Mr. PAUL. What about back in the support, what do you call it, 8th Army rear? General MICHAELIS. We are trying, and I believe it feasible, to effect some consolidations next year. That matter is currently under study with my command. DURATION PRESENT U.S. AND ROK FORCES COULD WITHSTAND ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA Mr. PAUL. General Michaelis, could you say anything as to the duration that your forces, American and Republic of Korea forces, could presently hold their positions without reinforcement in the event of a full-scale North Korean conventional attack? General MICHAELIS. That is a most difficult question. To evaluate we would need to determine what type of air support the enemy forces have, what air support is available to us, how much warning we have. [Deleted.] Mr. PAUL. In this connection, let me read you, they all seem to be coming from this Reporter article of April 18, 1968, in which it says: By massing their attack the North Koreans could probably break the U.S.-ROK line stretched thin over 155 miles of the DMZ. Unofficial estimates are that the U.S. Second and Seventh Divisions could hold the terrain north of the Imjin for 24 hours and the flat bowling alley north of Seoul for another 72. After that Seoul would again fall to the invading North Koreans, and U.S. and ROK forces regrouping near the bottom of the peninsular would again have to fight their way back towards the 38th Parallel. Is that a plausible scenario? General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.] However, I do not believe it. Mr. PAUL. You think we can do better than that? General MICHAELIS. We can do much better than that, and we have the means. Mr. PAUL. You are talking about conventional means? [Deleted.] Mr. PAUL. Your comment renders what I just read somewhat less relevant. But under an assumption of this order or something even less than that, would you care to comment on the following statement, too, that the article makes? It says: These estimates pointly ignore one factor. Most observers in Seoul believe the U.S. would use tactical nuclear bombs if the North Koreans invaded in force. Is that sentiment often felt in Seoul? General MICHAELIS. I would rather not comment. Mr. PAUL. I didn't ask you whether you thought they would be used, but rather this is the maybe the Ambassador can talk to this, whether this is the attitude. Mr. PORTER. I have no authority to comment on anything with respect to nuclear matters, Mr. Counsel. Mr. PAUL. Let me ask the general a question then, a hypothetical question, with regard to nuclear weapons which this question raises, and that is under circumstances like those characterized in this article, even though they may be somewhat hypothetical for Korea. As one long experienced in military matters, would you have a presumption toward recommending the use of nuclear weapons or not? General MICHAELIS. Sir, the Secretary of Defense has instructed me not to discuss nuclear weapons. Mr. PAUL. I am sure the committee will want to take your answer under advisement. NUMBER OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN KOREA I would like to now turn to the Air Force and ask General Holderness (page 1747) of the Defense Department statement indicates that in 1969, as you have said earlier, we had 105 combat aircraft in Korea, and that since the Pueblo incident the figure has gone as high as 182. What determines the level of U.S. aircraft in Korea? General HOLDERNESS. There is no fixed magic number. The increase to 182 was a recognition of the obvious need in the aftermath of the Pueblo. The subsequent reductions have been, I think, the result of both reconfiguration problems, available aircraft in that part of the Pacific, as well as reevaluations of the threat. I would think that the number of aircraft required in Korea could be best correlated with the number required to prevent the destruction of our air bases by a surprise attack. Mr. PAUL. You said the reconfiguration of our aircraft in Asia? General HOLDERNESS. We have had a conversion which was taking place at the time of Pueblo from F-100's to F-4C's. We have had maintenance problems with the F-4C's, and we have had conversion to F-D's. This type of change has had something to do with the number we can afford to keep there. Mr. PAUL. Your last comment that the number should be correlated to this air defense role-do you mean that air defense aircraft should be in Korea? I know the F-4 is dual purpose in this regard as opposed to the aircraft that would be used for other military purposes. General HOLDERNESS. Well, the preservation, I think, of the air base structure in order to permit reinforcement is the fundamental requirement. It is Air Force doctrine, and I have heard no one who will argue with it, that to have a successful air defense we must also have the ability to attack the enemy's airpower, which are his airfields. Consequently, a force of air defense fighters alone, that is, F-106 or F-102 aircraft would never suffice for this purpose. Mr. PAUL. Approximately how many American combat aircraft could be brought to bear in a Korean conflict promptly following the onset of hostilities? General HOLDERNESS. Mr. Paul, you are getting into the area of contingency planning, and I have instructions that I cannot discuss contingency plans per se with you. Mr. PAUL. You are sure that is a question of contingency planning, just the approximate figure of American aircraft in the northeast Asian theater? General HOLDERNESS. No, I will put it this way. The 5th Air Force resources per se can be brought to bear immediately. The bringing in of additional resources from Southeast Asia or from the United States begins to get into contingency planning. Mr. PAUL. But when you said the 5th Air Force you would also include carrier-based aircraft. General HOLDERNESS. It has come out in testimony that there is one task force committed to stay within [deleted] hours. This is an obvious part of the immediate forces. HAS FRONTLINE DEFENSE MOVED TO KOREA? Mr. PAUL. (Page 1747) of the Defense Department's statement indicates that before the Pueblo incident there were no more than 11 American combat aircraft in Korea. The Chicago Tribune on June 10, 1969, says: Earlier the Air Force has thought of the air defense of Northeast Asia in regional terms, lumping Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea into a bloc. Planes from all areas would be mobilized in case of a threat to any of them. Now, the frontline defense has been moved into Korea itself. From what you said earlier would you favor a return to this kind of concept or not and, if not, why not? General HOLDERNESS. I wasn't there at the time, but it was pretty apparent to the people at the time of the Pueblo that they did not have the force in the interior that was required to defend the air bases in Korea and that this has caused the reassessment of the numbers of aircraft that should be based there. COST OF HARDENED SHELTERS Mr. PAUL. What is the total cost of the [deleted] hardened shelters that we referred to earlier? General HOLDERNESS. The direct cost of just the shelters and the pads that go under them is in the vicinity of [deleted] per shelter. I think it is roughly $9 million. The actual cost of putting in the [deleted] shelters into Korea, counting the necessary taxiways for dispersal and what not, came to approximately $13 million or [deleted] per shelter. INCREASE OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA Mr. PAUL. The Defense Department's statement on (page 1747) says that the United States had 38 combat aircraft in Japan and 62 on Okinawa when the Pueblo incident occurred. How many more aircraft had to be put in Japan and Okinawa to support the concept of forward deployment of aircraft in Korea that has been done since the Pueblo? General HOLDERNESS. At the time of the Pueblo the 5th Air Force wings at Misawa and Yokota in Japan were undergoing conversion to F-4C aircraft. They had very few combat-ready crews or, for that matter, completely combat-ready aircraft. The only additional forces that have been brought in and have remained under 5th Air Force control as a result of the Pueblo buildup has been the F-106 squadron which rotates on a 6 months basis from the continental United States, and the two F-4 squadrons at Kunsan which also rotate from the continental United States on a 6 months basis. Mr. PAUL. Well now, the statement shows that there were [deleted] aircraft at Yokota and [deleted] at Misawa on January 23, 1968. 35-205-70-pt. 6- -9 There are now, or there is now, is there not, one wing at each of these bases, which is in the order of [deleted] aircraft per base? General HOLDERNESS. There was also one wing at each of those at that time. As I was saying, they were in the process of conversion. WHAT WOULD SOUTH KOREA'S ATTITUDE BE TO RANDOM ROTATION OF AIRCRAFT? Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, speaking of the aircraft, what would you say would be the attitude of the South Koreans if you did not permanently station any of our aircraft in Korea? Perhaps we can take this in two parts, the aircraft which had been brought in subsequent to the Pueblo, first. What would be the attitude if instead of keeping a number of aircraft there at all times, there was a random rotation of aircraft to Korea? Mr. PORTER. [Deleted.] I think some degree of visibility is one requirement for all kinds of forces, and that extends to the question of their placement. They need not necessarily be in one place or another, it seems to me, to have a deterrent effect. Obviously, if changes are made in present posture there will be a period of psychological conditioning required as far as the Republic of Korea public is concerned. USE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AS PROTECTIVE COVER Mr. PAUL. Turning back to General Holderness, do I understand from your statement our fighter aircraft still fly protective cover for our reconnaissance vehicles? General HOLDERNESS. Yes. Mr. PAUL. So they are airborne as opposed to being on strip alert. General HOLDERNESS. Actually the details of how we use them for protection is an item I am instructed not to discuss. However, protection is provided in accordance with the President's statement. Mr. PAUL. All right. Can you say it is an airborne protection as opposed to an airfield alert protection? General HOLDERNESS. I would say it is both. Mr. PAUL. The Defense Department's statement on (page 1747) says normally [deleted] fighter aircraft are required to provide this protective cover. General Holderness, could you say whether the Koreans could take over at least a portion of this function? General HOLDERNESS. I would say personally that it would not be practical. Mr. PAUL. Why is that? General HOLDERNESS. [Deleted.] Mr. Paul, I would like to make a suggestion that if you were to pursue this subject further it should be tied in with the special arrangements for discussion of intelligence because the practicality of the Republic of Korea Air Force doing this ties into that. [Deleted.] Mr. PAUL. Well, let us have these questions on the border of intelligence they always create a problem for us as to the way they are to be handled. I don't know that some questions in this area necessarily have to be in that area. If you think so you certainly are free to so state. General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.] Mr. PAUL. [Deleted.] General MICHAELIS. I beg your pardon. Mr. PAUL. [Deleted.] General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.] Mr. PAUL. On another aspect of reconnaissance, you have mentioned in the statement that we fly reconnaissance flights. I think these are Army aircraft along the DMZ-on (page 1749) of your statement. Do we also fly protective cover with fighter aircraft for these reconnaissance vehicles? General MICHAELIS. [Deleted.] HOW CLOSE DO NORTH KOREAN AIRCRAFT COME TO THE DMZ? Mr. PAUL. How close, General Holderness, do North Korean aircraft come to the DMZ? General HOLDERNESS. We get occasional indications that light aircraft come down to the DMZ at low altitudes for the same sort of administrative purposes as our own Army aircraft. The general pattern of the North Korean Air Force is to stay well north of the DMZ. Mr. PAUL. Do we send aircraft airborne in to intercept North Korean aircraft which come within [deleted] miles of the DMZ? General HOLDERNESS. [Deleted.] Mr. PAUL. Do we, to the best of your knowledge, know whether the North Koreans have similar aircraft go to the DMZ? General HOLDERNESS. Occasionally. NIGHTMARE BOMBING RANGE Mr. PAUL. Now (page 1756) of the statement shows that one of our bombing ranges in South Korea, known as the Nightmare Bombing Range is only 12.7 miles from the DMZ. Do the North Koreans express concern in any manner as far as sending aircraft airborne or otherwise when we use this bombing range? General HOLDERNESS. No; I know of no reaction to our use of the bombing range. I think, just as I pointed out, that our reactions are to things considered unusual, I think theirs is the same. Mr. PAUL. Isn't there a lack of equilibrium here? We have aircraft, either for bombing practice or for reconnaissance, regularly up near the DMZ, whereas when they fly [deleted] of the DMZ, and they rarely do so, we go into more precautionary measures than we normally take. Why? We look like the more threatening side, it would seem, from these statistics. General HOLDERNESS. Of course, I am not a North Korean and I don't know exactly what they are doing. I think one of the reasons that we are more sensitive is the immediate proximity of the capital city of Seoul as well as our major airfields to the DMZ. Ïf you will note their nearest airfields are well back in the Pyongyang area, hence their vital resources are not so immediately exposed. |