agers at the present time. Indeed, despite intimations that managers of enterprises are to be given greater decision-making authority, the number of directors of civilian plants on the all-union Central Committee and Auditing Commission fell from five in 1961 to four in 1966, and the number among the full members of the six republican central committees from 18 to 16. The leading plant directors involved in the recent economic experiments received no recognition at all.

It would, of course, be premature to conclude that the proposed economic reforms will be abortive. However, one can point to a problem which surely must be resolved in the next few years. In quasiMarxist terms, we might almost say that there is a "contradiction" between some of the professed goals of the reforms and the personnel chosen for the top posts in the councils of ministers, gosplans, and ministries—or to be more exact, between these goals and the relative positions accorded to key groups. It is a "contradiction" which is not likely to last long, however, for unless there are changes in personnel policy, the men called upon to implement the reforms will not have the prestige or authority to do so.

Heavy vs. Light Industry

While the results of the party elections raise questions about the intensity of the commitment of the leadership to radical reforms in the planning system, the announced decision to bring light industry somewhat closer to equality with heavy industry does find greater reflection in the election results.

To be sure, the elections (as well as the directive on the new Five-Year Plan itself) leave no doubt about the continued primacy of heavy industry. Fourteen Ministers of Industry were elected full members of the All-Union Central Committee, none of whom head light industry ministries. With the exception of the Ministry of Electronics (essentially a defense industry), even the ministries on the periphery of light industry (those concerned with the production of chemicals and machinery for light industry) won representation only at the level of candidate members of the Central Committee.

7 Defense plants are excluded because of the difficulty in identifying their managers. No managers of defense plants were found among the members of the all-union bodies and only a few among those of the republican central committees.

A similar situation prevails within the central party secretariat. The head of the heavy industry department (A. P. Rudakov, who died July 10, 1966) was given the rank of secretary and full membership in the Central Committee, while the secretary for industry with the highest status (D. F. Ustinov, a candidate member of the Politburo) is a former Minister of Defense Industry. On the other hand, the head of the light industry department is only a candidate member of the Central Committee, and the heads of the chemical industry department and the trade organs department are only members of the Auditing Commission. (The heads of the departments for machine building and for defense industry are also only candidate rather than full members, but Ustinov's and Radakov's prime responsibility in these realms must be taken into account in evaluating this fact.)

In the republics, the differentiation of status between officials of heavy industry and those of light industry is not as marked, but it is still quite visible. While republican ministers in charge of branches of heavy industry which have always had low priority (notably the timber industry and the building-materials industry) continue to be accorded rather low status, those in charge of oil, coal, and metallurgy are, as always, full members of the central committees. By contrast, less than half of the ministers of the various branches of light industry have been granted full membership. Similarly, only four out of 11 heads of light industry and food industry departments of the republican party central committees were given full membership on the central committees, while all but one of the heads of heavy industry departments (or industrial-transportation departments in cases where there is no department for heavy industry alone) received this honor.

8

Nevertheless, in spite of the higher status still accorded to officials connected with heavy industry, the recent elections do reveal that for the first time in the postwar period the ministers in charge of light, consumer-goods industries have been given a significant place among the party elite. In 1952 three of the four ministers in charge of consumer industries were not even elected to the Auditing Commission; in 1956 only two of these four were

8 There are a few republics in which it has not been possible to identify the heads of the light industry and/or food industry departments, and, strictly speaking, I should refer to a sample of 11 heads of departments. Some republics have both an industrial-transportation department and a light industry department. In these cases the former is really a heavy industry-transportation department.

included on the Central Committee and the Auditing Commission; and in 1961 the number of light industry administrators in these bodies remained at two. In 1966, by contrast, three of the four consumer industry ministers and the deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers in charge of light industry were elected candidate members of the Central Committee, and the fourth consumer industry minister was made a member of the Auditing Commission. In the republics also, ministers in charge of consumer industry received substantially increased recognition in the party's governing bodies. In the six republics sampled, 18 such ministers were elected full members of republican party central committees in 1966, as against 13 in 1956, and 10 in 1961.10

Even more dramatic has been the elevation in the status of the ministries concerned with consumer services.1 In both 1956 and 1961 only seven heads of such ministries were given places on the All-Union Central Committee and Auditing Commission, whereas 11 of them received this honor in 1966. In the six sample republics, the total

9 The author has not included the Ministry of the Automobile Industry among the consumer industries since it has actually been more of a Ministry of the Truck Industry. In any case the Minister of the Automobile Industry was not included in the 1952 party bodies, but was a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1956 and 1966.

10 1961 is not completely comparable to 1956 and 1966 because of the existence of the sovnarkhozy at that time. However, the 1961 figures do include the sovnarkhoz officials who supervised light industry.

11 These ministries (and state committees) supervise education, health, social security, trade establishments, entertainment, and the communication industries.

number of ministers concerned with consumer services who were elected to the key republican party bodies rose from 21 in 1956 to 24 in 1961, and to 35 in 1966.

The substantial rise in the status of the consumeroriented ministries from 1961 to 1966 is indeed striking in comparison with the relative lack of change between 1956 and 1961. In retrospect, the 1961 party elections appear to be a truer index of Khrushchev's actual investment priorities (that is, the priorities he adopted when faced with a hard choice) than were his many statements about "goulash Communism." The 1966 party elections could, therefore, presage a more determined and effective effort to achieve the new targets for consumer-goods production than was made to meet these targets as set in the preceding seven-year plan. If the Soviet citizen now hears little about a transition to communism by 1980, perhaps he has greater reason to hope that the country is at least moving closer to a consumer-oriented economy.

The Role of the Party

Anyone who speculates about the development of Soviet society must investigate the changes, if any, that are taking place within the Communist Party itself. Is there any evidence of an erosion in the "directing" role of the party apparatus as compared with the role of the governmental institutions? Is the process by which party decisions are made becoming more pluralistic? Are men with new and different backgrounds and perspectives

coming to the fore in the directing party bodies? The Soviet press in the post-Khrushchev period has carried a multitude of warnings that party organs should not attempt to "replace" (podmeniat') the soviets or state organs of economic administration and should not interfere in detailed administrative questions. Some observers have concluded from these statements that while Khrushchev "tried to expand [the party apparatus] from an ideological organization into an operational organization involved in day-to-day management of all aspects of the economy," his successors "have withdrawn the party organization from the detailed operation of government and society.

99 12

In an earlier article published elsewhere,13 the author pointed out that the significance of such warnings against party encroachments on the administrative functions of the soviets and state organs has often been exaggerated. After all, such warnings had been uttered periodically in the last two years of the Khrushchev period as well as earlier. Rather than implying a restriction of the authority of party organs, these warnings are intended to remind republican and lower-level party secretaries of the broad scope of their responsibilities and of the consequent necessity to leave relatively routine problems to the state administrators. The party first secretary at the republican or provincial level has been depicted in party theory as a prefect-like official-that is, an official who is an integral part of the administrative system with the responsibility of representing the center in his area, of coordinating the work of the local agencies of the specialized ministries, of seeing that the decisions of these agencies reflect a broader perspective than might flow from narrow departmental interests, and of promoting a balanced development program in the region.

Nothing in recent Soviet official statements indicates that there has been any curtailment of the basic authority or responsibility of the party organs, and the 1966 elections provide corroborating evidence of the continued primacy of the party apparatus. Republican and regional party secretaries continue to constitute the largest single group in the all-union Central Committee, as do lowerlevel party secretaries in the republican party central committees, and they continue to dominate

the all-important bureaus. Nevertheless, there has been a slight decline in the percentage of acting party officials elevated to membership of key party committees and bureaus, a decline which might possibly foreshadow a gradual change in the role of the party organs but more probably reflects the necessity of representing the larger number of central ministries required by the major reorganization of the central government apparatus last fall. It should be noted that the Khrushchev period saw a drastic increase in the representation of the professional party apparatus in the republican party bureaus. Following a 1952 decision to reduce the republican and regional party secretariats to three men, party officials held a majority of the voting seats in only two (or possibly three) 14 out of 14 republican party bureaus. In 1956, however, party officials constituted a majority of the voting members of party bureaus in nine republics; in 1961, in 11 republics; and in 1962-64, in all the republics.

The 1966 party elections did not reverse this trend. At the present time, party officials have a majority on all but one of the republican party bureaus, and in this one exception (Latvia) five of the ten bureau members are party secretaries. Moreover, in over half of the republics, one of the "state" members of the party bureaus is the chairman of the People's Control Commission, a position invariably filled from the career party apparatus. The significance of the high percentage of party officials on the republican party bureaus does not lie in the existence of a common apparatchik viewpoint. It is doubtful that any such thing exists any longer in view of the increasing scope and diversification of functions within the party apparatus. In many bureaus, specialized party officials who work in intimate contact with one another and with the first secretary constitute a majority. It is virtually inevitable under these circumstances that on many problems a compromise will have been informally, perhaps even unconsciously, reached before the question is even considered by the bureau as a whole. In this sense there is a danger of the party secretariats supplanting the bureaus, and the danger is not merely a hypothetical one.

At the center, few of the specialized secretaries sit on the Politburo, but Khrushchev's practice of

12 Peter Grose, "The Communist Party is the Rear Guard of Russia," New York Times Magazine, March 27, 1966, p. 131. 13 "The Soviet Concept of the Relationship between the Lower Party Organs and the State Administration," Slavic Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, June 1965, pp. 215-40.

14 I cannot identify one member of the Lithuanian bureau. Since he could not be found in the kind of party position from which bureau members are usually selected, I have assumed that he held a governmental post. If I am mistaken, then party officials would have had a majority in three bureaus.

giving a majority of Politburo voting memberships to party officials has been continued. Six out of the full Politburo members are full-time party officials, and four of the "state" administrative officials now on this body spent most of their careers in party or Komsomol work. No doubt reflecting the nature of the Politburo's work, nine of its voting members have had the coordinative administrative experience of a republican or obkom party first secretary.

W

hile party officials are still the largest single group in the party committees and bureaus, there has been, as already noted, some reduction in the strength of their representation on these bodies, although at certain levels it is difficult to make a distinction between purely government and purely party leaders. At any rate, the enlargement of the all-union and republican central committees has meant a decrease in the percentage of seats held by individuals identifiable as purely party leaders.15

The decline in the proportion of party officials on the committees and bureaus appears to have little practical significance for the short run. The change in the central Politburo primarily reflects the decision to divide the two major positions held by Khrushchev between two men, while the shift in the republican bureaus can be explained by the transformation of the former Party-State Control Committees (regarded as primarily party organs) into people's Control Commissions (now classed as state agencies). If this is taken into account, the actual change from 1964-66 is very slight, nor does the reduced proportion of seats occupied by party apparatchiks on the All-Union Central Committee seem likely to have much impact on the decisionmaking process. With party officials continuing to constitute 42 percent of the Central Committee membership and with many former party secretaries now in the state administration, there is little reason to believe that the Central Committee could be used as a vehicle to reduce the role of the party apparatus, or that important differences of opinion on other issues will involve representatives of the party apparatus on one side and those of the state apparatus on the other. In fact, any divisions are likely to cut across both groups rather than to follow party-vs.-state lines.

15 The number of party officials on the average nine-man republican bureau fell from six to five between 1964 and 1966.

If the decline in the proportional representation of the party apparatus is unlikely to have any immediate practical impact, does it have any broader, longer-range significance? To answer this difficult question, it becomes necessary to examine what particular groups have benefited most from the expansion of the central committees. When we take a long look at the all-union Central Committee over a period of years, for example, we find that there was a sharp rise in the representation of the military in the period 1956-1961, of industrial administrators in 1961-1966, and of foreign affairs officers throughout the last decade. At the republican level, there have been considerable variations from the pattern of change in the all-union Central Committee, but increases in the representation of state administrators in consumer-oriented fields and of rank-and-file peasants and workers have been generally conspicuous.

Rather than seeking to explain each of these changes individually, it is perhaps more useful to treat them as a whole and to relate them to what is doubtless the fundamental long-term trend in the evolution of Soviet society-the increasing specialization in the decision-making process. Because of the growing number of specialized institutions and sub-institutions and the increasing complexity of the decisions to be taken, it becomes inevitable that an ever greater number of these decisions should in fact be left to those individuals with specialized knowledge, regardless of changes in the top political leadership. From this perspective, the gradual rise in the number of specialized administrators seated on the party central committees no doubt reflects recognition of the growing importance of the decision-making role of the institutions which these administrators represent.

In any event, it seems clear that the resolution of conflicts between the major interests in Soviet society continues to be carried out primarily by party officials. Certainly, despite statements about. an increase in the role of the soviets, there is no indication of any increase in the status of their chairmen since 1961. Furthermore, it is worth noting that every republican party first secretary was named a full member of the Central Committee, while only five of the chairmen of republican councils of ministers received this honor.

In a subsequent article I will examine more closely the categories of party officials who are becoming increasingly important and attempt to see whether new men with different backgrounds and perspectives are coming to the fore in the directing party bodies.

By Borys Lewytzkyj

arly in 1966, before the opening of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, local congresses were held in 14 union republics, at which time the members of the leading party organs were selected and the leaders of the CPSU formally endorsed. The results of these congresses provide us with interesting data from which we may make some observations regarding the changes in the leadership of the party apparatus and its composition in terms of age, educational background, and political tendencies. The following analysis is based on information collected by the author on two elite groups: the 200 full and candidate members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Bureaus of the 14 republican party central committees, and the 139 party First Secretaries of the oblasts, krais, autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts.

Dominance of the War Generation

The age structure of the two groups that were studied is given in Table I. The data available clearly indicate that the younger generation does not play a major role in these groups. Of the 200

Mr. Lewytzkyj is a well known writer on Soviet affairs, now living in Munich, Germany. His studies have appeared in various European scholarly periodicals.

(full and candidate members of the CPSU Politburo and the 14 republican party bureaus), 146 are over 45 years of age; the same is true of 118 of the 139 First Secretaries. On the other hand, the old revolutionary generation no longer has a dominant role either, the major components of both groups being between the ages of 45 and 55.

A second factor of interest concerning the present party apparatus is the length of party membership. The information available on the two groups studied indicates that the largest percentage in each group joined the party during the war years (see Table I).

A similar picture emerges from an examination of the membership of the Central Committee of the CPSU (see Table II). The phenomenon of "overaging" is clear from the fact that those over 46 years old dominate the Central Committee almost completely. In terms of length of party membership, it is again those who joined the party during the war who enjoy numerical preponderance. Note that only four of the Central Committee's 195 members are known to have been party members for less than 12 years, though it might be possible to add another four of the 18 persons for whom data are not given.

It is true that there has been considerable turnover in all of these groups since Stalin's death. Only 11 of the 200 group held the same position prior to 1953, while 142 became members between Stalin's death and Khrushchev's overthrow. The com