General MICHAELIS. I will provide this information for the record. (The information referred to follows:)

SOVIET FLEET REACTION TO USS "PUEBLO" AND EC-121 INCIDENT

In the case of the PUEBLO, the Soviet Fleet reacted to both U.S. and North Korean activities. The Soviets shadowed the ENTERPRISE task group with air and surface forces.

[Deleted.]

Soviet surface and air units immediately initiated a search of the area. Within less than 24 hours of the shoot-down, Soviet destroyers retrieved some wreckage. The Soviet operations were generally marked by cooperation with U.S. surface forces that arrived in the area approximately 24 hours after the shoot-down. General HOLDERNESS. I could make the statement for the EC-121, that the Soviets did not.

Mr. PAUL. Perhaps you could confirm it or deny it for the Pueblo incident then.

(The information referred to follows.)

SOVIET PRESENCE OFF WONSAN HARBOR FOLLOWING USS "PUEBLO" INCIDENT

Other than the shadowing activity alluded to on previous page there is no evidence that the Soviet naval forces took what would be characterized as "station off Wonsan Harbor." [Deleted.]

U.S. REACTION TO BLUE HOUSE RAID

Mr. PAUL. To your knowledge, was there any relationship between the major harassment in Korea in the form of the raid on President Park's palace and the Pueblo incident, both occurring in January 1968, and the Tet offensive in Vietnam which occurred later that month, Mr. Ambassador, or Mr. Brown.

Mr. PORTER. Not to our knowledge.

Mr. PAUL. An article in the April 18, 1968, issue of the Reporter magazine entitled, "The Forgotten Front at the 38th Parallel," states:

The South Korean government was appalled at Washington's handling of the Pubelo incident in comparison with its reaction to the attempted assassination of President Park. It was bad enough the North Korean would-be assassins had gone through the American sector of the DMZ. But what really offended the ROK Government was that their attempt was in effect regarded as a relatively minor truce violation by U.S. diplomats, whereas the seizure of the Pueblo was at once decried as an international crime.

Was this a fair assessment?

Mr. PORTER. I would not say that. It represented the Reporter's opinion. We never considered the intended raid on Blue House as a relatively minor incident, and we had dealt with both as necessary, certainly without developing or, I believe, showing in any way that

we considered Blue House a minor incident.

Mr. PAUL. And the South Koreans appreciated this point.
Mr. PORTER. The South Koreans understood that, yes.

WAS THERE PROVOCATION IN REGARD TO "PUEBLO" OR EC-121 INCIDENT?

Mr. PAUL. It was said in the prepared statement of the Defense Department that there was no provocation for either the capture of the Pueblo or the shoot down of the EC-121.

With respect to the EC-121, the Washington Post reported that the

North Korean radio stated that such action was taken in retaliation for American firing along the DMZ.

What the Washington Post said was this:

The broadcast indicated that the downing of the aircraft was in retaliation for American fire along the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea. Specifically the North Koreans accused the United States of "grave acts of provocation" southwest of "Woldi-San in the eastern sector of the frontline and in the Sobang-San area of the western sector of the front line, firing hundreds of shots from heavy weapons at our side❞—

That would be the North Korean side

in each place.

Were these events going on?

General MICHAELIS. We checked on the two areas quoted as the areas of activity. May I check again?

Mr. PAUL. Sure.

General MICHAELIS. Mr. Paul, we have listed all of the incidents that have occurred, and could not verify that claim.

Mr. PAUL. Was there something similar though that could reasonably have led the North Koreans to respond as they did?

General MICHAELIS. Not to our knowledge.

Mr. PAUL. These references to firing into the DMZ such as this, have been heard on North Korean broadcasts subsequently, with considerable frequency. Is this, in fact, a common situation or not?

General MICHAELIS. In my statement I have a complete record of all incidents reported for each year from 1967 to 1969.

Mr. PAUL. Does your statement reflect that substantial firing by our side was not occurring?

General MICHAELIS. Generally and substantial, no. There are times when a fair amount of ammunition is fired, and other times when just one or two rounds are fired.

If I can refer to page 10 of my statement, for example, the year of 1968 you will see an item of suspected intrusion, weapons fired. This is an exchange of fire.

Mr. PAUL. I see.

General MICHAELIS. And you will see the 2d Division area had [deleted] reported incidents of suspected intrusions/weapons fired during the year.

Mr. PAUL. These are in connection with expected infiltration?

General MICHAELIS. Infiltrators crossing the military demarcation line.

Mr. BROWN. In each case the North Koreans claimed at Panmunjom this was something that was started by us, and it is regular standard procedure on their part.

HAS UNITED STATES HAD BELIEF WAR WAS IMMINENT AT ANY TIME SINCE 1968 ?

Mr. PAUL. General Michaelis, any time from January 1968 to the present was there a belief within the American command in Korea that war might be imminent?

General MICHAELIS. I arrived in Korea in mid-February 1969. Since that date, no. Prior to that date was the Blue House raid, and the Ulchin landing of 120 or 130 infiltrators on the east coast, there was some concern so I am told.

Mr. PAUL. General Cagwin, were you there in 1968?

General CAGWIN. I was in Korea in 1968, but was not present at the time of the Blue House raid. I was in the Republic of Korea at the time of the shoot down of the EC-121.

Mr. PAUL. Were you there in May of 1968 ?

General CAGWIN. I was not. I did not arrive until June 16.

Mr. PAUL. Were one of you two other gentlemen there in May 1968? General CAGWIN. May I go back to a question you asked earlier, Mr. Paul, on suspected intrusion-weapons fired and the [deleted] incidents listed in the 2d Division sector, that does not mean firing across the military demarcation line. Weapons fired could have taken place anywhere in the DMZ south of the MDL. We did not fire across the MDL as a matter of policy. These are where an intruder, suspected or otherwise, would come into the fence or encounter us in the south half of the DMZ, so it is not a case of firing across the DMZ.

Mr. PAUL. Let me leave this specific question for the record then. In or about the month of May 1968, which is not exactly the time of any of these incidents that have been referred to, was there what might be characterized as a war scare within the American military command in Korea?

General TAYLOR. I arrived in the Republic of Korea on May 30, 1968.. Mr. PORTER. Are you seeking from our side, too?

Mr. PAUL. Yes.

COUNTERINFILTRATION

Mr. PORTER. So far as we are concerned there was no such scare, nothing to warrant that description.

Mr. PAUL. I would like to turn our attention to the infiltration from the north, and then ask, first, General Cagwin, and then General Michaelis for the areas not under his responsibility, to summarize briefly the more important aspects of the counterinfiltration measures that have been taken, referred to in Ambassador Porter's statement, to improve the south's capability to handle this infiltration in light of its increase in 1967 and 1968.

General CAGWIN. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. What portion of this has been added since the increase in infiltration?

General CAGWIN. Since the EC-121?

Mr. PAUL. Since about January 1969. You had some of these measures, such as the minefields for quite a long time.

General CAGWIN. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. General, would you want to add anything to that with regard, perhaps, to the other areas outside of the American sector of the DMZ?

General MICHAELIS. No. In my statement (page 1730) there is a complete listing of the additions that were put in from the beginning of the massive infiltration by the North Koreans in 1967. It is a chainlink fence 8-feet high over the entire 151 miles. I don't know whether you want me to go into the situation.

Mr. PAUL. I did not want you to go into such detail, just the major things. I think General Cagwin has done well.

What about for infiltration by sea, what has been done to reduce this threat?

General MICHAELIS. Here again I should start by saying internal security is the responsibility of the Republic of Korea. We are not involved.

The sea approaches, however, do involve U.N. Command, to counter sea infiltration by a specific series of patrol areas by the Republic of Korea Navy. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. The statement indicated that you feel some of these measures have contributed to the reduction in infiltration.

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. How would you then characterize or assess the counterinfiltration capability along the DMZ, and then with respect to counter-infiltration against seaborne attempts?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.] We have been quite successful in countering sea infiltration, but we can only report and evaluate those landings we have detected. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Now, looking at (page 1730), which set forth the statistics with regard to infiltration, it appears that the preponderance of incidents that have occurred in the DMZ have occurred in the American sector. I would think this is a political question, which I would direct to the Ambassador. What explains the preponderance of the probes coming through the American sector, which is only oneeighth of the line?

Mr. PORTER. Well, first of all, I think the Americans have been a special target over the years. They devote a great deal of attention to us not only on the DMZ but in their propaganda on a daily basis.. Second, of course, when there is an incident on the DMZ, in our sector, however slight, it is carefully reported and recorded, and this may not always be the case in some of the more remote Republic of Korea sectors. Perhaps they may not feel them worthy of bringing them to our attention or to that of their own headquarters. I really don't know, but I suspect there is a great deal of more precise knowledge of what happens in our sector than along the very lengthy Republic of Korea sector or sectors.

Mr. PAUL. Why don't we stop at this point and we will resume at 2:25 p.m. with a couple of questions with regard to that October 1968 raid.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:25 p.m. the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, if it meets with your approval, we will call the meeting to order.

Mr. Paul, will you proceed?

LANDING AND MISSION OF NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATORS IN SOUTH KOREA

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, at the end of October 1968, the North Koreans landed 120 infiltrators on the east coast of South Korea, I believe.

How many men did the South Koreans send in to intercept this intrusion?

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM J. PORTER, AMBASSADOR, U.S. EMBASSY, SEOUL, KOREA; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. JOHN H. MICHAELIS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.N. COMMAND, COMUSK, COMMANDING GENERAL 8TH ARMY; GEN. LELAND G. CAGWIN, FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL, 2d INFANTRY DIVISION; MAJ. GEN. LIVINGSTON N. TAYLOR, CHIEF, JOINT MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, KOREA; AND BRIG. GEN. ARTHUR W. HOLDERNESS, JR., COMMANDER, 314TH AIR DIVISION, PACAF Resumed

Mr. PORTER. As I recall, at one point there was a considerable number of troops moved to encircle the area in depth, possibly as many as 40,000 I have heard. I can be corrected by my military colleagues.

The reason, of course, was the ROK authorities wanted to be sure they had been encircled and also at least initially no one was sure as to how many came ashore. They were being encountered in groups of 30, as I recall, and not being certain of their number, I think the South Koreans decided that it was best to take precautions and send a great number of troops in.

Mr. PAUL. How long did it take to round up the 120?

Mr. PORTER. Well, as I recall, that was something in the order of a couple of months, perhaps, because toward the end of the operation ROK forces were finding them in very small groups indeed, and I think the bulk or the majority were rounded up in a shorter period of time, but they did continue to find elements that had been separated from the main groups.

Mr. PAUL. What part did the United States play in this?

Mr. PORTER. To my knowledge, no practical part. I think we gave them a helicopter at one point to carry somebody into the area, but our pilots took no part in the operation, so far as I know.

Mr. PAUL. Did any of our personnel go along as advisors?

Mr. PORTER. Observers, not advisors. It was dealt with by the ROK's who really didn't invite us into the operation. They felt they should handle it as an internal affair.

Mr. PAUL. Didn't we have a mobile training team in the country at that time, and if we did, did it go along?

Mr. PORTER. We had a Special Forces group cooperating in the development of combat police, and possibly some of them went over there with the unit to which they were attached. But the general might know, I don't believe

General MICHAELIS. There were several personnel from Special Forces that went along during the operation, not as advisers, but as observers.

MISSION OF NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATORS

Mr. PAUL. What was the mission of this North Korean infiltration group that came ashore, as well as we understand it?

Mr. PORTER. Do you want to answer that or shall I?

Judging from the reports that we were receiving then and were later in a position to examine, it seems to have been an effort to instill terror into the countryside. It is impossible otherwise to explain the rather inept methods they used to implant themselves there.