CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN TO COMBINING MAAGS

Mr. PAUL. Why do we have this kind of division?

General MICHAELIS. In 1948 when the United States first went into assistance and training, we had a provisional MAAG, 1948 to 1953. When the Korean war broke out, the only tangible military force was the Republic of Korea Army. A Korean Army MAAG called KMAG was established. Then as the Air Force developed, an Air Force MAAG was formed and in the Navy a Navy MAAG. There are plans currently under consideration for the revision of the MAAG's into one joint MAAG. This will require approval of higher headquarters and is beyond my level for decision. I do not know the

status.

Mr. PAUL. Would the KMAG be any different in size, if it didn't have this special Korean operational control responsibility? Would it be smaller without that, that is what I am asking.

General TAYLOR. We have had reductions already. In my opinion, further cuts would seriously affect our operational effectiveness.

MILITARY ATTACHÉS

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, we also have military attachés in Korea and, if so, how many?

Mr. PORTER. We have a senior defense attaché, and two attaché assistants from the other services. The senior is an Army man.

MAAG STRENGTH DEVOTED TO TRAINING

Mr. PAUL. At (page 1763) of the Defense Department statement it also points out that of the total MAAG strength, 678 will be devoted to training.

General Taylor, is the concept behind this training for our personnel to train Korean instructors who, in turn, train the Korean forces or do we train the forces directly?

General TAYLOR. I think there is misunderstanding of the term training. We are talking about those individuals who are actually advisers versus those people who are administrative and support people for the trainers who are advisers.

Mr. PAUL. By training what do you mean, advisory?

General TAYLOR. That is the adviser who actually gives advice to, and works with, his counterparts in the ROK services to see that they do their training properly and see that they are properly taught and are effective.

Mr. PAUL. Well, have we not been conducting such a role for quite a long time? The thrust of my question is and, if so, shouldn't we be phasing out that sort of program?

General TAYLOR. If you examine the strength in the past and the strength that we are going to, we are phasing out.

Mr. PAUL. But nevertheless over 600 is still a substantial presence there. Is this a continuing reduction? Is this just a stage in the process of even fewer people?

General TAYLOR. This is a stage. I think we will get additional reductions as the years go by.

CLOSE RELATIONSHIP OF ROK AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Mr. PAUL. Now, I would like to ask you to read one thing into the record, as part of your statement, (page 1763) ending with the words "stock levels." This explains the familiarity, the relationship, of the

ROK forces.

General TAYLOR. All ROK services are provided with planning dollar levels to encourage maximum participation by the ROK Government in military assistance planning. In addition to encouraging a greater degree of participation by the ROK services, the planning dollar levels provided insure that all the advisory groups and ROK counterparts are working within the same general parameters. Personnel of the ROKF participate, and associate directly, with U.S. advisory personnel in the preparation of the military assistance program. The overall degree of ROK government participation in the military assistance effort is limited only to the degree necessary to insure compliance with the MAM prohibition against disclosure of total dollar ceilings. The capabilities of the ROK services to participate in the formulation of MAP proposals has shown a marked increase within the past 2 years and every effort is being made to further improve these capabilities. The ROK services have demonstrated their ability to propose logical, accurate plans within planning ceilings. The ROK staffs have access to, and have developed an acceptable level of expertise in the use of the documents that define cost, usage rates, and stock levels.

Mr. PAUL Does this familiarity that you have just referred to, General Taylor, with the military assistance program-I think I should direct this question to the Ambassador, though-create an expectation on the part of the South Koreans that could lead to a political problem if such expectation is not fulfilled?

Mr. PORTER. Does the presence of the MAAG lead to such expectations?

Mr. PAUL. You know, the ROK integration in the development of the program of our military assistance program.

Mr. PORTER. I Would say that ROK expectations have shown some capacity for buildup with or without any association with the MAAG. They are not reticent in developing expectations, and certainly they are in a position to question MAAG personnel about progress and things that they desire to see come to Korea in connection with, for the use of their forces.

ARE THERE ANY PLANS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RIFLES TO SOUTH KOREA ?

Mr. PAUL. Now (page 1762), General Taylor, states when Mr. Packard visited Korea in 1969 the Koreans made a request for 2 million rifles, and we agreed to supply 790,000 out of excess stocks. Do we have any plans for providing the South Koreans with the remaining 1,210,000 that they requested?

General TAYLOR. We have no plans now. However, if we find rifles offered in the many excess programs throughout the U.S. military services, we will ask for them.

35-205-70--pt. 6- -8

IMPROVEMENTS IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Mr. PAUL. I would like to ask the Ambassador a general question as we are drawing to the end of this section of the hearing. Are there any changes in either the organization or the coordination of the military assistance program which you would think might either improve the program or its political consequences?

Mr. PORTER. Well, I have had some ideas on the program. So far as the command chain is concerned, carrying the general views to various parts of the ROK Army, I certainly would keep that intact.

I have felt that with respect to the training aspects of the program that it might be preferable to have more TDY teams for stated periods for the introduction of new articles or items and techniques rather than a resident MAAG, but there may be good reasons for not doing that. It has never been fully discussed with me.

It may be that the TDY concept would run into problems of expense and other problems that I am not familiar with. But I have felt that it should be examined, and if the concept proved out that that was the way to go with the MAAG of today, the form of the MAAG's has not changed and, again, as I say, possibly with good reason, for many

years.

WOULD KOREANS ACCEPT MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM JAPAN?

Mr. PAUL. Would the Koreans, Mr. Ambassador, do you think at this time or in the near future, be willing to accept military assistance from Japan in the various forms which it may take, hardware would be the first type?

Mr. PORTER. I have no reason to believe they would, Mr. Paul. I will say why.

[Deleted.]

I don't think they are psychologically ready for the kind of relationship that the supply of military items implies so far as the Japanese are concerned.

MILITARY GRANT AID

Mr. PAUL. Could I ask you, General Taylor, for the record, with reference to this chart on (page 1731-1732), to be sure we understand what we are seeing here, this chart, as far as the U.S. participation is concerned, shows the military budget support that the United States provides; that is correct, and it does not show, add to that, the military grant aid.

General TAYLOR. If you will look

Mr. PAUL. It does?

General TAYLOR. It does not include the grant military aid.

Mr. PAUL. Just so the proportion of American contribution to the Korean military effort is clear, would you supply a line here that is in terms of won and percentages that would show what you get when you add in the military grant aid to the military budget support that we provide? You can do that for the record.

(The information referred to follows.)

RELATIONSHIP OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA MILITARY BUDGET

The relationship of U.S. assistance to the total Republic of Korea defense budget is:

DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES IN REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mr. PAUL. I would like to turn now to the subject of U.S. facilities and forces, and to start this, I would like to ask General Michaelis if he could briefly describe what the major U.S. units are and their facilities.

General MICHAELIS. Briefly, major U.S. military facilities in the Republic of Korea are dispersed from the DMZ south to Pusan. Headquarters, United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea/8th Army is located at Yongsan/Seoul, Korea, along with supporting elements. I Corps, 2d U.S. Infantry and 7th Infantry Divisions, along with support elements are located north of Seoul. The 4th Missile Command is located at Chunchon. Major support activities are located an Inchon/Ascom-a port near Seoul-Taegu, Waegwon, Pyongtaek and Pusan.

Major USAF installations-would you like them to be pointed out on the map you have?

Mr. PAUL. I see them, that is fine.

General MICHAELIS. Major USAF installations are Osan, Kimpo, Taegu, Kwangju, Kunsan, and Suwon with [deleted] at Kangnung. The major bases are jet capable and have [deleted] hardened shelters, as we mentioned earlier.

There are no U.S. Navy installations in Korea. The Naval Advisory Group principal advisory activity is at Chinhae, a Republic of Korea naval base.

A majority of the U.S. Army installations are post-Korea quonset huts although a modernization program commenced subsequent to the Pueblo. Camp Carroll is a modern repair and maintenance base. The Department of Defense has previously provided a map which shows the various places and I have included a complete and detailed listing on part II of the omnibus statement.

Improvements have been funded. A POL pipeline, barracks, some construction and some modernization in the depot system. We are presently studying the feasibility of consolidating installations in the I Corps Gp area and in the Seoul area. The latter is necessary in view of our fund limitations.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you very much.

GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND ROK

Now I would like to ask Ambassador Porter if he would read from his statement the matter starting on (page 1710) that goes over to (page 1711) entitled "The State of United States-Republic of Korea Relations," and then to read pages from the middle of (page 1711), which is entitled "Estimated Response from North Korea and Republic of Korea if United States Should Reduce its Forces on the DMZ.” Mr. PORTER. The "State of United States-Republic of Korea Relations."

Before turning to some more specific questions, I would like to say something about our general relations with the Koreans. They are, in a word, excellent. Somehow or other, perhaps because we have fought together, perhaps due to a basic congeniality of temperament, a direct approach coupled with a sense of pride and a sense of humor, we have been able despite our disparate strengths and backgrounds, work together harmoniously in carrying out a basic community of purpose. The Koreans are a proud and strong and independent people. They could not have survived over four millenia as a nation against the conflicting pressure of Japan, Russia, and China had this not been so. Yet they have never felt it unbecoming to be generous in their appreciation of what the United States has done for them. Korea is one of the few countries in which there have been demonstrations saying "Americans stay."

It has been a heartwarming experience for me and my colleagues, and for our predecessors, to serve in Korea, and to see emerging from the many dark days, even as late as 1964, when there seemed to be little hope of Korea's becoming a viable economy, a competent, selfreliant, and hopeful nation allied to us by friendship as well as common interest.

Let me now turn to a number of the committee's detailed questions not answered in the foregoing.

"Estimated Response from North Korea and Republic of Korea if U.S. Should Reduce its Forces on the DMZ." [Deleted.]

SIZE AND DESCRIPTION OF KATUSA PROGRAM

Mr. PAUL. (Page 1735), General Michaelis, of the Defense Department's statement shows that the 2d Division has a strength of [deleted] men and officers, and the 7th Division a strength of [deleted], a total strength in the two combat divisions of about [deleted.]

Now, first, is this figure a figure which just represents the American personnel in these divisions or does it include the Korean forces that are integrated into these divisions known as the KATUSA?