltrated the north.

Mr. PORTER. Not as a planned campaign of notable dimension.
Senator FULBRIGHT. I mean in any fashion. They don't do it.
Mr. PORTER. They don't do it as a matter of policy, no.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Because we don't allow them to, is that why they don't?

Mr. PORTER. I think they understand that anything of any dimension requires consultation, and they-with us, haven't abandoned that concept.

PROBABLE FUTURE POLICIES OF NORTH KOREA

Mr. PAUL. General, would you want to continue. In the middle of (page 1729).

General MICHAELIS. North Korea during 1970 will probably continue to upgrade conventional forces with modern equipment furnished primarily by the Soviet Union, increase advanced combat training, and further strengthen the Military Establishment. North Korea will probably continue a diplomatic campaign to improve relations with non-aligned countries and increase its influence among Communist nations. Independence of action in politics and good relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China continues as an integral part of North Korean policy. North Korea continues to refuse the competence of the United Nations on Korea issues. An intensive

propaganda campaign to "peacefully" reunite Korea may be expected if any U.S. forces are withdrawn. North Korea is likely to pursue its objective of a "South Korean Revolution" and may take advantage of any unrest resulting from the upcoming Republic of Korea (1971) elections, an economic recession, and/or rifts in United States/Republic of Korea relations.

A measure of restraint may continue in creating incidents of a magnitude which might cause reassessment of the U.S. military presence in the Republic of Korea. Agent activity will be characterized by sophisticated operations, and a lower degree of violence, with an objective of building a subversive base in the Republic of Korea which can be exploited during periods of unrest. Information is not available as to why North Korean infiltrators have not made regular attacks upon U.S. military installations.

LACK OF NORTH KOREAN ATTACKS ON U.S. INSTALLATIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. What does that say?

General MICHAELIS. Information is not available to us, as to why the North Koreans have not made attacks upon our installations and facilities.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What do you think.

Have you got a theory about it?

General MICHAELIS. Yes; I think primarily because an attack upon U.S. installations on facilities in the Republic of Korea is not the North Korean objective. Their objective is to cause a rift between the United States and the Republic of Korea. By attacking our installations the North Koreans simply bring the ROK's and the United States closer together.

[Deleted.]

COMPARISONS BETWEEN ROK AND NORTH KOREANS

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like the general to read the figures. Why can't they defend themselves with all this money and supplies? Why do we have also to keep 60,000 troops there for 20 years? Would you read the table?

General MICHAELIS. Yes; comparison between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korean (NK)

NECESSITY OF DEPENDENCE OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON THE UNITED STATES

Senator SYMINGTON. If they have a bigger army, navy, and air force, and determination to defend their country, and they, the South Koreans, have double the gross national product, and two and a half times the population, and if we give them all this money, why can't they do the job by themselves, militarily speaking?

General MICHAELIS. May I answer that?

Senator SYMINGTON. Please.

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. That is part of the extrapolation we always use. What I want to know, based on the record you have just read, it is inconceivable, if South Korea wants to defend itself why it can't do so with our logistic support. They, the South Koreans, have the North Koreans licked in every category, except they don't tax their people as much. That is the only item that the North Koreans have them beat

on.

General MICHAELIS. Part of your question can be answered by Ambassador Porter, sir.

[Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. You say [deleted].

What would be wrong with that, if it is their country? Why don't they go ahead and do it themselves if they want their country back? Do we restrain them from trying to get their country back?

What would have been the reaction in this country if either the French or British had told either side in our Civil War, not to move into Maryland or Pennsylvania, or told Lincoln, Grant should not go into Virginia? What would have been the reaction to that? What do we do, tell these people they cannot try to get their country back and then pay them not to try?

General MICHAELIS. You are directing your questions to matters of national policy which I am not competent to answer.

Senator SYMINGTON. What are your thoughts about this Mr. Ambassador.

Look at what they have. Why can't they handle it themselves with this amount of support in weapons and supplies?

DISCUSSION OF TREATY COMMITMENT

Mr. PORTER. They are in charge of seven-eighths of the lines. There has been a Koreanization of the DMZ to a rather extraordinary extent. I forget what the general indicated the figure was.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then why can't we pull say one division out. Mr. PORTER. Well, there are studies, the Under Secretary has given testimony before this committee, there are studies under way to deal with these problems. But I can't predict the outcome of them. But the question is certainly germane, and there will perhaps be something more authoritative than I know about at this time on the subject. I can't say. But certainly, we are also committed to peaceful reunification of that country, as is the United Nations, and if they were to cross the line in pursuit of some objective, either in the air or on the ground, it is very unlikely that the two states to the north of Korea, that is to say the Soviet Union and the Chinese, would look upon that passively.

Senator SYMINGTON. But if we get out then the South Koreans have the right to do the same thing to North Korea that we say the Soviets and the Chinese in turn say North Korea has to do to South Korea, haven't they?

Mr. PORTER. Out of there or in there, you have got a basic commitment which would have to be dealt with.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What is that? What is the basic commitment? Mr. PORTER. The treaty commitment.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is what I wanted to get clear.

Mr. PORTER. This is a factor that we should consider very carefully. The North may be looked upon by the two major Communist States as a buffer zone between those States essentially and ourselves, and any incursion by southern forces

Senator SYMINGTON. Even if we are not in the South?

Mr. PORTER. Quite possibly. If we had entree into the South and were called upon to reenter the South as we once felt

Senator SYMINGTON. We are out of the South, let's say; certainly South Korea today is infinitely stronger than in June 1950 when the North Koreans hit.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And they know a lot about war they didn't know then.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And they have fine armies, including one that could come back from Vietnam. Are you saying that if they attacked North Korea like North Korea attacked them that would be bad.

Mr. PORTER. [Deleted.] What I am saying is that this would immediately arouse the attention and perhaps the action of the two major Communist States, especially if the southerners seem to be succeeding. Senator SYMINGTON. What you are saying then confirms what we have learned in these hearings; that much of our policies are not set in Washington, rather in Moscow and Peking. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why a great Army general told me in the last few weeks that many fine young officers were resigning because they are fed up with this hanging their clothes on a hickory limb but never going near the water policy when it came to military action. I was in the executive branch when pilots were forced to watch their wingman shot down, but not allowed to shoot the enemy who did it if it involved hot pursuit; this in the Korean war.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir, we are committed to the peaceful reunification of the country, that is policy which has been determined and maintained and I can't make fundamental comment on it.

CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator SYMINGTON. Isn't this all a sad situation for us to get in? Isn't there some way we can turn the job of defending their country over to the local people, just give them our treasure instead of the lives of so many of our youth?

What we are really doing is saturating the world with uniforms, but emphasizing we don't want to fight because we are afraid of the real enemy; isn't that a fair statement?

Mr. PORTER. I am not sure I would say it that way, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How would you say it?

Mr. PORTER. I would say we would rather not. We would rather have a dialog than fight.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then why do we send soldiers? Why don't we send people like you?

Mr. PORTER. Well, we are both there experience has indicated there has been a very harsh war perhaps because of our premature withdrawal.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where was that?

Mr. PORTER. In Korea. We have to be awfully cautious about the way we handle any changes in our present position.

Senator SYMINGTON. I fully supported our defending Korea, but do you think, in all sincerity, that it would have been disastrous to the security of the United States if we had lost Korea?

Mr. PORTER. I can't say, sir. It depends on what that loss would lead to.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, if you can't say you can't say. Neither could I say but I do know it has cost us many billions of dollars and a great many thousand lives, and the same is true with respect to Vietnam, and it may well end up that way in Laos. Then we have the Middle East situation which because of your experience I would like to kick around with you before you go back, and then we have Europe.

U.S. DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could I for the record read one sentence out of the committee report at the time this treaty was made.

Senator George, I believe, made this report to the Senate; this was in 1954, January 21, the Defense Treaty with Korea, Executive Report No. 1, which says:

But there is no obligation incumbent upon the U.S. under the Korean treaty to participate in the internal security of the Korean Republic or to take any military measures as a result of the violent overthrow of the government or through coup d'etat. There is in fact no obligation for the U.S. to maintain any armed forces whatsoever in Korea.

And on the basis of this kind of presentation of course they get the support of the Senate to put through a treaty.

Senator SYMINGTON. What year was that?

Senator FULBRIGHT. 1954. This was the report of the treaty based upon the presentation by the Department of State. Of course, the Senators at that time, and the Senate, felt no probability, I suppose, of having to maintain forces forever there.

Senator SYMINGTON. There just doesn't seem any stopping of this outflow of our resources. In recent years we have put in the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Thailand a total of $21.3 billion in aid. Perhaps we should not have gone in the first place. In any case it is now just a question of how long the American economy can handle it. Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I was going to say that as I see it our forces are there in Korea to deter aggression, contribute to the prevention of the kind of attack which happened in 1950 and which, if it happened again, would involve the treaty and would thereby involve us in some major hostility.

35-205-70-pt. 6- -6