Mr. PAUL. I realize that in a way there is a parallel with the political situation in Germany. But is it in a tactical situation, the nature or the manner in which the Army conducts its patrolling, and so forth? General MICHAELIS. To the best of my knowledge Berlin and Korea are the only situations in the world where forces of nations confront each other with simply an armistice to keep the peace.

Mr. PAUL. Let me put it this way: The experience that the U.S. Army personnel gain in training, if you will, from being on the line there, is there any comparable place outside of Vietnam for this kind of thing?

General MICHAELIS. I would say "No."

ROTATION OF FORCES

Mr. PAUL. At this point let me ask is there a rotation pattern, General Cagwin, between the forces in your division that are on the line and those that are kept in the bivouac area?

General CAGWIN. Yes. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. That means essentially on the line.
General CAGWIN. Yes. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Is it a little more than [deleted] of the units at any one time forward and [deleted], a little less than [deleted] are back? General CAGWIN. Roughly, yes.

ACTIVITIES OF FORCES IN BIVOUAC AREA

Mr. PAUL. What are the activities of the forces back in the bivouac area?

General CAGWIN. Training, construction of the main battle position, rest, and recreation.

PATROLLING PATTERN

Mr. PAUL. When you are on the line you developed very well what the picture of the line looks like earlier. What is the patrolling pattern that we follow ?

General CAGWIN. [Deleted.] That patrol varied in strength depending upon the situation at a particular time, and depending on whether there was a known threat. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. This is into the demilitarized zone south of the demarcation line?

General CAGWIN. Yes, into the demilitarized zone.
Mr. PAUL. Do they have to patrol at night as well?

General CAGWIN. They did patrol at night and during the day. The patrols went out for [deleted] hours at a time, when I commanded the division.

POLITICAL NECESSITY OF U.S. FORCES ON DMZ

Mr. PAUL. Let me now ask the Ambassador a general political question. What is the political necessity for keeping the forces on the line as opposed to elsewhere, if an elsewhere could be found economically? Mr. PORTER. Political necessity?

Mr. PAUL. Is there any political necessity that American troops be on the demilitarized zone itself?

Mr. PORTER. Necessity is difficult to determine. Certainly the visibility of American troops there, as we have remarked earlier during the hearing, has had an effect, I think, on the North Koreans, for one, and on the South Korean population generally.

There is, of course, a tradition now of some years of American troops in that position. It certainly is accepted in the South as a sign of constancy and encouragement. The political aspects would be connected with that tradition and that holding of the position over this period of time.

Mr. PAUL. Would it make substantial political difference if a greater portion of our forces were in positions similar to what the 7th Division now has which is near the DMZ but not in constant exposure to contact with the enemy?

Mr. PORTER. I should think that would depend on how American troops were replaced and [deleted].

COSTS INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE RELOCATION OF U.S. FORCES

Mr. PAUL. Let me ask General Michaelis, it would cost $100 million to relocate an American division. What if the relocation were in the existing bivouac area, what sort of costs would be involved under the two alternatives: one is the level of forces is exactly the same but they are put in existing bivouac areas, and the second alternative is that you reduce the force by about a third, in other words, what you presently have a bivouac area for?

General MICHAELIS. The existing areas now, as you will recall, are fairly adequate. We have primarily quonset huts. As a matter of fact, it was only in late 1968 that the last of the troops moved from tents occupied since 1953. The configuration of present stationing does not allow any flexibility.

I think many commanders have tried over a period of years, to achieve a better consolidation of forces rather than having troop elements all over the landscape.

Mr. PAUL. But for redeployment just packed into the bivouac area rather than somewhere else in Korea would not be in the order of $100 million, would it?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. In the existing bivouac area, you already have [deleted] of the force in the bivouac area now.

General MICHAELIS. Today, for example, in the 2d U.S. Infantry Dvision there is no potable water supply. We still supply by contract water trucks.

Mr. PAUL. What I had trouble understanding, frankly, is this. I can visualize what General Cagwin was describing here that [deleted] of the force at any one time is already in this facility, in these quarters, and if you only had [deleted] the size of your existing 2d Division, they could stay in the bivouac area that you have already built. Granted they are perhaps entitled to better quarters than they have now.

General MICHAELIS. If you are discussing taking away, say, one division, pulling one division out, certainly we could come upMr. PAUL. Discussing pulling out [deleted] of a division.

General CAGWIN. I think you may have gained a picture from what I said about personnel who are on patrol, on guard post duty, on duty

at the barrier fence, that they do not have quarters when they are north of the river.

These personnel on patrol are in compounds north of the river. When they go on patrol, for example, at night, they have been sleeping during the day, and at sundown go out into the DMZ, and come back at daybreak into their compounds.

The men who are on the barrier fence go on for an 8-hour period. Then when off duty go back into the compound which is north of the river. All of the compounds in the 2d U.S. Division area were fully utilized.

General TAYLOR. What you are saying is take out the [deleted] that are on the line and replace them with somebody else.

Mr. PAUL. Koreans.

General TAYLOR. Whoever you put in place of the division on the DMZ must have somebody to back them up. That is what the rest of this division is doing. If you did you would still have a requirement for men in the complex.

KOREAN EXPECTATIONS FOR CONTINUATION OF U.S. PRESENCE

Mr. PAUL. Going on to a more general question with respect to the two combat divisions, you have stated in your statement, Mr. Ambassador, that there is no commitment for the continuation of these two divisions. But what would you say is the Korean expectation as to the continuation of these divisions?

Mr. PORTER. I think the Koreans, as the general mentioned, have an understanding that there will be changes in our force posture as time passes. President Park mentioned that, I think, last fall at Armed Forces Day or about then. Their concern is that this not be done too drastically, too rapidly, and that certainly that it not be done without some attempt to really modernize their forces.

They have said they realize, the President has said that he realizes, that U.S. forces will not remain in Korea forever.

Mr. PAUL. In this regard, the Washington Star on October 28, 1969, reports high Seoul Government sources are saying that the United States will not be able to reduce its military presence for 4 years from last year, and then only after a special military assistance package of $1 billion.

Are you referring to something like this when you said they expect phasing out and modernization, of a linked modernization with phasing out of our forces?

Mr. PORTER. That expresses the general idea, yes.

DISCUSSION OF REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

Mr. PAUL. Does this also reflect our thinking?

Mr. PORTER. No, not necessarily. As we said, the whole question of bases abroad, including those in Korea, is at present under study and I cannot authoritatively predict how that will come out.

Mr. PAUL. General Michaelis, if the U.S. military presence in Korea were cut by a substantial number, could you say whether you would think it advisable that a single combat unit be removed or that bits from various support units be removed if the decision were made that such a percentage has to be cut from Korea?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Speaking hypothetically, if you were given the number you would have a preference for cutting a division slice and its support as opposed to all combat or all support units?

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.]

General HOLDERNESS. [Deleted.]

AUTHORIZATION FOR PATROLLING IN DMZ

Mr. PAUL. Coming back to the DMZ for just a minute, General Cagwin, you mentioned that our forces do daily patrolling in the demilitarized zone.

My question is a legal one that I should direct to the State Department. But what are the purposes for which this is permitted under the armistice agreement, patrolling in the demilitarized zone?

General CAGWIN. We had three missions in the division: defend an area, counterinfiltration, and maintain the peace. The patrols were out there to assure the maintenance of the armistice agreement, the maintenance of the peace in the area, and counterinfiltration.

Mr. PAUL. My question is, the armistice agreement deals with the demilitarized zone, and I wondered what the language was as far as authorizing patrols in the demilitarized zone.

General MICHAELIS. I have the armistice agreement here.
Mr. PAUL. Again you can supply this for the record.

(The information referred to follows.)

AUTHORIZATION FOR PATROLS IN THE DMZ-ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

The Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, states:

"8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought."

"9. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission."

"10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission."

"11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the De

militarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone."

General CAGWIN. When we go into the DMZ you understand we only go to the military demarcation line. We do not go beyond the demilitarization line.

General MICHAELIS. We can provide the actual number of people in the DMZ.

Mr. PAUL. Does it authorize patrolling of this nature?

General CAGWIN. The Armistice agreement authorizes police in the DMZ. The number of personnel permanently stationed in there is part of the armistice, for the DMZ as a whole. It wasn't by division.

Mr. PAUL. If you would supply for the record what the relevant language of the armistice agreement says, the subcommittee would appreciate that.

(The information referred to is found above.)

PATROLLING OF DMZ BY NORTH KOREA

Mr. PAUL. Do the North Koreans regularly patrol their side of the DMZ?

General CAGWIN. Yes; they do.

Mr. PAUL. What is the military necessity-I am sure there is a good reason—for patrols of this nature, particularly at night?

General CAGWIN. To maintain surveillance over the area; that part of the area for which we are responsible. There are two ways in which it can be done, through patrols and through guard posts that are permanently fixed.

The guard posts permit surveillance during the hours of daylight and good weather. During inclement weather and hours of darkness, the only way [deleted].

General MICHAELIS. Simply, we patrol to maintain the security of our own forces.

Mr. PAUL. You mean there would be an infiltration advantage if we did not have these patrols?

General CAGWIN. That is correct.

POSSIBLE CONSOLIDATION OF SMALLER INSTALLATIONS

Mr. PAUL. The Defense Department's statement, General Michaelis, on (page 1732), refers to a study of U.S. facilities in Korea completed in June 1969 to which you referred earlier this afternoon, I believe, with a view toward consolidation of such facilities.

What changes, if any, in our force levels or our facilities could be expected as a result of this study?

General MICHAELIS. This study was undertaken due to fiscal restrictions rather than in contemplation of force reduction. [Deleted.] There are 96 installations in the 2d Division area, and maintaining each of these is a very expensive function. What we are trying to do is to cut down the number of the small installations by consolidating them.

Mr. PAUL. That is in the I Corps group, is it?

General MICHAELIS. Yes; that is in the I Corps group area.

General CAGWIN. The 2d U.S. Division area is where the 96 compounds, mentioned by General Michaelis, are located.