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Mr. PORTER. I am not in position to go into the question of his knowledge on that subject.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't know. Do you know, General whether General Park knows or doesn't know. Does he know anything about this matter.

General MICHAELIS. I do not know, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have never discussed this with General Park.

General MICHAELIS. No, sir; I have not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then it is quite possible that nuclear weapons could be there without either General Park or the United Nations knowing it, isn't it, as far as you know?

General MICHAELIS. Is this question addressed to me, sir?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

General MICHAELIS. Sir, I am instructed by the Secretary of Defense not to discuss questions on nuclear weapons.

Senator FULBRIGHT. OK. I just want to make the record to see just how these instructions operate because this is a new experience for us. You are the same way?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. So that it is possible that the nuclear weapons could be in Korea without either the government of Korea or the United Nations knowing it.

Mr. PORTER. I am not in position to comment on that, sir.
Senator FULBRIGHT. Is that your position, too?

Mr. BROWN. Secretary Brown?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You take the same position?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON PLANES IN KOREA AT TIME OF "PUEBLO"

INCIDENT?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, is it possible through charts and otherwise that we might be instructing the South Koreans how to use an atomic weapon in the event that some day in the future it was found desirable to locate any there. Of course, we could instruct them how to use them without the weapons actually being present, couldn't

we.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, we could.

I think the record should show, and I believe my memory serves me correctly, that although the Assistant Secretary of State, the commanding general of the United Nations forces in Korea, and the Ambassador of the United States to Korea are instructed not to in any way discuss nuclear weapons, there were press accounts which were never denied at the time of the Pueblo incident that there were planes in Korea that could have flown to the area of the Pueblo except they were equipped with nuclear weapons. They didn't want nuclear weapons, they weren't suitable for use under those circumstances, and there were no planes which weren't equipped with nuclear weapons. Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind I will leave you and go to the Atomic Energy Committee meeting.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I want to put in the record an article which is dated January 24 of 1968, and is entitled "Tie-Up of U.S. Jets Laid To Atom Role." U.S. officials say squadrons could not be refitted.

The closest jet fighter-bombers to the intelligence ship Pueblo were rigged solely for a nuclear mission.

It is very odd indeed, Mr. Secretary. This is a special New York Times article. I won't read it all but I think it is interesting to have it in the record in view of that having been published. As a matter of fact, I attended a briefing at the White House on this same subject and the same matter was discussed then. Why is it? Can you give any reason why since that kind of presentment now a new policy regarding discussions has been developed? Can you discuss it to that extent?

Mr. BROWN. I don't know, sir. All I know we have been given instructions not to discuss it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I think the Pentagon was the source for this article. The Pentagon sources apparently can discuss this matter with the press, but they can't discuss it with this committee. Can you think of any good reason why you are allowed to discuss the matter with the press and not with this committee, General. Can you think of any good reasons? Do you think this committee is not to be trusted with this information?

General MICHAELIS. Sir, my instructions are specifically not to discuss nuclear weapons.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Could you undertake to ask your instructor to give the committee the same kind of information the Secretary of State is going to give us as to the reasons why you will not discuss it?

General MICHAELIS. Sir, I will pass your request to the Department of Defense.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That you request it and relay the request. I think it is, and Mr. Reporter, I would like that article put in the record.

(The article referred to follows.)

[From the New York Times, Jan. 25, 1968]

TIE-UP OF U.S. JETS LAID TO ATOM ROLE

U.S. OFFICIALS SAY SQUADRONS COULDN'T BE REFITTED

(By William Beecher)

The closest jet fighter-bombers to the intelligence ship Pueblo were rigged solely for a nuclear mission, ranking Pentagon sources said today. Thus, they added, the planes could not have been readied in time to aid the beleaguered ship yesterday after she called for help.

This was offered as a principal reason North Korean gunboats were able to seize the Pueblo and force her into Wonsan harbor without opposition. Contributing causes, some officials conceded, were a lack of ready American fighter planes with nonnuclear payloads, presumably because such planes were needed in the Vietnam theater and an apparent slowness on the part of local commanders in taking the initiative to prepare for possible action. Higher officers and civilian officials were also apparently slow to direct such preparations, it was said.

There were 12 Phantom F-4 jet fighters in South Korea at the time, officials said. Half of them were on alert for possible call to use nuclear weapons in any major crisis. The remaining planes were on standby to substitute for any alert aircraft that might suddenly develop mechanical difficulties.

2-HOUR DELAY POSSIBLE

All of the aircraft, authoritative sources said, were equipped with bomb racks and other equipment applicable only to the nuclear mission. It would have taken at least two to three hours for the nuclear bomb racks and associated devices to be replaced with conventional bomb racks, gun pods and air-to-air missile pylons.

There have been many cases of North Korean harassment of intelligence ships, according to this account, so neither the skipper of the Pueblo, Comdr. Lloyd M. Bucher, nor Air Force and Navy commanders expected any attempt to seize the vessel.

Such ships are often buzzed by aircraft, photographed by helicopters and closely approached by gunboats of other nations not only off North Korea but in many parts of the world. Soviet intelligence ships are often given the same kind of treatment, officials say.

Commander Bucher was concerned enough about the first threatening approach by one North Korean PT boat to report the incident by radio to Navy headquarters in Japan. From there, it was relayed up the line at least to Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu.

It cannot be ascertained whether the word was sent to Washington at that point. Officials who knew decline to say.

It was an hour-and a quarter, the Pentagon says, before the Pueblo's skipper flashed word that he was being boarded by North Koreans and for the first time called for help.

At that moment the seized vessel was said to be only about 17 miles off the North Koreans coast. Officially the Pentagon has said she was about 25 miles off shore.

Informed sources say she was actually about 17 miles from Ungdo, at the mouth of Wonsan harbor. But nearly 29 miles from port facilities of Wonsan. Then after 25 minutes, the Pentagon said. The skipper reported that he had been told to follow the North Korean ships into Wonsan.

HALF-HOUR TRIP FOLLOWED

From that moment, it would have taken the ship about half an hour to be shepherded inside Korean territorial waters, some officials noted, and there was not time to get fighters to the scene.

What they did not explain was why the Phantoms in South Korea had not been readied for dispatch well before the Pueblo called for help.

But some officials said that the 12 fighters in South Korea, even if they could have been readied in time, would hardly have been a match for the scores of advanced North Korean MIG-21's that could have come to meet them.

The three squadrons of Phantoms in Japan were too far away and didn't have aerial refueling tankers available, officials said. Similarly, the Enterprise with its 90 planes, was about 600 miles away, steaming from Japan toward Vietnam.

Some officers suggested that were it not for the war in Vietnam more conventionally equipped fighters would probably have been in South Korea. "But when you're fighting a war, priority must go to the combat zone," one officer said. Military and civilian officials were reluctant to discuss the level at which the decision was made against trying to intervene with fighter-bombers, even after the seized ship was in North Korea's territorial waters.

"Let's just say the final gun sounded before we could mount a touchdown drive," one planner remarked.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I also would like to just lay the warning, to the Assistant Secretary of State and the Pentagon, that I shall do everything in my power to keep this particular passage from being deleted from the record when it is published, I think it ought to be published. I think if we are going to have this relationship between the Senate and the Executive it ought to be a matter of public knowledge because I don't like to sit here forever being unable to do anything about matters of this kind, being held responsible by my constituents and faced with an attitude on the part of the administration of this kind, that we are not entitled to know what is going on. Do I make myself clear.

Mr. PORTER. Very clear, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't want to be faced now with any effort to delete this. What we want is an explanation in justification from the administration as to their attitude. If they have one, well fine and good.

I am surprised they have not given you some indication as to why they take this attitude.

QUESTIONS BY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Mr. PAUL. On this subject of nuclear weapons I would like to read into the record the further specific questions which, as I understand it, the subcommittee is interested to have answers on so the record will be clear.

These questions are: First, what agreements or understandings, written or oral, have been entered into with South Korea with respect to the introduction, use, storage or removal of nuclear weapons? Second, has the United States placed nuclear weapons in Korea?

Third, why is it considered necessary to have these weapons there, if they are there?

Fourth, would you describe the arrangements that exist for maintaining the security of these weapons?

Fifth, what are the political consequences in Korea of disclosure that we do have weapons there, if we do?

Sixth, when did the United States first deploy nuclear weapons to Korea?

Seventh, what changes have occurred in the pattern of this deployment since then?

Eighth, whether we have nuclear weapons in Korea or not, does the Ambassador know whether we do, and if we do and he knows, does he know their general location and general nature?

Finally, what would be the political consequences if the nuclear weapons which are stored in Korea are removed?

EXERCISE CAPSIZE CARAVAN

Senator FULBRIGHT. I wonder, General, if I can ask you this question. Are you familiar with an exercise entitled "Capsize Caravan"? General MICHAELIS. I am not, sir. Perhaps it is in my exercise book. Senator FULBRIGHT. This was in September of 1969, just about what, 6 months ago. Are any of you familiar with an exercise called Capsize Caravan, 8th Army?

General CAGWIN. I am not, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you all Air Force?

General HOLDERNESS. Air Force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are any of you 8th Army?

General MICHAELIS. I am the commanding general, 8th Army. Senator FULBRIGHT. This is Septmber 15-19, 1969. "Critical cancellation 15th of September 1969, 7th Infantry Division of the 8th Army." No one is familiar with this?

General MICHAELIS. I am not familiar with that name, sir. There are many unilateral exercises at division, brigade, and lower unit levels— all have various exercise names.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, the brief description is division CPX code 4 and the purpose is as follows, that may prompt your memory:

To familiarize newly assigned commanders and personnel of the current readiness as to procedures, to exercise commanders and staff in preparation and discussion of general plans, to include employment of nuclear weapons and to exercise communications.

You have never heard of that?

General MICHAELIS. No sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you have any other exercises of a similar

nature.

General MICHAELIS. As I noted previously sir, there are many unilateral exercises and command post exercises conducted by division brigade and battalion commanders. All are given exercise titles of one type or another.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And none of your aides here are familiar with this one or does it follow or are you refusing to discuss it under your instructions or what?

General MICHAELIS. No, sir; I am not refusing to discuss the exercise. I simply do not have any information covering an exercise by that name.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Now, this is a CINCPAC communication center document. It is a report from the Secretary of Defense on exercise Focus Retina. Does that mean anything to anyone here?

General MICHAELIS. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know about that.

General MICHAELIS. I do; yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. On page 6 of this document there is this item "Simulated use of nuclear weapons will not be made during exercise Focus Retina." Are you familiar with that?

General MICHAELIS. I am not familiar with that wording, sir. I had just arrived in theater and immediately went in to the exercise and at this point do not recall the particular document being quoted. Senator FULBRIGHT. Any other of you gentlemen.

General CAGWIN. I was not in the exercise.

General TAYLOR. I was not within the exercise.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It would clearly indicate in this particular one you are not having simulated use but in others which are, I assume, a similar nature you are using simulated use of nuclear weapons.

I think this, these instructions, along with these press accounts make only clear our position that these matters are being discussed and being carried out and obviously I don't think you could do it without discussion with the Korean people, the Korean command, and yet you are unwilling to discuss it with this committee. It only makes it clear to me how unusual this instruction is.

I want to reemphasize we would like very much the basis unon which the Secretary of State and Defense base their instructions. This really comes down to that as a very important matter. Go ahead.

Mr. PAUL. Thank you.

Senator FULBRIGHT. John, you weren't here when I came in, and maybe for your information just to know what this is about, they declined to discuss nuclear weapons, whether they are there or anything about them, on instructions from their respective Secretaries. OK.

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