Senator SYMINGTON. But the treaty is a unilateral treaty. Each signatory has a right to look. It doesn't automatically involve us. I have read the SEATO treaty carefully because of all of the wordsthe false premises that have been built up about it. The treaty says at the point of decision one has the right, unilaterally, to make the decision as to whether it is

Mr. BROWN. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Äll right. So it is not necessary for us to be in Vietnam based on the treaty unless we think it is in our national interest. We don't have any primary obligation to anybody except ourselves based on the wording of the treaty.

Mr. BROWN. It certainly would be very unfortunate if that treaty were-in which a situation arose in which it had to-be invoked.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who else has gone into these countries under this treaty with anything other than strictly token support, if that. What is Germany or France or Italy doing? We defend them in NATO. What have they done? What has the Philippines done? [Deleted.]

WHY SHOULDN'T TREATY BE REVOKED?

Why don't these other people do something, make some real sacrifice, if it is the SEATO treaty that you hang your hat on with respect to this situation.

Mr. BROWN. I was not talking about SEATO.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You were not talking about SEATO. You and the Ambassador invoked the treaty and both of you prompt me to ask the question if that is the reason and that is the only reason we think of, why don't we consider revoking the treaty. Here they are, we have done the job of building them up to twice as strong in nearly every category than the others, with a year's notice we can get rid of the treaty and then supposing we did that then what would your excuse be for staying there?

Mr. BROWN. Well if we did that I think we would offer quite a considerable temptation to Kim Il Sung to come and pursue his objectives by force.

Senator SYMINGTON. I didn't hear you, I am sorry.

Mr. BROWN. I say if we should denounce the treaty that would leave quite a temptation to Mr. Kim Il Sung to consider marching southward.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Kim Il Sung ought to have his ears beaten down if he were so foolish to do it if these figures are right. The South Koreans are twice as strong as Mr. Kim Il Sung; I don't know why he would be so foolish as to do that if the figures which the Ambassador or the general has read are correct. Do you mean Mr. Kim Il Sung or do you mean somebody else?

Mr. BROWN. I mean Mr. Kim Il Sung.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, if you do, I don't understand the reasoning of that.

General MICHAELIS. One reason, sir, is the North Koreans have a superior air force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I understood you to say a while ago you thought they could maintain their end-they could resist. General MICHAELIS. Ground wise but the major—

Senator FULBRIGHT. It would be a relatively minor matter to give them some Phantom jets if that is all that is required.

General MICHAELIS. It would require the construction of adequate. air fields which would be extremely expensive.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It wouldn't be nearly as expensive as what it is now costing but that is a minor matter, I mean to give them a few more airplanes. They don't need all that many. The air force is larger, they have [deleted] against [deleted]. It couldn't be more than a question of a hundred or so planes.

General MICHAELIS. It is a question of modernity.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Let's assume we cured that, then what would you say, have you got any further reason?

General MICHAELIS. I said earlier if modernization could take place, a thorough modernization of the ROK Armed Forces they could certainly withstand it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't see how your testimony and Mr. Brown's are consistent, frankly.

Mr. BROWN. I was speaking of the situation as it exists now.

JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. POLICY IN FAR EAST SOUGHT

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think what we are trying to do and what your testimony is coming to really is a review of this entire policy of the Government that we have been pursuing in the Far East. Since both of you are senior members of the Department of State, why wouldn't this be a good point for either or both of you to give your justification for the policy in these various places, which the Senator from Missouri mentioned that we put over $21 billion in. That is only a tiny little bit. That is only what, one-sixth or one-seventh of what we are spending in Vietnam. It is a very small part of it, but it is a substantial part leaving out the war in Vietnam. What is the interest of the United States in pursuing the policy we are pursuing? What do you think? Mr. PORTER. In Korea?

Senator FULBRIGHT. The Far East; you are familiar with the whole Far East.

Mr. PORTER. Well, sir, I am not authorized to discuss the policy of the Far East and other countries. I will be glad to seek authorization. Senator FULBRIGHT. Take Korea.

Mr. PORTER. I have made a statement this morning which I think covered it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I won't ask you to repeat it, the policies. You deal with the basic justification of the United States being there. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir; I think so.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Good. I won't ask you to repeat it.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. PAUL. General Michaelis, you pointed out that one of your commands stems from the United Nations authority. Could you and your command take military action without any further action on the part of the United Nations in New York.

General MICHAELIS. I could not take action of any type without authority from higher headquarters. In this case the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff when you talk about my hat as the United Nations commander. Mr. PAUL. Maybe we ought to leave it for the State Department or

Defense Department to supply an answer for the record as to whether further United Nations action is required for military action to be taken by your command in the event of full-scale Korean hostilities. (The information referred to follows:)

No. The Armistice Agreements are still in force, and the U.N. Command is free to take military action to deal with infractions of the Armistice Agreements.

NUMBER AND FIRE POWER OF NORTH KOREAN AND ROK DIVISIONS

I would like now to turn to a few questions related to order of battle matters.

General, could you tell us how many North Korean divisions there are and how many South Korean divisions there are.

General MICHAELIS. The Republic of Korea has [deleted] divisions and one marine corps division. The North Koreans have [deleted] infantry divisions, [deleted] tank division, and [deleted] infantry brigades

Mr. PAUL. I am sorry, how do you equate the [deleted] brigades in terms of divisions.

General MICHAELIS. The North Korean brigades are about the same size as the division less organic artillery.

Mr. PAUL. So it would be the same as saying [deleted] divisions? General MICHAELIS. They are not the size of a division for comparison.

Mr. PAUL. All right.

General MICHAELIS. The North Koreans have [deleted] howitzer brigades.

Mr. PAUL. Does that make [deleted] divisions subject to the qualification you mentioned with respect to the units identified as brigades. General MICHAELIS. Carry [deleted] divisions and [deleted] brigades.

Mr. PAUL. And we have a total of [deleted] ROK divisions and two United States.

General MICHAELIS. Two U.S. infantry divisions.

Mr. PAUL. For a total of [deleted]. Are these divisions on both sides of the line comparable in manpower?

General MICHAELIS. No, the ROK-U.S. divisions are somewhat larger.

Mr. PAUL. By about what percentage or multiple?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. How would you compare them in terms of firepower? General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. How do they compare to the two U.S. divisions?

General MICHAELIS. The U.S. divisions are superior in firepower.. Mr. PAUL. What shoulder piece do the U.S. forces carry?

General MICHAELIS. The U.S. Infantry divisions, as well as other elements of the 8th Army are equipped with the M-16 rifle. Mr. PAUL. And the ROK's are armed with what?

General MICHAELIS. The U.S. M-1 rifle, carbines, and some M-16 rifles.

Mr. PAUL. How do these opposing forces compare in their ratios of logistics personnel to combat troops?

General MICHAELIS. I have no information immediately available concerning the North Koreans.

Mr. PAUL. You don't have any estimate?

General MICHAELIS. I believe we can get that information for you. Mr. PAUL. Would you supply it for the record?

General MICHAELIS. I will.

Mr. PAUL. Then could you supply the whole answer for the record as far as comparing these ratios?

(The information referred to follows.)

ARMY COMBAT TO COMBAT SUPPORT RATIO-KOREA

The ratio of combat to combat support forces (ground elements only) on the Korean Peninsula is estimated to be the following:

Combat

Combat support

8th U.S. Army 1.

Republic of Korea Army.

North Korean Army..

[Deleted].

1 Also provides specific logistical support to headquarters UNC/USFK and other UNC activities, U.S. Air Forces, and ROK forces.

COMPARISON OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE NEEDS

Mr. PAUL. Also in this context and with respect to something you referred to earlier, is it relevant and is it accurate to say that the offense needs two to three times the number of forces that the defense needs? General MICHAELIS. Not to equivocate but it depends on the area in which the attack may take place. You need a superior force to penetrate. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Is it relevant in equating the total manpower on the opposing sides that one needs some multiple to launch an offensive attack? General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. To whatever extent greater power is needed by the offense is this also true of air power.

General MICHAELIS. We have [deleted] jet capable airfields and [deleted] partially jet capable. We have a hardening program for [deleted] aircraft shelters. The North Koreans have many jet capable airfields some hardened [deleted].

Mr. PAUL. I am just trying to understand the significance of these figures, whether an air force in offense needs more aircraft than an air force in defense.

General MICHAELIS. May I refer that question to General Holderness?

General HOLDERNESS. I think in the air as on the ground he who is exercising the initiative has a tremendous advantage. [Deleted.] I think the same thing applies to the army.

Mr. PAUL. General Michaelis, do you know or could you supply the number of Communist Chinese divisions that would be available for prompt deployment to Korea?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. How do they compare in manpower with these other ones we have been talking about?

General MICHAELIS. The CHICOM divisions are similar in strength to the North Korean divisions.

DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AIRCRAFT

Mr. PAUL. General Holderness, turning to the air force for a moment, on (page 1729) of the Defense Department statement it is pointed out that the North Koreans have over 500 combat aircraft, the South Koreans have [deleted] and out of the North Korean total [deleted] are MIG 21's.

Is this aircraft, the MIG 21, basically an air interceptor or what might be called an interdiction and close air support aircraft?

General HOLDERNESS. The MIG 21's that the North Koreans have are about [deleted] in the intercept configuration, [deleted] and tactical configuration. In actuality both types of aircraft can carry bombs and guns to South Korea. The MIG 21 is a very significant improvement in range over the MIG 15's and 17's [deleted].

Mr. PAUL. Just so the record is clear, tactical configuration generally refers to the bombing capability or rocket capability for attacking ground positions.

General HOLDERNESS. Yes.

Mr. PAUL. Then, would you say the MIG 21's that face us in Korea have a defensive purpose or an offensive purpose?

General HOLDERNESS. The MIG 21 [deleted] give them the dual capability. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Now, in addition to these Korean aircraft, I believe the statement says that we have [deleted] combat aircraft in Korea as of 1969. Is that still about the figure?

General HOLDERNESS. That is a good average.

COMPARISON OF NORTH KOREAN AND ROK AIRCRAFT

Mr. PAUL. So that would be a total of [deleted] allied combat aircraft, opposing this total of over 500 North Korean, and assuming no further Red Chinese or Soviet aircraft there. But how would the comparison be if we just looked at up-to-date aircraft. Would this be a comparison of the MIG 21's versus all of the American aircraft and the [deleted] F-4's that the South Koreans have.

General HOLDERNESS. I think that would be a fair comparison, only if you take into account the fact that we have F-106's and F-102 aircraft that constitute approximately 30 or so of the U.S. side that are strictly defensive air interceptors and have no offensive capability. Mr. PAUL. If we do add those in then there are more up-to-date aircraft in South Korea than there are in North Korea.

General HOLDERNESS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Now, what would be the tactical significance of this, assuming the North Koreans are the offensive force.

General HOLDERNESS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Could these modern allied aircraft contain the more numerous antiquated Communist aircraft which the North Koreans have in large number?

General HOLDERNESS. Well, this take us back to the program that was initiated in the aftermath of the Pueblo, the improvement of the airbases to support logistically our aircraft which we brought in and particularly the construction of revetments and hardened shelters, such that we could hopefully weather an initial attack. Prior to the