not like having more children. The latter type accepts Russian leadership and the decline of his ethnic strength as part of a reality that cannot be changed, and he attempts to enjoy life without complaint until he is provided with reasonable prosperity. This prosperity is, in fact, evident in the Baltic republics, especially in comparison with many of the other Soviet republics.

Recent Tendencies and Prospects

The new Soviet five-year plan does not envisage radical changes in the development of the Baltic republics, and the economic and social problems of this region can therefore be expected to remain similar to those experienced so far. In recent years, however, the atmosphere has been somewhat more relaxed than in the other republics, and Russian pressure in the cultural field, especially since Khrushchev's removal, has eased. Furthermore, since the Vatican Ecumenical Council, the status of religion, both Catholic and Protestant, has somewhat improved. The Vatican was able to appoint a new bishop for Latvia, where none had remained, and another for Lithuania, so that now at least one of its seven dioceses is administered by a bishop. Some liturgical publication was allowed. Methods of atheist propanganda and pressure are also becoming somewhat more considerate of individual privacy and preference.

In the early 1960's, the Baltic republics were finally opened to foreign tourists, enabling at least partial fulfillment of the desire for cultural communication with the outside world. It is of considerable importance that this communication, at least in some cases, can now be developed directly, without first going to Moscow, though needless to say it still needs Moscow's tolerance. In the spring of 1964, Finland's President Kekonnen visited Estonia and greeted the Estonians as kinfolk (the Estonian-Finnish relationship is roughly comparable to that between the Latvians and Lithuanians). A year later, direct travel by boat between Helsinki and Tallinn was opened. In 1966, similar communication was established with Riga and with Kotka, another Estonian port.

The Estonians and Latvians are now seeking closer cultural ties with Sweden, where interestingly enough one finds many Estonian and Latvian émigrés. Estonia's Minister of Culture recently paid an

official visit to Sweden. Swedish musicians have performed in Tallinn. performed in Tallinn. Estonians, who can understand some Finnish, are able to receive Finnish TV programs on their sets, and the Russians do not seem to regard such Estonian-Finnish contacts as suspect. Lithuania attempts to foster relations with Poland, which now seems to be resuming its traditional role as mediator with the West. Direct air communication between Vilnius and Warsaw is supposed to be established before the end of 1967.

An attempt (no doubt politically inspired, but nevertheless providing important contacts with the West) has been made to establish communication with Baltic émigrés. Estonian and Lithuanian journals and publishing houses have reprinted works of émigré authors which were first published in the West. In 1966, a Lithuanian painter who has lived in the United States since the late 1940's visited an exhibition of his earlier paintings in Vilnius.

Discussion of issues of national culture and even economy have become surprisingly frank and matter-of-fact in the Baltic area. Republic leaders, especially the Estonians, were obviously dissatisfied with the abolition of sovkhozes and said so in public forums in Moscow. Genrikas Zimanas, editor of the Lithuanian party's daily, recently demanded that Khrushchev's policy of assimilation be reexamined, that republic organizations be given more autonomy, and that Russian cadres learn the language of the republics in which they work.32 Efforts have also been made, it appears, to increase the proportion of native Balts in the republic parties. In the late 1950's party leaders were likely to lose their jobs for expressing such ideas.

This change in atmosphere is, on the one hand, a sign of the Soviet regime's confidence that no crisis situation exists, and on the other, a response to the underlying popular demand for more personal freedom and recognition of national values. Whether or not it will endure will depend in large measure on whether or not the current Moscow regime will be able again to tighten the reins of government. The party still pursues the objective of the ultimate merger of all the Soviet nations. This being the case, demographic changes and Moscow's economic policies will provide the real key to the future of the Baltic peoples.

32 Article in Voprosy filosofii, No. 7, 1966, esp. pp. 7-9; also Literaturnaia gazeta, Moscow, September 27, 1966, p. 1.

By Mary Matossian

T

he Armenian people have had a particularly painful history. Deprived of their independence countless times, persecuted and massacred by neighbors on all sides, scattered over much of the world, they have somehow endured. Today there is no Armenian state save that of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Whatever shortcomings derive from this particular historical development, Soviet Armenia is the only available focus of Armenian nationalist pride and cultural creativity. The attitude of its native inhabitants may vary from enthusiasm to hostility, but few Armenians condemn all aspects of life there. It is, after all, Armenia.

The Armenians in Soviet Armenia, who constitute 88 percent of the population, are not being assimilated into Russian culture. They continue to use their language officially and have some degree of autonomy with regard to the production and consumption of material goods and in the arts. Compared to many other national minorities in the USSR, they have fared rather well. Under the circumstances, one may well ask why the Armenians have remained so nationalistic, and more important, how they have managed to keep their identity

Mrs. Matossian is lecturer in the Department of History, University of Maryland. Her last book, The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia (Leiden, E. J. Brill) was published in 1962.

separate from other more dominating cultures that have surrounded them and often overpowered them over the centuries.

The Origins of

Armenian Nationalism

The peculiar character of Armenian nationalism is made up of two strong elements: the memory of cruel persecution and a sense of tenacious pride. It is an extremely potent combination.

Before the rise of modern nationalism in the 19th. century, Armenians tended to regard themselves as belonging more to a particular locality than to a "nation." They had only one major bond in common: they were all Christians in a sea of Moslems, almost all of them belonging to the Armenian Church, founded in the fourth century. Within both the later Ottoman and Russian empires, the Church enjoyed autonomous functions-regulating marriage and divorce, recording vital statistics, and providing education for the Armenian community. In its archives were preserved the only records of Armenian history and culture that bound the faithful together.

Two major centers of secular Armenian thought developed during the 19th century to cement these

public out of self-defense, hoping that some sort of political unity would save them from disaster.

The internal situation in the new republic was wretched. An area that had imported one-third of its food before the war, it now had to support a 50percent increase in population made up of Armenian refugees from Turkey. Only the efforts of the American Relief Mission in 1919-20 prevented a major famine. The new government managed to get some arms, ammunition and funds from General Denikin's White Russian Army. Soon, however, armed conflicts broke out over Armenian territorial claims in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Eastern Anatolia. In September 1920 Kemal Ataturk sent his armies to war with the new, virtually defenseless republic. Not surprisingly, the Turks won an easy victory. However, in November 1920, while the defeated Dashnak government was negotiating with the Turks in Aleksandropol (now Leninakan), Red Army detachments began moving across the Armenian border toward Yerevan. These detachments had moved into Azerbaijan earlier that spring, and were now accompanied by Armenian Communist leaders who, with the Russian Bolsheviks, accused the Dashnaks of being a petty bourgeois group. At the same moment, the Russian representatives in Yerevan handed the Dashnaks an ultimatum to yield to the "Revolutionary Committee of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia." As Richard Pipes has interpreted these events:

There are many indications that the Soviet entry was motivated by a desire to forestall the complete collapse of the Armenian Republic and to prevent a Turkish occupation of Yerevan. The Russian move was directed primarily against Kemal whose victories had threatened to bring Turkish troops into the heart of Transcaucasia. The readiness with which the Dashnaks consented to the Soviet ultimatum, the establishment of a joint Communist-Dashnak government in the newly-Sovietized Armenia, and the silence with which the Armenian diplomatic mission abroad treated the Soviet conquest while loudly protesting Turkish aggrandizement-all these facts indicate that the Armenian government did not consider the Soviet invasion as an unfriendly gesture.2

This was not, however, a "happy ending" to the affair. Once the Armenian Communists established themselves in Yerevan, they imprisoned and shot many Dashnak leaders. When remnants of the latter organized a rebellion in February 1921 which temporarily overthrew the Soviet regime in Yerevan.3

the Red Army cruelly suppressed it. Ever since that time the Dashnaktsutiun has remained a focus of opposition to the Soviet regime, especially among the Armenians of the Diaspora. It is generally recognized, however, that the Soviet government rendered the Armenians a service by forcing the Turkish armies to withdraw almost to the 1914 RussoTurkish frontier (the Turks kept Kars and Ardahan). If the Armenians were not actually liberated, at least the Russian presence permitted them to survive. Although the new Armenian Soviet Republic could not be described as independent, it was nevertheless a distinctively Armenian political unit, located on at least a major portion of the ancestral territory of the Armenians. The government of the new "Republic" was staffed almost wholly by Armenians; its population-totalling about 780,000 by 1926-was 82 percent Armenian.*

Over the years, the Armenians have both suf

fered and profited from their participation in Soviet society. Along with members of many other nationalities, thousands of Armenian peasants were shot or deported during the period of forced collectivization. Almost a whole generation of political leaders, such as Aghasi Khanchian and Sahak Ter Gabrielian, and intellectuals such as Yeghishe Charents and Aksel Bakounts, perished during the Great Purge. Rank-and-file party members and the intelligentsia were badly hit. Although we have no reliable statistics, it can be assumed that the purges were at least as traumatic for the Armenians as they were for the Russians themselves."

On the other hand, the loyalty of the Armenian troops and population to the Soviet Union during World War II was beyond question. Moreover, Armenia emerged from the conflict relatively unscathed, since the Red Army was defending other frontiers. This, among other factors, helped launch the country on a significant course of progress in the postwar era.

Since the war, the Armenian population has grown to over two million. The country has become industrialized and can now produce manufactured goods for export. Armenian scholarship and the folk arts have flourished. Under the leadership of the astronomer Viktor Hampartsoumian, Armenia has also

2 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 232.

3 M. T. Florinsky, ed., Encylopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union, New York, McGraw Hill, 1961, p. 44.

4 According to the Yerevan party daily, Kommunist, Jan. 31, 1967.

5 See Mary Matossian, The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1962, Chapters VI and VIII.

become something of a scientific center. In many ways it would seem that Soviet rule has proved immensely successful.

Signs of Unrest

Armenian nationalism, however, has not disappeared. Recent signs indicate that, while not as virulent as in the past, national sentiment still runs deep. Old grievances are continually brought to Moscow's attention, such as the fate of the Armenian enclaves in Karabakh and Nakhichevan in neighboring Azerbaijan, and ancient Armenian territory in Anatolia. Reports in the Soviet Armenian press indicate that Armenians in Georgia and Azerbaijan, where over 30 percent of the total Armenian population of the Soviet Union live, desire to be attached to Soviet Armenia.

The current phase of overt unrest began in April 1965, when the Communist Party of Armenia scheduled a series of meetings in Yerevan commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Turkish massacres of 1915. At all of these gatherings, Armenian speakers unleashed bitter attacks at their historic enemies and

laid claims to "Western Armenia" in present-day Turkey, charges and claims that conflicted sharply

with Moscow's determination to establish better relations with Istanbul. At one particular meeting on April 23 at the Yerevan State University, the chairman of the Academy, the aforementioned Viktor Hampartsoumian, accused the Turks of deliberately killing one and a half million Armenians and of devastating Western Armenia. Two other scholars presented papers on the falsifications of the "History of the Massacres in Turkish Historiog raphy." On April 24, another observance was held at the State Opera House, drawing an overflow crowd of thousands who demonstrated in the streets.

7

The violent demonstrations apparently went beyond the expectations of the party leaders in Armenia. They also represented to Moscow an alarming manifestation of the kind of nationalist fervor that could easily have developed anti-Russian overtones.

The Soviet census of 1959 indicated that only 55.7 percent of all Armenians in the USSR lived in Soviet Armenia. Another 15.9 percent lived in Soviet Georgia and an equal percentage in Azerbaijan.

7 Kommunist (Yerevan), April 22-25, 1965. One editorial compared the Armenian massacres with Nazi genocide and quoted Lenin as demanding complete freedom "for all Armenia." Moscow's Pravda on the same day condemned the events of 1915, but softened the charge of genocide with kind words for "the new Turkey."

It is possible, however, that Zarobian's fall— he was accused only of unnamed "defects" in his work-was connected with certain Armenian economic demands being made in Moscow at the time.

As opposed to central directives calling on Armenia to produce more copper, Armenian leaders were industry. It was probably no coincidence that three known to have prefered building a modern plastics weeks after Zarobian's ouster, a eulogy to Sahak nian Council of Ministers, appeared in the Yerevan Ter Gabrielian, the purged Chairman of the ArmeKommunist. Ter Gabrielian, who was liquidated

in the mid-1930's in connection with his demands on

behalf of the Armenian economy, was posthumously rehabilitated after Stalin's death. The timing of the publication of his eulogy suggests that the Armenians resent perhaps more than ever Moscow's arbitrary handling of Armenian affairs.

One year after the "unfortunate demonstrations," mission to hold another assembly commemorating when a group of Armenian citizens requested perthe massacres of 1915, the authorities refused. Despite the order, a demonstration took place in the main square, in full view of the Intourist Hotel of Yerevan. As a number of visitors reported, the police quickly broke up the meeting and arrested some of the participants. No mention of the disturbance was reported in the press, however.

Finally, in November 1966, three weeks before Premier Aleksei Kosygin's historic state visit to Turkey, the Fifth Congress of Armenian Writers in Yerevan carefully laid down the official party line on nationalism. The Secretary of the Governing Board, E. S. Topchian, praised the achievements of a num

8 Kommunist (Yerevan), March 4, 1966.

9 Ibid., Feb. 27, 1966.