the 1966 suspension and items valued at $49.6 million annually remain to be transferred.

Several approaches have been made to the ROK Gevernment pointing out the benefits that would accure to the ROK by at least a partial resumption of the MAP Transfer Program.

The following chart shows the incremental impact of the suspension on the MAP investment program from FY 66 through FY 70 and the anticipated impact for FY 71 and FY 72 (in millions of dollar).

Thus the incremental impact of the suspension on the MAP from FY66 through FY70 is $93.1 million and the anticipated impact through FY72 will be [deleted.] The only plan to reinstate the MAP Transfer Program is that implied in the Brown Memorandum, wherein the US agreed, inter alia, "To suspend the MAP Transfer Program for as long as there are substantial Republic of Korea Forces, i.e., at least two divisions, in the Republic of Vietnam." The ROKG budget can withstand the impact of a resumption of the transfer.

The illegal seizure of the Pueblo preceded by the abortive North Korean raid on the Blue House dramatically demonstrated the need to take steps to reassure the ROKS of US interest and support and signal the North Koreans of the firmness of US intentions to support our ally. In early February 1968 President Johnson asked Congress for a $100 million supplemental augmentation to provide additional military assistance to the ROKG. On 11 February 1968 Presidential Envoy Cyrus R. Vance arrived in Korea to confer with President Park and ROKG officials on the situation and actions required to strengthen the Korean and American Forces in this area to deal with any contingency that may arise. The $100 million package was discussed and on 21 February 1968 the Country Team in accordance with Washington guidance [deleted] make a major contribution to defeating NK infiltrations, particularly the increased effort expected that year; improve military capabilities of present ROK force structure to deter over NK military aggression; and minimize the impact of new equipment on the ROK Defense Budget and MAP funded operating costs.

Status of FY 1968 $100 MAP Augmentation Package:

(a.) Overall status:

[Deleted.]

The proposed contents of the FY 1968 Supplemental Military Assistance Program were discussed in the highest councils of the Government of the Republic of Korea. The Blue House Raid and Pueblo incident of January 1968 pointed to the possibility that North Korea might be entering a new and more aggressive phase of the confrontation. It was considered fundamental that the contents of the supplemental budget present dramatic evidence of the support of the United States Government to the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea Air Force did not possess aircraft capable of countering the North Korean Air Force MIG21 aircraft. It was the considered opinion of Korean and U.S. military officials that the Republic of Korea Air Force could efficiently operate F-4 aircraft and thereby partially eliminate this deficiency. The final decision to provide F-4s was made subsequent to an urgent request from the highest officials of the Government of Korea.

ROKAF pilots have been flying the F-4s in Korea since 29 August 1969. All 18 aircraft were in-country by 23 December 1969. [Deleted.] The six ROKAF instructor pilots trained in CONUS will conduct a majority of flying training in Korea. Substantial USAF support has contributed to the growing self-sufficiency of this squadron. 128 ROKAF officers and men have attended training courses in the U.S. Of these only five are still in the States. Air Force Logistics Command provided 67 personnel at the outset of flying operations for direct support and to train ROKAF maintenance personnel. The last member of this team is scheduled to leave Korea in April 1970. In addition, a 17 man USAF Mobile Training Team (MTT) is presently on temporary duty in Korea training 343 ROKAF personnel in 14 aircraft maintenance specialties. This team will depart in mid-March

1970. Fifth Air Force has provided a USAF training assistance for ROKAF personnel in weapons loading procedures. This team completed its work in January 1970. Over a longer period, USAF advise and assistance will be provided by eight permanent advisors, each in a different specialty, who have been added to the 6146th Air Force Advisory Group at Taegu Air Base. The goal of all training is to make the ROKAF F-4 squadron self-supporting and to make it capable of conducting its own internal continuing training.

The ROKN has three destroyers provided by the U. S. Navy. ROK Ship DD–91 was loaned in 1963 on a five-year loan under Public Law 87-387 to meet military requirements. The loan was extended in 1968 for an additional five years. ROK Ships DD-92 and DD-93 were provided through MAP in 1968 and 1969, respectively. Annual O&M costs for each destroyer are $259,529. The peacetime mission of the destroyers is to maintain control of the seas contiguous to Korea and provide counter-infiltration patrols against North Korean agent boats. In wartime, the destroyers would conduct anti-submarine warfare, naval gunfire support, and naval control/protection of shipping.

Major actions are and have been taken to improve the Republic of Korea's counter-inltration posture. [Deleted.]

Informal discussions have been held between COMNAVFORK and representatives of the ROKN in regard to developing an in-country fast boat construction program. These fast boats are to assist in countering the North Korea agent boat threat. [Deleted.] These devices may assist the ROK in detecting agent infiltration. [Deleted.]

These resources are considered essential to achieve : improved coastal and offshore capability; improved DMZ effectiveness; improved interior defense; improved small arms firepower; and improved command and control. The FIR requirements identify [deleted] worth of improvements and modernization of the existing ROK force structure to keep pace with the improved North Koreans conventional capability. Not included in the above dollar amounts is [deleted] to be provided by the Won Budget. The program except for the dollar figures, was developed in November and December 1968, in coordination with the ROK Services.

The ROKG has an urgent requirement to modernize rifles in the hands of its troops and is desirous of obtaining the capability to manufacture a U.S. designed rifle. It has been recommended by the U.S. Government that the ROKG treat this requirement as a "self-help" program and undertake to finance the entire cost of this production facility with U.S. credit support. The ROKG is also desirous of expanding their existing ammunition facility to permit the manufacture of 5.56 ammunition. The ROKG is also interested in eventually extending the rifle production facility to allow for the manufacture of other types of small arms such as pistols and machine guns. The ROKG has requested the U.S. to review the following company proposals in terms of produciblity, cost and operational reliability: (a) the M-16 rifle, production rights own by Colt Industries, Inc.; (b) the AR-18 rifle, production rights owned by Armalite Company; (c) the Stoner weapon system, production rights owned by Cadillac Gage Co. These reviews are currently underway. It should be noted, however, that since the ROKG will be paying for this program, the final decision relative to the selection of a rifle for production in Korea will be the responsibility of the ROKG.

No military assistance was promised to the Republic of Korea as a result of Secretary Packard's visit in 1969. The ROK Minister of National Defense stated an urgent requirement to modernize and improve the ROK Armed Forces and specifically to equip the entire Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) and he asked Mr. Packard to look into the availability of any old US weapons that could be made available to the ROKG. Mr. Packard responded by saying that he had already asked Admiral McCain to obtain serviceable old weapons, as many as possible, and to bring them to Korea, but modernization would take further study.

Weapon requirements identified by ROK was for about two million rifles. Mr. Packard stated the U. S. would try its best to satisfy the requirement. He also announced that the Colt Firearms Company was sending representatives to Korea about 15 June 1969 to discuss the production of M16 rifles in Korea. Mr. Packard made the statements based on an urgent plea from the Minister of National Defense for assistance in providing effective counter-measures against infiltration efforts into the ROK by North Koreans. 790,000 excess weapons (M-1 rifle, M-1 and M-2 carbines, M-3 SMGs), varying amounts of ammunition, repair

parts and basic issue items were located. Upon approval of DEPSECDEF in June 1969, DA ordered these items shipped to Korea at no cost to MAP except PCH&T; 4,000 weapons were shipped immediately. A Memorandum of Understanding between USG/ROKG has been prepared and presented to the ROKG for signature which acknowledges the fact that the 790,000 weapons are not MAP supportable and that all future costs associated with the maintenance/support of these weapons is a responsibility of the Republic of Korea.

All shipments arrived in-country during the period June-September 1969, and those weapons requiring repair/rebuild are being scheduled through the Ordnance Base Depot prior to issue to ROK HDRF. Repair/rebuild is scheduled for completion by April 1970. The distribution plan for the HDRF weapons was implemented in November and should be completed during April 1970. On completion of repair/rebuild/issue, the small arms inventory of the HDRF will be approximately 1.4 million weapons. Although nothing was requested by the U.S. in return for the weapons provided, the Republic of Korea has greatly improved its counterinfiltration capability.

The current total authorized strength of U. S. personnel MAAG Korea is 1061. (Authorized strength as of 1 July 1970 is 897). There are 219 personnel directly involved in administering the distribution of American equipment and 678 personnel directly involved in training. Commander, U. S. Forces Korea has been charged by SECDEF with responsibility for MAP Korea. The Joint MAAG Office (PROV-MAAG-K) exercises the programming and budgetary control. The service components (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force) have responsibility for the MAP programming, training and advisory effort. The following steps were taken to reduce the size of MAAG Korea: BALPA II reduced MAAG strength by 414 during FY 69; Program Budget Directive 412 will eliminate 13 more U. S. spaces by 30 June 1970 for ceiling of 1048, and the President's approval of the Overeas Personnel Reduction Plan (OPRED), submitted by DOD, reduces 151 more U. S. spaces for a new manning level of 897 as of 1 July 1970.

All ROK Services are provided with planning dollar levels to encourage maximum participation by the ROK government in Military Assistance Planning. In addition to encouraging a greater degree of participation by the ROK Services, the planning dollar levels provided ensure that all the Advisory Groups and ROK counterparts are working within the same general parameters. Personnel of the ROKF participate, and associate directly, with U. S. advisory personnel in the preparation of the Military Assistance Program. The overall degree of ROK government participation in the Military Assistance effort is limited only to the degree necessary to ensure compliance with the MAM prohibition against disclosure of total dollar ceilings. The capabilities of the ROK Services to participate in the formulation of MAP proposals has shown a marked increase within the past two years and every effort is being made to further improve these capabilities. The ROK Services have demonstrated their ability to propose logical, accurate plans within planning ceilings. The ROK staffs have access to, and have developed an acceptable level of expertise in the use of the documents that define cost, usage rates and stock levels.

[Deleted.]