ical foundations for understanding national relations up until 1961. The "laws of development" implicit in Stalin's methodological principles could be expressed as follows: Nations, which are related to peoples (narodnosti) and other prenational ethnic forms by language but not blood ties, arose with the develop ment of capitalist economic relationships, found their leading ideological and political force in the bourgeoisie, and despite inner class contradictions —had a definite, if perverse, psychological unity that manifested itself in hostility toward other nations. The overthrow of capitalism and victory of socialism produced a radical transformation in the basis of internal cohesion of nations and eliminated the socio-economic sources of antagonisms among nations. Nevertheless, nations are eduring social groups which will flourish in the socialist present and merge only in the remote future.10 Seeds of Dispute After Stalin's death, conditions changed but the doctrine did not. With official admission (especially at the 20th Party Congress) of the injustices committed against the nationalities under Stalin's rule, and with the decline of terror, it became possible once again to argue-however guardedly-about solutions to the nationality problem. A literal reading of Stalin's methodological principles now tended to support the moderate rather than the assimilationist position, because these principles left some room for the notion of "national character," insisted on the presence of all the defining characteristics of nationhood, and foresaw the continued existence of nations. In addition, the reclassification of a number of nationalities as "peoples" (narodnosti) rather than nations, with reference to the prerevolutionary period (for how else could they be presented as models for "bypassing capitalism"?) helped to draw the sting out of the "bourgeois nation" concept. 10 Stalin's doctrine-which cannot be equated with his own chauvinistic operational ideology ("Stalinism")—nevertheless was geared to serve this more or less illegitimate set of private convictions. It rationalized his implacable hostility toward the outside "capitalist" world; minimized the precapitalist derivation of the culture of non-Russian nations of the USSR; reduced to almost naught elements of prerevolutionary tradition to which these nations could legitimately refer; made it virtually impossible to mention the existence of national inequality or tensions among "socialist" nations (which had its bloc implications as well); facilitated a conspiratorial explanation of non-Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union; and contributed to the political consolidation that Stalin evidently sought in his declining years. At the same time, however, other factors-the potentially contagious example of East European nationalism, the signs of local nationalism that appeared in the republics in the course of cultural destalinization and economic decentralization, and the deepening schism between Russia and China with its possible implications for Soviet Central Asia reinforced the hand of those who urged a harsher line in nationality policy. Also, the apparent inability of the orthodox methodology to produce the desired answers when applied to the analysis of nationalism in the Third World helped to justify the appeal for doctrinal revision. The Party Program's "complete unity" passage, together with its assertion that a qualitative change had occurred in class relationships in the USSR and that "communism"-of sorts-lay around the corner, provided the pro-"merging" writers with an opening that they were quick to exploit. In an authoritative exposition of the tasks of historians that appeared late in 1961, Yevgeni Zhukov-the Academic Secretary of the Academy of Sciences' Division of Historical Sciences, and an authority on revolutionary movements in Asia and Africaclaimed that Stalin's definition of a nation was now obsolete (see box, p. 15). Zhukov's article was the opening gun in a campaign to whittle away the attributes of nationhood in preparation for rapid "merging." This campaign led eventually to the Voprosy istorii symposium. I. ང. In the Voprosy istorii articles we see two contrasting approaches to "methodology," which in varying ways point toward two opposed interpretations of the "laws of development." The assimilationist methodology-as reflected in articles by Sverdlin and Rogachev, Kaltakhchian, Semionov, and Ananchenko-is spiritually Stalinist, doctrinally "revisionist," and leads to "laws of development" which have politically radical implications. In oversimplified form, the essence of the assimilationist "laws" might be summarized as follows: Nations, which have no deep tie with prenational ethnic forms, arose with capitalism and even at birth were marked by deep class conflict. The ideological and emotional bonds linking the toilers of one nation with those of others were therefore stronger than the bonds linking the same toilers with other classes in their "own" nation. The overthrow of capitalism and victory of socialism in the USSR eliminated class antagonisms within the Soviet nations, leveled differences of social structure among these nations and thereby bound each one of them even closer to all the rest. No objective obstacles prevent their further "coming together" and "merging" in the not-too-distant future. The moderate approach, on the other hand-as reflected in articles by Dzhunusov, Mnatsakanian, Burmistrova, and Tavakalian-is spiritually antiStalinist, doctrinally "orthodox," and leads to "laws of development" which have politically conservative implications. It projects the existence of nations farther back into the past and farther forward into the future; recognizes more continuity between "peoples," presocialist nations and socialist nations; assigns greater weight to interclass social and psychological ties in presocialist nations; and more openly admits the presence of tensions between nations both before and after the socialist revolution. Assimilation-For and Against The different preconceptions and implicit objectives which the participants brought to the Voprosy istorii symposium suggest the existence of conflicting notions of a private ideological sort about the assimilation of non-Russian minorities. The symposium articles as well as the past writings of those who favor accelerating assimilation characteristically include positive references to the "merging of nations," although the authors cover themselves by indicating that merging cannot occur immediately. In a series of increasingly radical articles Sverdlin and Rogachev have long made clear their predilection for merging." They assert, as they put it in one study, that "it is necessary . . to focus upon the fact that processes of merging must occur sooner within the USSR than in the world as a whole." 12 Population Distribution and Ethnic Composition Reproduced from Roy E. H. Mellor, Geography of the USSR, London: Macmillan, 1964, p. 135. Based on Atlas SSSR, Moscow, 1962, pl. 96-97. Reprint permission granted by the author. this standpoint closer to the point at which the full Definitions of Nationhood state-legal merging of nations will become a matter of the foreseeable future.13 14 From the publication of his first major article in 1959, Semionov has set himself the task of proving -largely through the exegesis of Lenin's writings that national statehood is not connected in principle with the development of nations in the Soviet Union. The main theme of his article in the Voprosy istorii symposium is that national statehood cannot be considered a defining characteristic of nationhood. The attacks on Semionov's views by other specialists strongly suggest that they think he is really advocating the disappearance of the nonRussian nations as well as national state borders within the USSR. 15 The case against aggressive denationalizing, on the other hand, has been repeatedly argued by M. S. Dzhunusov. In numerous articles and books written over the course of the past decade he has supported a policy of national integration based on genuine equality. (The emphasis on equality is one of the main characteristics of the moderate ideology, sharply distinguishing it from cryptonationalism.) Dzhunusov frequently implies that "great-power chauvinism" has been no less of a hindrance to the achievement of ideal relations among the Soviet nations than "local nationalism." Coercion, he warns, will not lead to integration, but will merely enliven nationalist sentiments. Dzhunusov's outlook is shared by M. O. Mnatsakanian, who in an outspoken article appearing in 1963 recalled the harmful effects on national relations of the "cult of personality," attacked the chauvinism of the "anti-party group," defended the expansion of union republic rights in the post-Stalin period, and advocated the consolidation of these rights in the new Constitution of the USSR.16 In the symposium, he strongly opposes Semionov's views. Burmistrova has also emphasized the danger of Russian chauvinism (even hinting at antisemitism) and has vigorously criticized Stalin's nationality policy.1 If the assimilationists are thus "Stalinist" in sentiment while the moderates are anti-Stalinist, these roles are reversed with respect to doctrine. Sverdlin and Rogachev, for example, have been the most vociferous advocates of revising the orthodox definition of the characteristics of nationhood. They argue in Voprosy istorii that an ethnic community may be termed a nation even if all the characteristics are not “fully developed”; it is wrong, they say, to approach this question rigidly. The central aim underlying their definition of a nation (see box, p. 15) is to minimize the significance of psychological or racial dimensions of nationhood and maximize the role of "objective factors, especially economic and territorial community." To accomplish this purpose they not only thoroughly subordinate "subjective" to environmental determinants of nationhood, but even further minimize the psychological aspects of nationality by arguing that most ideas or traits are a product of class membership rather than ethnicity, or by asserting that many national traits are really "international" in character. Hence they reject the concepts of "national character" and "common psychological makeup," both of which had been used by Stalin, as well as the concept of "common spiritual makeup" proposed by Burmistrova in her books on the party's prerevolutionary nationality policy.18 They admit "national selfconsciousness" as a characteristic of some presocialist nations, but deny that it is a permanent feature of nationhood that applies in the postrevolutionary setting.19 In this fashion they arrive at "consciousness of national belonging," by which they mean the mere "elemental self-consciousness" people show when declaring their ethnicity to the census-taker. Although S. T. Kaltakhchian criticizes Sverdlin and Rogachev on some details, he agrees with them that the full set of characteristics descriptive of one type of nation (e.g., the socialist nation) will not fit other nations, that one must apply definitions flexibly, and that a nation may exist even when some of the elements of nationhood are not entirely present. The essential feature of his definition of a nation (see box, p. 15), is his denial of the applicability of Stalin's "fourth characteristic" (community of psy 18 See footnote 27. 19 "National self-consciousness" includes consciousness of national belonging, attachment to national values, feeling of national pride, consciousness of community of interests in the liberation struggle, and attitude toward other nations. chological makeup manifested in a common culture) to presocialist nations. In his view, Stalin failed to see that to assert the stability of community of psychological makeup of the people of a given nation, and consequently of exploiter and exploited in an antagonistic society, means to view the nation as a naturalistic [prirodno-yestestvennuiu] and eternal, not social-historical community. With such an understanding of the essence of the nation, it [the nation] would turn out to be not a transient but an eternal category, and matters would not be altered by accepting the changeability of national character. No matter how national character changed, it (and consequently the nation) would be an eternal category by virtue of its naturalistic foundation.20 Much the same argument is presented by Ananchenko, who complains that reducing the complex and changing reality of nationhood to a "metaphysical model of the nation equipped with such-and-such mandatory and fixed formal attributes" goes hand in hand with treating the nation as "a sort of eternal category." (V. I. Kozlov, who disagrees with the assimilationists on a number of issues, nevertheless comments on the difficulty of applying Stalin's four attributes in practical research.21) to psychological factors. He strongly criticizes those writers, such as the well-known ethnographer S. A. Tokarev, who wish to exclude ethnic psychology as a characteristic of nationhood. Yet he also criticizes those who speak of "community of culture," ignoring Lenin's precept of "two cultures" in each presocialist national culture. In his contribution to the symposium, M. O. Mnatsakanian, who is especially interested in Soviet federalism, revises Stalin's definition of a nation in that he omits any reference to the ethnic psychology of presocialist nations (see box, p. 15). But he argues that Marx, Engels, and Lenin included statehood among the defining characteristics of nationhood: National statehood is not simply a progressive factor of enormous significance that influences national life, a condition that facilitates national consolidation. It is an important integral element of a nation which determines its [the nation's] essence, its immanent character.24 His main target is, of course, Semionov, who, he says, ignores Lenin's criticism of Stalin's plan to grant the large non-Russian nations merely national "autonomy" within the RSFSR. His central defensive aim is to demonstrate that national statehood in a socialist multinational federal state by no means The moderates disagre fundamentaly with the encourages centrifugal tendencies and is fully com disagree fundamentally with the revision of the orthodox definition of nationhood as proposed by Sverdlin, Rogachev, and Kaltakh chian. patible with the economic development of the whole (witness Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, he argues). N. A. Tavakalian, stating that "the nation is characterized by four attributes in Marxist literature,' argues that Engels considered "national character" to be an "important" element of nationhood. "National character is formed not in years or decades, but over the course of centuries." Tavakalian also suggests that national statehood "is becoming one In his contribution to Voprosy istorii, Dzhunusov defends Stalin's definition of nationhood.22 He does so in order to support his argument that there is a significant ethnic continuity in the evolution of human social forms and a certain non-correspondence, or at least lag, between ethnic and class change. Dzhunusov suggests, implicitly contradicting Sverdlin and Rogachev, that the essence of nationhood cannot be reduced to any single one of the defining nation lacked precision. But, she says, characteristics-in particular to economic, territorial, or linguistic community. Rather, a nation must be viewed as an "integral social-ethnic organism," a "subject of specific traditions, social will, varied interests, and a system of social feelings.' The most striking feature of his definition of a nation (see box, p. 15) is the relatively large role it assigns of the attributes of the socialist nation." 25 Burmistrova admits that Stalin's definition of a 99 23 in criticizing a formula that does not satisfy us today, one must not repudiate what has been won by Marxist thought over the past hundred years and has become thoroughly accepted in scientific usage.26 In her own definition of a nation (see box, p. 15), she retreats from her earlier assertion that the same "spiritual makeup" is common to all members of a 20 Filosofskie nauki, No. 5, 1964, p. 28. 21 Voprosy istorii, No. 1, 1967, p. 89. 22 Ibid., No. 4, 1966, pp. 19-20. 23 Ibid., pp. 16, 21. 24 Ibid., No. 9, 1966, p. 30. 25 Ibid., No. 2, 1967, pp. 115, 120-21. given nation 27 but insists on the less inclusive "character and culture." The psyche of any person-his character, abilities, temperament-is determined by a variety of factors, largely non-ethnic (e.g., class, profession, climate, sex, age). Nevertheless: Even in the culture of a bourgeois nation (despite the two ideological lines in this culture) there are elements which belong to the nation as a whole.28 In essence Burmistrova presents a refined and qualified version of Stalin's "four characteristics." The distinction drew between "bourgeois" he distinction Stalin drew between "bourgeois" and "socialist" nations underscored the radical difference between nations under capitalism and those under socialism, but only by conceding the notion of "national character"-an idea that now blocks the path of rapid assimilation. In a letter published by Voprosy filosofii in 1964, Sverdlin and Rogachev argued that Stalin, who had "dogmatized the concept of 'bourgeois nation,'" obscured the difference between oppressor and oppressed nations and “extended the characteristics of the ruling bourgeois and imperialist state to the entire nation,... equated the concept of nation and social structure. 99 29 He thus ignored Lenin's idea of "two nations" in each presocialist nation. In their contribution to the Voprosy istorii symposium, Sverdlin and Rogachev carry the attack on the "bourgeois nation" concept to its logical conclusion by distinguishing between "socially heterogeneous," "transitional," and "socially homogeneous" nations. These labels, they argue, are based upon the correct principle of categorizing nations— namely, the character of class relations within them. While the term "bourgeois nation" could lead to "conclusions which are scientifically or politically unfounded," the term "socially heterogeneous nation" points up the existence of class conflict without exaggerating the role of the bourgeoisie. "Transitional nation" reflects the possibility for some nations to "bypass" capitalism. And "socially homogeneous nation" calls attention to the pervasive 27 See T. Yu. Burmistrova, Leninskaia politika proletarskovo internatsionalizma v period obrazovaniia RSDRP (1894-1903 gg.), Leningrad, Izdatelstvo Leningradskovo Universiteta, 1962, p. 144; Natsionalnaia politika partii bolshevikov v pervoi russkoi revoliutsii 1905-1907 gody, Leningrad Izdatelstvo Leningradskovo Universiteta, 1962, p. 59; Voprosy istorii KPSS, No. 2, 1965, p. 41. 28 Voprosy istorii, No. 12, 1966, p. 105. 29 Voprosy filosofii, No. 10, 1964, p. 179. intra- and inter-national unity of socialist nations.30 Moderates are probably no more pleased with the "bourgeois nation" idea than assimilationists. However, the substitute scheme proposed by Sverdlin and Rogachev would in some ways accentuate the undesirable effects of the old methodology. Hence, the moderates seem prepared to live with Stalin's formula. In his article Dzhunusov to some extent questions the concept, but he does so on the grounds that social rather than ethnic groups are the “bearers” of inequality and antagonism. He illustrates this point by criticizing the discriminatory cast of mind implicit in Stalin's distinction between "warmongering" and "peaceloving" nations, and in the 1949 campaign against "cosmopolitanism.” Nevertheless, as Kaltakhchian critically points out, he is reluctant to discard the concept altogether. Burmistrova, defending the orthodox distinction between the two types of nations, throws back at the proponents of the "socially heterogeneous" formula their own argument that this "plays down the main thing the class character of a nation." Tavakalian rejects the "socially-heterogeneous" and "sociallyhomogeneous" terminology on the grounds that it underestimates the extent to which the entire bourgeois nation falls under the influence of bourgeois ideology, while it overestimates the class homogeneity achieved in socialist nations. erhaps the best single indicator of a Soviet writer's position on nationality policy is the way in ing and coming together of nations under socialism. which he interprets the "dialectic" of the flourishIs the present historical phase one of flourishing, coming together, or as most writers assume-both flourishing and coming together? If both processes flourishing, or flourish through coming together? are stressed, do nations come together through Considerable scholastic ingenuity is exercised by individual writers in propounding the "correct" formulation of this problem. Their absorption with the "dialectic" is understandable, because this element of the methodology has the most immediate operational implications. The positions of the symposium participants on this issue are completely predictable. Sverdlin and Rogachev, for example, argue that coming together is now the leading tendency in national relations. They even perceive "certain elements of merging" 30 Voprosy istorii, No. 1, 1966. |