Ukrainians assimilated to one degree or another into Russian culture. Statistics on languages used in the school system indicate that ethnic cultural polarization follows substantially along urban-rural lines.20 In recent years, approximately 86 percent of students enrolled in rural schools have been taught in the Ukrainian language as opposed to only 52 percent of students in urban schools. The figures suggest that although Soviet language policy may have been successful at one time in prompting Russians and Jews to learn Ukrainian and at another time in prompting Ukrainians to learn Russian, it has not altered the basic pattern of language use in either the cities or rural areas.

21

In the early period, during the 1920's, the Ukrainization program led many to study and use Ukrainian, but it failed to convert the bulk of the urban population to Ukrainian as its primary tongue. It was this failure which aroused the ire first of Shumskyi and then of Skrypnik, prompting them to demand a more stringent language program aimed at transforming the Ukraine ultimately into an exclusively Ukrainian republic. The decision of central leaders to avoid pressing for such a transformation meant that the large cities would remain predominantly Russian centers.

With the new emphasis on the Russian language in the 1930's and 1940's, the situation was reversed. The new policy led to an increase in the number of Ukrainians moderately fluent in Russian but did not change the patterns of language use in the countryside. It is doubtful that the central leaders meant to produce a change, although the Russification measures adopted by Stalin after World War II suggested such an intent. In any case, Stalin's successors repudiated these measures, supporting the continued use of Ukrainian in the areas where it was the generally accepted tongue.

The most striking development in the Ukraine, therefore, has been its steady urbanization. In 1926 less than 20 percent of the population lived in cities. By 1965 the number had grown to 51 percent.22 The urbanization process, involving Ukrainians and Russians alike, has reinforced not the Ukrainian culture-as Skrypnik had hoped would be the case-but the entrenched Russian culture.

Regardless of official policies, migrants to the cities have been confronted with informal economic and social pressures which have led many of them—if not in the first generation, then in the second,-to accept Russian as their primary tongue. Moreover, inasmuch as Russian is the common tongue for the Soviet Union as a whole and the accepted language for official organizations and agencies, there has been an additional premium on its use, particularly for those hopeful of rising to high positions in the party, government, industry, or even the professions and arts. In certain traditional Ukrainian cities such as Poltava and Vinnitsa, as well as in the western Ukraine, the effect has been less marked. But in the major industrial and commercial centers, particularly in the Donbass, Russification has apparently proceeded apace.

23

Finally, it seems likely that Ukrainians, particularly Ukrainian intellectuals, will be confronted in the future with a growing crisis of identification. In the past their concerns have been chiefly with nationalist, historical-traditional, and rural themes. Their nationalism has been powerfully conservative in its sentiment. As contemporary problems of economic development and modernization have intruded, Ukrainians have viewed them as essentially urban and non-traditional problems, and hence as non-Ukrainian in character. In the same way traditional themes have become to a degree inappropriate or irrelevant. Ukrainian intellectuals are therefore faced with the task of bridging the gap between the warm familiarities of a national, primarily rural past and the conditions of a contemporary Ukrainian society with all its complex problems and difficulties. It may be that traditional-nationalist themes will continue to exert a powerful appeal despite the difficulties they are likely to create with central officials anxious to moderate feelings of regional distinctiveness. It may be that the tensions of urbanization and industrialization will lead to a renaissance. of rural and therefore Ukrainian-nostalgia, although much of the Ukraine has apparently completed the most difficult phases of urbanization. Perhaps the most likely development is the emergence of a new urbanized Ukrainian culture, centered in the old traditional cities of the Ukraine, but concerned with themes running parallel to those in other urban areas of the USSR.

23 A rough measure of the rate of assimilation is suggested by figures of the late 1950's indicating that although 76.8 percent of the population of the Ukraine was Ukrainian by background, only 69.1 percent of all students were enrolled in Ukrainian language schools.

By V. Stanley Vardys

T

ravelers report that in Moscow the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are known as Sovetskaia zagranitsa," i.e., "The Soviet Abroad." The label is apt because the Baltic states indeed stand-culturally as well as geographically -on the edge of Soviet civilization. They are the most Western and the youngest of the Soviet republics, occupied in June of 1940 and incorporated in August of the same year. Though they now feel the entire weight of the Russian colossus, historically the Baltic states have functioned as a battleground and meeting place for Western and Russian influences. Finally, in the period 19181940, the Baltic nations were independent. Appreciation of these facts provides the perspective necessary for understanding their present situation. Therefore, at the risk of sounding too elementary, a brief historical sketch must precede the discussion of conditions in the Baltic republics today.

Although the fate of the three republics has been almost identical in the 20th century, the earlier his

Mr. Vardys is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin (Milwau kee). He has written widely on Soviet nationality policy and Baltic affairs, and is editor and partial author of Lithuania under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-1965 (Praeger, 1965) which is reviewed in this issue.

torical development of Estonia and Latvia was different from that of Lithuania. While the Western influences in the first two republics were primarily of Germanic and Protestant origin, in Lithuania they were mainly Polish and Catholic. The early history of the three small nations was determined by the German missionary knights who in the 11th century conquered the Prussians, relatives of the Latvians and Lithuanians, and in the 12th century the Estonian and Latvian tribes. The knights colonized the northern Baltic region, and their descendents, popularly known as the Baltic barons, ruled the native population, establishing a Germanic feudal system, and building cities and trade. They suppressed the Baltic languages and limited economic opportunity for the native population. On the positive side, they introduced a more progressive social order than that found elsewhere in Russia. Courland, Livonia, and Estland-the precursors of today's republics-came under Swedish rule, and were finally annexed by Russia in the 18th century. But the German noblemen retained control of the local governments throughout this time and kept it until World War I, when their power was lost and its vestiges destroyed by the social measures of the independent Latvian and Estonian states. In 193940, the Germans were repatriated into the Reich.

In the 13th century, the medieval Lithuanian state, with the resources of the large Russian and

Ukrainian areas that it ruled, was able to defend itself against the Teutonic Knights. At the end of the 14th century, Lithuania entered into a personal union with Poland, and together they were able to destroy the power of the Knights at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410. But pagan Lithuania, having just accepted Christianity from Poland, soon fell under Polish cultural and political influence, gradually lost its position as an equal partner in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and in 1795 lost statehood altogether as a result of the final division of Poland by Russia and the Central German powers. Russian rule in Lithuania was more severe than in the northern provinces. Between 1863 and 1904, for example, Lithuania was even denied native language schools and publications. Russian industrial growth at the turn of the century, too, was barely reflected in Lithuania.

The fate of the region, however, was not always determined by outsiders. The national movements of the 19th century culminated in the establishment of independent states upon the downfall of the Tsarist Empire (Lithuania on February 16, 1918, Estonia on February 24th, and Latvia on November 18th of the same year).

The Period of Independence

Conditions for independence were favorable because both the giants, Russia and Germany, whose alliance usually spelled doom for the independence of the area, were defeated and disorganized. Native leaders and armies were able to assert themselves, with small help from the Allies, and to throw out the attacking Bolshevik armies which entered at the end of 1918 ready to set up Communist governments in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In 1920, after failing to conquer the fledgling states, Soviet Russia signed peace treaties with them, "forever" renouncing all Russian claims to these territories. It was, as events proved within the same generation, a promise of expediency only.

The new nations established democratic governments on the French model, with omnipotent assemblies and weak executives, and with proportional representation which helped to produce multi-party systems. However, this democratic radicalism and the emaciation of the executive backfired, and in the 1930's all three republics found themselves ruled by strong men, Konstantin Päts in Estonia, Karlis Ulmanis in Latvia, and Antanas Smetona in Lithuania. There were differences between the three dictatorships, but generally the authoritarian re

gimes were similar to Pilsudski's rule in Poland, though they were not as strict and offered more protection for the rights of minorities. In fairness, it should be added that the pendulum was beginning to swing back toward democracy on the eve of World War II. In 1938, Lithuania, after some ten years of dictatorship, had a coalition government, while in Estonia, under reformed rules, a Communist could be elected to Parliament.

In the economic field, Estonia and Latvia were able to adjust their industries, both old and new, to serve non-Russian markets, since the Soviet Union conducted very little trade with these former provinces of Russia. Lithuania made modest progress in building new industry. All three were quite strong in agricultural production, especially dairy and meat products, and developed important foodprocessing industries. Their exports went primarily to England and Germany.

The social basis of agriculture was laid down in the early 1920's by rather radical land reforms; manors were broken up, their lands distributed to the peasants, and the size of landholdings limited. Private enterprise was the rule in industry and business, but the private sector was balanced by substantial cooperative and state ownership of industrial and marketing enterprises. At the outbreak of the war, the farmer's and the city consumer's standard of living was generally higher than that of the Soviet Union, especially in Estonia and Latvia.

In addition, during the independence period, educational facilities were expanded, and cultural activities flourished as never before in Baltic history. Seeking comparisons with Soviet development, it is possible to compare the period of Baltic independence to the NEP period in Soviet Russia, with the difference that in the Baltic states it was much longer, guaranteed more personal and organizational freedom, and facilitated the uninhibited development of national culture and, indeed, political nationalism.

hus Baltic independence, though short-lived, was basically viable. The young republics did not collapse as a result of internal instability or incompetence, but became victims, like Poland, of a new Russian-German alliance brought into being by the Hitler-Stalin non-agression pact of August 1939. In October 1939, the Soviet Union demanded the establishment of Soviet military bases on Baltic territory in exchange for mutual assistance pacts to "guarantee" Baltic independence. Although the

republics had declared their neutrality in the European conflict that had just begun, they felt very insecure. Still shocked by the Nazi destruction of Poland, they bowed to Soviet demands, hoping that "protection" by the Soviets would be easier to bear than domination by the Nazis.' They did not know, however, that in the secret protocol signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov on August 23, 1939, virtually the entire Baltic region was to be considered part of the Soviet sphere of influence. The introduction of Soviet air and ground bases signified the beginning of the end of Baltic independence. The end came soon after the USSR won its war against Finland-which had refused to accept Soviet garrisons. On fabricated charges, Moscow accused the Baltic states of failing to fulfill the terms of the mutual assistance pacts, and on June 15-17, beginning with Lithuania, the Red army moved in to occupy the three republics. The pretext for introducing more troops, estimated at some hundreds of thousands, was the need to "guarantee" the enforcement of treaty obligations.2

Under conditions of military occupation, the Kremlin's emissaries-Andrei Zhdanov in Estonia, Andrei Vishinski in Latvia and Vladimir Dekonozov in Lithuania-in actions foreshadowing the Soviet seizure of power in postwar Eastern Europe, organized the transfer of administration to "People's Governments" and the local Communist parties, which until then had been small underground organizations. Within six weeks, elections to People's Diets were held in the now familiar style. These diets then petitioned for the admission of their republics into the Soviet Union. On August 3, 5, and 6, this wish was granted by the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. Thus the USSR, anxious to legitimize and formalize the annexations, completed the process in less than two months. The Communists now call this period the "socialist revolution of 1940.” There was no revolution, of course, and the Baltic

states' entry into the Soviet Union was in no way voluntary. Soviet documents-though no longer editorials or speeches like Kosygin's in Riga in 1965-admit that Baltic independence was liquidated with the help of the Red Army, and Soviet power established "thanks to the Soviet Union." The United States at the time labeled the processes by which the Soviet Union attempted to legitimize its occupation "devious" and refused to recognize the annexations.3

The establishment of Baltic independence and the subsequent incorporation of the area into the Soviet Union are, on a practical as well theoretical level, sore points for Soviet historians and politicians. In their endeavors to win Baltic loyalties during the last twenty-seven years, they have been trying to convince the younger generation of the three countries that the independence period was a deviation from the historic Baltic destiny of union with Russia, and that in 1940 the Baltic workers. brought the republics back into the path of historic righteousness.

Sovietization

The sovietization of the Baltic republics—that is, the introduction of an economic and administrative system conforming to the "socialist" constitution of Stalin-was accomplished in record time. While it took the Soviet Union almost twenty years to announce the establishment of socialism at home, in the Baltic countries seven years sufficed (1940-41 and 1945-51). The constitutions of the three republics were changed to eliminate socio-economic exceptions granted in 1940, and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were declared to be "socialist nations." Agriculture was completely collectivized, in Latvia first, in Estonia last, and the administrative systems,

1 For Lithuania, the bitter pill was sugar-coated with the return of the city of Vilnius, the historical capital of Lithuania, and a part of the Vilnius region which the Lithuanians had claimed from Poland and which Soviet troops had occupied. The prewar conflict betweeen Poland and Lithuania over Vilnius was successfully used by Moscow's diplomats for Soviet purposes.

2 The Soviet Union accused Lithuania of torturing and killing Red Army soldiers kidnapped from Soviet bases in Lithuania, of harassing Lithuanian civilians who worked for Soviet garrisons, and of "entering into a military alliance with Latvia and Estonia." Latvia and Estonia were charged with organizing this military aliiance, to which, Moscow said, plans had been made to add not only Lithuania but also Finland. The existence of such an alliance, allegedly directed against the USSR, was considered to be proven by two conferences of Baltic foreign ministers (these, however, were held under provisions of the Baltic Entente agreement of 1934), visits by officers of the

General Staff, and publication of a journal, Revue Baltique, in Tallinn. (For Soviet ultimatum texts, see Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. III, Oxford University Press, London, 1953, pp. 453-56.) Molotov refused to consider the findings of a Lithuanian investigation commission showing that the alleged kidnapping was in fact desertion and that the soldier who did not return to his army base actually committed suicide. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had his people investigate whether the charges about the formation of a military alliance were true and found that they were not. (See Boris Meissner, Die Sowjetunion, die baltischen Staaten und das Völkerrecht, Verlag fur Politik und Wirtschaft, Köln, 1956, p. 77.) For the story of Baltic-Soviet relations, especially the events of 1939-40, see Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States, 1918-1940, University of Notre Dame Press, 1959.

3 Statement by Under-Secretary Sumner Welles, US Department of State, Bulletin, III, No. 57, 1940, p. 48.

inherited from independent times, were transformed along Soviet lines.

The creation of socialism took its usual tollStalin deported, in 1941 and 1945-51, over half a million people as enemies of the regime and of collectivization-and exhibited characteristics of social change familiar from the experience of other European Soviet republics. These changes, in the main, included the neglect of collectivized agriculture; a rapid development of industries; urbanization; Russification of the population, education, the press, and the apparatus of power; suppression of religion and the establishment of the party's ideological monopoly.

Baltic agricultural production declined as in other Soviet regions and has only very recently recovered to levels equal to or higher than before the war. As in other parts of the Soviet Union, a large part (in Lithuania, one half 5) of total farm production still comes from peasants' private plots. Soviet sources praise Latvian and Lithuanian farming, especially for dairy and cattle production, while Estonian agriculture has been declared the most efficient outside of the Soviet black-soil region. Socially, Estonian agriculture has also been the most progressive; it was among the very first to introduce a guaranteed wage and then to organize old-age pensions.

Industrialization of Latvia and Estonia began immediately after the war, although Lithuania had to wait almost until the death of Stalin. The probable reason for the difference in pace is that Estonia and Latvia already had a substantial industrial base and tradition, which Lithuania lacked. The pace of Baltic industrial development was higher than that of any of the other Soviet republics. The Baltic republics soon became industrial rather than agricultural states, deriving 60 to 75 percent of their total economic production from industry-just the inverse of the prewar ratio. By 1967, Lithuania's industrial production was reported to have increased 20 times over 1940, and Estonia and Latvia had

* Only estimates are available. They include figures compiled immediately following the mass deportations of June 1941 and estimates of people deported in subsequent deportation waves in 1945-51. Since definite figures for these latter years are not available, estimates vary. For example, figures compiled by Hellmuth Weiss (Die baltischen Staaten," in E. Birke, Rudolf Neumann (eds.), Die Sowjetisierung Ost-Mitteleuropas, Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt, 1959, p. 30) add up to 587,000, while those of Andrivs Namsons ("Die nationale Zusammensetzung der Einwohnerschaft der baltischen Staaten," Acta Baltica, Konigstein im Taunus, Vol. I, 1960/61, pp. 63, 67, 73) come to 831,000. Both authors, furthermore, include estimates of arrested and liquidated people. Generally, however, the figures of these and other authors do not fall below half a million when estimates for the individual countries are added up.

5 Kommunist, No. 1, 1967, p. 10.

6 Pravda, March 27, 1967.

become the most industrialized republics of the Soviet Union, a position they had occupied in Tsarist Russia as well.

The development of heavy industry was stressed first, especially where historical precedent for it existed, as in Latvia. In the late 1950's Moscow allowed the buildup of mechanical industries that required no mass labor, but rather training and skills. Thus, Latvia has a heavy metallurgical industry, makes 130,000 tons of steel though it has neither ore nor coal, and produces 20 percent of all Soviet railroad passenger cars, 47 percent of all automatic telephone exchanges, and 20 percent of radios. Estonia mines 65 percent of all Soviet oil shale and produces over 30 percent of the Soviet Union's larger electric transformers. Lithuania contributes 33 percent of certain electric welding instruments and 10 percent of metal-cutting lathes.' The republics also make ships (Lithuania), fertilizer, artificial fibers, bicycles, buses, refrigerators, washing machines, textiles, cement, and so on.

The Stalinist type of industrialization, later corrected only in some aspects, has been very revealingly explained by Aleksei Muurisepp, in 1956 chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers and now chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet. In sentences that fit equally well the Latvian and only slightly less the Lithuanian situation, he wrote that Moscow's economic planners neglected his republic's "special economic needs," forced the export of Estonian raw materials while developing in Estonia industries for which materials had to be imported, and brought in Russians to work in new industries while assigning Estonian specialists to jobs outside of their republic. He also complained that Estonia had to export its products, especially those needed for industry, before the republic's own needs were met. Some leading Latvians in 1959 further amplified this explanation by proposing what seemed like two economic plans, one for industries that produce primarily for local republican needs, the other for those that work for outside demand." They also opposed the further development of heavy industry, and the Balts are known to dislike such industry even now.

This intriguing opposition to the development of heavy industry can be explained by considering its demographic effects.

7 Data from Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii, No. 4, 1963, p. 37, and Liaudies Ukis (Vilnius), No. 7-8, 1965, p. 195. 8 Izvestia, September 22, 1956, p. 2.

9 Cf. Dzerve's article in Sovetskaia Latvia, April 22, 1959, p. 2, and various articles, especially by A. Pelshe and V. Lacis, on events in Latvia in 1959, as cited below.