a point, this explanation also oversimplifies the situation. The point is that the Albanian leaders have created a world of their own: living in largely self-imposed isolation and ignored by the rest of the world, they have been free to do what they want at home, where their power since 1948 of the Greek claim to Northern Epirus. The Albanians had always opposed this claim vigorously, and after the break with Belgrade this policy sharpened the regime's ultra-nationalist propaganda. has rarely been in serious question. Curiously, The Quarrel with Moscow however, the regime has derived much of its internal strength from its international alienation. The Yugoslav domination of the Albanian Communist Party from 1944 to 1948 was an acute traumatic experience for the Albanian leaders. During this period the Albanian Communists had to hold in check their own personal ambitions as well as their national aspirations. Not only Albania's historic claim to Kossovo-Metohia province in Yugoslavia, which has a large Albanian-speaking population, but also her posture as the champion of this minority had to be modified to conform to the political realities of the moment. Relations between the Albanian and Yugoslav Communist parties were further aggravated by a number of personal factors, chiefly the Yugoslavs' distrust of Enver Hoxha. The Yugoslavs were never quite sure where they stood with him and suspected him of intriguing with the Russians behind their backs.1 When the final break between Moscow and Belgrade came in 1948, these personal, political and national resentments broke loose, providing the motive power for Tirana's virulent anti-Yugoslav campaign, which has continued, except for occasional short intervals, to the present day. A good deal of this bitter, selfrighteous propaganda was meant for home consumption. It was designed to persuade the Albanian people, first, that Hoxha and his associates had saved the country from permanent Yugoslav domination; and secondly, that they were the only staunch defenders of the political and human rights of the Albanian-speaking population of Yugoslavia. With the removal of Yugoslav tutelage, the Albanian Communists asserted their identity as leaders in their own country and hastened to establish direct links of allegiance with Moscow. One of the first things they did to dramatize their freedom was to purge not only those party members who had supported Yugoslav policy but also many potential supporters of Tito. The chief victim of these purges was Koci Xoxe, the former head of the secret police. Another aspect of Tirana's new independent policy was the forceful rejection 1See V. Dedijer, Tito Speaks, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1953, p. 313. During Stalin's life-time the Albanian leaders did his bidding with enthusiasm not merely because they had to, but also because the Soviet dictator's policies and methods of rule were in harmony with their own personal interests as well as with their view of Albania's national interests. This state of relative equilibrium was gravely disturbed when, after Stalin's death, Khrushchev sought to mend relations with Yugoslavia and urged the Albanians to fall into line with this new policy. Among other things, Tirana was expected to cease its anti-Yugoslav propaganda, to rehabilitate the leading pro-Yugoslav Communists who had been purged since 1948, and to establish reasonably friendly relations with Belgrade. Hoxha with some of these demands, but he refused to made a number of half hearted attempts to comply restore the good name of Koci Xoxe, whom he considered to have been justly sentenced to death as a traitor to his country and to the party. The fact is that the Albanian leaders were utterly opposed to Khrushchev's policy because it clearly undermined and contradicted their own position. The Soviet leader made a final attempt to persuade them to alter their attitude when he visited Albania in May 1959. We know from subsequent events that he failed. In addition to his demand that the Albanians should improve their relations with Yugoslavia, Khrushchev wanted them to abandon the persecution of pro-Soviet elements, and to pay more attention to agriculture than to industrial development. Over the next two years the Albanians' refusal to accommodate Moscow led to a growing coolness between the two capitals. It became clear the USSR would rather sacrifice Albania than lose the chance to heal the breach with Tito. By the end of 1961, Hoxha knew that he could no longer count on the Kremlin for economic, 2 See Khrushchev's speech to the 22nd Party Congress, Oct. 27, 1961, in Pravda, Oct. 29, 1961. 3 For a recent statement on Khrushchev's views of Albanian industrial and agricultural development, see Hoxha's speech to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party, Zeri i Popullit, Nov. 2, 1966. technical and military aid. As he himself declared a few months ago, this period was the most difficult that the party had to endure since the war of national liberation. Totally isolated from both its former friends and its enemies (its only ally, after all, was thousands of miles away in the Far East), the leadership was suddenly confronted with a twofold task of immense magnitude: 1) to restore the self-confidence and militancy of the party rank and file; and 2) to build a bridge between the party and the population at large. prac The problem of party morale was both more important and more complex, for it involved recasting the hitherto accepted image of the Soviet Union as the unquestioned leader of the Communist world and the fountainhead of theoretical and tical wisdom into that of an enemy of an Albanian regime that boasted its faithfulness to the pristine ideals of Marxism-Leninism. How could this sudden transformation be explained? What was particularly embarrassing to Hoxha and his associates was the fact that the Soviet Union could certainly not be portrayed in traditional hostile terms-that is, as just one other rapacious capitalist bully. The only solution, then, was to denounce Khrushchev and his associates as corruptors and defilers of communism. Accordingly, a violent attack on the Soviet leaders was unleashed. At the same time, Hoxha went out of his way to reaffirm his party's ideological purity and historical glory. This was done principally by emphasizing the nebulous left-wing ideas of primitive communism and the fierce peasant radicalism which had essentially characterized the Albanian party since its foundings. Fusing these notions with a blatantly nationalistic appeal to the population at large-e.g., resurrecting the name of long-forgotten Albanian heros, evoking the memory of past national grievances and frustrations, and acclaiming old victories and successes-Hoxha produced the crude, blunt, insolent, turgid and apocalyptic language of the diatribes which the Albanian Communists have hurled at the Soviet leaders and other "revisionists" ever since. A Modern Reformation For a historical parallel to the social and ideological circumstances which gave rise to such an uneven conflict, one would have to go back to 16th-century Europe, Europe, when the Reformation 4 Ibid. 5 spawned a number of radical sects, known under the collective name of Anabaptists, which became in time its radical "left wing." One of the most curious figures in this movement, though he was not in fact a member of any of its many sects, was Thomas Müntzer, who began his career as a devoted follower of Luther but later became one of his bitterest enemies. Müntzer has been described as "a propheta obsessed by eschatological phantasies which he attempted to translate into reality by exploiting social discontent" -the social discontent of the peasantry of Germany and Central Europe, which finally erupted in the Peasants' War of 1525. Müntzer believed that Luther had betrayed the ideals of the Reformation, just as Hoxha accuses Khrushchev (and Tito) of having betrayed the ideals of communism. The German, convinced that he was one of the elect charged with the divine mission of bringing about the Millennium, preached hatred and violence against all those who impeded the triumph of the "true" Christian faith. In the same manner the Albanian leader preaches hatred and violence against all "revisionists," whose ideas and power threaten the very existence of his regime. The tone and virulence of both men is oddly similar. Lest it be thought that the analogy is rather farfetched, let me cite just one example. In one of his addresses, Müntzer accused Luther of claiming that poor people had their own faith and should be content with it: Doesn't he [Luther] see that usury and taxes impede the reception of the faith? He claims that the Word of God is sufficient. Doesn't he realize that men whose every moment is consumed in the making of a living have no time to learn to read the Word of God? The princes bleed the people with usury and count as their own the fish in the stream, the birds in the air, and the grass of the field, and Dr. Liar says, "Amen!" What courage has he, Dr. Pussyfoot, the new pope of Wittenberg, Dr. Easychair, the basking sycophant? He says there should be no rebellion because the sword has been committed by God to the ruler, but the power of the sword belongs to the whole community.6 And here is Hoxha in one of his numerous outbursts against the man who embodies what he fears and despises most: After Stalin's death, the pseudo-revolutionaries of the Soviet Communist party, led by N. Khrushchev, began organizing themselves and plotting to assume power. 5 N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, London, Mercury Books, 1962, p. 271. R. H. Bainton, Here I Stand, A Life of Martin Luther, London, Mentor Books, pp. 215-16. Lacking in forethought and revolutionary power of decision, the Soviet Marxist-Leninists were soon caught in a web of intrigues spun by such revisionists and renegades as Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Brezhnev, etc., who were thus able to carry out their counterrevolutionary putsch. The leaders of the party behaved like apathetic and frightened men when they faced the rising tide of revisionism. Having no real faith in the party or the masses, they were carried away by a series of bargains, compromises and illusions until they finally surrendered to N. Khrushchev, the greatest counterrevolutionary charlatan and clown the world has ever known." ... Hoxha has made the Albanian Communist Party into a militant anabaptist faction of the world Communist movement. The party thus reflects his own political and ideological frustrations, as well as the national, social and economic frustrations of the people whom he rules. Had he relied on purely Stalinist methods alone to maintain his position, he would have risked a dangerous explosion sooner or later. The survival of his regime has depended on the employment of a potent mixture of Communist anabaptism, nationalism, and Stalinist ruthlessness. The Chinese Phase If the Chinese leaders in the early 1960's ever hoped that Albania would become a convenient base from which to spread their influence in Eastern and Central Europe, they have obviously been disappointed. The only country which appeared at one time to be at all receptive to Chinese blandishments was Rumania, but it became evident within a short time that the Rumanians were only playing their own game. Still, China's extension of technical, economic and other aid to Albania and her commitment to support the regime in Tirana have produced some rewards from the Chinese point of view. For example, in the early stages of the SinoSoviet dispute, Peking was able to attack Soviet policies via Tirana, for the Albanian leaders were expressing themselves more forthrightly and of fensively than the Chinese were prepared to do at the time. More important, Albanian representatives to many international Communist conferences all over the world have supported Chinese policies during the past six years, often attacking Russia and her allies with jack-in-the-box alacrity. The Albanians have also rendered China faithful service at the United Nations. In addition to becoming her spokesmen on every possible occasion, they (together with Cambodia) have raised the question of Chinese representation at every autumn session of the General Assembly since 1963. Another service that is often underestimated and largely unnoticed is the publication of Albanian anti-Soviet newspaper articles and speeches in China. Peking uses this propaganda on its own people there are many Chinese who have no accurate idea of the size, resources and strength of their country's sole ally in Europe-to persuade them that another Communist power besides China has wisely renounced the false Communist doctrines of the Soviet Union. Tirana's vehement black-and-white propaganda may even have a similar impact on other parts of Asia under Peking's influence. The amount of economic and technical aid that China has given to Albania is something of a mystery. The only concrete information provided so far was contained in a Chinese official announcement, issued in Febuary 1961, to the effect that China had granted Albania a loan of 125 million dollars. The loan, originally supplied to make up for the withdrawal of Soviet aid during the third five-year plan (1961-65), was to be used for building 25 chemical, electrical and metallurgical plants. But it seems that Chinese economic assistance either was not prompt enough, or was used for unproductive purposes. Albanian Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu has recently admitted that construction on a number of these industrial enterprises has been delayed by nearly three years. Over the past several years Peking and Tirana have held a series of talks on the financing of Albania's fourth five-year plan (1966-70). The most important of these took place in April 1965 when Spiro Koleka, then Deputy Prime Minister and now Chairman of the Albanian Planning Commission, went to China at the head of a large delegation. A communiqué issued at the end of the talks indicated that China had agreed to provide all the economic aid Albania required, but no details or figures were published. However, from the statements made by Hoxha and Shehu at the party congress in November 1966, it became obvious that the Chinese did not offer any large-scale aid that would effectively make up for what the Soviets had withdrawn. The Albanian leaders stressed that industrial and economic de- such developments ever take place in Albania, Such an argument, if indeed the Chinese ever presented it, would appeal to Hoxha and his associates on two grounds. First, they are faced with the perennial problem of preventing any dangerous weakening of the foundations of their regime. Secondly the policy of relying more and more on the country's own efforts and resources allows them to claim, at least internally, that they are not anyone's satellites, and that the kind of overlordship that Khrushchev and Tito had exercised over Albania can never return. between the Chinese and the Albanians on the scale of economic aid and on the use to which it should be put. One might deduce from all this, as well as from certain recent developments within Albania, that even if the Chinese had been able to be lavish with their gifts, they would have opted for restraint. The Chinese leaders believe (and they appear to have induced the Albanian Communists to believe) that rapid economic progress without proper ideological control would breed the kind of revisionist and bourgeois ideas which, in their view, are now rampant in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the other countries of Eastern Europe. Should The Albanian leaders, in fact, began a serious control-tightening operation several years ago. Although the inspiration was probably Chinese, the party took great pains to show that the inspiration came from Lenin's works, and to a lesser extent from Stalin's. For example, a report on literature and the arts submitted by Ramiz Alia, who is in charge of ideological affairs, to the October 1965 plenary meeting of the Politburo 9 Ibid., Oct. 26, 1965. PRESENT-DAY REVISIONISTS For a long time now the clique of Khrushchevite revisionists has set as one of its chief goals liquidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . [in order] to transform the USSR into a bourgeois-type state. The social basis for this change is the new aristocracy which has been born and developed like a poisonous mushroom throughout the body of Soviet society. . . . As soon as he arrived in power, Khrushchev made people like Sholokhov and Ehrenburg his "personal" friends. He stroked the long hair of hooligans like Yevtushenko and put them on a pedestal. And among them there were some who put all their "talent" to work in order to soil the Soviet Union and the heroic past of the Soviet people. These revisionist flunkies spend all their money buying abstract paintings, antique furniture, and porcelain objects, and on a life of debauchery. -Zeri i Popullit (Tirana), March 8, 1967. Through the so-called "new economic reform" presently being implemented in the Soviet Union, Khrushchevite revisionism is trying to give a free hand to capitalist tendencies in the Soviet economy in order to advance more rapidly toward the restoration of capitalism. The substance of this "reform" is masked by frantic demagogy about the "well-being of the workers,” by insults and curses . . ., by underestimating the scientific data and the "subjectivism" of their predecessor and teacher, that clown, Khrushchev, in whose tracks they are rapidly following. In place of the "great chemistry" and the numerous "reorganizations" of their predecessor, the present revisionists, who have usurped the leadership of the Soviet party and state, have proclaimed that the "new reform" and the material stimulation will save Soviet society from all the evils that are gnawing away at it. -Zeri i Popullit (Tirana), March 11, 1967. was one of the most comprehensive and thoroughly repressive documents ever to appear in a Communist country. What Alia's report seemed to imply was that unless certain drastic measures were taken in the fields of education and the arts, revisionist and liberal ideas might take root in Albania as they had done elsewhere, placing the existence of the regime itself in danger. In early February 1966, 12 Communist leaders (five of them members of the Politburo) were sent to different parts of the country, in order to supervise party and government ideological, political and economic activities.10 In March the Central Committee addressed an open letter to the people in which it announced that steps would be taken: 1) to eliminate some of the evils of bureaucracy; 2) to revise and simplify certain laws and regulations in consultation with the people; 3) to place local government executive committees under the direct control of their respective elected people's councils; 4) to do away with nepotism and arrogant methods of ordering people about.11 At the party congress in November, Hoxha reported on the implementation of some of these measures: The reorganization of the party and state bureaucracy, he said, had resulted in the transfer of 15,000 people from administrative to productive work. The salaries of high party and state officials had been trimmed down (no figures were given) to bring them in line with the workers' average wages. Party cadres, government officials, intellectuals, students and schoolchildren in large numbers had been sent to work on farms and in factories. Finally, Hoxha announced that the decision (published in March 1966) to abolish all ranks in the army and to set party committees in all its units had been carried out. The main object of these measures, he emphasized, was "to pull out by the roots all plants which could bear revisionist or capitalist fruit.' 99 12 There has also been some direct evidence that certain cautious and controlled reforms in economic planning and organization have been set in motion. This is a sphere in which the Albanian leadership is obliged to move with extreme caution, lest it be accused of carrying out the very revisionist reforms which it attacks so fiercely in its propaganda. In December 1965 and during the early months of the following year, the Albanian press made a number of suggestions for better economic planning, more efficient administration, and less centralization. These suggestions were made by economists and technical experts. Within a short time (in March 1966), Spiro Koleka, one of the country's leading technical experts and planners, was appointed Chairman of the Planning Commission. It is not quite clear whether he was given this job in order to block the new economic ideas altogether, or to try them out under strict party guidance and control. In view of the efforts that have been made to render the country's bureaucracy generally more efficient, the second surmise seems more plausible. Bourgeois and revisionist influences are affecting our young people in several, often indirect and subtle, ways: through books, films, fashions, etc. Under these conditions, young people, particularly those attending schools and universities, may develop bourgeois illusions; a desire to lead a soft life; intellectualist tendencies, and a kind of detachment from the great mass of the ordinary people and their troubles. All this could lead to excessive demands on the community, to conceit, and to a lack of respect for the revolutionary experience of the older generation.13 Chinese pressure in this area, obviously of a very different nature, has been hardly less troublesome. During the summer months of 1966, China's "Cultural Revolution" was mentioned only occasionally and perfunctorily in the Albanian press. No attempt was made to explain that this campaign was being carried out by the Red Guards. More or less the same studied vagueness was maintained during the Fifth Party Congress. When in November and December an Albanian delegation visited Peking and a number of other Chinese cities and towns and was greeted by thousands of Red Guards, the Al 10 Ibid., Feb. 11, 1966. 11 Ibid., March 4, 1966. 12 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1966. 13 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1966. |