Despite this, the great majority of managerial and technical personnel in Yakutia are still Slav and primarily Russian immigrants, and there is a continuing and acute lack of qualified people to meet the growing demands of the new mining and other industries of the country.

Economic Development

Over the last five decades, Yakutia has been economically transformed by geological prospecting which has led to the development of valuable new mining sites, many in remote, roadless and inhospitable areas. These natural obstacles greatly increased the cost and difficulty of exploiting the country's mineral resources. Soviet capital investment in Yakutia, which has shown a sharp upward curve during this period, has been primarily concentrated in branches of heavy industry designed to strengthen the economic might of the USSR, and in the mining of gold, mica (phlogopite), diamonds and tin.

A Yakut prospector discovered the large Aldan goldfields in southern Yakutia in 1922-23 (in an area of small older workings of a primitive nature), and extraction operations here and in the adjacent mica mines have been greatly expanded since the war through mechanization. The supply situation has also been improved by the construction of the Amur-Yakutsk main motor road, which links the Aldan mining district with Bolshoi Never on the trans-Siberian railway to the south and also serves as a winter road connection between Aldan and Yakutsk.

Aldan, now the administrative center of the gold mining industry, is reported by travellers to be a relatively well-appointed town with good public buildings. It lies in a valley in the permafrost area and has an airport. Some processing of the ore is done in two local refineries, but final processing is carried on outside the republic. The majority of the local inhabitants are Russians, but Yakuts are also being drawn into the mining industry.

Gold is also found in northern Yakutia, in the Indigirka, Yana and Kolyma river basins, but the Aldan gold mines remain the most important producer. A new gold processing plant is believed to have been completed recently at Nizhnii Kuranakh and should increase output. No precise figures of current gold production are published in the Soviet Union. In the 1930's Yakut gold output was stated by several Soviet sources to be 20-25 percent of

total Soviet gold production.23 There is no doubt that output from the Aldan and other Yakutian gold mines is much higher now as a result of increased mechanization, the opening of new deposits, and the liquidation of the former concentration camp labor force with the abolition of Dalstroi in 1957.

The diamond resources of the Soviet Union were sharply increased by the discovery in the 1950's of three rich kimberlite pipes in the wilds of northwest Yakutia at Mirnii and Aikhal, and further north at Udachnaia-Vostochnaia, following earlier finds of alluvial diamonds in the Viliui basin. These deposits are regarded by geologists as among the richest (if not the richest) in the world, comparable to those in South Africa. They are difficult and expensive to work owing to labor and supply problems caused by their remoteness from inhabited centers and the harsh climate. Their importance to the Soviet economy is indicated by the fact that they now account duction, estimated in international trade journals for about 90 percent of annual Soviet diamond pro

at between 3 and 6 million carats. Some natural diamonds still have to be imported for special purposes, but Yakutian output is thought to be sufficient for normal Soviet requirements. A diamond institute has been established at Mirnii, and an interest

ing experiment is in progress looking toward the building of a completely enclosed town at Aikhal,

with a micro-climate to shield the workers from the extremes of the local weather (plans for this project Expo 67 at Montreal).24 were to be shown at the Soviet pavillion during

The tin mines at Ese-Khaiia and Bagatai and the more recently opened Deputatski mine in northern Yakutia, together with the piesoquartz and phlogopite mica workings at Aldan, are other Yakut resources of all-Union importance. The tin deposits this mineral in the Soviet Union, which has necessiare especially valuable because of the scarcity of tated large imports from Malaya to make good the deficit.

Borisov, himself a Yakut in spite of his Russiansounding name. Complaining of the underdevelopment of gold, diamond, tin and mica resources, Borisov declared:

The annual output of minerals in proportion to prospected reserves is less than one percent for diamonds, just over one percent for tin, about two percent for mica, and five percent for gold. The rich deposits of highgrade coking coal and iron ore in southern Yakutia, other deposits of non-ferrous and rare metals, and the salt deposits are not being worked at all and represent so much frozen capital, in spite of the fact that the appropriate research for getting the most out of these deposits has already been carried out and has proven the great profits which can be expected from their exploitation.25

Borisov went on to hint that there was opposition in influential quarters to sinking "much capital in a sparsely-populated region." He pointed out, how ever, that the diamond industry in Yakutia had already more than paid for itself, and that capital investments in the Deputatski tin mining enterprise, producing the cheapest tin concentrate in the USSR, were "15-16 times less than comparable capital investments in tin mining elsewhere in the Soviet Union."

It is impossible for an outsider to judge the validity of this possibly exaggerated special pleading. There is, however, plenty of evidence in Soviet sources as to the existence in Yakutia of a serious labor problem (to which Borisov also referred) which is greatly hampering mining and industrial development. Owing to poor living conditions, unreliable food supplies, and inadequate social amenities such as hospitals and crèches, it has hitherto been impossible to attract adequate numbers of immigrants to settle permanently in Yakutia. Higher wages and bonuses are indeed paid to workers in the more inhospitable areas of the country, but they are not enough to compensate for the greatly increased cost of living, the irregular supplies of fresh food, and the lack of good housing.26

The Labor Problem

As a consequence of these conditions, labor turnover is exceptionally high in the most important Yakut mining areas. Soviet sources in 1961 gave the following statistics (which are not regularly published) for migrants leaving their jobs in these

Notwithstanding the special difficulties of supply, housing and communications throughout these northern territories, it is suprising that the Soviet government has not made more headway in solving the labor-turnover problem there after its long experience in the area. Its record is immeasurably less successful than that of capitalist countries like Canada or the United States in overcoming similar difficulties in their Arctic regions. Now that Stalinist

restrictions on the free movement of workers have

been abolished, Moscow is learning at great cost that free labor will not remain on the job in bad conditions any longer than is necessary to accummulate a little capital before seeking more attractive conditions elsewhere. Certainly, the Soviet authorities will have to devote much more serious thought to Yakutia's labor problems if the provisions in the new draft Five-Year Plan (1966-70) for building up the economic potential of the Soviet Far East and further increasing the output of gold, tin, wolfram, mercury, diamonds and mica-all found in Yakutia are to be implemented. Moreover, when the new metallurgical plant now planned for the Far East gets off the ground, the coking-coal deposits at Chulman in southern Yakutia will probably be chosen as its fuel base, further heightening the urgency of solving the labor problem.

In view of the vast distances and the largely roadless state of much of the country, air transport is the most convenient means of moving light freight and passenger traffic. Aeroflot runs scheduled flights to over thirty small towns within Yakutia, as well as farther east, and through Siberia to Moscow and Central Russia. The Lena River system is also important for heavy freight, and supplies reach northeastern districts via the North Sea route and the port of Tiksi on the Arctic Ocean.

There are as yet no railways in Yakutia for transporting heavy freight, but this situation may eventually be improved by the projected construction of

25 Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, No. 35, 1965.

26 Planovoe khoziaistvo, No. 4, 1966, p. 48.

27 "Labor Turnover in the Yakutskaia ASSR," Polar Record, May 1966. Data based on papers published in Voprosy geografii Yakutii, No. 1, 1961.

a great new rail line (Sevsib) traversing Northern Siberia and Yakutia and terminating at a Pacific port. This will be a major project comparable in magnitude to the old Trans-Siberian railway and will take at least twenty years to complete.

Agriculture

The ill-conceived Soviet attempts in the 1930's to collectivize the Yakut herds of cattle, horses and reindeer and to settle the nomadic reindeer-herding peoples caused much confusion and distress among the rural population of Yakutia. The folly of trying to change the traditional methods of reindeer herding was eventually recognized, and now the reindeer peoples are classified as "semi-nomadic." Their reindeer meat and other products find good markets in the new mining settlements of northeastern Yakutia, and their animals are indispensable for transport in the tundra. There are now some prosperous mixed reindeer collectives in the Kolyma depression, with Chukchi, Evenki, Yakut and Russian members.28

Large areas of Yakutia are unsuitable for arable farming owing to the harsh climate and the permafrost soil. The best lands for wheat and vegetables are in central Yakutia and the Olekminsk district. There are large herds of cattle and horses, and Yakutsk is now supplied with meat and dairy products from the surrounding farms. As a result of intensive experimental work in plant breeding, the boundaries of agriculture in Yakutia have been moved substantially farther north than was formerly believed possible, although the practical results of these experiments are still not very substantial.29 In the more inclement areas, some vegetables are grown in large glass-enclosed nurseries to supply local workers, but in far from sufficient quantities.

Conclusion

That a considerable degree of social and economic progress has been realized in Yakutia under Soviet rule cannot be denied. On the other hand, the severely limited measure of self-government allowed to the Yakuts and other native peoples of the area

stands out in sharp contrast to the USSR's constant agitation in the United Nations on behalf of full independence for all colonial peoples, however ill-prepared they may be, politically and economically, for self-rule. The Yakuts are now nearly 100 percent literate and are making an appreciable contribution to local government administration, scientific research, and other sophisticated activities in their republic. They thus are much more entitled to genuine self-government than are some of the more primitive peoples from Oceania to Africa for whom the Soviets demand independence.

Lined up against the Slav millions, a people so numerically small as the Yakuts seems insignificant. Yet, even numerically, they appear in a different light within their own homeland. There they are the largest and the dominant group of native peoples and have given their name to a country almost six times the size of France, with great natural resources. These are the significant facts locally.

Notwithstanding the imposition of collectivization, the destruction of the tion, the destruction of the young Yakut national intelligentsia under Stalin, and the continued subjection of the YASSR to Moscow's overriding political control, Soviet writers blandly tout the myth of Yakut "autonomy" and "independence." Even a work of the caliber of The Peoples of Siberia, produced by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, can affirm: "The Yakut people received its national independence from the hands of the Russian proletariat directed by the Communist Party." 30 But, as pointed out earlier, the terms "national independence" and "autonomy" in the Soviet context are a far cry from genuine independence and autonomy in the accepted Western sense. The Soviet "autonomous republics" do not represent an intermediate stage in the preparation of a primitive people for self-government; by definition, they are a fixed and permanent form of political tutelage imposed on the national minorities of the Soviet Union.

It would, of course, be unrealistic to demand that the Russians grant independence to a tiny minority people like the Yakuts occupying a vast rich area of Siberia. But if the Yakuts were located in some equally rich Western colonial territory in the heart of Africa or Asia, one can imagine the clamor that would be heard from Moscow demanding the liberation of this small people and its natural resources from colonial exploitation.

28 Pokshishevski, op. cit., pp. 185-86. 29 Armstrong, op. cit., 141-43, 161.

30 Narody Sibirii, op. cit., p. 307.

By Zvi Gitelman

S

oviet policy toward the Jews can best be understood when viewed not simply in terms of specifically "Jewish policies" but rather in the wider context of general policies that have peculiar effects on Soviet Jewry-a group whose religion is tribal rather than ecumenical, whose culture presents unique difficulties for Soviet ideology, and whose extraterritoriality poses problems different from those posed by any other ethnic groups in the USSR. This is not to say that there are no policies specifically aimed at the Jews; indeed, there is striking evidence that in some key areas of Soviet life-notably, politics, culture and educationJews are denied the rights or opportunities enjoyed by citizens of other nationalities.

This article will examine the three principal aspects of the Jewish problem in the USSR: religion, antisemitism, and assimilation as a key to the future of the Soviet Jewish community. This approach, it is hoped, will serve to bring into sharper focus both the similarities and the significant differences between the status and treatment of the Jews on the one hand, and of other ethnic and religious minorities on the other.

Mr. Gitelman is an Associate in the Department of Government at Columbia College and a Junior Fellow of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University.

To begin with, there is little question that the Jewish religion is on the decline in the USSR, perhaps more rapidly than other religions. While it is difficult to estimate the number of believing Jews (some Soviet sources have put it as high as 500,000), it is a fact that only about 60 synagogues remain open in the entire Soviet Union whereas the Belorussian Republic alone had some 500 synagogues or houses of study in the late 1920's.1 The overwhelming majority or worshippers are in their sixties and seventies. There is a lack of religious articles and, just as importantly, of religious functionaries. There is no Yeshiva (religious seminary) in Moscow-or anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

To some extent, the decline of the Jewish faith is part of a general decline of religion in the USSR. A poll conducted by Komsomolskaia pravda's Institute of Public Opinion in 1961 revealed that the majority of Soviet youth considered adherence

1 This figure is cited in the Minsk Yiddish daily Oktiabr, February 1, 1929. Despite the extremely militant anti-religious campaign of the 1920's conducted by the Yevsektsiia, or Jewish Section of the Communist Party, the number of synagogues had declined only from 1,034 in 1917 to 934 in 1929-30. The number of rabbis in the Ukraine had fallen from 1,049 in 1914 to 830 in 1929-30. All in all, 646 synagogues had been seized since the Revolution. American Jewish Yearbook 5690, Philadelphia, 1930, p. 68-9, and AJYB 5691, p. 118. In contrast, 354 of 450 remaining synagogues were seized between 1956 and 1963.

to a religious faith among the lesser "social evils.” 2 Workers and members of the intelligentsia have manifested a similar indifference, although there have recently been signs that some among the intelligentsia and youth have begun exploring Russian religious tradition and more exotic religious and metaphysical doctrines in what may be described as "a search for the meaning of life."

This general decline of religious belief in the Soviet Union has of course been largely a product of the anti-religious policies of the Communist regime, but in part it also reflects a widespread trend toward secularization that was already becoming noticeable in Russia-among Jews as well as others-even before the Revolution, and that has been evident still longer in most other European societies. In England, for example, 152 out of every thousand persons were enrolled in the Anglican Church forty years ago, whereas in 1964 the number had dropped to 81.3 In Denmark today, only two percent of the population attend church with some regularity; and in Sweden, about four percent. But in the Soviet Union, the process of secularization was sharply accelerated by the antireligious campaigns of the 1920's and, to an equal if not greater extent, by the industrialization and urbanization of the 1930's.

S

ecularization has perhaps affected the Jews more than it has other religious groups because of the fact that they are very highly urbanized and tend to concentrate in the larger cities, precisely where it is most difficult to practice religion and where religion tends to be weakest. A recent survey taken in Belorussia showed that, of eleven population samples in various cities and towns, the Jewish sample (taken in the town of Bobruisk) revealed 98.5 percent of the respondents declaring themselves atheists, whereas the average for the other ten samples was only 65.1 percent. Even allowing for the methodological shortcomings of the survey and the probability that Jews were more reluctant than others to declare themselves believers, this finding seems a significant indication of the declining religiousness of the Soviet Jewish community. It should be noted here that certain

Jewish religious forms and festivals retain a special meaning for nationally-conscious Jewish youth, even though atheist, since they have a national historical significance independent of theor theological content; thus, Passover is observed in some form by many non-believers, who celebrate it rather as a holiday of national liberation.

5

Official persecution has also been an important factor in the decline of the Jewish religion, and while it has extended to other religions as well, the evidence seems to indicate that the Jewish religion has been harassed with greater zeal and subjected to greater deprivations than other faiths. The officially-tolerated Orthodox Church has about 8,000 places of worship open; it is allowed to print Bibles and prayer books, to manufacture candles, crucifixes and icons, and to publish a monthly religious journal and an annual yearbook; it has five seminaries and two academies for higher theological education. For some 540,000 Soviet Baptists, there are 5,500 Baptist churches; there is an All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists, which functions as a central administration coordinating church activities and publishes a magazine, Bratskii vestnik; and the Baptists are also printing a Bible for their adherents. By contrast, the 2,268,000 Soviet Jews have only 60 synagogues; they have no central religious organization and no magazine or journal; they have been permitted to publish only 3,000 copies of a prayer book (and that in 1958), and none of the Bible. Soviet rabbis have consistently been denied permission to attend European rabbinical conferences, and no Soviet Jews have been allowed to train. abroad for the rabbinate, whereas Soviet Moslems have occasionally been permitted to make pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, and gifted Soviet Moslem students to receive training in the seminaries of Cairo, Damascus and Morocco."

Cited in Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Religion and Soviet Society," Survey (London), July, 1966.

3 New York Times, Dec. 14 and 18, 1966. Prichiny sushchestvovaniia i puti preodoleniia religioznykh perezhitkov, Minsk, 1965, p. 40.

5 Moscow Radio Broadcast, March 27, 1964, quoted in Jews in Eastern Europe, (London), November 1964, p. 28.

6 Morning Star, July 13, 1966, quoted in Jews in Eastern Europe, loc. cit.

7 Mufti Babakhanov, "USSR Moslems Expand Ties," Soviet Information Service, November 10, 1966 and TASS radio broadcast, April 17, 1966.