They were certainly, I think, using fear in most of the cases to try to bring about obedience and support from the villagers. They treated many of them very harshly.

Mr. PAUL. Speaking about the infiltration in general, how do the North Koreans in their public statements characterize these intrusions? Mr. PORTER. They characterize them generally as uprising of southern elements.

Mr. PAUL. Do they acknowledge North Korean participation in these "uprisings?"

Mr. PORTER. Never.

COMMUNIST INSURGENCY AMONG SOUTH KOREANS

Mr. PAUL. How much actual Communist insurgency is there among the South Koreans?

Mr. PORTER. In my opinion, practically none. There may be an isolated sympathizer here or there who is contacted when an agent comes down, but the bulk of the population, and certainly the rural population, has given every evidence of anti-Communist sentiment.

INFILTRATION TRENDS-1967, 1968, AND 1969

Mr. PAUL. There was an increase in the infiltration in 1967, and then again in 1968, but a marked decrease in 1969. Apparently that has continued even more so this year.

What do you think explains these trends?

Mr. PORTER. I think initially they were losing too many trained men to go on the way they were. I think that probably somebody had to account in North Korea for the loss of the 120 and then, of course, the 31 who participated in the Blue House raid, and other smaller units which landed on the sea coast during this period of infiltration.

No doubt, someone had advocated that kind of program and someone had to explain the lack of success.

What was the other part of your question?

Mr. PAUL. What explains the increase in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. PORTER. I think the decision to see just how soft the South was behind the DMZ.

Mr. PAUL. You think it was related to the war in Vietnam?

Mr. PORTER. It could possibly have had some connection, an effort to impress the North Vietnamese that they were exerting pressure on the South, an effort also, perhaps, to destroy investor confidence inasmuch as the economy of the South at that time was beginning to show real strength and expansion. Investor confidence was, of course, a crucial factor in that.

Mr. PAUL. Page 1750 of the Defense Department's statement points out that the U.S. participation in counterinfiltration activities is usually limited to the security of our own facilities and our own tactical area of responsibility, and elsewhere it is usually limited to training, advice, and equipment.

Do U.S. personnel ever go on counterinfiltration patrols with the ROK forces other than this instance that you mentioned in connection with the 120 infiltrators, General Michaelis?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

35-205-70-pt. 6- -7

Mr. PAUL. You use the word "usually," in explaining the limits on American participation. What are the exceptions that you are referring to other than this one you identified?

General MICHAELIS. Sometimes U.S. Air Force, or Army aircraft, are on air patrols to try to help locate infiltrators.

EFFORTS TO CONTROL LEVEL OF VIOLENCE

Mr. PAUL. Coming again to something we touched on earlier today, perhaps, we can look at it in this context. The New York Times on April 27, 1969, says the following:

Efforts constantly made by the American military commander, General Charles Bonesteel 3d, and the United States Ambassador William J. Porter, to hold down the level of violence contrasts with the chronic theme of the Pyongyang radio and the North Korean spokesmen at Panmunjon that the United States is trying to provoke a new Korean war.

Mr. Ambassador, what are these efforts that the paper is referring to?

Mr. PORTER. To hold down the level of violence?

Mr. PAUL. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. I suppose that in its way the paper was referring to our efforts to advise restraint during periods of difficulty, the Blue House raid, the Pueblo, east coast landings. I cannot imagine anything else.

Mr. PAUL. The article goes on to say:

It is a virtually universal conviction in Seoul that left to themselves, the North and South Koreans would again plunge into civil war at the drop of a hat. Could you explain this sentiment?

Mr. PORTER. No; I cannot explain the sentiment expressed in those terms. It seems an exaggeration to me. I believe we exercised a useful function in counseling restraint and in making arrangements for consultation that we have referred to often in these hearings. But I would not characterize their sentiments as they are stated in that particular news dispatch.

NECESSITY OF AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE

Mr. PAUL. Do you feel that an American military presence in the country other than a normal military assistance advisory group and attachés, is necessary to prevent such a civil war?

Mr. PORTER. I believe a visible U.S. presence in that country for some time would be a very useful deterrent as far as the North is concerned, and a very useful assist to morale, to confidence in the South, not only in the military field but in other fields.

Mr. PAUL. Are the South Koreans likely to try any significant retaliatory acts against the North without our approval?

Mr. PORTER. As of now?

Mr. PAUL. Now or in the foreseeable future.

Mr. PORTER. I would say it is not likely since they are committed, for example, in the treaty to consultation in the event of armed attack. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. I would like to see if we can understand for the record the relationship between this military presence and this limita

tion on the South Koreans from doing anything that might trigger a major conflict.

[Deleted.]

What is it about the American military presence that makes this any less likely?

Mr. PORTER. American military presence is unquestionably a comfort to the South Koreans in the sense that it, well, it makes them feel that they have an ally who is visible, present, and who has a clear commitment to protect the country from attack.

Certainly the visibility of American forces to a definite degree aids the South Koreans in understanding that there is, in fact, a commitment and, in that sense-it acts as a--both as a restraint on them and, as I said before, as a deterrent to the North Koreans.

Mr. PAUL. I am not disputing it, but the one thing I do not see clearly, you might say, is how does this comfort act as a restraint on them. I see the deterrent.

Mr. PORTER. How does it act as a restraint?

Mr. PAUL. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. I think in view of the presence of American forces there they feel that they have, as I said, time to consider these things, very visible and very influential advice from the American military presence from such circumstances, people they can talk with, in addition to the effort being made on, of course, the diplomatic side when trying to deal with a given provocation.

Mr. PAUL. Did you want to add to that, General?

General MICHAELIS. I think the important key here is that were they to act independently and not consult with us they could find themselves in violation of the Mutual Defense Treaty [deleted]. The ROK's in my opinion do not want that.

Mr. PAUL. I see that, but it does not bear on the question of the size of the American military presence. They could know this without any divisions.

General MICHAELIS. They are concerned the North Koreans will attack. Whether they will or not is questionable, but the ROKS have a genuine concern, and feel the U.S. presence, in the size that it is— stops the North Koreans from attacking now.

Mr. BROWN. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. That was mentioned, I remember that.

But looking at this point at present, the South Koreans have about 11 times the number of men that we have on the DMZ. We guard oneeighth of the line and they guard seven-eighths of it.

Without cutting our forces down to a minimal force, would it make any difference if they were cut by some figure that still left a substantial amount of American presence there?

Would these factors I have been talking about as to restraining the South Koreans or deterring the North Koreans be any different if the forces were cut by any figure you wish to talk about, such as a third? Mr. PORTER. Well, much would depend on what you did along side with a cut in forces. If the South Koreans were strengthened to some degree, modernized, I think they might take a withdrawal with more equanimity. [Deleted] our ability to influence them, will lessen to the extent that you cut down our visibility and our presence in the country.

RESTRAINT ON SOUTH KOREA FROM TAKING OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Mr. PAUL. I would like to ask what the practical restraints are on the South Koreans from retaking operational control of their own men, General and Mr. Ambassador. You have said you have operational control under a formal understanding, but if they want it back, couldn't they get it back rather quickly?

General MICHAELIS. The Minister of Defense would say the ROK Government had withdrawn operational control from the commander in chief, United Nations Command.

Mr. PAUL. That is the existing arrangement now?

General MICHAELIS. Yes.

Mr. PAUL. So the letter would be consistent with the agreement?

POSSIBILITY OF SOUTH KOREA REGAINING OPERATIONAL CONTROL

General MICHAELIS. Yes, it would.

Mr. PAUL. Do you think, General and Mr. Ambassador, as the South Koreans increase in strength the time will come when they will recover operational control of their own men?

Mr. PORTER. The South Koreans-excuse me, General-will value the United Nations support and association quite apart from, in my opinion quite apart from direct U.S. interests, and United Nations control of their forces is to them a valuable thing and something to be preserved.

Mr. PAUL. The Washington Post on February 3, 1968, indicated some desire at that time by the South Koreans to remove their troops from your operational control, General.

Were there such efforts at that time, and have there been subsequent indications on their part that they would want it.

Mr. PORTER. That was in the Blue House-Pueblo period or just after?

Mr. PAUL. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. No; we did not encounter that, that kind of request at that time.

Mr. PAUL. What about subsequent to that time?

Mr. PORTER. Nor subsequently.

General MICHAELIS. This matter has not been mentioned.

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, do we talk privately with the North Koreans, either at Panmunjom or elsewhere, without full and frank coordination with the South Koreans?

Mr. PORTER. We have talked face to face with the North Koreans in the Pueblo matter without South Koreans attending, but with the full knowledge of the South Koreans, and generally informing them what went on after the sessions.

Mr. PAUL. How did the South Koreans feel about these sessions? Mr. PORTER. They accepted the sessions.

ARE THERE ANY NORTH KOREAN NAVAL VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT SOUTH OF THE DMZ?

Mr. PAUL. Do North Korean naval vessels or aircraft transit international waters south of the DMZ but more or less in the vicinity of South Korea? General, do you know? General Holderness, do you know?

General HOLDERNESS. I have had no indications that they have flown south of the DMZ extended.

General MICHAELIS. You asked a question earlier this morning on Whiskey class submarines-whether or not they are offensive in nature. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Do the North Koreans have vessels or aircraft in the area around Korea, and do the South Koreans engage these aircraft or vessels out in or over international waters?

General MICHAELIS. We have had several instances where we have sunk infiltrating boats, but these have entered the national waters of the Republic of Korea. They are declared hostile because they have actually put agents ashore, have fired on Republic of Korea vessels, and attempted to evade/escape investigation. At that time they are pursued by either Republic of Korea Navy, or Republic of Korea air force, and sunk.

GERM WARFARE

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, can you tell us anything as to the authenticity of recent reports that North Korea may have been perpetrating germ warfare against South Korea in the form of spreading a cholera epidemic last year?

Mr. PORTER. I have seen those reports in the press, but we have nothing to substantiate them.

Mr. PAUL. Could you say anything about the further report that a Japanese firm has been supplying North Korea with cholera germs? Mr. PORTER. Only that I understand the Japanese Government has officially stated that that was not the case.

EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT

Mr. PAUL. I would like to turn now to a few questions with respect to the internal situation in South Korea.

Emerson Chapin, in April 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, in an article entitled "Success Story in South Korea," besides mentioning a number of things that are quite favorable to the South Koreans, does

state:

"Corruption has been almost a way of life in Korea and in many undeveloped countries, and eliminating it is an arduous process."

Mr. Ambassador, what would you say is the extent of corruption in the South Korean Government?

Mr. PORTER. I would say there are some forms of what is called corruption, occasionally visible, and against which the Government of South Korea, led by the President, takes very strong steps. The President has recently instituted a series of measures involving people who seem to be, officials who seem to be occupying houses somewhat larger than their official salaries would normally support, and has required them to leave those houses. This is one example of things that he has done.

When other matters pertaining to officials in various parts of the country come to his attention, he invariably orders action taken. Corruption when considered against the background of what I have seen in my career, I would say, is becoming more manageable in South Korea as the salary level of officials and the general standard of living improves.