mand which we were discussing, I notice from (page 1745) of the Defense Department statement that it also broadcasts some of its broadcasts to South Korea as well as North Korea; is that correct?

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM J. PORTER, AMBASSADOR, U.S. EMBASSY, SEOUL, KOREA; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. JOHN H. MICHAELIS, COMMANDING GENERAL, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMUSK, COMMANDING GENERAL, 8TH U.S. ARMY; MAJ. GEN. LELAND G. CAGWIN, FORMER COMMANDING GENERAL, 2d INFANTRY DIVISION; MAJ. GEN. LIVINGSTON N. TAYLOR, CHIEF, JOINT MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP, KOREA; AND BRIG. GEN. ARTHUR W. HOLDERNESS, JR., COMMANDER, USAFK/314TH AIR DIVISION, PACAFResumed

General MICHAELIS. That is correct.

Mr. PAUL. I would like to ask the Ambassador, then, what he considers to be the political significance of this militarily operated broadcast to the allied country, South Korea?

Mr. PORTER. Well, the South Koreans have found certain broadcasts, news, commentaries I think in particular, of interest. They have used them as an adjunct to their own programs, I mean on their own network_relaying it. Other than the remark of their interest in the matter, I have no additional comment.

Mr. PAUL. Is it, perhaps, even more inappropriate for a military broadcast to be directed toward a friendly audience as well as toward the enemy one?

Mr. PORTER. Well, philosophically speaking, one might say that the views and even, perhaps, news should be conveyed to the South Koreans by South Koreans. But the fact of the matter is that, without any particular prompting or urging that I know of, they have found it desirable to carry certain broadcasts of VUNC.

Mr. PAUL. With respect to military assistance, I would like to insert in the record a briefing paper that was given to the staff on its trip to South Korea dated May 16, 1969, entitled "ROK Capability To Absorb Additional Defense Costs."

(The document referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

KOREAN GUARDS EMPLOYED FOR U.S. FACILITIES

Mr. PAUL. With respect to the question of our facilities and the protection for these facilities, one final question, General Michaelis. Could you tell us approximately how many Korean guards we employ in connection with our facilities?

General MICHAELIS. May I supply it for the record? I don't have that information readily available.

Mr. PAUL. All right.

(The information referred to follows.)

ROK CONTRACT GUARDS

As of 27 February 1970, U.S. Forces Korea had 4,916 ROK Contract Security guards.

Mr. PAUL. Could you tell us or supply for the record the extent to which these guards are former Korean military personnel or members of the Korean military reserve?

General MICHAELIS. I would say they are almost universally ex-members of the military service.

Mr. PAUL. Are these guards paid by us, receiving compensation from us, more than they would receive if they were on active duty with the Korean forces in Korea?

General MICHAELIS. Yes.

Mr. PAUL. Isn't this a little unusual? I shouldn't say unusual, but doesn't this raise a question as to the appropriateness of our paying for these services?

General MICHAELIS. These are people who are now out of the military service and provide their own meals. The pay of a private in the ROK Army, as you remember, is $1.60 a month.

Mr. PAUL. Finally on this subject, could you tell us who owns the company that supplies the guards?

General MICHAELIS. I do not have that information.

Mr. PAUL. Who owns the company that supplies the guards? I gather it is a contract arrangement between our forces and a local employer.

General MICHAELIS. That is correct. But I do not have the name of the company or companies. There are various contract companies in various areas.

Mr. PAUL. Let us put it this way: Could you tell us, if available supply for the record, who owns the companies and whether they are high Korean civilian or military officials. That is the point of the question.

General MICHAELIS. Right, I understand. I will endeavor to obtain that information for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

U.S. Forces Korea has contracts for ROK security guards with the following ROK civilian companies. Company senior official is as indicated. Kyung Hwa Enterprise, Co., Ltd.-Mr. Kim L. Nam. Bong Sin Enterprise Co., Ltd.—Mr. Kim Hyong Chung. Shin Won Enterprise Co., Ltd.-Mr. Choc Yoon Ok. Young Jin Industrial Co., Ltd.-Mr. Yoo Hwa Yul.

Korea Procurement Agency, a U.S. Army facility, has certificates from the Republic of Korea Government that the above listed companies are non-government connected organizations. None of the company senior officials listed are active duty military personnel. At some point in time some, or most, of the senior company officials listed may have served in one of the ROK military services since a very high percentage of the male population in the ROK do have prior military service.

DESCRIPTION OF EXERCISE FOCUS RETINA

Mr. PAUL. I would like now to return to the question of joint exercises and also air defense briefly.

First, looking at the joint exercise known as Focus Retina, this was the large-scale U.S.-Korea airlift exercise in March of 1969. Could I ask General Michaelis to summarize the features of this exercise briefly.

General MICHAELIS. Briefly this was an exercise wherein the borders of one hypothetical nation were violated by another. The exercise

commenced, just after the violation of the border, with one of the hypothetical nations starting its counterattack to drive out the invaders, reinforced by a U.S. Strike Command brigade composed of a brigade from the 82d Airborne Division-which flew in from Fort Bragg in a combination of C-141 and C-130 aircraft. It was the first such exercise of its kind in the ROK. It took place in March 1969. Mr. PAUL. Could I ask you, following this, to read to us from (page 1751) over to the top of (page 1752) in your statement which gives the political significance of the exercise.

General MICHAELIS. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. PAUL. Yes.

General MICHAELIS. Exercise Focus Retina was conducted to demonstrate the rapid reaction capability of CONUS-based USSTRICOM forces for deployment to PACOM; provide strategic mobility and tactical training of USSTRICOM, MÁC, ROK, and U.S. Forces, Korea. The exercise had no relationship to possible reductions in U.S. force level in Korea. Objectives of the exercise were accomplished. The exercise demonstrated the rapid reaction capability of CONUS-based forces to deploy to Korea, and provided an extremely valuable opportunity for realistic combined training. Request has been made for a Focus Retina-type exercise to be conducted in Korea during early CY 1971. Exercise is tentatively scheduled. No tanks were involved during Focus Retina; however, with the availability of C-5A aircraft, tanks could be flown in during such an operation.

Focus Retina made a significant and favorable political impact in Korea. ROKG leaders were pleased and reassured by selection of ROK as exercise target area. President Park publicly said it would play a "great role in defending peace and freedom of Korea and Asia." The airlift display was also an effective reminder to ROKG that United States has variety of options available in the context of the U.S. role in free world defense. The press, on the whole, reflected positive political impact. The predominant view was that Focus Retina provided an impressive demonstration of U.S. capacity and determination to honor commitments to help defend ROK in event of attack. The exercise was viewed as particularly reassuring at a time of uncertainty in intentions of the new U.S. administration toward Asia and rising interest in the fate of the Okinawa Base. The only major reservation was speculation that Focus Retina might signal an eventual move by the United States to withdraw from the ROK. Several editorials expressed concern that while Focus Retina showed the U.S. capability to respond to attack, the U.S. determination to do so was more in doubt. Mr. PAUL. Thank you.

Now, the statement at the top of (page 1751) which says there was no relationship to possible reductions in the U.S. force level in Korea, I am sure that was a sincere statement, but is that accurate? There was no such intention?

General MICHAELIS. Yes, it is accurate. There was no discussion-I arrived in the ROK just prior to this exercise. Suddenly the comment was in the U.S. press that this exercise was a forerunner to U.S. force reductions in Korea.

This exercise was planned purely and simply to demonstrate a reenforcing capability. It had nothing to do with any possible decision to reduce forces.

Mr. PAUL. I realize that it certainly didn't apply to any anticipated short-range expected reduction of forces; but within the total picture of things?

General MICHAELIS. With the advent of the C-5A and the C-141 lift, of course, the dynamics have changed. This will affect strategic thinking in the Department of Defense, and there are studies now under consideration to examine the entire matter.

KOREAN ATTITUDE TOWARD SIMILAR EXERCISE

Mr. PAUL. And you also mentioned that another similar exercise is planned for 1971. Could you or the Ambassador tell us what the Korean attitude toward this future exercise is, if they know of it?

Mr. PORTER. I am not sure that they are aware of the prospect, but I am fairly sure that they would welcome it.

Mr. PAUL. Did Focus Retina practice any aspects of nuclear warfare?

General MICHAELIS. This was a conventional operation.

SPECIAL FORCES EXERCISES

Mr. PAUL. Turning to other exercises, General Michaelis, do you have frequent or regular Special Forces exercises with the South Koreans?

General MICHAELIS. To the best of my knowledge, we have no Special Forces exercises. There were some Special Forces personnel in the ROK at the time of the Ulchin landings, but they were more or less in an advisory role. There are no U.S. Special Forces in the ROK. Mr. PORTER. We asked for that group primarily for police training

purposes.

Mr. PAUL. You don't have any exercises of a Special Forces nature? General MICHAELIS. I have been informed there was one exercise called "Foal Eagle."

Mr. PAUL. When was that?

General MICHAELIS. It was in the fall of 1969 and a Command Post type exercise. The participating forces were U.S. and ROK Special Forces and the U.S. Air Force.

Mr. PAUL. Do we also have other exercises practicing a technique of nuclear artillery or other forms of nuclear warfare with the South Koreans?

General MICHAELIS. I have been instructed by the Secretary of Defense not to discuss questions pertaining to nuclear matters.

PROTECTION OF RECONNAISANCE VEHICLES BY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

Mr. PAUL. I would like to turn to the question of the protection of our reconnaissance vehicles by fighter aircraft. I will turn to General Holderness on this.

On (p. 52) of the Defense Department's statement, it is said: [Deleted.]

General HOLDERNESS. I have been instructed not to respond beyond what is written here with respect to the statement.

[Deleted.]

Mr. PAUL. Let me say the reason I ask some of these questions which you are unable to answer are for two purposes: one is similar to the one today so that the record will make clear our concern.

Second, even if you cannot satisfy us on our concerns you can satisfy yourselves on the concerns that come to one who is not familiar with the actual operation of these rules.

Mr. Ambassador, finally, I would like to ask you whether these rules which we have just been referring to are cleared with the representatives of the State Department, either at the embassy level or in Washington.

Mr. PORTER. We have an opportunity always to submit our comments. Mr. PAUL. General Holderness, could you tell us at what level in the Defense Department these rules are cleared?

General HOLDERNESS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is as far as I know.

Mr. PAUL. That is all I have with regard to the ordinary questions, the easy ones.

(Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)