SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. FORCES

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Now, to answer Senator Wiley: I believe that the Soviet Union does know this. We have made it our objective to tell them in the last 9 months. Mr. Nitze, Mr. Gilpatric, and I have on several occasions spoken to this point publicly, both in order that the Soviet Union may know our power, but also so that our own allies and our own people may know it.

This is an extremely dangerous situation we are in. As I pursue this paper, I will try to indicate that, despite this power, we are in great danger. But we would be in greater danger if either our allies or our own people or the Soviet Union failed to understand the power we have. So we have made it our objective to disclose it.

Senator WILEY. That is why I wondered why you took this off the record, because if it is a deterrent, and the people here know it, Russia knows it, I do not see the advisability of keeping it further secret, because I just wondered

Secretary MCNAMARA. The specific point I wished to leave off the record was the number of warheads in our alert force. This is a vital point that can affect the disposition of their air defense and the operational plan that they would develop for the use of that air defense, and I wished to withhold that, at least for the present.

Senator WILEY. And the Kremlin does not know about those warheads? That is what my question was.

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir. It knows of the warheads, but it does not know specifically the number we have in our alert force. Senator WILEY. Thank you.

U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Secretary MCNAMARA. If I may proceed then, starting with the second paragraph on page 5.

Finally, the United States has a command and control system which we believe will continue effective operations under major nuclear attack. We have hardened underground control centers, a continually airborne command post, and a command ship at sea, all of which provide a highly centralized system for control of nuclear weapons. We are confident that our command system gives the President a rapid and secure mechanism for bringing our nuclear power to bear when needed, and that it would remain operational throughout any foreseeable United States-Soviet nuclear exchange.

The net result of all these facts is that a clear military superiority for major nuclear conflict now exists, even if the Soviet Union strikes first. Moreover, this superiority is growing and we are determined that it shall be maintained.

In passing, let me say I gave you the number of warheads planned for our alert forces as of July 1 of this year. We plan to approximately double that in the 3 to 4 years ahead, and the programs which we presented to Congress are designed to that end.

'Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, and Deputy Secretary Roswell S. Gilpatric.

CONSIDERATIONS OF GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR

In light of the relative nuclear strike capabilities of the U.S.S.R. and NATO, we have developed a number of basic and critical judgments of the probable results of general nuclear war should these strengths on both sides be put to that test in a near time period.

The first conclusion which emerges is that U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union after a nuclear exchange, measured in surviving strategic nuclear forces, would be even greater than before. This would be the case no matter which side initiated the nuclear exchange. The Soviets cannot attack the relatively wellprotected main base of our nuclear strength in sufficient force to keep us from inflicting enormous destruction on their delivery systems and on all parts of the civil societies of the Soviet Union as well.

The second major conclusion, however, is that Soviet-inflicted damage to the civil societies of the Alliance could be very grave indeed. Even if we attempted to destroy the enemy nuclear strike capability at its source, using all our available resources, some portion of the Soviet force would survive to strike back.

SOVIET STRATEGY CANNOT BE PREDICTED

In estimating the civil damage that might result, one must take into account not only numbers of vehicles that would reach their targets, and the size of their warheads, but also the strategy chosen by the Soviet Union.

There would be a high priority to hitting at military forces and, in view of the substantial Allied nuclear superiority, it would not seem militarily sound for the Soviets to attack civil targets. To do so would invite prompt, certain, and massive Allied destruction to the Soviet Union. Further, the Soviets may avoid nuclear attacks on civil targets in the hope of ultimately controlling a relatively intact Europe. Nevertheless, the rationale of a Soviet attack cannot be predicted, cities may be targeted, and even if this attack aimed primarily at military forces, extensive civil destruction would

occur.

The final major conclusion which emerges is, therefore, that leaders on both sides must be aware that the likely results of a full nuclear exchange might be: Virtual destruction, not only of the nuclear power of the Soviet Union, but of its economic and social fabric as well; survival of the United States and the other NATO nations, but with very serious damage to their human and material

resources.

THE NON-NUCLEAR BALANCE IN NATO

The implications of general nuclear war impose restraints on both the East and the West, but the pressures on the Soviet Union, arising from the nuclear balance, we believe, are stronger. Despite our best efforts to achieve a solution by political means, we must consider the possibility that we may have to take some kind of military action if we are not to lose our vital interests in Berlin through erosion. The threat of general nuclear war has not been sufficient thus far to deter the Soviets from pressures and other ac

tions designed to erode our vital interests in Berlin. Conflict is inherent in the present situation unless the political course of one side or the other is changed.

Similarly, other crises at other parts of the NATO area may occur in the future. Bearing in mind the relative nuclear strength, it therefore becomes important to assess briefly our comparative non-nuclear strength and some of the implications involved.

In our view, the Russians have superiority in non-nuclear forces in Europe at the present time, but this superiority is not overwhelming. While the U.S.S.R. can today rapidly mobilize greater non-nuclear strength in Europe than can the NATO Alliance, the portion of this strength which can be effectively applied is limited by geographic, logistic, and above all by political and strategic factors.

It is our view that it is within the capability of the alliance during the course of the present tensions to provide non-nuclear defense of the NATO area adequate at least to hold a bloc non-nuclear attack for a period sufficient to cause the Soviet Union to realize the gravity of the course upon which it has embarked. In time, the NATO Alliance has the capability to create even stronger non-nuclear forces relative to such non-nuclear bloc forces as could be brought to bear under the restraint imposed by the nuclear threat.

RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF BOTH SIDES

The respective tactical air strengths which can now be brought rapidly to bear in Western Europe tend to favor the bloc. Maximum efforts by each side to reinforce might provide the bloc an additional quantitative edge; however, these increased capabilities could be achieved only at some sacrifice of other strategic considerations, and they would not be large. With a concentrated effort, the West can probably reduce or eliminate this advantage.

On the ground, there is a rough balance in effective divisions currently deployed in the area immediately critical to the Berlin situation. We can now count 24 NATO divisions on the central front so deployed, in comparison with the 26 Communist bloc divisions in East Germany. While the bloc enjoys a larger total reinforcement capability, the satellite divisions are of reduced value because of their doubtful reliability.

As to nominal total of some 147 active Russian divisions, over one-third are maintained at only cadre strength. Others are disposed for operations in other areas of the Soviet Union and in low states of readiness. It is therefore our considered estimate that, with due regard to the factors limiting Soviet freedom of action, a total of only 55 or so Soviet divisions would be brought to bear effectively in the first 30 days of hostilities.

Against this estimated ground threat, NATO could, during 1962, have on the order of 28-30 divisions deployed in Central Europe, with a capability of increasing this number up to 35-40 divisions within 30 days after the start of mobilization. These are not unfavorable ratios for the defender, particularly in view of the nuclear forces available to back them up.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO

A number of conclusions concerning general and limited war flow from three basic judgments.

General nuclear war superiority is and must remain a fundamental strength of NATO, as of the whole free world. The alliance must maintain the psychological and physical readiness for general nuclear war as a central objective of its military policy in order to defend the vital interests of its members. The effects of general nuclear war, however, could be so grave that the alliance should engage in such action only when necessary in the defense of these vital interests and only after exhausting all feasible political, economic, and other lesser military actions.

Short of general nuclear war, the relative non-nuclear balance leaves the West vulnerable to the continued aggressive policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviets can attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities, always trying to avoid the threshold of general nuclear war, by a series of minor aggressions or possibly through limited but serious non-nuclear actions, probably followed by a prompt call for negotiations to avoid Western reaction. The capability to defeat Soviet aggression at whatever level it occurred would make such Soviet actions clearly futile.

NATO now has superiority in nuclear warfare and at sea and on land. To repeat, in the short term the NATO Alliance can offer a non-nuclear defense in Central Europe capable at least of holding a bloc non-nuclear attack without significant withdrawal for some period of time. In the longer run it is within the capability of the alliance to create still larger non-nuclear forces. In our view, the alliance should make certain that a future crisis will find us better prepared then the present one.

U.S. MUST HAVE CREDIBLE DETERRENT

Deterrence, the prevention of war while achieving NATO's objections, must clearly remain our principal goal. However, NATO has heretofore not given adequate consideration to the possibility that deterrence may fail and that war may come in spite of our best efforts to the contrary. It is our belief that deterrence against largescale Soviet military aggression based primarily on the threat of general nuclear war is not credible against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military, none of which is grave enough, in itself, to warrant recourse to general nuclear war.

Thus, we consider that we must recognize the dangers of exclusive reliance on general nuclear war as an instrument of policy and make the effort required to build a strong non-nuclear capability as well. We believe that the United States and the NATO Alliance must, in the words of President Kennedy, "have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action."

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Finally, before leaving the question of the nuclear balance and its implications, let me refer to one issue that is now reflected acutely in a NATO policy problem, but that has wider effects as

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well. This is the issue of the spread of nuclear capabilities to additional countries.

On this, the position of the United States is clear. We remain strongly opposed to the creation within third countries of nuclear weapons capabilities, whether by independent production or by transfer of weapons.

Although several countries are now capable-or might become capable within a few years-of producing a limited number of nuclear weapons, it is exceedingly improbable within the foreseeable future that any country or group of countries could develop a capability that even remotely approached that of the United States or the Soviet Union. Moreover, nothing in the actions of the Soviets suggests that they are prepared to transfer nuclear weapons to the independent control of another Communist country.

NATO'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA

Nevertheless, we are confronted with the desire of certain European nations for an increased nuclear role within the context of NATO. These nations state that such a role is necessary if pressures for additional independent national capabilities are to be reduced or eliminated. We hope that after the Europeans are exposed to more of the facts of U.S. nuclear capabilities, they will be reassured and convinced of the undesirability of fundamental changes in the present ownership and control of nuclear weapons within the alliance.

Basically, the development of additional independent centers of nuclear decision would have a destabilizing effect on relations among all the major powers. Even with relatively minor nuclear capabilities, each additional center of decision would increase the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used for national purposes, or by accident, miscalculation, irrationality, or desperation, with a corresponding increase in the danger of setting off a general nuclear war.

COVERT AGGRESSION

I have dealt previously in detail with the non-nuclear balance in the NATO area. Elsewhere in the world, there exists a continuing danger of overt aggression against the countries on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. However, there are also powerful restraints that operate not only against general nuclear war, but against lesser overt aggressions.

There remains another major technique of aggression, one that is repeatedly and skillfully used by the Communists. This is what Mr. Khrushchev, in his speech of January 6, 1961, calls "wars of national liberation." We know them as subversion, induced or supported insurrection, guerrilla operations, or covert armed aggression. It is a form of warfare which has the advantage of remaining well below the threshold of a conventionally defined international aggression. At the same time, it is usable in countries which are not contiguous to the bloc, though it is a much more powerful technique in adjacent countries, where supply and reinforcement are easier and where the threat of overt military action compounds the defender's problems.