I happen to know him very well. In fact, he worked with me in London in 1941, and he was one of my principal assistants. This was the first job he had in the Government. I think he is a very capable Foreign Service officer, a New York lawyer who, as a result of his law experience, became a Foreign Service officer and served our country well.

He is quite loyal, as all Foreign Service officers are, to the administration for whom he works, so he might just as well go along with them or resign. I just want to make this comment about his testimony.

CONCERN OVER SOUVANNA PHOUMA

But so far as your question is concerned, my answer is, the information I have is that President Diem, whom someone else criticized, is not very keen about Souvanna Phouma.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why is he not?

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. And he has not got very much confidence. The same is true, may I say, in case you ask it, of Prime Minister Sarit.

Senator LAUSCHE. Of what nation?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Of Thailand.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Those two countries.

Senator LAUSCHE. So you have South Vietnam on the east, Thailand on the south and the west, and both of them do not trust Souvanna Phouma.

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about

Mr. HARRIMAN. But could I say that there are a good many other people in the world who do trust him, our NATO allies, some of the other countries-

The CHAIRMAN. The British and the French.

Mr. HARRIMAN. The British and the French, the Australians are supporting us; the Indians, the Burmese. Except for those two countries, there is unanimity.

Now, it is very rare that you get everybody in the world to agree upon a controversial personality. There is no question that he is a controversial personality. I might say that our choice between coming to an agreement-the alternative is to have war, and that is a subject which I have gathered from certain of the members of this committee, they did not want to contemplate.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator from Ohio, who seems to make a point, and I think it is a valid one

Senator LAUSCHE. May I pursue my questions first?

The CHAIRMAN. I want to show the complete record, though, as to what Mr. Brown said. You only read part of it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead. Where are you reading from?

AMBASSADOR BROWN'S TESTIMONY

The CHAIRMAN. You go on, as I remember, on page 69 and page 70, and I will quote it just for the record, and then let you pursue your questioning. On page 69 Mr. Brown was talking, and he said:

If you remember, on the 31st of August the government was formed with Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister and with Phoumi as the Deputy, and then he broke away for various reasons which I do not need to bore you with at this moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who broke away?

Mr. BROWN. Phoumi. And he then formed his revolutionary committee.

The CHAIRMAN. With our help?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir. He did that solely on his own. We supported his forces later.

This is the key point on it, and this is Mr. Brown:

I believed at that time that this government, with Souvanna as the Prime Minister, and with other strong people in it, was a government with which we could work and with which we could have a broad support in the country, because at the time I" not "we.'

I felt that Souvanna did have a wide appeal, and that if there were others in the government who were strong and represented the kinds of point of view that Phoumi did, that he could be kept in balance. I was in favor of supporting that government for those reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. They sound like very good reasons.

Then it goes on. But this is where we were pursuing this thought, and it is a little vague. He very clearly there says,

I thought at that time the government could succeed if it was balanced. Granted, as you have said-I do not quarrel with that-that later when Phoumi came in and the policy of the government was to support him, then he went along with it.

Senator LAUSCHE. But later Souvanna Phouma changed his conduct, his attitude, and with that change also came a change in Ambassador Brown's view.

Let me proceed with my questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go right ahead. I just thought this ought to be part of the record.

CONCERNS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Isn't it a fact that Taiwan does not trust Souvanna Phouma?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not know. I have never consulted with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the subject.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have you made any search to find out what Taiwan's attitude is?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is an important factor, though, is it not? Mr. HARRIMAN. They are not involved in this situation.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Isn't it also true that Thailand—that is, we mentioned it

Mr. HARRIMAN. I just mentioned it to that effect.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about Malaya?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I have not consulted the Malayans. I do not want to speak for their government. You see, there are 14 governments. Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, but isn't Malaya just scared to death about what will happen in South Vietnam?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think they are very much concerned, and very strongly approve of the policy which we have adopted in South Vietnam, which some of the members of the committee questioned. They are, in fact, assisting in advice and giving the benefit of their experience, which are 8 years of battling against the guerrillas.

They are most anxious to be of assistance in South Vietnam in a similar struggle.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

We at least agree upon this, that South Vietnam and Thailand fear Souvanna Phouma.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would say, have some doubts about him. I do not know how far they go. You would have to bring the goverments here to testify.

Senator LAUSCHE. We have had testimony here.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I think they are concerned, they have expressed concern, over whether a Souvanna Phouma government could be successful in withstanding Communist infiltration and subversion.

NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have access to the CIA reports and the intelligence of our Army, Navy, and Marines?

Mr. HARRIMAN. As far as I know, I have access to them. Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. chairman, I think we ought to have the intelligence reports on this subject because, as far as I am concerned, I am not going to be in the position of being silent when I firmly believe that we are setting up the structure for a repetition of the disastrous results that we suffered every time we created a troika government. We ought to know what those nations in the immediate vicinity of Laos think of Souvanna Phouma. I am going to ask that that information be provided.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you asking the Ambassador to do it? Senator LAUSCHE. I do not know whether the Ambassador should do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Dutton can see it is done.

NATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS IN THEIR GOVERNMENTS

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say this, Senator: There is a grave difference between the establishment of a government with Communist infiltration when the Red army is in the country. There have been a number of countries, beginning with France and Italy and Austria, Finland and Norway, and they have had-I will be glad to submit to the committee the number of countries that have hadCommunists in their government.

As far as I am concerned, I would not trust any country with Communists in it, which country was under the domination of the Red army, either Soviet or Chinese Communists or North Vietnam. But the record does not show, and I would like to have this recorded, that just because you have a Communist in the government or several Communists in the government that the government falls. Now, I would like to be able to tell this committee, if I may, very briefly, what is involved.

STRUCTURE OF THE LAOTIAN COALITION

There is a discussion of having a government of 19, of which four would come from the Pathet Lao; the other 15 would not-maybe 18 or 19, it has not been decided fully. These others, if they work

together, can dominate the government. The great problem will be whether they can win the election.

Senator LAUSCHE. Before we come to the Pathet Lao, how many would come from the present incumbent government, four?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Four from the present incumbent government. Senator LAUSCHE. And Souvanna Phouma would have ten?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There would be, the talk is of ten in the center, of which the names have not been mentioned. Five of them were his followers, supposedly non-Communist followers, at Xiengchiang, who have been supporting him there, and in his claim for his rights, which we do not accept, of course. The other five would come from independents in Vientiane.

Souvanna Phouma has made it very plain that the election can only be won if the majority of the non-Communists in Laos work together, where if they put up one candidate in his district he can win. If they put up five or six, as they have done before, they can get licked. They do not have a run-off system under their constitution as you have in certain of our States.

The other question is whether the armies can be integrated. That is a very serious problem, and whether it can be worked out or not, I do not know. But the general idea is that the armies would be integrated on a basis where each side will integrate them on a proportional basis.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT

Then, the other question is how much support this government will get from the outside. I hope our country as well as others will support this country with the necessary economic assistance in order to help them do a job.

Souvanna Phouma, I have been told by our AID mission there, USOM,2 showed great interest in the social improvement of the villages. It is a very backward country, as you know, and it is a contribution which should be developed from the village up, agriculture as well as the social life of the village, education, and so forth. The other question is whether the international agreement which has been made will be kept, and I cannot guarantee that. Nobody can guarantee it. But we have the acceptance of the Soviet Union of the responsibility of seeing to it that the other side does live up to this agreement.

These are the factors which are involved. This is not dependent upon one man, but a series of people.

The fact that the neighbors would like to see the struggle continue in Laos, rather than extend it to their own country, is quite natural. The fact is that most of those who have studied the situation in the rest of the world believe we are together on this, we are not doing this alone that the President's policy is a wise decision, and I think it should be considered, as well as the judgment of the two neighbors.

2 United States Operations Mission.

CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVE

Now, the alternative is to, with or without SEATO, put in not a number of training personnel, air crews, and maintenance forces that we have in Vietnam, but combat units, and this is a major war that you start there. Where it will escalate-if you look at the map, you will find that Laos is a neighbor of China, and also North Vietnam to the north; it has been supplied by the Soviet Union. How far this war will be escalated in the future is something that you can look at and prognosticate as well as anyone else.

But I think before you criticize, Senator, if I may be so bold as to suggest it, a proposal to have a peaceful settlement, you should consider the alternative.

Senator LAUSCHE. Oh, yes, I have considered it.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. And to weigh the evidence for what chance there is to be a success.

Now, none of us can guarantee this, but the President wanted me to come here and talk very frankly about it.

I see the committee is divided in its views as to whether we should join in a war in Southeast Asia or whether we should join in the future at all, the future settlement. I simply indicate that there is a difference between South Vietnam and Laos; there is a civil war there, which-—

Senator LAUSCHE. You cannot make a difference.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. Which we can encourage the continuation of or attempt to find a coalition.

Senator LAUSCHE. Let me proceed with my questions, please.

COMPOSITION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT

So we do have this new government which will be made up of four representatives of the present government, four representatives of the Pathet Lao, and the balance followers of Souvanna Phouma.

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, they are called neutrals.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, they are called neutrals.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Followers of Souvanna Phouma and other independents, political personalities of considerable prominence and strength.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have answered my question.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I just finish this, Senator-who have had positions in the government, some of whom in the past——

Senator LAUSCHE. And to Souvanna Phouma will be given the portfolios of Defense and the Interior?

Mr. HARRIMAN. To the center group. The independents and Souvanna followers-I accept your definition of those who followed him to Xiengchiang-will be half of the center group, at least, and who the personalities will be has not been agreed to. He has indicated himself that he wants to retain the Ministry of Defense.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. I hope that you are correct in your analysis of it. I hope the same mistake will not be made that was made in Cuba. I fear, however, that you are wrong, and pardon me for being so bold as to make that statement.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I ask you a question, sir? Are you ready to face the alternative of very substantial military commitments?