(The information referred to follows):

ROK ARMY NIKE-HERC AND HAWK UNITS

The ROK's did not receive Nike-Herc or Hawk equipment through a unit turn-over, i.e. a US Unit turning over its air defense missile equipment to a ROK Unit. All Nike-Herc and Hawk equipment was provided to the ROK by the US through MAP and all equipment for ROK missile units are presently funded by MAP.

a. Hawk I was programmed for FY 1963 through MAP. CONUS training was completed in June 1964. The planned operational date was December 1964, however, the unit did not achieve operational status until March 1965.

b. Nike-Herc was programmed for FY 1963 through MAP. The first ROK Army unit was activated and missiles were received in June 1965. The first ROK Army Nike-Herc Unit was operational in July 1966.

WHY CAN'T ADDITIONAL U.S. MISSILE UNITS BE TURNED OVER TO ROKA?

Mr. PAUL. Now page 39 also explains why we haven't turned over any more even though it was some time ago that we turned over these air defense missile units that we did turn over, and the reason given, is as follows: "Additional units have not been added since the ROKA has been unable to provide sufficient funds, personnel and equipment. U.S. missile units in the ROK have not been turned over to the ROKA due to limitations in funds and personnel."

In light of the fact that we had turned over some and it was quite a long time ago, it would seem they do have the capability to bring people to technical proficiency to man these weapons. The weapons themselves would be the weapons we already have that are manned by the United States, and perhaps it would be a legitimate end of military assistance to reach a goal that would allow the reduction of 4,000 American personnel.

I wonder what your comment is as to why we can't turn more over to the ROKA.

General MICHAELIS. The omnibus statement is correct. Missile units of this type are very expensive both in manpower and in funds. There is no question the ROKS have the technical capability and could form the necessary type organizations. [Deleted.] Currently we are studying many alternative force postures [deleted]. It will however require additional fundings by the U.S. Congress.

Mr. PAUL. Funding of, for which type of funding O. & M. or procurement or construction or what.

General MICHAELIS. Fundamentally O. & M. funding.

Mr. PAUL. You mean it would be more O. & M. costs if the ROK forces were manning it than if the U.S. forces were manning the same missiles.

General MICHAELIS. It would require additional MAP funding for O. & M. It would also reduce U.S. Army O. & M. requirements in the ROK.

Mr. PAUL. I see.

General MICHAELIS. Increases in MAP would result in corresponding reduction in service funding.

MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS IN KOREA

Mr. PAUL. General Michaelis, are there two separate military communication networks in Korea, one for the U.S. forces and one for the ROK forces?

General MICHEALIS. There are multiple communications systems. For example, there is a ROK Army system, a ROK Air Force system, and the U.S. "backbone system." All have integration features.

Mr. PAUL. Do the ROK forces have access to the U.S. backbone system.

General MICHAELIS. Yes, they do.

Mr. PAUL. But then there are some dedicated channels.

General MICHAELIS. There are some dedicated channels, I believe, and common user circuits.

Mr. PAUL. Are most of them dedicated or common user.

General MICHAELIS. I would like to supply that information for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

COMMUNICATIONS UTILIZATION

On the US "Backbone System" of communications in the Republic of Korea, we provide circuits to ROK military forces as follows: ROK Army-21; ROK Navy-1; ROK Marine Corps-5; and ROK Air Force-34. The 61 circuits noted are dedicated to the sole use of ROK military forces, however, in most cases, the circuits terminate in US switch boards which provide access into the Common User System.

Over the ROK Ministry of Communications System, US forces lease two circuits, from Kwangju to Detachment "K", KMAG, near Kwangju. From Kwangju US forces are provided with three circuits over the ROK Army System for use by KMAG. The five circuits are dedicated to KMAG but provide access to the Common User System. The ROK Air Force System provides 32 command-control circuits and nine administrative circuits to US Air Forces Korea/314 Air Division, Osan. The 41 circuits are dedicated but can also be considered common user circuits since anyone in the US and ROK Air Forces can utilize the circuits. General HOLDERNESS. I think, Mr. Paul, it would be good here to point out that communications are one of my particular points of concern. Duplication is really desirable in my case in that it permits redundancy, the ability to get from one place to another in multiple ways. This would be one of the major considerations in reducing the U.S. presence, the increased costs in both equipment and personnel to operate an adequate communications system if we were to move out. Mr. PAUL. You say it would cost more if we were to move out. General HOLDERNESS. I am simply pointing out this would be an additional load that would have to be picked up by ROK Aviation and ROK Army in order to provide adequate communications.

Mr. PAUL. What I am trying to ask here, as in the earlier question, is that it seems to be just a question of different pockets. In other words, maybe military assistance would have to increase but the normal military budget would decrease by a comparable amount.

General HOLDERNESS. I think that is a fair answer.

General MICHAELIS. I believe this is a point that must be brought out. [Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Now, the next step in this analysis is, it would seem, that each ROK personnel costs less to support than an American soldier does. Is that a fair statement?

General MICHAELIS. Admittedly. However, there is no change in many cases in the cost of the equipment whether a U.S. unit or a ROK unit utilizes it.

CLEARANCE OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WITH EMBASSY

Mr. PAUL. Turning to another question, Ambassador Porter, with respect to these reconnaissance flights that we were discussing at the end of the session yesterday, both those near the DMZ and those over the international waters-are such flights cleared with the Embassy? Mr. PORTER. We are generally made aware of or informed about these programs in advance, and are given an opportunity to comment as we see necessary.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FLIGHTS

Mr. PAUL. What do you consider to be the political implications of both of these types of flights.

Mr. PORTER. Well, in general, my approach to problems of that nature is governed by the lack of or difficulty of collecting information about North Korea. It is an extremely isolated regime, deliberately kept that way, or area deliberately kept that way, by the regime, and I believe in a certain amount of activity which will develop information with respect to their intentions.

At times I have demurred. I thought that perhaps the risk was not likely to be commensurate with the gain, but I state my views, whether positive or negative, and then the decisions are made back here.

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us just a little more, Mr. Ambassador, as to what you meant by the statement that the Embassy is generally informed?

Mr. PORTER. Well, we are informed that an effort is envisaged along certain lines, and invited to comment. Sometimes, of course, a period of time passes and we are not, unless we indicate that we wish to be, informed of specific efforts as they occur.

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us a little more about your views as to balancing the political disadvantages against the intelligence collection advantages of these flights. For what types of flights does the balance tend to be negative?

Mr. PORTER. I would like to do that in the-under the other procedure which I think you agree with.

FLIGHT PATTERNS OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

Mr. PAUL. General Holderness, on the day that the staff visited Osan, the air control center had [deleted] reconnaissance aircraft listed on its tracking board. I would like to mention what they were by aircraft designation and ask you to tell us generally what these were and whether this was a typical pattern, this [deleted] number of aircraft.

There were [deleted].

Could you tell us just the general area of responsibility. Was it over international waters around the DMZ, to give us some visual picture of what is flying around Korea on any one day?

General HOLDERNESS. I would say that was a slightly more active than average day, and that the coverage is both over international waters and over the Republic of Korea, and I think anything beyond that we should discuss in the other session.

Mr. PAUL. Let me ask you this: Would you say what relative proportions of these are over water and what are over land? I assume the land is South Korea in this instance.

General HOLDERNESS. Probably about [deleted].

Mr. PAUL. Senator, would you care to ask any questions at this point? Senator AIKEN. No. I am not prepared with my questions at this point.

COMPOSITION AND REDUCTION OF TASK FORCE ASSEMBLED FOLLOWING

EC-121 "PUEBLO”

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador or General Michaelis, I am not sure who should answer this naval question, perhaps General Holderness who seems to be our naval witness here. How large was the naval task force that was sent into the Sea of Japan, I believe, following the shoot down of the EC-121 as it was originally constituted at that time?

Let me phrase that a little differently. The statement indicates that a task force was assembled following the Pueblo. There is no reference to a further task force following the EC-121 shoot down but I thought on the basis of news clippings there was a well-known task force that was kind of our visual response to the EC-121 shoot down. Could you, Mr. Ambassador, or one of you, kindly clarify this historical situation?

Mr. PORTER. I can't recall myself the composition of the task force after Pueblo except that it involved carrier elements, nor do I remember specifically what happened in that sense after EC-121. Maybe others of my military colleagues can supply or we can get details.

Mr. PAUL. Let's put the question so it is clear for the record. Was there a carrier task force following the EC-121 either formed or deployed differently from the period just before the EC-121? What was its size originally? Then the question that I am really getting up to is this. According to public statements, I believe, it was reduced markedly rather quickly, being cut from 29 vessels to eight vessels; and so the further question is why was it reduced so quickly after being assembled. Mr. PORTER. You would like that for the record. Mr. PAUL. Unless you can speak to it now.

General MICHAELIS. I do not have the information.

Mr. PORTER. Well the reductions, I can say in general terms so far as the post-Pueblo period was concerned, simply resulted from requirements of the military services for these vessels elsewhere.

Mr. PAUL. If there was a reduction following the EC-121 very shortly after, in the order that I talked about, I wonder if there was any other reason.

Mr. PORTER. I don't recall the circumstances post-EC-121, Mr. Paul. (The information referred to follows:)

U.S. NAVY TASK ORGANIZATION

Following the EC-121 incident, Task Force 71 was assembled by CINPAC as directed by the JCS. The immediate movement of three carrier (CVA) task groups was ordered, with suitable anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and cruiser bombardment capability toward the Sea of Japan at best speed.

The force was instructed to hold south of Korea until further advised. COMSEVENTHFLT activated CTF 71. Initial forces assigned were USS ENTERPRISE (with CTF 71 embarked), USS TICONDEROGA, USS RANGER, the cruisers USS ST. PAUL and USS CHICAGO, and COMDESRON 3 with destroyers, DALE, TUCKER, MAHAN, and STERETT. The battleship NEW JERSEY, enroute to CONUS, was turned around and ordered to proceed toward the area but did not become a part of TF 71. All units were drawn from existent 7th Fleet assets.

RULES GOVERNING USE OF FIREARMS BY AMERICAN GUARDS

Mr. PAUL. Turning to another subject, General Michaelis, could you tell us what the rules are for the use of firearms by American guards guarding American facilities in Korea. This has to do with the field of pilferage and not the field of hostilities.

General MICHAELIS. Generally we do not have U.S. personnel performing these functions. We have contract Korean Security Guards around most of our installations and facilities.

General HOLDERNESS. We do use U.S. Air Force Security Police rather extensively. Their instructions are very clear that they are not to fire unless critical resources are in actual danger or in self-defense. This is a very critical point in our position in Korea because, as I am sure you know, the crime of theft is not taken nearly as seriously in this part of the world as it is in our part of the world.

Mr. PAUL. Could you venture a comment as to the significance in the pilferage rate because of the existence of this rule, or the relationship of this rule to the volume of theft.

General HOLDERNESS. I don't personally think that the use of firearms is necessary in the prevention of a theft.

General MICHAELIS. Mr. Paul, all American guards are under instructions not to fire except in self defense or in the event a critical item is in actual danger. They are taught to say "Halt" in Korean. We have a mixture of U.S. and Korean guards. Incidentally the Korean guards are generally better because they understand the methodology of the Koreans; and, of course, speak the language.

COUNTRIES OTHER THAN UNITED STATES WHICH MAINTAIN FORCES
IN KOREA

Senator AIKEN. May I ask, is there any other country, a member of the U.N. that has any forces at all in South Korea besides us?

General MICHAELIS. The Thais are a major contributor and of course the ROK's themselves.

Senator AIKEN. The Thais.

General MICHAELIS. Yes, the Thais have an infantry company in the Republic of Korea, and a portion of an Air Force flight squadron, two C-123's stationed in Japan, to support UNC and their troop unit. Senator AIKEN. I see.

General MICHAELIS. The Turks maintain an element of about 15 personnel. The U.K. maintains an element of about 24 personnel. There are other nations represented by one or two individuals.

Senator AIKEN. They are really small military missions.

General MICHAELIS. Each represent their nations and give a flavor of the United Nations to our command.

Senator AIKEN. They haveU.N. flags over there.