Nunmati with Rumanian help, and two others at Barauni and Barod with Soviet aid, allowed the state sector to counterbalance the previous Western monopoly of the nation's petroleum industry.32 Giving credit to state capitalism and Soviet support for harnessing foreign aid amounts to a substantial modification of the post-Stalin theory on the negative role of foreign capital. As late as the summer of 1955, M. I. Rubinstein wrote in the New Times that what made the evolution of the new nations towards socialism inevitable was the inability of capitalism, particularly of foreign capital, to rise to the huge task of developing the backward economies of Africa and Asia. By admitting now that mixed companies have installed themselves in the new industries, precisely where they once claimed foreign capital would refuse to go, Soviet analysts have conceded that foreign capital can contribute to development in directions desired by the developing countries themselves—e.g., heavy industry in the public sector. The weak rationalization that it is natural for foreign capital to flow to sectors where it can make the biggest profits only underlines the admission implicit in the Soviet analysis: that capital-even reactionary foreign capital—can after all contribute to a healthy economic development in India. Between the lines of this apparent condemnation That state capitalism can contain the dangers of Western aid and the self-congratulatory approval 99 33 of private foreign investment does not, in the Soviet view, mean that imperialism offers no other threat to Indian economic sovereignty. An even more serious threat is Western governmental aid, the alleged purpose of which is "to block the road against the process of national and social liberation." As an alternative to free development, "the imperialists aim to transform India into an oriental support for the world capitalist economy.' The aforementioned Pavlov advances many arguments to prove the nefarious effects of Western aid: it encourages private enterprise; it discriminates against industry in the public sector; structurally it goes to build the infrastructure, thus encouraging private investment rather than helping to increase economic independence by aiding the creation of the means of production; aid is tied to the purchase of goods in the donor country, the of socialist cooperation, the reader can infer what Indians will admit in private: that the cause of India's development of a mixed economy prospers in direct proportion to the country's ability to extract aid from both the "imperialist and the socialist super-powers." Agriculture Another dimension of the Soviets' view of India's economic situation appears in their discussion of agrarian relations. What is striking in this aspect of the analysis is the Soviet preoccupation with the development of agrarian capitalism. The analysis of change in the Indian villages is a direct application to India of Lenin's analysis of Russian agriculture at the turn of the 19th century. With their 32 V. V. Rymalov, SSSR i ekonomicheski slabo-razvitye strany, Moscow, 1963, pp. 97-98. 33 V. I. Pavlov, op. cit., p. 133. 34 Ibid., p. 168. 35 P. Tretiakov, "Soviet Technical Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 2, 1960, p. 47. feudal privileges liquidated by the bourgeois government's agrarian reforms, the big landowners (zamindars and ryotwari) are being transformed into capitalist entrepreneurs, exploiting their own holdings personally rather than leasing them to sharecroppers. The other feudal class, the peasantry, is itself splitting into an agrarian bourgeois sector, owning the land it once worked under tenancy, and a kind of rural proletariat, so impoverished it must sell its labor as manpower for the new rural capitalists. Apart from the class differentiation, the Soviets note a growing commercialization of agricultural production, evidenced in increased sales to industry and growing monetary expenditures by the agricultural population.36 As a result of the widening internal market, other indices of capitalism become more pronounced. Capital accumulation increases, permitting technical improvements (increased use of fertilizers, modern equipment, irrigation, etc.) that lead to an "intensified development of agricultural production.' 99 37 culture, 38 while others, such as Ulianovski, declare that feudalism is no longer the dominant economic form.39 While the debate is being actively pursued, Soviet agronomists seem to be in clear agreement that capitalism has not yet completely triumphed over the Indian countryside in all its Western splendor. They conclude that therefore its further development must be supported as progressive. If the Indian "kulaks" leave something to be desired, it is the low degree of capitalism characterizing their farms and their restricted opportunities to improve capital equipment. As for the lower strata of the peasantry, they suffer, according to Marx's famous phrase, “less from the development of capitalism than from the insufficiency of its development.” 99 41 40 put it, the basic problem in Indian agriculture remains "the contradiction between the old agrarian structure and the capitalist mode of production which is developing." 42 The solution of India's desperate agricultural situation lies in the direction of more radical, but nevertheless capitalist, reforms. In speaking with Soviet Indologists in Moscow, this author was struck by their lack of any doubt about the possibility of analyzing the Indian situation in terms of capitalism. In one conversation, I asked an agricultural specialist whether there were any features peculiar to the Indian situation which were not susceptible to analysis by Lenin's concepts. He replied that such factors as the "relative How New Is the New Line? agrarian overpopulation," caste relations, and village isolation in India were only differences in degree and not of kind from the Russian conditions that Lenin had known and definitively analyzed in the 1900's. Given Lenin's insistence on the idea of capitalist development in Russian agriculture (an emphasis that can be traced to his acceptance of Plekhanov's adaptation of Marxism to Russian agrarian conditions and to Lenin's bitter polemic with the Populists, who denied the necessity of passing through a capitalist stage), it appears unavoidable that the Soviets discover capitalism wherever they observe any agricultural progress in a non-socialist country. If this notion of growing agricultural capitalism is a virtual tautology in the Soviet analysis, there are nevertheless different viewpoints on the relative degree of feudalism's decline and capitalism's development in India. Some maintain that semifeudal relations still predominate in Indian agri 36 R. P. Gurvich, Selskoe khoziaistvo Indii, Moscow, 1960, p. 96. 37 Ibid.; also A. Maslennikov, "Agrarnie reformy v Indii," in Agrarnie reformy v stranakh Vostoka, Moscow, 1961, p. 86. Having identified the main features of the Soviet analysis of Indian capitalism—the progressive nature of state capitalism, the critical approval of free enterprise, the acceptance of the planning principle in a non-socialist system, the recognition of Western aid's contribution to Indian development, the emphasis on the development of agrarian capitalism-it remains to offer some interpretation of these post-Stalinist developments in Soviet Marxist-Leninist Indology. Is this accommodation with capitalism in India unusual and, if so, what does it indicate? It could be objected straightaway that there is nothing at all extraordinary in finding that the Soviets analyze underdevelopment in terms of capi 38 D. S. Laialpuri, "Kapitalisticheskoe preobrazovanie selskovo khoziaistva Indii," Narody Azii i Afriki, No. 4, 1963, p. 19. 39 R. A. Ulianovski, "Reforma agrarnovo stroia," in Ekonomika sovremennoi Indii, Moscow, 1960, p. 81. 40 Maslennikov, op. cit., pp. 95-97. 41 Cited by M. A. Maksimov and V. G. Rastiannikov, "Predislovie," in D. Torner, Agrarnii stroi Indii, Moscow, 1959, p. 10. 42 Ibid. talism. Marxist-Leninists are logically impelled by their methodological system to identify the historical stage through which a given society is passing, measuring it in terms of their rigidly defined conceptual tools. These concepts originated with Marx, who forged them to explain the phenomenon of 19th-century Europe's emerging capitalist system. They were adapted by Lenin to analyze semiAsiatic Russia at its "take-off" stage. It is only natural that contemporary Marxist-Leninists should find these concepts perfectly adequate to explain India, entering on its own industrial revolution. As an historicist doctrine directed towards political action-the objection would continue-it is necessary for Marxism-Leninism to identify a given society's secular progress, since the nature of its historical stage of development will determine the state of its class relations and, as a result, what class tactic should be pursued by the proletariat and its Communist Party to hasten the revolution. Furthermore, the logical preoccupation with capitalism is strengthened by the equivocal moral attitude of the Marxist: on one side, he likes to underline the evils of capitalist society in order to show that scientific socialism is the true champion of the interests of the exploited; on the other side, he can salute the progress achieved by capitalism as a preparation for the inevitable revolution. If his analysis shows, for example, that the bourgeoisie is prospering while the peasantry has fallen to a state of chronic famine, he can both deplore the unjust consequences of the capitalist system and rejoice that the class struggle will inexorably heighten. hough the author would agree that Soviet Marxist-Leninists are ideologically induced to talk in terms of capitalism, these arguments do not explain why such an impatiently revolutionary doctrine as Leninism should adopt so conciliatory an attitude in speaking of Indian capitalism. The post-war Stalinist analysis of India used the same concepts and methodology to reach completely different conclusions: by its compromise with British imperialism, the Indian bourgeoisie was deliberately conserving India's colonial situation, neither industrializing the economy nor dissolving the feudal state of agriculture. As for India's historical stage, it was identified with that of China in 1927: "Since its compromise with English imperialism, the Congress has lost its raison d'être, just as [did] the Kuomintang, after Chiang Kai chek's treachery of 1927." chek's treachery of 1927." Whereas the Stalinist analysis anticipated an imminent "revolutionary agrarian transformation," the post-Stalinists view socialism only as a final point to be achieved through the progress of state capitalism. It would be too easy to infer from this change of line that the validity of the Soviet analysis is discredited. After all, didn't the US State Department reverse its position over a relatively short period of time on such a basic question as the legitimacy of Indian neutralism? Nor does the disparity between the current Soviet and Chinese views of India allow one to dismiss out of hand the MarxistLeninist conceptual apparatus, any more than the disagreement between economists like P. T. Bauer and Wilfred Malenbaum on the worth of Indian planning proves that the concepts of Western economic analysis are ipso facto invalid. The key to appreciating the validity of the Soviet analysis is the realization of its three functions, for Soviet Indology is simultaneously an official governmental view, a scholarly investigation, and a consciouslyexecuted line of propaganda. As an analysis with official sanction, the Soviet line in many instances takes up positions that are counterposed to the Western point of view. This mirror effect is especially evident on issues closely related to the cold war: socialism/capitalism is the only viable socioeconomic system for India, while capitalism/socialism would be disastrous for the Indian people; the Other Side is trying to subvert Indian development onto the wrong road by its so-called aid; in the end Our System will win out. On other issues more related to development problems there is an obvious convergence between the current Soviet analysis and such Western academic views as those of John P. Lewis: a mixed economy is well-suited to India's situation because governmental initiative strengthens the weak sector of free enterprise; economic planning is essential for a rational exploitation of scarce resources; heavy industrial production allowing major import substitution is the best base for self-sustaining growth." But whatever the similarity in content, the Soviet analysis still remains quite distinct by virtue of its propaganda role. Its self-righteous dogmatism may of fend the Western reader more accustomed to rational persuasion, but it is this very moral and 43 E. Varga, Osnovnie voprosy ekonomiki i politiki imperializma posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny, Moscow, 1953, pp. 36276. 44 John P. Lewis, Quiet Crisis in India, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1962. mental simplicity that constitutes its propaganda effectiveness for the literate but semi-educated reader. Above all, it flatters the wounded ego and justifies the innate anti-Western nationalism of the Indian who is sensitive about his ex-colonial economic backwardness. I. Lt is small wonder that the Soviet analysis, in trying to fulfill all three of these functions for a widely-mixed audience, makes itself vulnerable to rational attack. Yet while the Soviet analysis certainly is aimed to appeal beyond the local Communist readership, it would be wrong to deduce that Soviet Marxism-Leninism is for this reason losing its ideological content. The post-Stalinist analysis clearly contains some novel features which can easily be labeled revisionist: a reformism which acknowledges the socio-economic achievements of a capitalist system; a gradualism which implicitly accepts, in its view of state capitalism, the absence of ultra-rapid solutions for the country's problems; a collaborationism proclaiming Soviet aid can strengthen a non-socialist economy. Though this attitude does play down the prospect of immediate revolution, it is false to maintain, as the Chinese claim, that the Soviets have no revolutionary plan for India. Their whole analysis assumes the ultimate transition to socialism, as can be seen in their political formula of the National Democratic State, their guide for action to help direct the course of events towards a "non-capitalist path of development." What the current Soviet analysis of India does show is an unusually clear separation between the twin natures of Marxism-Leninism-the "scientific" analysis of the socio-economic situation based on a rationalistic conceptual system, and the ac 45 tivist guide for revolutionary action. It would be naive to infer that Mr. Hyde has been exorcised, but it is clear that Dr. Jekyll is in prominence at the moment and extremely well disposed towards India. That a re-evaluation of the Soviet national interest in the emerging "third world" played the decisive role in this doctrinal acceptance of welfare capitalism in India is not difficult to conclude.46 Post-Stalin reversal toward acceptance of Nehru's achievements—including his stabilization of the political situation, his frustration of the Communists' separatist tactics, and his inauguration of real socio-economic progress was predicated on the desire to base Soviet policy on a more realistic assessment of the local situation in the developing countries. Welcoming neutralist India to the "zone of peace" showed that the Soviet Union appreciated the strategic value of this populous non-Communist nation's independence from Western tutelage. Offering substantial economic aid reflected not just the need to compete with the West for India's good will but a Soviet preference for a successfully developing, if bourgeois, neighbor situated on the border shared by the USSR and China. The stability of the Soviet attitude toward India since 1955, despite leadership changes in both countries, indicates that this high degree of Marxist-Leninist tolerance for the Indian system can be expected to continue unless some major realignment of forces compels a new reorientation of Soviet strategy. 45 A greatly increased realism and objectivity is, of course, characteristic of all post-Stalinist social, economic, and political analysis. 46 For a more complete discussion, see this writer's forthcoming L'analyse soviétique des problèmes indiens du sous-développement (1955-1964), Paris, Mouton. Politics in Flux: I EASTERN EUROPE EDITORS' NOTE: During 1966 Problems of Communism presented a series of articles on "Economics and Politics" which discussed the economic reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and their political implications. We begin in this issue a new series of studies on the role and development of the political institutions in Eastern Europe in order to discern any new trends that might accommodate the widespread demand for representational reform. Below, the case of Czechoslovakia is examined by Mr. Morton Schwartz. In forthcoming issues Poland and Hungary will be discussed. Czechoslovakia: Toward One-Party Pluralism? By Morton Schwartz deserve our attention, if only for the reason that they are being discussed at all. Most of the proposals for political change seek to modify the centralized and repressive character of the Communist political system inherited from the Stalin era. Highly jealous of any threat to their power monopolies, the ruling Communist parties have generally resisted major alterations in the existing system. It is particularly significant to note, therefore, that a recently proposed political reform in Czechoslovakia has, despite its unorthodox nature, won some support in high party circles. While this proposal does no real harm to the concept of the leading role of the Communist party, there is some evidence to support the inter |