represented by L. A. Kostandov, Minister of Chemical Industry. The single Komi, both in 1962 and 1966, is economist Vladimir N. Starovski, who has headed the Central Statistical Office of the Council of Ministers since 1948, and the newly added Tatar is Fuad B. Yakubovski, Minister of Assembling and Special Construction Work. The last four mentioned certainly are on the Council of Ministers not by virtue of their nationality but because of their special individual expertise in certain areas. The Quota System-An Assessment The main burden of this article has been to show the operation of a limited nationality-quota system in filling political offices in the USSR. With certain exceptions, seats in the Supreme Soviet are allocated to the various nationalities in rough proportion to their respective numbers in the total Soviet population, but as has been pointed out, this principle tends to be applied more and more restrictively and discriminatorily as one moves to the higher organs of state and party where real power is centered. Within the non-Russian republics themselves, under the recently emphasized policy of interrepublican exchanges of personnel, we find Russians and Ukrainians holding key positions in the republican party organizations. At the center, Russian-Ukrainian predominance has been even more pronounced, with the Belorussians recently coming into increased prominence. The really crucial positions in the party Secretariat, however, are now held exclusively by Russians. The way in which the nationality-quota system operates poses the moral question of whether it is just to discriminate among citizens of one and the same state on grounds other than ability and merit. Its application to Soviet Jewry in particular makes the question more poignant, for the regime is apparently trying to destroy the Soviet Jews as a group while continuing to discriminate against them as individuals. Soviet morality, however, makes the interests of the state paramount. How do the lesser nationalities feel about the operation of the quota system? It would seem that the principle of proportional representation would be popular with them insofar as it enables their representatives to attain leading political offices in their own republics, responsible positions in the more "dignified" central organs in Moscow, and at least secondary positions in the more "efficient" organs of central power. That it is definitely a matter of concern to them to be adequately represented not only at the all-Union level but, above all, in their own republics is evident from the following statement made by G. O. Zimanas, a member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian CP, in an article published last year: The representatives of any Soviet nation whatsoever judge their rights, including their nationality rights, not only and not so much by what functions their deputies (poslantsy) fulfill in the all-Union organizations, but also by what they can actually accomplish themselves in the sphere of administering state and public affairs [in their own republic].33 It is precisely the ability of the lesser nationalities to run their own national affairs that is threatened by the new emphasis on the interexchange of responsible personnel between republics. Certainly, the Kazakhs or the Kirghiz cannot be enthusiastic about the immigration into their republics of socalled "elder brothers"-mainly Russians and Ukrainians to assume important positions in the local party and state administration. To please the smaller peoples, the regime is continuing to train indigenous cadres, but to a more limited extent than in the 1920's and 1930's, and their hopes of advancement would appear to be diminishing under the present policy. On the other hand, the more socio-economically and culturally advanced but less numerous nationalities, such as the Georgians and Armenians, not to mention the Jews, may very well resent the fact that the operation of the quota system restricts them to all but token representation in the central organs of political authority. The Georgians, who once enjoyed a favored position under Stalin, now find themselves reduced to but two full members and one alternate in the Central Committee and a single member of the Politburo-and they must resent even more the fact that the Georgian CP itself has had a Russian second secretary since 1956. The Armenians, too, cannot be happy over the unceremonious retirement of Anastas Mikoyan from the Politburo, which leaves them without representation there. The nationalities problem thus remains a difficult and thorny one for the Soviet leaders. As the 50th anniversary of the Communist regime draws near. they must have learned that there is one thing more difficult than conquering an empire—and that is maintaining it. 33 G. O. Zimanas, "O sushchnosti protsessa sblizheniia sotsialisticheskikh natsii," Voprosy filosofiii, No. 7 (July) 1966, p. 7. The Union Republics: How Much Autonomy? By Samuel Bloembergen O ctober 1967 will mark the 50th anniversary anniversary of the first Communist state. It was five decades ago that the basis was laid for the Soviet Union, a federation of republics now 15 in number. Western observers generally waste few words on the subject of the status of the union republics (hereafter referred to as "republics") as political as political entities, and may even deny that they have any such status at all. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the subject is taken very seriously. Recent Soviet textbooks on constitutional law report a marked tendency toward continuous increase in the powers of the republics in almost all branches of state administration.' This increase in power is said to 1 A. I. Lepeshkin and others, Kurs sovetskovo gosudarstvennovo prava, (Course in Soviet State Law), Part II, Moscow, 1962, p. 161. A specialist in Soviet law and lecturer in law at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands, Mr. Bloembergen has contributed previously to Problems of Communism (see March-April 1965). imply an important change in the relationship between the spheres of authority of the federal government and those of the republics, and an elimination of superfluous centralism in individual areas of administration. Yet the alleged improvement in the status of the republics has taken place only since Stalin's death, and upon examination, proves to be relatively modest. In order to present a clear picture of the issue, and possibly to suggest some trends, the author will analyze the most important legal provisions of the past 50 years which have a direct bearing on the status of the republics. The Pre-Union Years From the dust clouds caused by the collapse of the Great Russian Empire in 1917, a number of independent, sovereign socialist republics emerged. 2 Osnovy sovetskovo prava i sovetskovo stroitelstva, (The Principles of Soviet Law and State Structure), Leningrad, 1965, p. 160. The first to arise as a result of the October Revolution was the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Next, in December of 1917, the Ukraine was established as a Soviet Socialist Republic. Eventually these two were joined by other republics: Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. (In 1922 the last three formed the Trans-Caucasian Federation.) These republics were all fully sovereign states that conducted their own external relations.3 Early in 1919, the first movements toward a union became apparent. The need for a union between the Ukrainian republic and Soviet Russia, on the basis of a socialist federation, was stressed in a Declaration of the Temporary Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukraine of January 28, 1919. In the same vein, a Declaration of the First Belorussian Congress of Soviets of February 3, 1919, ordered the opening of negotiations with the RSFSR on the establishment of federative relations between the two republics. Beyond this, it urged all independent socialist brother states to follow its example and start negotiations toward federation with the RSFSR." To implement these ideas of unification, the RSFSR and the Ukraine merged their economies on April 12, 1919. On May 20, 1919, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee resolved that the Soviet republics should merge their armed forces to form a united front against enemies." The culmination of these individual attempts at unification was the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on the Unification of the Soviet Republics, issued on June 1, 1919. The decree provided for unification of the war ministries and defense organizations, finances, and labor commissariats of the Soviet socialist republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Lativa, Lithuania, Belorussia and the Crimea.8 In the field of foreign relations, steps were also taken toward unification. A resolution of the fourth party conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party, adopted on March 18, 1920, contemplated the unification of the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs. A declaration issued by Belorussian party and trade organizations determined that all diplomatic statements of the Belorussian Soviet Republic would conform to those of the RSFSR.20 It even became fashionable for the other Soviet republics to be represented by the RSFSR at international conferences. This is shown by an agreement concluded February 22, 1922, transferring power to the RSFSR to represent the Soviet republics at the general European Economic Conference." In addition, from 1921 onward, all Soviet republics had a number of representatives accredited to the RSFSR government "in view of the coordination of their foreign policies and with the aim of providing them with the opportunity to participate in negotiations with the representatives of foreign states in Moscow." 12 Apart from the unification of the economic, defense and foreign relations functions of the Soviet republics, steps were taken to establish a degree of formal cooperation between their central executive committees. Thus the RSFSR Central Executive Committee resolved on June 16, 1920, to include in its membership, at the request of the Ukraine, 30 members of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.13 A similar request was made by the three Trans-Caucasian republics on December 27, 1921.1* The formation of the Union, which became a fact with the signing of the Union Treaty on December 30, 1922,15 was the natural consequence of the above developments. The indications are that the signing of the treaty was a pure formality, since, for a document of such importance, little time was spent coming to an agreement on the text. A Conference of Representatives of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which met on December 29, examined and approved the draft of the Union Treaty and of an additional Declaration. Apparently there were very few comments or none at all, for the Conference ordered that the treaty be signed the next day at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR.16 It is worth pointing out-in the light of later developments that at about the time the Union Treaty was signed, a serious conflict arose between Lenin and Stalin about the form the new Soviet state was to take. If Stalin had had his way, the USSR would have become a unitary state, rather than a federative state, since his "autonomization plan" provided for the incorporation of the Soviet republics into the RSFSR as mere autonomous republics.1 The 1924 Constitution Whatever the theoretical construction of the Soviet Union, our essential concern is to determine what powers the republics actually held. Both the Union Treaty of 1922 and the Constitution of 1924 (the contractual character of the latter is indicated by the fact that its second part consists of the Union Treaty start with a detailed enumeration of what constitute Union affairs. A comparison of this list as it apeared in the Treaty and later in the Constitution reveals an interesting increase in Union powers. Below is a partial summary of what the Treaty called Union affairs, and how these were enlarged: 1). Representation of the Union in international relations. The Constitution of 1924 added to this the conduct of all diplomatic relations and the signing of political and other treaties with other states. 2). Alteration of the external frontiers of the Union. The Constitution added the regulation of questions concerning the alteration of frontiers between the republics. 3). The transacting of foreign state loans. The corresponding phrase in the Constitution reads: "the transacting of foreign and national loans of the USSR and the authorization of the foreign and national loans of the republics." 4). The determination of a foreign and internal trade system. The Constitution changed this to: "the direction of foreign trade and the determination of the internal trade system.” 5). The determination of principles and a general plan for the entire national economy of the Union, and also the signing of concessionary contracts. The Constitution added: "the determination of the branches of industry and individual enterprises which are of all-Union importance." It also specified that the Union bodies would sign con 17 A. I. Lepeshkin, "Konstitutsionnoe razvitie sovetskovo soiuznovo gosudarstva" (Constitutional Development of the Soviet Union State), Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (Moscow) Vol. 32, No. 12, 1962, p. 27. cessionary contracts not only for the Union, but also in the name of the republics. 6). The determination of principles for the organization of the armed forces of the USSR. The Constitution read: "the organization and direction of the armed forces of the USSR." A slight increase in the powers of the republics in the field of legislation may be deduced from the fact that while the Treaty made civil and criminal legislation all-Union affairs, the Constitution reserved to the federal government only the determination of the principles of civil and criminal legislation. What did the Constitution of 1924 leave to the republics? It determined that their sovereignty was limited only in the 24 spheres defined in the Constitution, and only in matters falling within the authority of the all-Union Government. It should be noted, however, that this last could cover practically everything. The Constitution added that apart from these spheres each republic was to exercise its state authority independently, and that the USSR would protect the sovereign rights of every republic. In order to emphasize this sovereignty, the Constitution declared that each republic had the right of secession from the USSR. This right was undoubtedly a concession to the newness of the Union, for it was, and is, very narrowly construed as we shall discuss later. The Constitution also provided that the republics could amend their own constitutions as long as they remained in conformity with the Union Constitution. The territory of the republics could not be altered without their consent. Further, any modification, restriction or abrogation of the right of secession was subject to the consent of the republics. For the citizens of the republics, the Constitution established a uniform Union citizenship. The way in which the Constitution defined spheres of authority of the Union and the republics invites the conclusion that the sovereignty of the republics was from the start subordinate to that of the central government. Some Soviet commentators have tried to argue otherwise, however: for example, P. E. Nedbailo and V. A. Vasilenko, who criticize the structure of the Constitution on this score, assert that the sovereignty of the republics has in actuality been unlimited, and that the Constitution should not be seen as defining spheres The first to arise as a result of the October Revolution was the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Next, in December of 1917, the Ukraine was established as a Soviet Socialist Republic. Eventually these two were joined by other republics: Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. (In 1922 the last three formed the Trans-Caucasian Federation.) These republics were all fully sovereign states that conducted their own external relations.3 Early in 1919, the first movements toward a union became apparent. The need for a union between the Ukrainian republic and Soviet Russia, on the basis of a socialist federation, was stressed in a Declaration of the Temporary Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukraine of January 28, 1919.* In the same vein, a Declaration of the First Belorussian Congress of Soviets of February 3, 1919, ordered the opening of negotiations with the RSFSR on the establishment of federative relations between the two republics. Beyond this, it urged all independent socialist brother states to follow its example and start negotiations toward federation with the RSFSR.5 To implement these ideas of unification, the RSFSR and the Ukraine merged their economies on April 12, 1919. On May 20, 1919, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee resolved that the Soviet republics should merge their armed forces to form a united front against enemies." The culmination of these individual attempts at unification was the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on the Unification of the Soviet Republics, issued on June 1, 1919. The decree provided for unification of the war ministries and defense organizations, finances, and labor commissariats of the Soviet socialist republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Lativa, Lithuania, Belorussia and the Crimea." In the field of foreign relations, steps were also taken toward unification. A resolution of the fourth party conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party, adopted on March 18, 1920, contemplated the unification of the People's Commissariats for 11 Foreign Affairs." A declaration issued by Belorussian party and trade organizations determined that all diplomatic statements of the Belorussian Soviet Republic would conform to those of the RSFSR.10 It even became fashionable for the other Soviet republics to be represented by the RSFSR at international conferences. This is shown by an agreement concluded February 22, 1922, transferring power to the RSFSR to represent the Soviet republics at the general European Economic Conference. In addition, from 1921 onward, all Soviet republics had a number of representatives accredited to the RSFSR government "in view of the coordination of their foreign policies and with the aim of providing them with the opportunity to participate in negotiations with the representatives of foreign states in Moscow." 12 Apart from the unification of the economic, defense and foreign relations functions of the Soviet republics, steps were taken to establish a degree of formal cooperation between their central executive committees. Thus the RSFSR Central Executive Committee resolved on June 16, 1920, to include in its membership, at the request of the Ukraine, 30 members of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.13 A similar request was made by the three Trans-Caucasian republics on December 27, 1921.14 The formation of the Union, which became a fact with the signing of the Union Treaty on December 30, 1922,15 was the natural consequence of the above developments. The indications are that the signing of the treaty was a pure formality, since, for a document of such importance, little time was spent coming to an agreement on the text. A Conference of Representatives of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which met on December 29, examined and approved the draft of the Union Treaty and of an additional Declaration. Apparently there were very few comments or none at all, for the Conference ordered that the treaty be signed the next day at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR.16 It is worth pointing out-in the light of later developments that at about the time the Union Treaty was signed, a serious conflict arose between Lenin and Stalin about the form the new Soviet |