port, was an opposition group led by Yojiro Konno, a lesser figure in the party hierarchy. This group, committed to dogmatic support of Peking, rejected the charge that adherence to Chinese revolutionary doctrine had caused the Indonesian debacle, attributing it rather to the fact that the Indonesian Communists, instead of developing a small, disciplined and resolute elite party, had concentrated on building up a broad mass following, which at the moment of crisis proved lacking in discipline and determination.

Further indication of a change in the party's attitude toward China was given in a four-page unsigned article which appeared in the JCP daily organ Akahata on February 4, 1966.18 The article followed existing party policy in attacking American "imperialism" and criticizing Soviet "revisionists" for believing in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the United States. It went on to

Between Scylla and Charybdis

Our party has staged an uncompromising struggle to smash great-power chauvinist intervention by foreign forces connected with rightist and "leftist" opportunism, as well as the subversive activities of anti-party renegades who are currying favor with these foreign forces.

Recently, just before the 10th Party Congress, Ryuji Nishizawa betrayed the party and the people by starting open activities to undermine the party. No matter what he does, however, he will be doomed along with the Shida group, the Choshu Shimbun group the terrorists residing in Peking, and other antiparty flunkies. There is no doubt about it, for Shiga, Naito, Kasuga, and other anti-party revisionists have gone bankrupt in the face of the unity and advance of our party. These experiences of our party have revealed to everybody both at home and abroad that all foreign forces which attempt their big-power intervention in our party and our democratic movement in violation of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism are doomed.

-From speech by Central Committee Chairman Sanzo Nosaka opening the 10th JCP Congress, Akahata (Tokyo), Oct. 25, 1966

strike a different note, however, in arguing that it was a mistake to regard socialist regimes collectively as the only anti-imperialist force, or underdeveloped areas ripe for revolution as the only regions in which the anti-imperialist struggle should be fought. There were, the article maintained, three basic revolutionary forces: the socialist (i.e., Communist-bloc) regimes; revolutionary movements in capitalist countries; and national liberation movements in nations subject to foreign oppression. (One commentator in a non-Communist Japanese weekly suggested that this was a roundabout way of asserting the party's independence from Peking by saying that the JCP, as a revolutionary movement in a capitalist country, was in a different category from the Chinese Communist Party.19) The most significant point in the article, however, was a proposal for immediate joint action to combat US "aggression" in Viet-Nam through an international Communist united front including both China and the Soviet Union. Such action, the article declared, should not be postponed until the settling of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy.

Shortly after the publication of this article, Miyamoto left at the head of a JCP delegation, reportedly composed exclusively of members of his own faction, for a visit to Communist China, North Viet-Nam and North Korea. At Shanghai the delegation had preliminary talks with the since-purged Mayor of Peking, P'eng Chen, who apparently rejected out of hand the JCP's idea of a united front. On the same day, moreover, the Chinese Communist Party organ Hung Ch'i (Red Flag) came out with an attack on the Akahata article of February 4.20 Following this cool reception, the Japanese delegation did not proceed immediately from Shanghai to Peking, as had been expected, but instead went on to Hanoi for a two-week visit culminated on February 27 by the signing of a joint statement by the Japanese Communist and North Vietnamese leaders. A speech made by Miyamoto in Hanoi was reprinted in the Chinese Communist central newspaper Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily) on February 21, but the Chinese version conspicuously

18 The article was entitled "Amerika teikokushugi ni hantai suru kokusai tōitsu kōdō to toitsu sensen wo kyōka suru tame ni" (Strengthen International United Action and a United Front in Opposition to American Imperialism). Daily Summary of the Japanese Press, US Embassy, Tokyo, Feb. 18, 1966, pp. 1-38.

19 "Nikkyo kambu hō-Chu to sono rosen" (The JCP Executives' Visit to China and Their Line) Asahi Janaru, (Tokyo), Vol. 8, No. 8 (Feb. 20, 1966), pp. 7-8.

20 Hung Ch'i (Peking), Feb. 10, 1966. See also Asahi Shimbun, Feb. 12, 1966, p. 2/3.

omitted a passage in which Miyamoto had said, "We shall continue to strive for Sino-Soviet cooperation in extending aid to Viet-Nam." 21

From Hanoi, the Japanese returned to China, this time making a rather brief stopover in Peking, where they had further conferences with Chinese Communist leaders. These meetings, however, evidently proved no more fruitful than the earlier exchanges in Shanghai, and Miyamoto's party went on to Pyongyang on March 11 to meet with a much warmer reception. There they signed a joint communique with the North Korean leaders stressing the equality and independence of all Communist parties, and affirming the principle that no individual Communist party should attempt to exert pressure on the internal affairs of another.2

22

In view of the Miyamoto leadership's previous moves to reassert the JCP's independence from Peking, this decision seems surprising. It is of course impossible to say for certain what prompted the decision, but very likely the following factors all played a part. First, in view of the numerous setbacks China had recently sustained in various parts of the world, the Peking leaders must have been particularly anxious to retain the Japanese party's loyalty and no doubt exerted strong pressure on the JCP delegation. Second, the Soviet Union was still actively supporting Shiga's Communist splinter group, causing considerable annoyance and embarrassment to the JCP. Third, the pro-Chinese "tough" faction within the JCP was conducting a vigorous campaign against Miyamoto's attempts to gain greater independence from Peking.25

21 On this discrepancy, see "Nikkyō, Miyamoto rosen no yuku e" (The JCP and the Direction of the Miyamoto Line), in Asahi Janaru, Vol. 8, No. 15, (April 10, 1966), pp. 8-9. For a further account of the delegation's tour, see Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 1966, p. 1/7.

22 Text of communique in Akahata, March 22, 1966, p. 1/7. 23 E.g., see Asahi Shimbun, March 25, 1966, p. 1/7.

24 This decision was apparently reached while the Japanese delegation was in Peking for the second time. According to a Japanese report, it was not until then that the Chinese finally staged an official reception for the delegation. See "Nikkyo, Miyamoto rosen.. " loc. cit. (Footnote 21). 25 See Asahi Shimbun, March 26, 1966, p. 1/3.

It may be surmised that the Chinese made it clear to the JCP delegates that attendance at the impending Moscow Congress would mean a complete break between the Japanese and Chinese parties-an eventuality which Miyamoto obviously was anxious to avoid. The Japanese Communist leader's real intention, at least at this stage, appears to have been to place the JCP in a more independent footing vis-à-vis Peking, at the same time preserving its basically pro-Chinese orientation. Since last spring, in any event, the JCP has progressively asserted its autonomy-though not without some conflict within its own ranks.

At the same time, the party has sought to resume a cautious dialogue with Moscow after two years of complete estrangement. According to Japanese press reports, a visiting Soviet trade union official was permitted to break the ice by calling at JCP headquarters in Tokyo last summer, but his meeting with party officials did not go beyond an exchange of courtesies.26 Clearly, independence from both sides-though perhaps in differing degrees— is the essence of Miyamoto's new policies. Autonomy vis-à-vis Peking in particular would seem to be a logical consequence of the party's drive to expand its membership and electoral strength: a "broad mass party" is hardly consistent with contemporary Chinese Communist revolutionary strategy. More important, perhaps, the party's new posture of independence reflects its increasing financial affluence, which seems to come mainly from publications sales and other domestic sources rather than from outside the country.

The Party Today

The major weaknesses of the JCP in the past have been factionalism, susceptibility to foreign Communist pressure, and an uncongenial political environment. Factionalism is endemic in all Japanese political parties and has recurred constantly in the JCP no matter what disciplinary measures were taken against dissidents. The present leadership seems purposeful, determined, and perhaps more capable of imposing unity on the party than its predecessors. Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is not without its opponents.

Susceptibility to foreign Communist pressure also seems to die hard. Although the party is unlikely

26 Mainichi Shimbun, (Tokyo) June 29, 1966, p. 2/1, and Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 1966, p. 2/1.

to repeat the catastrophe of 1950, its recent steps towards autonomy have an appearance of timidity, as though too much independence from Peking, and consequently from Chinese backing, would carry the risk of a dangerous isolation.

As for the party's third major handicap, it is true (although by now a truism) that Japan's burgeoning economic growth, in combination with postwar institutional and social reforms, has tended to create political conditions unfavorable to the JCP. Nevertheless, economic and social strains can still be strong even in an advanced industrial country with a high basic level of prosperity, especially where economic growth has been extremely swift and traditional influences have been rapidly undermined. In Japan, it is a conspicuous fact that the political parties giving their members a sense of total commitment (the JCP and the Kōmeitō) have been making progress in recent years, while the "open" parties relying on a generalized appeal and seeking to gain votes through personal connections and influence (the LDP and JSP) have been falling back or stagnating. It is not easy to say just how far foreign policy issues have helped the JCP, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that the party is profiting somewhat from the reactivation, due to the Viet-Nam war, of a latent Japanese anti-Americanism, which happens to coincide with a reawakening sense of national identity.

POSTSCRIPT

Since this article was written, the 10th Congress of the JCP took place in Tokyo from October 24 to 30, 1966, and produced a clear-cut reaffirmation of the Miyamoto leadership's new line of independence from both Peking and Moscow. The Congress reelected Miyamoto as party Secretary-General and Nozaka as Chairman, but the latter's position is now essentially honorary, with real power resting in the hands of Miyamoto. Party membership was claimed to have reached a figure in excess of 200,000, representing a continuing advance.

In their addresses to the Congress, both Nozaka and Miyamoto made clear the party's determination to pursue an independent course opposed not only to Khrushchev-style "modern revisionism" but also to the "dogmatism and sectarianism" characteristic of the present Peking leadership. The Congress endorsed this line without open dissent, amending the party rules so as to add "dogmatism and sectarianism” to “revisionism” as de

viations against which party members are pledged to fight. The Congress also endorsed the leadership's renewed call for the formation of an international Communist united front to aid North Viet-Nam—a proposal thus far rebuffed by Peking.

In spite of the Congress' approval of the "independent" line, there have been numerous indications of opposition to it on the part of pro-Chinese elements within the party, although the exact extent of this opposition is hard to judge. A report in the Japanese weekly Ekonomisuto (Economist) on October 25, 1966, estimated that 22 out of the 67 members of the pre-Congress Central Committee could be considered "proChina." Significantly enough, the Congress enlarged the membership of this body to 88, no doubt with a view to swamping the dissidents, and in the Congress elections to the Central Committee, at least one prominent "pro-China" figure was dropped from membership, while a number of Miyamoto supporters were added.

The presence of considerable pro-Chinese opposition within the party has also been attested to by a steadily mounting number of expulsions of party members accused of "flunkeying" to a "foreign party." According to a Japanese Police Agency report published in Asahi Shimbun (December 18, 1966), the JCP had so far purged during 1966 a total of 98 pro-Peking party members. The most prominent of these was Ryuji Nishizawa, a member of the Central Committee and a son-in-law of the late veteran party leader, Kyuichi Tokuda. Nishizawa was expelled in October on charges of preparing to publish a magazine entitled "Study of Mao Tse-tung's Thought" and aimed at criticism of the party leadership. Also expelled prior to the 10th Congress were almost all the members of the Yamagata Prefectural party committee (the so-called Choshu Shimbun group), who rebelled against the "independent line” vis-àvis Peking, as well as a number of Japanese Communists residing in Peking.

The party's moves to discipline the pro-Chinese dissidents in its ranks has caused a conspicuous deterioration of JCP-CCP relations which, should it continue, might even lead to an eventual open break. The question for the future is whether the JCP will continue its present independent line or, in view of its worsening relations with Peking, turn once more to Moscow for moral support-a prospect which apparently is causing the "Voice of Japan" and related right-wing Communist opposition groups serious concern since it would remove their raison d'être.