1914 it solidly voted socialist, and in 1919 the Social Democrats gained an absolute majority in the local parliament; the movement to set up workers' councils and to allocate to them a share

in political power was particularly strong in Hamburg, as was left-wing radicalism. As the author of this interesting study in local politics puts it: "in spite of the unions' hostility ... the council system engendered a wave of enthusiasm that could not be entirely ignored." All this, however, had remarkably little to do with communism or Bolshevism, for there was then no organized Communist party and hardly any individual Communists in the city. It was only after the wave of revolutionary enthusiasm had passed that a strong and well organized Communist party came into being, largely drawn from the left wing of the independent socialists.

The man who had been the chairman of the workers' and soldiers' council, Dr. Heinrich Laufenberg, on the other hand, soon left the Communists to lead his own more extremist splinter group, and later became a "National Bolshevik." The author has little to say about this interesting man who was in many ways typical of the confusion reigning on the German left. Unfortunately, he tells us even less about the one event that made Hamburg famous in international Communist history: the uprising of the Hamburg Communists in October 1923, which has been celebrated in Communist novels (one of them written by Radek's wife, Larissa Reisner) and manuals for street fighting. This revolt was to inaugurate "the German October"; in reality, however, "the Communist cadre fought in almost total isolation," while most of the workers "went to their jobs as usual." Naturally, the few hundred ill-armed and heavily outnumbered militants were soon overwhelmed by the superior forces of the Prussian police. Several of the Communist militants have written vivid accounts not only of the rising, but of their despair at its complete failure.

The author has made interesting use of a new source: autobiographical accounts written by 14 leading Hamburg Communists who were tried by court martial for their part in the rising. From these it emerges that the Communists were "alienated men," most of them unsuccessful in their trades, many suffering from the after-effects of wounds received in the war; their lives showed a "pattern of failure, frustra

tion, and hostility" to a society which they blamed for the ills they had experienced. The few pages that Mr. Comfort devotes to the careers of the local Communist leaders are perhaps the most interesting in the book; but again one would wish that the author had quoted more from these important documents and had not confined himself to a brief summary.

F. L. Carsten

KURT ROSENBAUM: Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations 1922-1928. Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse University Press, 1965.

THE CAPTURED German Foreign Office Documents have made possible some fine historical and political studies, but one would hardly have thought that they would sustain yet another examination of Russo-German relations during the 1920's. Several scholars have already produced excellent works on the subject, and since Prof. Rosenbaum has not found any important new source material, he has not been able to come up with any startling revelations. What he has done is to go over essentially familiar ground, providing additional details here and there.

In an introductory chapter, the author discusses the formulation of German policy towards Russia in the years 1918-22 and gives a lucid account of the different schools of thought within the German government. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, a highly intelligent diplomat who played a large role in determining that policy, is given the usual place of honor, and his views and actions are carefully analyzed. Prof. Rosenbaum then painstakingly follows the negotiations between the two countries for six years, telling us precisely who said what, when, and-wherever possible-under what circumstances. He examines the various treaties, their impact on the two countries, and, of course, the intriguing military collaboration between the "outcasts." His general conclusion is sound, if undramatic: friendly relations with Russia "gave Germany maximum possibilities for diplomatic maneuver. Her close relationship with Russia contained the tangible threat which forced the Western powers into one concession after another, culminating in Germany's ele

vation to a permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations. After 1926 Germany was once again a major

power, as power was reckoned in those days, basking in the good will of her neighbors."

The long love-hate relationship between Russia and Germany has, quite understandably, had a particular fascination for students of modern European history. For those specialists whose appetite for detail has not yet been stilled, Mr. Rosenbaum's book will be a useful source of further information. Abraham Ascher

Military Affairs

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF: Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis. New York, F. A. Praeger, 1966.

MR. GARTHOFF has produced the right book at the right time, a study which breaks new ground and orders disparate material into a coherent context. Its relevance to contemporary international problems cannot be denied. For 50 years the Soviet Union has designed for itself a variety of military-strategic commitments, ranging from the intricate requirements of internal revolutionary warfare to the complex demands of a policy of deterrence. In drawing up his "balance sheet" on Soviet plans and performances, the author has isolated and examined what he calls "the relevancies of military power to communism in the past, present and future," in the USSR and to a lesser degree in other Communist states, principally Red China. The result is a very felicitous presentation, its scope increased by a comprehensive review of the Soviet approach to "war, peace and revolution," and its value enhanced by its movement through time.

Soviet Military Policy looks at Soviet explorations of, and reactions to, the strategic environment in terms of national traditions and requirements, the competition of institutions, the collision of intra-Communist power and priorities, the convolution of dogmas and the contortion of doctrine to accommodate reality. It is divided into four main sections the military in modern Russia, military considerations in Soviet foreign policy, military relations in the

Communist world (an exact, original

study of great value) and war and the Communist revolution. The author has marshaled an abundance of historical evidence, institutional analyses, doctrinal comparisons and evaluations to show that Moscow does not consider war a “motivating force of historical change," that even if territorial change has been promoted at times by limited war, an indiscriminate resort to force remains unlikely, that the military has moved and continues to move in the direction of greater professionalism (thus abandoning to some extent its political role), and that the costly and complicated Soviet alliance system has broken down to "conditional commitment" (the Warsaw Pact), and "mutual military isolation" (USSR-Communist China).

As a nation-state, the USSR has been and remains thoroughly committed to ensuring its own safety. Yet as a “socialist state committed to the victory of world communism," it must deal with exigencies of revolutionary doctrine and concomitant definitions of war which Peking is all too ready to twist to its own unique advantage to the dismay of the Russians. Violence is certainly endemic to internal revolution, but the application of outside military intervention as conceived by Trotsky is downright un-Marxist and supremely dangerous. Mr. Garthoff shows very convincingly (where much contention and confusion has hitherto prevailed) that such discrepancies as exist between "expectation" and "expediency" on the Soviet side do not presently promote "adventurism.' As for Peking, here also the scope of options is narrower than one might generally suppose. This is the substance of the whole discussion on modification in "the basic relationship between Communist ideology and Soviet policy." It is expertly handled and massively buttressed with supporting evidence.

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There is also a highly sophisticated and thought-provoking analysis of the Soviets' projections of their military power in "non-war situations" where the author's earlier stipulations about Soviet selectivity and caution, induced by recognizable constraints and identifiable setbacks, equally apply. The projections themselves are modest, but they do adumbrate a possible future line of demarkation between military and non-military strategy.

Mr. Garthoff's Soviet Military Policy merits several readings: for its originality and argumentation, for its

shrewd, swift insights, and above all for its comprehensive treatment of a subject as important as this one.

DAVID WOODWARD: The Russians at Sea, A History of the Russian Navy. New York, Praeger, 1966.

GEOGRAPHY AND THE vagaries of politics have combined to give the history of Russian naval development a somewhat bizarre aspect. Geography because it resulted in the development of physically separated fleets as opposed to the single major “high seas” force characteristic of most navies. Politics because the history of the Russian Navy reflects a record of eccentricities on the part of the national leadership, be it Peter the Great and his maritime innovations, Stalin and his "big ship" mania inspired by reasons of prestige, or Khrushchev and his anticruiser campaigns. The changing whims of Russia's leaders made the development of the Navy a peculiarly "stop and go" process marked by alternating periods of frenzy and inertia.

The broad lines of this evolution are conveyed very well in Mr. Woodward's history of the Russian Navy, which brings more or less up to date (into the 1960's) Mairin Mitchell's vast and durable Maritime History of Russia, 1848-1948 (New York, Macmillan, 1949). However, the author devotes fully two-thirds of his book to the Imperial Navy, with correspondingly limited attention to the Soviet Navy, and even less to the developments of the past decade. The reader in search of technical detail regarding the modern Soviet Navy will be well-advised to turn to Breyer's Die Seerüsting der Sowjetunion (1964) or to recent editions of Jane's Fighting Ships.

Especially regrettable is the cursory, almost abrupt treatment given by Mr. Woodward to the Soviet Navy's role in World War II. Soviet amphibious operations in the Black Sea and the Far East are worth examining, and the shortcomings of Soviet submarine operations in the Baltic in 1941 could have been elucidated from the writings of Admiral Vladimir Tributs, Commander of the Baltic Fleet from 1939 to 1947, or his Chief of Staff, Admiral Yuri Panteleiev. Soviet naval air arm operations also merit some attention.

Another notable shortcoming of the book is the absence of any serious treat

ment of Russian ideas about the role of sea power, or of the would-be Tsarist and Soviet Mahans who, for a variety of reasons, never quite made it. Mr. Woodward does present a readable, even anecdotal, account of Russian ships and squadrons, and he also shows the gyrations of Russian interest in naval development. However, bereft of much rather essential technical exposition and all but cursory references to matters of high policy and doctrine, his book leaves the oddities of Russian naval history and their implications largely unexplained.

John Erickson

J. CHESTER CHENG, ED.: The Politics of the Chinese Red Army. The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1966.

ONCE IN A great while, authentic secret documents become available that throw light on the inner views and workings of the Communist powers. In 1963 the Department of State released a nearly complete file of a secret internal publication of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army for the period January 1 through August 26, 1961. The Bulletin of Activities (or Work Correspondence, as Kung-tso Tunghsün can also be translated), which is classified secret and appears irregularly, is distributed only to regimentallevel staffs and occasionally, as top secret, only to division levels of the Chinese Army. Recently the 29 issues for 1961 released by the State Department have been translated into English by the Hoover Institution, to the undeniable benefit of students of Chinese affairs.

The Bulletin of Activities covers a wide range of subjects, from military secrets to political, social and economic matters that affect not only the army but the whole of Chinese society. Since it is used to report on conditions in army units throughout the country, as well as to transmit instructions, the

Bulletin offers us a first-hand look at conditions in China following the failure of the Great Leap Forward.

Of particular interest are reports of insurrections in the provinces and of purges of army elements in various areas from 1959 through 1961. Between July and November 1960, for ex

ample, insurrections occurred in Honan province, among others, and "counterrevolutionaries" temporarily seized control. This is of particular interest since Honan was a major center of the abortive "commune" movement. The Bulletin reported that in 1961 there were still some 3,000 armed rebels in the southern provinces "after we spent the whole of last year [trying] to destroy them." Mutinous members of the militia were even reported to have used their automatic weapons to kill party cadres, cut communications, hold up convoys, and paralyze several municipalities. Army units in these areas suffered many serious morale problems, as disease and malnutrition added to the general confusion. Out of 60 local soldiers in one company stationed in Szechuan, the families of 24 had been struck by some calamity or other, including nine deaths by starvation. The soldiers themselves were advised to eat refined rice straw rather than the sometimes poisonous weeds with which they supplemented their meager diet. Not suprisingly, therefore, the survey of political tasks to be undertaken in 1961 referred to the coming period as a "critical” one in testing the army's political and ideological caliber.

The dissension in the army that became widespread in 1960 and 1961 had actually begun in 1959 following the purge of the former Defense Minister, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, in September. The party began to look more closely at the reliability of its army officers and found some disturbing evidence. A survey in the latter part of 1960, covering some 20,000 of the 25,000 company-level party branches, judged 5,000 of them "poor," of which 10 percent were "corrupt." Only a modest purge was undertaken at the time, however, owing to the already tense general situation in the country. Another report in January 1961 by General Lo Jui-ch'ing in Kunming disclosed that 38 men in one division had openly condemned the regime and urged revolt and desertion. In April a check of battalion-level officers showed that "a considerable number" held the Central Committee responsible for the difficulties of 1959-61. A General Political Department report in March 1961 noted that 30 percent of a sample surveyed displayed "incorrect ideas" about the conduct and ability of local party cadres, and that the soldiers regarded the party cadres as venal, brutal and stupid.

The documents also throw light on the little known Military Affairs Committee of the Central Committee which has been responsible for military decisions. While nominally chaired by Mao Tse-tung, the Committee took orders, even in 1961, from Marshal Lin Piao, known then as the “Chief,” despite his infrequent public appear

ances.

Although the Chinese leaders were avoiding any open condemnation of the Soviet Union during this time (1960-61), we learn through the Bulletin that as early as July 1958, Mao had ordered the army to dispense with Soviet military manuals. The documents also began about this time to criticize severely any "foreign" methods and principles of training. It is also clear that in 1959 there was still uncertainty, if not controversy, over the future availability of Soviet military assistance. By 1961 the Army was further instructed to secure China's southwest and northwest (i.e., SinoSoviet) borders, and to report any incidents as quickly as possible to headquarters.

With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, the documents show that during this time the leadership made no secret of its determination to become a nuclear power, at the same time contending that nuclear weapons in enemy hands could never defeat China a contention that was reversed a short time later when it was discovered that military bases had not been adequately dispersed to avoid the destructive power of high-yield bombs. It is interesting that during 1960 and 1961 about five percent of the senior officers in military regional headquarters and staff above the division level were assigned to scientific research teams and specialized technical units to study and develop atomic weapons and defense systems.

In all, the military strategy of Communist China in 1960 and 1961 appears to have been a defensive one, in clear recognition of the political, economic and military weaknesses of the moment. Industry was not able to meet the nation's military requirements; weapons and fuel were in short supply; and training was at an extremely low level. The papers also reveal considerable apprehension over the accident rate in the air force and over the quality of the pilots themselves.

It has not been possible in a brief review to do more than highlight and

MR. ECKSTEIN'S VOLUME is a valuable addition to studies of Communist China. Lucidly written for the layman and expert alike, it examines the economic development of mainland China from 1949 to 1965 with special reference to its support of Chinese Communist foreign policy and the role of foreign trade. It places the economic events of this period in an analytical framework which provides the reader with a proper dynamic perspective of the problems confronting China and the economic underpinnings of its foreign policy.

China achieved rapid economic and industrial growth in the 1950's on the basis of Soviet economic cooperation, an emphasis on industrial development at the expense of agriculture, and drastic social measures to mobilize internal resources. This strategy collapsed in 1960 with the disintegration of agricultural and industrial output and the alienation of the USSR. Stability was regained in 1962 through a shift in imports to support agriculture, a partial recovery of farm production under moderate policies, and a halt in the industrial decline (although Peking now describes 1961-63 as its stabilization period). A slow recovery through 1965 has permitted the start of a Third Five-Year Plan (1966-70), but the new plan only calls for somewhat more intensive recovery efforts rather than a resumption of rapid growth. In short, the failure of the late 1950's, in Mr. Eckstein's judgment, "cost the Chinese economy roughly a decade of growth."

Regarding the impact of this economic record on China's foreign posture, Mr. Eckstein points out that it tarnished but did not altogether destroy China's image as a developmental

model for other economically retarded countries. Despite her domestic economic difficulties, China achieved a modest gain in influence in the nonCommunist world through trade shifts and expanded trade and aid; however, Peking's ability to exploit these factors for political purposes remains severely constricted. The overall effect of the setbacks to China's economic growth, in the author's view, has been to postpone her attainment of world power status, although the achievement of such status seems a virtual certainty in the long run.

This reviewer has only one quibble with Mr. Eckstein's presentation relative to China's present industrial power. The comparative output data he offers (p. 250) overstate China's 1962 output, which probably fell to or below 1957 levels, and his estimate would be more representative of China's 1965 output. The author's footnote concerning the distortion of relative price structures between industrial and underdeveloped countries also needs more emphasis, for the distortion is on the order of 2:1. In real terms, then, China's 1965 industrial output was around one-third or one-quarter of the 1962 industrial outputs of Italy and Japan, with the prospect of a widening gap in the immediate future. Moreover, if the technological content of imports was critically important to Chinese industrial growth in the 1950's-though less so in the 1960's when agricultural difficulties have limited industrial growth--what of the 1970's? Will China, in fact, be able to renew rapid industrial growth without establishing strong and stable ties with the advanced industrial countries?

Mr. Eckstein's recommendations for United States policy, principally his proposal for the abandonment of trade controls aimed at Communist China as a conciliatory gesture, seem to be anticlimactic non sequiturs which do not flow from his analysis but rather from a sense that the United States ought to do something. For Mr. Eckstein's analysis shows, in effect, that the United States can afford to wait. China has not yet solved its economic problems, and it faces wholesale changes in its leadership through age. In the near future, China, in order to cope with her internal problems, may find herself obliged to accept the world as it is. More than anything else, this would establish a real basis for a SinoAmerican rapprochement.

Edwin F. Jones

SVEN LINDQVIST: China in Crisis. Translated by Sylvia Clayton. New York, Crowell, 1965.

SVEN LINDQVIST, a Swedish journalist, was a student at Peking University for nearly two years in 1961-62. His stay coincided with the worst part of the crisis which followed the Great Leap Forward of 1957-60, and his book is a record of some of the most important consequences of that policy.

China in Crisis is brief (125 pp.), but its brevity has not in this case led to precision or simplicity. The author introduces a number of subjects—the life of the foreign student in Peking, the quality of Chinese authoritarianism, the mystical leadership of Mao Tse-tung, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the communes, the domestic and international position of Taiwan-but deals with none of them systematically or thoroughly. His account is a rambling one, full of asides and vignettes. Consequently, the book is too superficial for the specialist and too incomplete for the non-specialist. This is a pity, because Lindqvist is a perceptive reporter on both the visible and submerged tensions that the Great Leap Forward produced in Chinese society. The scenes, conversations and incidents that he describes have an air of authenticity which is enhanced by his empathy for those caught up in the "necessary tragedy" of China's drive for economic development.

The author's attempts to evaluate his impressions of China pose a curious contradiction. He argues that the crisis of the early 1960's was a "temporary halt in a climb" rather than the "lowest point of a downward curve," that a "new and purer light can already be seen gleaming through the darkness.” Elsewhere he suggests that party controls are relaxing, that "unnecessary evils" are disappearing, and that "the present policy of the Chinese Communist Party is the best possible one for China." Although he is quite right in identifying certain concessions and relaxations in 1961-62, he has assigned them a significance which subsequent trends have not supported; in fact, in his Foreword, he takes note of the renewed political pressures that followed after 1962. Moreover, leaving aside later events, his description of Chinese life in 1961-62 presents a very grim picture indeed which does little to confirm his prophecy about the approach of a "new and purer light."

There are numerous photographs in

Lindqvist's book which deserve special mention. Taken by the author's wife, Cecilia Lindqvist, they portray the somber tones of everyday life during Communist China's hardest years, eloquently supporting and amplifying the mood of the book.

James R. Townsend

Latin America

ERNST HALPERIN: Nationalism and Communism in Chile. Boston, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1965.

COMPARED TO MANY countries in Latin America, Chile stands out as an example of political stability that defies most of the existing economic and sociological explanations. Plagued by chronic inflation, poor land distribution, malnutrition as well as a high birth and mortality rate, Chile has developed her own democratic form of government and her own ideas regarding national and international politics that have overcome the typical ideological banalities that compete for influence in comparable societies today. In discussing how Chile has discovered her own individual path toward social progress, Ernst Halperin has produced a serious, well documented and penetrating study that should be of interest to Latin Americans and North Americans, and one which contributes to the sometimes difficult but very necessary dialogue between the two Americas.

While Chile's example is extraordinary, the country cannot be understood out of the Latin American context. Accordingly Mr. Halperin begins his study of nationalism and communism in Chile by analyzing the broad aspects of these issues in Latin America. He directs our attention first to the question of nationalism, and, therefore, to an examination of how Latin America seeks to exert its individuality vis-à-vis the overwhelming presence of the United States.

Avoiding the formulae of the extreme nationalists who employ who employ "strategic hatred" of the United States and everything it stands for, as well as the attitudes of those who accept the view that "what is good for the United States is good for Latin America,” Chile's ruling Christian Democratic party under Pres

ident Eduardo Frei recognizes certain political, philosophical and cultural I values of the United States with which it seeks to maintain useful contact. Yet it does not hesitate to criticize certain aspects of US policy.

The author devotes considerable attention to each Chilean political party, particularly in the context of the presidential elections of 1964, when a leftist coalition, the Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular), which included the Communist Party of Chile and the Socialist Party, demonstrated considerable strength. The Chilean Communists, according to Mr. Halperin, have always supported the Moscow line in its various zigs and zags, yet like many other Latin American Communist parties, it has refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. As elsewhere, dissident pro-Chinese group has developed (called in Chile the Espartaco) but this group has also avoided entering the Sino-Soviet debate, reserving its Maoist élan for revolutionary solutions to the country's domestic problems.

a

type guerilla group or the "puny recipients" of Soviet aid, but rather the Soviet Union itself. Only when Washington directly confronted the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 did the leftist groups in Latin America fully realize that the US was not the weak irresolute nation that helplessly watched the Cuban revolution succeed, an image strengthened by the Bay of Pigs disaster. Once it was realized that the Soviet Union could not have its own way in Latin America because the United States would not permit it, anti-American sentiment and pro-Soviet sentiment actually waned. The author makes the valid point that Washington must energetically pursue the goals of the Alliance for Progress, but at the same time it must make clear to the Soviet Union that Latin America lies securely outside of its grasp.

In discussing the growth and ideolog. Africa

ical formation of the Christian Democratic party, the author emphasizes that it is not merely a party of reform but also aspires to build a new socio-economic system, distinct from capitalism and collectivism. Its program is known as “comunitarismo,” and its ideology is specifically Latin American. While it has drawn inspiration from the European Christian Democratic parties, the Chilean Christian Democrats face and offer solutions to problems quite distinct from those of the European continent. The party's victory in 1964 (Eduardo Frei took 55.6 percent of the vote) is consequently of great significance not only in Chile but throughout Latin America as well. In this connection, the author has not, in my opinion, given sufficient attention to the electoral reform proposed by the Christian Democrats and adopted in 1962, which enfranchised more people over the period 1962-64 than in the previous 30 years. For in effect this reform ended years of authoritarian tradition in Chile and made it possible for millions of Chilean people to express themselves en masse.

Of particular interest to US readers should be the conclusions which Mr. Halperin draws from the Chilean experience regarding US policy toward Latin America. The major adversary of the US in Latin America, according to author, is not the occasional Castroist

SCHATTEN:

Carlos Naudon

FRITZ Communism Africa. New York, Praeger, 1965.

in

THIS BOOK is an unashamedly polemical one. At the same time it offers a great deal of solid information on such matters as the development of Communist views on colonial revolution, Soviet African studies, the development of the Communist countries' relations with African countries-in particular Ghana, Guinea and Mali, Communist aid and views on economic questions, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization, the activities in Africa of Communist front organizations, and relations between African trade unions and the Communists. It is always difficult to function as both informant and polemicist at the same time. Somehow, Mr. Schatten doesn't have the mixture quite right, for often his argument gets held up by a sudden welter of detail. The story would have been more compelling if it had been removed from its polemical envelope.

Mr. Schatten has been both impressed and depressed by what the Communists have accomplished in various organizational contexts in Africa. His reaction is that something should be done about these activities, that "the West" should do something, but not necessarily in an obvious anti

Communist direction. "The first consideration of the West, particularly in Africa, should not be the struggle against communism," he claims. "The Communists should not necessarily be suspected of being behind every antiWestern move. The West should aim at an improvement of the objective conditions and at changing the existing circumstances in such a way that they no longer favor the growth and spread of communism." Do conditions in Africa at present favor the spread of communism? Mr. Schatten obviously thinks they do, although he does not anywhere argue this very cogently. In his view, the West must seek to make "Africa for the Africans" a reality.

A cynic might say that the best way to achieve this would be to let the Africans fight their own battles, including the one against communism-in which case books like Mr. Schatten's would be superfluous. But I think the cynic would be wrong. Passivity is just not a possible alternative-the pose, even if adopted, would not be credible. Not that militancy is the ideal either. But, since communism uses the same tactics again and again, they need to be exposed again and again-in the same old way, one might add. The task has few attractions for most writers, who usually prefer the more intellectually rewarding ploy of discovering novelties in the familiar Communist scene. Mr. Schatten does not shrink from going over the well-trodden ground again. Above all, he is honest about where he stands. He is not only repelled by Communist hypocrisy, but reacts very strongly against what he regards as near-communism in some African countries. He is disgusted with the foreign and domestic policies of the UAR, Guinea, Mali and Ghana (under its former regime) and says so. This is a sincerely written book and one which does not try to be clever. Nor is Mr. Schatten a writer who considers his subject too serious for humor. He notes, for example, that the Moshi Conference of 1963 marked a new low point in the affairs of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement. The fact that one of the youth delegates "had a grey beard" suggests certain recruitment difficulties. And how simple were the "problems of communism," as seen by Kenya's Oginga Odinga at the same conference. The Sino-Soviet conflict, Odinga assured his audience, was "nothing but an invention of the Western imperialists."

David Morison