UNITED STATES SECURITY AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD REPUBLIC OF KOREA THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1970 UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee continued to meet, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Symington and Aiken. Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Pincus, and Mr. Paul of the committee staff. Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order. [Deleted.] (1701) APPENDIXES APPENDIX I STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PORTER, AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: A quarter of a century has passed since United States troops were first sent to Korea to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces and began to assist the people to form their own government and conduct their own national life. We then found, to our regret, that our intentions were not matched by Soviet armies and officials who had moved into the northern half of the peninsula to accept Japanese surrender there, and who blocked all efforts to establish a united Korea based on the freely expressed will of its inhabitants. A republic was consequently formed in South Korea in 1948 under the aegis of the United Nations, and Americans began to think of, and to implement, withdrawal from the country. Unfortunately, in 1950, the Republic of Korea was subjected to an unprovoked attack from the communist-oriented North, whose leaders believed that the United States commitment to depart from Korea was sufficiently clear for them to run a risk. Bitter war which followed cost us dearly, and our allies also paid a heavy price for their determination to stand on principles on which the United Nations organization was founded. As for the Korean people, cost of the war was immeasurable in terms of life and property. When the smoke cleared, the situation had been stabilized at the armistice line along the 38th parallel. The South, with a majority of the population and few natural resources, is supported by the United States and other allies, with the moral backing of the United Nations. KOREA AND THE UNITED NATIONS The United Nations still maintains in Korea a Commission for Unification and Reconstruction (UNCURK). The Commission was established in 1950, under a U.N. Resolution, "to represent the U.N. in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in all Korea." UNCURK's presence in Korea and this mandate have been reaffirmed annually by overwhelming majorities in the General Assembly. A minority in opposition in the General Assembly each year is comprised of Communist countries and some members of the Afro-Asian bloc. The United States and other countries sent forces to Korea in 1950 pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolutions of June 27 and July 7, 1950. Allied forces, including those of the Republic of Korea, are under the UN Command which derives its authority from the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950. Nine of the 16 members who provided forces during the Korean War maintain troops or military representation in the country. A Military Armistice Commission established under the Armistice Agreement to supervise implementation and discuss violations of the agreement meets on the call of either party at Panmunjom. It still plays a key role although the discussion of armistice violations has with the passage of time become of secondary importance. Its greatest importance now is to provide a channel of communications between North and South and between the UN Command and North Korean forces. The Panmunjom site was used, for example, in the Pueblo negotiations and in negotiating the release last year of a helicopter crew which went down in the North. North Korea has just used the site to return 39 of the 51 people aboard the Korean Air Lines plane diverted to the North in December. UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS AND DECLARATIONS In 1954, the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. Article III contains the heart of the treaty and is worded as follows: "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." This language, containing the so-called "Monroe Doctrine" formula, corresponds to the Philippines, ANZUS and SEATO treaties of that period, but with an important difference in the description of the territorial area to which the treaty applies. The language makes clear that the United States' obligation extends only to territory then under, or recognized by us as lawfully brought under, the administrative control of the Republic of Korea. The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification by a vote of 81 to 6. In doing so it underlined the point on the treaty area by attaching the understanding that the treaty obligates the United States to assist Korea only in case of an external armed attack "against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under administrative control of the Republic of Korea." Article I of the treaty requires the Parties to refrain from the threat or use of force in ways inconsistent with UN purposes, and Article II requires consultation whenever there is a threat of external armed attack. The Republic of Korea Government fully understands that the United States opposes and would not support any aggressive military action initiated by the Republic of Korea against the North. Shortly after coming to power President Park repudiated the use of military force to reunify the country. He has stressed instead the importance of strengthening the South economically and politically to offer an alternative superior to life in the Communist North. In a Joint Statement dated May 26, 1961, the Republic of Korea placed its forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command. On September 21, 1961, the Koreans agreed to the terms, including prior consultation, under which their forces might be temporarily withdrawn from this control. [Deleted.] There are no other agreements or understandings regarding prior consultation before offensive or reprisal action by the Republic of Korea against the North. The Mutual Defense Treaty was a direct consequence of the war and its purpose was to help prevent a recurrence. Additional statements affirming United States support for Korean security have been made from time to time These would include, for example, the communiques issued after the presidential meetings of 1965, 1966, 1968 and 1969, copies of which are submitted for the record, and the statement of Vice President Humphrey on February 23, 1966. None of these statements extends the United States commitment originally stated in the Mutual Security Treaty. The most recent authoritative reaffirmation of the commitment was contained in the Communique issued by President Nixon and President Park of Korea in San Francisco on August 22, 1969, following their meeting. It reads as follows: "The two Presidents agreed that Republic of Korea forces and American forces stationed in Korea must remain strong and alert and the two Presidents reaffirmed the determination of their Governments to meet armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States." There are no secret agreements between the U.S. and the ROKG bearing on this defense commitment. The agreements and understandings reached at these presidential meetings are set forth in the communiques. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of January 26, 1950 sets forth terms under which the U.S. would furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. An agreement for the establishment of the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea was signed on January 26, 1950 and amended on October 21, 1960. The Sixteen Nation Declaration on Korea of July 27, 1953, signed by the U.S. and the other 15 nations who contributed troops in Korea, affirmed that if there were a renewal of armed attack they should again be united and prompt to resist, and warned that a breach of the armistice would be so grave that it probably would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea. Copies of these documents are attached for the record. NORTH KOREAN THREAT CONTINUES The armistice of 1953 was not a peace settlement. It laid down the conditions of cease-fire and recommended a political settlement, which has never been reached. North and South Korea remain, therefore, two parts of a divided country and have no relations of any kind. In consequence, almost a million men have faced each other along and near the 38th Parallel since that year, including a sizeable contingent of American troops. At present, Koreans of the south regard this situation with anxiety, not because they fear the North on a man-to-man basis today, but because they know that Kim Il-sung is committed to reunification of the peninsula by force if necessary and because they recall all to vividly that the North Korean attack in 1950 received support both from the Soviet Union and Communist China. The American forces still remaining in Korea are not only an important military part of the defense shield for South Korea but their presence is of considerable psychological importance in maintaining the sense of confidence which is responsible for so much of Korea's development. They are tangible, visible evidence of continued U.S. support. The presence of some of our forces on the DMZ has confirmed, to both North and South, our commitment to defend Korea in accordance with the terms of the treaty. [Deleted.] We have no commitment to the Koreans, either in connection with their dispatch of troops to South Viet-Nam or otherwise, to maintain U.S. forces of any kind in the peninsula or for any period of time. We have, however, agreed with the Koreans that we would consult with them before substantially reducing the number of our armed forces in Korea. The North Koreans have made many efforts to infiltrate agents through the DMZ or by sea further south. The most dramatic of these was their attempted assassination of President Park on January 21, 1968. In almost every case these agents have been detected, killed or captured. The Koreans who have come into contact with these agents almost immediately inform the police, even in cases involving members of their own families. Their memories of North Korean actions during the Korea War are bitter. Additionally, bonuses equal to $660 are paid to anyone except a government officer who provides information leading to capture or killing of an enemy agent. The Koreans have developed a very widespread and quite efficient counterinsurgency capability. We have helped them in this endeavor by providing training and such materiel as communications equipment, transportation, and small arms. The effectiveness of anti-infiltration measures, both in terms of organization and equipment, which have been put into effect, is undoubtedly responsible, at least to a considerable extent, for the fact that this effort has tapered off notably over the past year, and that at this time the situation generally is calmer than it has been for some years. But, the North and South still face each other in mute and menacing distrust. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE SOUTH Behind the shield which the treaty and the presence of American forces in Korea have provided, a remarkable development has taken place. A nation, ravaged by war, denuded of resources, handicapped by a million casualties and almost a million refugees and historically inward looking, has been transformed into a country with one of the fastest growth rates in the world imbued with a sense of confidence in the future and looking outward to improved relationships with its neighbors and the rest of the world. Most of the credit for this achievement obviously goes to the Koreans themselves who have tackled their problems with energy and intelligence. But it could not have taken place without a sense of confidence that they were reasonably secure from another attack from the North and without help in the form of both military and economic assistance. Both of these were provided to enable the Koreans to build up their own forces to take over increasingly the burden of |