Is that a reasonably accurate assessment or description of the situation?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

They have the M-47 tank which was used in the Korean war. The M-1 rifle was, of course, a development of the U.S. Government in 1940 for use in World War II.

AMOUNT OF ARMAMENT AND PETROLEUM PROVIDED ROK FORCES

Mr. PAUL. General Taylor or General Michaelis, could you say in terms of numbers of days of combat or another form of quantification how much ammunition and petroleum we provide the ROK forces?

Small arms ammunition.

General TAYLOR. In small arms ammunition there is about [deleted] days.

Mr. PAUL. [Deleted] days small arms ammunition.

What about petroleum, is that definable in such terms?
General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. You said ammunition.

General MICHAELIS. Ammunition of various types.

Mr. PAUL. Can you say for petroleum, too?

General MICHAELIS. Petroleum is about [deleted.]

General TAYLOR. We can furnish that figure for the record.
General MICHAELIS. I will provide a more accurate figure.
Mr. PAUL. In terms of days of combat would be very useful.
(The information referred to follows.)

POL LEVELS FOR ROK FORCES

USFK maintains POL products at a level [deleted] at average consumption rates, for all ROK military forces.

Mr. PAUL. In light of that I would like to read further from this article in the Reporter. It says:

It is widely rumored in Seoul that the U.N. Command keeps the ROK Army on very short rations of gas and ammunition. This is the easiest way for Washington to make sure so that South Korea's generals don't march North on their own initiative, embroiling the U.S. in a new Korean war.

General Michaelis or Ambassador Porter, is that part of the thinking on the availability of ammunition and petroleum products?

Mr. PORTER. I don't think that the writer's description of "very short rations" is necessarily correct or that it is connected with ROK intentions to march north. It is a question of availability, money, storage capacities of various kinds, and that is an interesting piece of journalism but not more.

COMPARISON OF F-5 AND F-4 AIRCRAFT

Mr. PAUL. Returning to the Air Force, General Holderness page 132 of the Defense Department's statement indicates that the cost for the 18 F-4's which we gave Korea was $35,422,000 or about $2 million per aircraft.

What would be the cost for a single F-5 aircraft?

General HOLDERNESS. I believe right now that the cost is around $900,000.

Mr. PAUL. What is the operation and maintenance cost for a peacetime year's activities for an F-4.

General HOLDERNESS. I could get you the exact figure, but an F-4 will cost roughly twice as much to operate as an F-5.

Mr. Paul. Does the F-4 have a capability for bombing that the F-5 lacks?

General HOLDERNESS. Yes, it does, both in terms of weight of bombs as well as a limited radar bombing capability in the F-4 which the F-5 does not have.

Mr. PAUL. Does the F-4 have a greater capability for penetrating North Korean air defenses than does an F-5?

General HOLDERNESS. Yes, in two ways. One, because of its longer range it can make deeper penetrations at low altitude, and if a prolonged conflict were started in which electronic counter measures, in other words, the ability to blind the enemy radar, became an active part of it, the ability of the F-4 to protect itself.

Mr. PAUL. You say the range is longer at low level than the F-5? General HOLDERNESS. The F-4, of course, is a longer range airplane. It could penetrate farther. When you fly at low altitude in order to avoid radar, a jet has a very limited range.

Mr. PAUL. What would you say is the range of the F-5?

General HOLDERNESS. The F-5, on what we call a low low high profile coming in at a low altitude, attacking low and returning high, the F-5 is approximately 250 nautical mile range against 450 nautical miles for the F-4.

Mr. PAUL. Now, a question for Ambassador Porter in light of this. Are these differences in the characteristics of the F-4 and the F-5 a reason against providing the South Koreans with F-4 aircraft; in other words, that the F-4 would have an offensive capability for retaliatory purposes against North Korea that the F-5 did not have, the capacity to bomb installations or urban areas in North Korea which the F-5 would lack an effective capability to do?

Mr. PORTER. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. One more question to General Holderness.

General HOLDERNESS. I think, Mr. Paul, I might make a correction. I have the operating costs for the F-5, approximately $1 million per year for an [deleted] UE F-5 squadron, approximately $3 million for the [deleted] UE F-4 squadron.

Mr. PAUL. What is UE?

General HOLDERNESS. Unit equipment, number of aircraft per squad

ron.

Mr. PAUL. Have the South Koreans used military assistance, General Michaelis or General Taylor, for purposes which we have not approved?

General MICHAELIS. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. PAUL. We have given military assistance, military hardware of various types. Have they ever used this for purposes of which we did not approve?

General TAYLOR. I know of no instance.

General MICHAELIS. I have no knowledge of any use not approved. General TAYLOR. You might find an isolated instance or so where someone may have used a couple of gallons of gasoline for his own car. That can never be stopped. Other than that, no.

PERCENTAGE OF ROK AMMUNITION PROVIDED BY UNITED STATES

Mr. PAUL. What percentage, General Taylor, of the Republic of Korea ammunition do we provide?

General TAYLOR. What percentage of the Republic of Korea ammunition do we provide?

Mr. PAUL. Well, both small arms and bombs.

General TAYLOR. You are talking about those-
Mr. PAUL. And mortar and artillery.

General TAYLOR. Are you talking about the days of supply?

Mr. PAUL. Well, I mean it in total percentage of their ammunition resources, what is provided by grant assistance by the United States, approximately?

General TAYLOR. We provide all the ammunition for the war reserve ammunition. The ROK's are now providing approximately 70 percent of their own training ammunition, and with the expansion of the ROK arsenal it will go up practically to 100 percent in small arms ammunition.

TRANSFERS OF AMMUNITION INTO KOREA

Mr. PAUL. Have there recently been large transfers of ammunition in country into Korea from Okinawa or elsewhere and, if so, what was the reason for this?

General TAYLOR. We have brought in ammunition to build up the war reserve. We retain it under U.S. control so it has not been provided to the ROK's.

Mr. PAUL. What is the purpose, does it have a political, eyeball purpose or any other purpose that you could speak to?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted] this usable ammunition is brought into the Republic of Korea.

Mr. PAUL. What was the amount and value of that ammunition? General MICHAELIS. May I provide that information for the record? Mr. PAUL. Yes.

(The information referred to is classified and is in the committee files.)

DECREASE IN PERCENTAGE OF KOREAN BUDGET SPENT FOR DEFENSE

Mr. PAUL. At (page 1759) of the Defense Department's statement it shows in the middle of the page that Korean defense spending, the percentage of the total Korean budget, has declined in the past 5 years. Why has it gone down from 28.3 to 23.3 percent, even though it represents in absolute terms an increase in the defense budget? General TAYLOR. The ROK budget, although the percentage of the national budget decreased, has increased 212 times.

Mr. PAUL. Is there any reason why the percentage is lower?

Mr. PORTER. I would say simply overall expansion of the budget which would allow the basic figure to increase in won, that is to say, but lower the percentage as other ministries shares were increased, particularly education.

Mr. PAUL. Does the ROK defense budget itself, that the ROK Government pays for itself, does that include military investment items or is this just operating expenditures?

Mr. PORTER. General Taylor.

General TAYLOR. It includes just operation, operation and maintenance items.

Mr. BROWN. Construction.

General TAYLOR. Construction is included in operation costs.
Mr. PAUL. General Taylor-

General TAYLOR. There are certain things that the ROK's have purchased for themselves using won, from the United States.

Mr. PAUL. What are you referring to?

General TAYLOR. Helicopters, sedans, and carbines. The items are included in the omnibus statement on (page 1760).

MARINE CORPS UNIT OF ROK FORCES

Mr. PAUL. General Taylor, do the ROK Forces have a marine corps unit?

General TAYLOR. Marine? Yes; they do.

Mr. PAUL. Could you or one of the other gentlemen tell us why they have a marine corps unit considering the nature of the threat against them? Mr. Brown, do you want to refer to that?

General MICHAELIS. They have had the Marine Corps insofar as I can recall since one of the first battles I fought in Korea during 1950, I was adjacent to a ROK Marine battalion. The ROKMC has a limited amphibious capability and, perhaps, this is good. It does present a tactical problem to the North Koreans and the North Korean Government disposes divisions along the east and west coasts.

I believe the North Koreans feared some amphibious landing in 1950. They learned about amphibious landings at Inchon.

Mr. PAUL. The Defense Department's statement on (page 1762) says that we have loaned the South Koreans three destroyers, each having an annual operation and maintenance cost of $260,000 or a total operation and maintenance cost of $780,000 a year for all three vessels.

General Michaelis, would you say that the destroyers are an appropriate vessel for the ROK Navy to have in light of the seaborne threat against them?

General MICHAELIS. It is the only vessel they have that is capable of patrolling the sea approaches and attacking the North Korean fast boats. The fast boats are the North Korean infiltration boats.

DESTROYERS

Mr. PAUL. But aren't there other smaller vessels that are faster than destroyers and, therefore, more appropriate for counterinfiltration? General MICHAELIS. Yes; there are possible alternatives.

Mr. PAUL. Why have we been providing them with destroyers? General MICHAELIS. An alternative vessel has not yet been developed. The North Korean fast boats can operate at speeds up to 45 knots. [Deleted.] These destroyers were originally given to them for patrol and engagement.

Mr. PAUL. Under the state of available resources you feel the destroyers are better than any alternative we have available for them? General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

ORGANIZATION OF MAAG

Mr. PAUL. I would like to return to the organization of the MAAG itself for a minute. At (page 1763) of the Defense Department statement it indicates that the MAAG by July 1 of ths year will be at a level of 897 personnel.

General Taylor, could you tell us how many of these personnel are what are known as the PROVMAAG, and how much are in the service MAAG's which the Army MAAG is called the KMAG?

General TAYLOR. Seventy are in PROVMAAG as of the first of July 1970, I can give it for the record if you want me to.

Mr. PAUL. What is the size of the-does that mean that 827 are in the service MAAG's?

General TAYLOR. Yes. That would be in the service MAAG's.
Mr. PAUL. How big is the Army MAAG?

General TAYLOR. The Army MAAG has 449 Military and 59 civilians.

PROVMAAG

Mr. PAUL. Would you explain what is the mission of the PROV MAAG and what is the mission of these other MAAG's since there is this two-tier system in Korea?

General TAYLOR. PROVMAAG manages the military assistance program and advises the Minister of National Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It handles the money, basically the military assistance program. It sends out directives to the service MAAG's on MAP. The service MAAG's develop their programs in conjunction with the ROK services and advise the ROK in military assistance management and military management.

Mr. PAUL. What does the KMAG do that is different from the ordinary MAAG in another more typical recipient country?

KMAG

General TAYLOR. KMAG is similar to the Army section of a conventional joint MAAG.

Mr. PAUL. There is no particular distinction?

General TAYLOR. Yes, there is. KMAG assists General Michaelis in working directly with units of the ground forces in the field. KMAG is a great asset to General Michaelis in that role.

Mr. PAUL. How do they affect this particular role that they have? You say they are a great asset in this liaison in affecting his operation. General TAYLOR. They are always with their counterparts, advising their counterparts and seeing that the counterparts are carrying out the roles. In addition, KMAG advises the ROKA how to carry out directives from General Michaelis.

Mr. PAUL. This distinction between a PROVMAAG and these other MAAG's is unusual in military assistance programs around the world, is it not? It is unique?

General TAYLOR. It is the only one of its kind that I know of.