armed attack against one of the parties, there is an obligation to assist, but the Treaty does not prescribe in advance the extent, manner, and timing. The obligation has been described by Secretary of State Acheson, testifying at the time the North Atlantic Treaty was before the Senate, as follows: 66* ** [W]hen the attack occurs, which is an attack upon all of them by definition, each party considers what the objective under the treaty is. "That objective is to restore, if it has been violated, and to maintain after it has been restored, the security of the North Atlantic area, and if it pledges itself to take any sort of action, including armed force, if that is necessary in its judgment-to take whatever action its judgment says is necessary to bring about that result. "That might be a declaration of war and use of all the resources of the country. It might be something much less, depending on what happens as the result of the attack. If the attack is something which has not been deliberately planned but has flared up in some way, it might be dealt with by means not involving the use of armed force. It might be dealt with by reason, and that sort of thing. "If, however, it were a deliberate plan, a highly mobilized attack on the whole area then I assume that the only thing that could possibly have any effect in restoring and maintaining the security would be every possible physical effort on the part of the country. So you are not automatically at war. You take whatever action you think is necessary in the circumstances." Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty The collective defense arrangements in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty incorporate the so-called "Monroe Doctrine Formula". In 1823 President Monroe warned the members of the Holy Alliance that "we should consider any attempt on any portion of the hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." In this treaty, the recitation that an armed attack against one of the parties would be dangerous to the "peace and safety" of the others is followed by a declaration that each party "will act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." With regard to the action required to implement this and similar treaties, Secretary of State Rusk has stated: "These treaties represent legally binding commitments to take appropriate action at the request of an ally that is the victim of aggression. These commitments do not bind us to any particular course of action. Most of them state that in the event of aggression we would act to meet the common danger in accordance with our constitutional processes. How we act in fulfillment of these obligations will depend upon the facts of the situation. Some situations will requires less participation on our part than others. What is fundamental to the fulfillment of our obligations under these agreements is that we act in good faith to fulfill their purpose. Thus, while the agreements permit great flexibility in choosing the means by which we would assist other countries in their defense, we could not expect what we would be regarded as fulfilling our obligation through the provision of minimum assistance when the survival of the country clearly necessitated greater aid." Conclusion In reality, the distinction between the obligation of the United States under the North Atlantic Treaty and the obligation under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is more a textual than a practical matter. The Department of State has stated on several occasions that the difference is "not appreciable." The response of the United States in a situation of armed attack against any State which is a party to any of its collective defense treaties would in the final analysis depend on the nature of the attack, the defensive capacity of the State or States attacked, and other relevant circumstances. While the language of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the use of armed force is somewhat more specific and direct than that of the other treaties, the response of the United States in every case, regardless of the particular treaty creating the commitment, would depend upon the requirements arising from the situation. I trust that you will find this submission responsive to the Subcommittee's request. Sincerely yours, DAVID M. ABSHIRE, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that commitment of the United States in event of attack by one NATO country on another but the point I want to make is, are we obligated in the opinion of the State Department, to come to the defense of a country [deleted] if it is attacked by the Soviet Union or can we make the decision at the time it becomes imminent. Second, what has been done, if anything, with respect to any plan if Turkey and Greece became exacerbated over any particular problem, as example, the most obvious one is Cyprus, to the point where one attacked the other? Mr. DAVIES. Sir, I will provide a detailed statement for the record. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Will you proceed? (The information referred to follows:) On the first point, the response is covered by the report of June 6, 1949 of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty which includes the following: "The Committee emphasizes that this clearly does not commit any of the parties to declare war. . . Action short of the use of armed forces might suffice, or total war with all our resources might be necessary. Obviously, Article 5 carries with it an important and far-reaching commitment for the United States; what we may do to carry out that commitment, however, will depend upon our independent decision in each particular instance reached in accordance with our constitutional process." On the second point, pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty the United States would plan to consult with its NATO Allies. Mr. PAUL. May I interrupt to ask just one question? You said the possibility of an attack by one NATO member on another was not covered by article 5. I believe Secretary Acheson testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on this very point on April 27, 1949. I am also informed that the Tripartite Declaration of October 3, 1954section V of the final act of the London Conference-may bear on this point. I wonder if your lawyers could review this matter and give us your position on it? Mr. DAVIES. We will research, Mr. Paul, and provide it for the record. (The information referred to follows:) The Department of State has reviewed the matter with specific reference to the legislative history referred to by Counsel and is of the opinion that Article 5 of the Treaty does not cover an attack by one NATO member on another. Mr. PRANGER. There is an exchange of letters between President Johnson and Premier Inonu at the time of the crisis of 1964 which is published in the Middle East Journal where this question is taken up and the President at that time was loath to intervene in the dispute on the ground that this was an unthinkable thing to happen between NATO allies and furthermore, he did indicate that we would have to consult with our allies before any moves against the Soviet Union if they intervened. But this is in the Middle East Journal and maybe we could supply this correspondence for the record, too. (The information referred to appears on page 1848.) GREEK AND TURKISH CONTINGENTS ON CYPRUS Senator SYMINGTON. What understanding exists governing U.S. supplied MAP equipment used by Greece and Turkey? Mr. DAVIES. Sir, this is supplied in accordance with the commitments of the two powers to NATO. It is equipment provided for the common defense within the Alliance. Senator SYMINGTON. Have there been any waivers permitting either Greece or Turkey to transfer war equipment to Cyprus? Mr. DAVIES. Only in connection with the two contingents that are maintained by the two powers on Cyprus under the Zurich Agreement, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. What does that mean? Mr. DAVIES. Each of the guaranteeing powers has a small contingent of forces on the island. There is a Greek force and a Turkish force. Senator SYMINGTON. And we supply both? Mr. DAVIES. They are detached from their national armies so, obviously would have the equipment provided their forces under our NATO program. Senator SYMINGTON. Are they part of NATO or are they Greek and Turkish forces? Mr. DAVIES. They are Greek and Turkish forces in support of NATO, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. Do they report to a NATO commander? Mr. DAVIES. No, not on the island. They would report to several governments. Senator SYMINGTON. How could they be NATO if they are Turkish? Mr. DAVIES. Well, the NATO forces, sir, as I understand it, are assisted by the United States and other NATO powers as forces in support of NATO, and you cannot distinguish between elements within those forces. Senator SYMINGTON. How many people does Turkey have on the island? Mr. DAVIES. About 650, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. And how many have the Greeks? Mr. DAVIES. The Greeks have about 950, as far as we know, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. Why do we let the Greeks have more than the Turks? Mr. DAVIES. The London-Zurich Agreement, to which we are not party, established the force strengths of these countries, taking into account the fact that the Greek Cypriot population is about four times that of the Turkish Cypriots. Senator SYMINGTON. Are the force levels decided on the basis of population on the island? Mr. DAVIES. I believe, sir, when the powers negotiated the Zurich Agreement the population balance was important because each thought that its forces would be elementary security for their particular segment of the population. Senator SYMINGTON. Do we supply more to Greece because they have about 950 than we do to Turkey because they have about 650? How do we work that out so far as military supplies are concerned? U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT ON CYPRUS Mr. PRANGER. The military supplies for the Greek and Turkish forces, I believe, come just through the ordinary supply channels for Greek and Turkish MAP. At that point the distribution is made to these forces, presumably by the Greek and Turkish forces and not by us. Senator SYMINGTON. Then, are you saying the decision as to how much we supply Greece in the way of military equipment on Cyprus is decided by the Greeks and what we supply the Turks is decided by the Turks? Mr. PRANGER. No, the volume of U.S. supplied military equipment which the two countries might take to Cyprus was established by agreement with Greece and Turkey in 1960 and the disposition of MAP furnished equipment given these countries is currently being monitored by means of equipment utilization reports which are filed periodically by the Military Assistance Group. Senator SYMINGTON. Do we know what equipment they have taken out of Greece to put into Cyprus? Mr. PRANGER. I do not have a record of it, sir, but I could look into the matter and supply it for the record. Senator SYMINGTON. Could you find out for both countries? Mr. PRANGER. Yes sir. We can get a T.O. & E. for you. (As of the date of publication, the Staate Department had been unable to gain Greek Government approval for declassification of the document referred to.) (The information referred to concerning Turkey follows:) No. 1727. His Excellency FATIN RUSTU ZORLU, ANKARA, May 16, 1960. EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to draw the attention of the Government of Turkey to the provisions of Article 4 of the Agreement on Aid to Turkey of July 1947, and with regard to the desire of the Turkish Government to use certain Military Assistance Program material for its planned military force in Cyprus to request that Turkey ask formal consent of the United States Government for such use for a purpose other than these for which the material was furnished. It must be clearly understood that United States consent for the use of this equipment in Cyprus, which will be granted immediately upon receipt of Turkey's request, should not provide a basis for requests for additional Military Assistance Program material. The equipment sent to Cyprus, which was provided by the U.S. as grant aid under the Military Assistance Program cannot be dropped from accountability and will be considered as assets available to requirements for the Military Assistance Program for Turkey. The material to be deployed initially to Cyprus has been agreed upon by the Turkish General Staff and JUSTMAT and is listed in the attached schedule and any Military Assistance Program material Turkey may subsequently wish to deploy to Cyprus will have to be the subject of a separate request. I have the honor to propose that, if this Note is acceptable to Your Excellency's Government, this Note and Your Excellency's Note in reply, asking for formal United States consent and agreeing to the list submitted, shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of Your Excellency's reply. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. FLETCHER WARREN. |