網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

Mr. PORTER. They are visible on parade occasions to the population and serve that purpose; yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Okay.

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD UNITED STATES REMOVE GROUND COMBAT FORCES ?

Mr. PAUL. A general question, Mr. Ambassador, which we have touched on from time to time earlier, but summing up, under what circumstances would you think we would be able to remove our ground combat forces from Korea?

Mr. PORTER. I think as Korea continues to develop and her economy is strengthened, which seems to be something well underway by now at this time, and if we envisage an adequate program of modernization certainly taking care of such items as their transport which is inadequate, and their light weaponry and other items, of course which the general could cite better than I, and provided we did not intend to change radically the basic commitment to the Koreans, I think we might make some statistical adjustments in our posture.

[Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Would you want to add anything to that from the military points of view.

Mr. PORTER. The general reminds me, Mr. Paul, that there have been statements [deleted] that from the Korean side they tend to measure this in certain ways [deleted.] When the time arrives that, [deleted] they would think in terms of assuming much more of the burden themselves in terms of forces, force support and, of course, basic responsibility in many ways.

We don't know exactly what that kind of statement means, but we do feel that the sentiment is there in that statement and in others [deleted] which indicate that they, in fact, do look forward to standing on their own feet. They will probably always desire some kind of visible evidence of American companionship. This is due to their geographic position, almost cheek by jowl with the Soviet Union and Red China. That generates a profound uneasiness. But nonetheless they most certainly do look forward to the day that they can depend on themselves for practically everything they need.

PERCENTAGE OF COST PAID BY UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN U.N. FORCES

Senator AIKEN. Speaking of per capita income what percentage of all the costs of maintaining U.N. forces from all countries over there is paid by the United States.

Mr. PORTER. What percentage, sir?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. Of all costs of U.N. forces including the Korean forces. The Korean forces are under the control of the U.N. Commander. Senator AIKEN. Yes. But I was thinking particularly of the smaller forces from other countries, Thailand, et cetera.

Mr. PORTER. We pay the support costs for the small [deleted] and Thai units which are there, sir.

Senator AIKEN. A hundred percent.

General TAYLOR. I believe they furnish some of their own uniforms. Mr. PORTER. Except for small items the general believes like their

uniforms.

STUDIES OF BASE POSITIONS AROUND THE WORLD

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned earlier there was a study going on now with respect to possible reductions around the world of our military presence. Could you tell us now or supply for the record whether there have been other studies with respect to reducing our forces in Korea.

Mr. PORTER. I was referring at that point, Mr. Paul, to a statement made by Under Secretary Johnson in a previous hearing in which he indicated that studies of our base positions around the world are under way.

Mr. PAUL. Other than this one that he referred to, in the past, in the last several years or so have there been any such studies which you or perhaps Mr. Brown are aware of?

Mr. PORTER. I am aware only of a study which I understand was carried on by Ambassador McClintock and General Wood. They traveled to various places where we have large military elements.

Mr. BROWN. I think the answer, Mr. Counsel, is this is a question that is looked at from time to time, sort of a regular review of the situation. It has always been an attractive idea to try to reduce our forces where we can and from time to time we look at the situation from the critical effect and the budgetary effect and so on, and then it is a subject which has not just been put on the back shelf in the thinking of the administration.

Mr. PAUL. Could you say anything more as to what has been done with these studies?

Mr. BROWN. The conclusion has usually generally been that the time has not yet come.

NECESSITY FOR INCREASED KOREAN FORCES IF U.S. WITHDRAWS

Mr. PAUL. Mr. Ambassador, as the Koreans look to the future do they expect to keep their standing army at its present level or, General Michaelis, which ever of you feels he knows the answer.

Mr. PORTER. As I understand it, yes, sir.

Mr. PAUL. Do they expect to increase the size of their air force as we leave, if and when we leave?

Mr. PORTER. I can't answer that. I would say that part of the modernization process they envisage would be along that line.

General MICHAELIS. Mr. Paul, over a period of years you can expect a difference in the composition of forces depending upon research, development, modernization and the type of equipment provided by the United States Government.

General HOLDERNESS. Mr. Paul, I think I should add that they feel the need for a larger air force of their own and if we were to withdraw they must increase the size.

Mr. PAUL. Now, with this modernization that you gentlemen have referred to, would they expect us to continue to support yearly these O. & M. costs that they have to incur in the coming years, that in addition to our providing the modernization that you mentioned, the initial costs for the modernization.

General MICHAELIS. Yes, until [deleted].

FOURTH MISSILE COMMAND

Mr. PAUL. I would like to turn now to a discussion of the Fourth Missile Command which is referred to on (page 1736) of the Defense Department's statement. First, it indicates on (page 1736) that the size of this unit has grown from 680 personnel at the end of 1967 to [deleted] at the end of 1969. General Michaelis, could you tell us why this increase by this amount.

General MICHAELIS. I do not have that detail, but will provide it for the record.

(The information referred to follows.)

STRENGTH 4TH MISSILE COMMAND

Figures indicated in the omnibus statement page 26, pertaining to the 4th Missile Command, groups 1967 through 1969 under the heading of Authorized and Assigned. Corrected figures are as follows:

[blocks in formation]

The increase in authorization between 30 December 1968 and 26 December 1969 is two officers and 32 enlisted men and occurs as a result of converting from the E-Series TOE to the G-Series TOE. The increase in assigned personnel, which is above that authorized by [deleted] enlisted men and below the authorized by [deleted] officers, results from an increase of personnel following the EC-121 shootdown. This overstrength was distributed throughout Eighth Army, depending upon skills, with the 4th Missile Command receiving a proportional share of the over-strength. This is no comparison between Authorized and Assigned in terms of growth since the overstrength is temporary and is now being reduced. Growth of the unit will be reflected only in the authorized figure comparisons which indicates that the unit has grown by a total of 34 personnel since 1967.

Mr. PAUL. Now, are the munitions for this unit stored at [deleted?] I believe the statement referred to [deleted] being that distant from the DMZ and this is the principal munitions storage facility for the Fourth Missile Command. Is that correct?

General MICHAELIS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. PAUL. How many facilities do we have similar to [deleted] that either support the ROK forces or the U.S. forces in this capacity, and how far are they from the DMZ.

General MICHAELIS. [Deleted]

Mr. PAUL. I see.

WITNESS INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Are these facilities nuclear weapon storage facilities?

General MICHAELIS. I have been directed by the Secretary of Defense not to discuss nuclear weapons.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am just curious as to the nature of those instructions, not that I am trying to break down your duty. What type of instructions did he give you?

General MICHAELIS. Sir, I received verbal instructions.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Verbal instructions.

General MICHAELIS. Verbal instructions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Not to discuss what aspect.

General MICHAELIS. I have been instructed not to discuss nuclear

weapons, contingency planning.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Any kind of contingency planning.
General MICHAELIS. Those concerning war plans.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I want the record to be clear so we understand it. There are certain kinds we have no interest in. There are certain ones such as the classic case in Thailand in which we do. You see, we have semantic trouble. Are you familiar with the one I have in mind on Thailand; do you know about it?

General MICHAELIS. No, I am not, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, it was a celebrated case. It went on most of last year; you know about it, don't you?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What I meant was these words. You know there are lots of your contingency plans about which we quite accept your theory or the Secretary's theory that that is not really of any particular importance to us. But when it involves signing an agreement with a foreign country, and their prime minister or their defense minister signs it, it begins to approach the nature almost of a treaty. This is the kind of contingency planning about which we don't accept the idea that the Defense Department can make plans and say "this is contingency and you don't have any business knowing about it." Do you see what I mean?

General MICHAELIS. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Therefore if the Secretary went into it sufficiently, can you state for the record what your instructions are with regard to that?

General MICHAELIS. The contingency plans are those pertaining to actual war plans, not signed agreements which are beyond my competence.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And they are contingency plans within the Department; is that it?

General MICHAELIS. Within the Department of Defense or within the Republic of Korea, actually, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We accept that. But did he say you were not to discuss any kind of agreement you have executed with the Government of Korea?

General MICHAELIS. I have received no such instructions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Have you in your capacity executed any agreement with the Government of Korea?

General MICHAELIS. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This is the type of thing I think we are entitled to know if you had the information. That is what I mean.

Now on nuclear weapons, what is the nature of that instruction?
General MICHAELIS. That I can not discuss.

Senator FULBRIGHT. At all.

General MICHAELIS. At all.

Senator FULBRIGHT. In other words, if I asked you have you got nuclear weapons in Korea you are not to discuss it?

35-205-70-pt. 6- -10

General MICHAELIS. That is correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes or no. No comment; is that it.

General MICHAELIS. No comment.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Those are your instructions?

General MICHAELIS. That is my instructions. I am to simply state that the Secretary of Defense has directed me not to discuss nuclear weapons.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Nuclear weapons at all. Well, at all, abroad or domestic.

Here again, I don't like to have the record stand in that sense. I am not trying to deviate you, I just want to make my position clear. I don't want you--I am not trying to urge you to depart from what you think your instructions are. I don't think I can, and I don't believe the committee can accept the idea that the disposition of nuclear weapons is a matter which is not of interest to this committee or that it has no bearing upon our foreign relations. Now the Secretary of Defense has instructed you.

Could I ask you, Mr. Ambassador, have you been instructed by anybody not to discuss the nuclear weapons with this committee. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. By whom were you instructed?

Mr. PORTER. I was instructed on behalf of the Secretary of State.
Senator FULBRIGHT. What was the nature of your instructions?
Mr. PORTER. That I was not to discuss nuclear subjects.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is that all. No reasons were given that you could enlighten the committee with.

REQUEST FOR LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE EXPLAINING HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO WITNESSES NOT TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. PORTER. No, sir; it was simply that instruction.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could I ask you to ask the Secretary, or would you do it in my behalf, or maybe the Assistant Secretary could do it, to give the committee a letter giving the reason why, I assume you believe, that this committee has no interest in the disposition of nuclear weapons abroad. We are not asking particularly, I don't see any reason why we care about nuclear weapons domestically or within the United States.

But it strikes me that under the jurisdiction of this committee, as given to it under the law passed by the Congress, that this committee has a legitimate right, not only that, its duty, to know about the disposition of nuclear weapons outside the borders of this country. I think they have a very great bearing upon our foreign relations, that they can be extremely dangerous to this country, and I cannot accept the idea that you are at liberty to refuse to tell the committee about the disposition of nuclear weapons.

So I would like to request you to get an official statement from the Secretary of State putting in your position, and if it is as I think it is, I would expect to contest such a position in the Senate because I think it is utterly indefensible that you can continue to keep the committee and the public in the dark about such matters.

If I may be permitted to elaborate a bit, you are seeing now what is happening in Laos. Within 2 weeks the Under Secretary of State told

« 上一頁繼續 »