This will require not just advisers, this will require very substantial military forces being placed in this jungle country where there is very little communication. Are you prepared to, may I ask you, sir?

Senator LAUSCHE. No, I am not. I did not believe that we could logistically support the situation in Laos.

Now, my question is-

Mr. HARRIMAN. Senator, may I continue this?

COMPARISON OF LAOS AND VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do you go into South Vietnam, then, with all of the signs of intending to prosecute a war if you pulled out of Laos in trying to avoid a war?

Mr. HARRIMAN. The situation is quite different. There is a civil war going on in Laos; there was, when President Kennedy became President. He had three alternatives: One, to support that civil war that was going against the government that we recognized. He had the question of putting in American troops with or without SEATO.

He had the second opportunity which was to let it be overrun by the Communists from the north. The third was to attempt to work out a peaceful settlement.

Senator LAUSCHE. In Laos?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In Laos. Now, that is what we are doing.

The alternative to a peaceful settlement is the United States putting in a large military force in Laos, with or without SEATO. If you do not do that, this country is going to be overrun by the Pathet Lao; there will be a Communist government there. Prince Souvanna Phouma will move to Paris and have nothing to do with it; he will be through with it.

In South Vietnam it is a completely different situation. You have a government there, Senator-you may not fully approve of it, but it is a government-which has made substantial progress in the last 8 years.

It has a standard of living 50 percent higher than in the north. It has increased its per capita food production. It has substantially increased its education, I do not know, from 200 or 300 to 11⁄2 million.

It is not-perhaps some people do not think it is-everything that conforms to all of the democratic processes, but they are in the middle of an aggressive war being carried on by these guerrillas, and you cannot have-even we do not have-all the freedoms during war that we have otherwise. I wish you would bear that in mind.

We are helping that government save itself. The people are fighting themselves. There is no question about it at the present time, or so far as I know, of any plans of putting in American forces. They are men who will fight for their country, a government that will command a competent military establishment, and we are attempting to help them in dealing with this aggression which has destroyed the peace in South Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. I cannot see the difference.

NEED TO GET THE FACTS

Senator MORSE. Will you give me 30 seconds to make a comment?

The Ambassador has referred several times to my position in regard to South Vietnam. I want to make it very clear to the Ambassador and to Mr. Dutton, to the people of the State Department, that I am submitting this list of questions as a member of this committee, because I know we have to provide the answers in our committee discussion on South Vietnam. I do not want the Ambassador or anyone else to reach the opinion that I have prejudged the situation.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am glad of that.

Senator MORSE. I want to get what the facts are, but I have to have the facts if I am going to be able to intelligently discuss this as a member of this committee.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am very grateful for that statement and, to the best of my ability, I will get the advice and help of the Department and the Defense Department and attempt to give you as much information which you can put on the record. If there is any part of it, Mr. Chairman, or Senator, which should be for executive session, I would like to have the privilege of asking your permission to submit it in that manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I am sure you agree, but I fully accept your position that this is something which is very difficult to understand and very complicated, and I think that the help of this committee in having the country understand it will be immensely useful. Senator MORSE. Thank you, Frank.

A NEUTRAL, INDEPENDENT LAOS

Senator LAUSCHE. At this point I would like to point out how a year ago the same arguments were made about Laos that are now being made about South Vietnam.

Mr. Brown testified:

I think that Laos is a very key place in Southeast Asia, as I say, both from the point of view of the physical fact that if it is neutral and independent and free from Communist influence it acts as sort of a cordon sanitaire between the Communists and the Thais in the south and the Cambodians, and also because the effect on the people of South Asia if another country falls to the Communists and if the Communists move that much nearer to them, is bound to be an effect which will weaken their morale and possibly lead them to positions of greater compromise and greater weakness.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, in fact, if Laos should go Communist, you will have Red China practically brought to the border of Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam? Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir. From a moral standpoint that will weaken the strength of Cambodia and Thailand and South Vietnam; yes, sir.

That was an argument that was made a year ago. The same argument is now made with reference to South Vietnam, and I frankly say that I find it difficult to follow what the policy is.

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I say, Senator-

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN [continuing]. What Ambassador Brown testified to a year ago is exactly the President's policy today, a neutral, independent country. I have forgotten the words that were used

there. That is exactly the President's policy today; there is no change in it.

The difference of opinion between you and the Administration is that you are unwilling to accept Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister. I can tell you, Senator, there is no alternative except war, and therefore you have to be honest with yourself, if I may say

that.

MUST IT BE SOUVANNA PHOUMA?

Senator LAUSCHE. Must it be Souvanna Phouma as the third party neutralist?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why can't it be someone in whom the bordering nations will trust as not being oriented to Peking and Moscow? Mr. HARRIMAN. All I can tell you is that this is a decision which everyone there will tell you the same thing; no other government is negotiable.

Senator LAUSCHE. No other government is negotiable? That is, it must be Souvanna Phouma, and unless it is he, it means that you are involved?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There has been some talk of the King. He has declined to accept it. But at this stage of the negotiation, the overwhelming majority of the nations there are ready to support a Souvanna government, providing he brings into the government, which is not clear yet, some stalwarts of the non-Communist group.

Senator LAUSCHE. Does that mean, inasmuch as you say that it is either Souvanna Phouma or no one else, that we have to yield to the demands of Peking and

Mr. HARRIMAN. No.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. And Soviet Russia?

Mr. HARRIMAN. No. We have――

Senator LAUSCHE. What does it mean?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This is an opinion which is shared by the overwhelming majority of the nations that are involved in this dispute. I mentioned them; I won't go over them again.

This is the only reasonable solution that can be found, and Souvanna Phouma is the one man who is available. Of course, if he were to die, there might be someone else. But he is the one man who is available to lead a coalition government at this time.

NOTHING WITHOUT RISK

Senator LAUSCHE. I hope that you are right and I am wrong. That is all I say, but I am afraid, I fear intuitively and on the basis of proof, that you will find Laos Communist before a year is past. Mr. HARRIMAN. I cannot guarantee what is going to happen in the future, and I have explained to you the very considerable risks and the President himself has said there are considerable risks. But there is nothing in the world which is without risk. This is, anyway, the program the President has put forward, and I hope it will get the support of this committee.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, that is all.

Senator MORSE. We are greatly indebted to the Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, I think it has been very informative. I know we have a vote in just a moment. I wanted to ask just a question or two about the South Vietnamese situation.

TRAINING THE VIETNAMESE FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE

Are you somewhat optimistic about the progress that we are making in training them for guerrilla warfare?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Mr. Chairman, of course, they know a good deal about it themselves, and they have consulted with Malaya and others, so that we are

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have someone from Malaya up there helping them?

Mr. HARRIMAN. There are some people that are helping them who are familiar with Malayan experience. But this is a long, long pull.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I was impressed with the progress made in the civilian side of civilian defense, as well as the progress that was being made and the difference it could make, the speed of communication.

These guerrillas are much fewer in number. There is an old story that you need somewhere between 5 to 10 members of the military force to rout out 1 guerrilla, but the speed with which the loyal forces can be brought to bear on a community that is attacked is of vital importance.

What I can say, Mr. Chairman, is that I am very much impressed by the progress that has been made in the plans that are being developed, and progress which has been made in training, both among the military personnel and the civilian defense, and in protecting the villages.

The CHAIRMAN. Čan you say anything about any increase in the confidence of the people generally in their government? Do you think the South Vietnamese are really interested in-

Mr. HARRIMAN. No, I think it is too early to do that. I think there is a large part of the country that is still under the threat of guerrillas, a considerable part of the country in which they are the dominant factor. It is the process in Malaya, which was to take and clear and defend, clear and defend, until you got rid of them.

The CHAIRMAN. In the long run, it will depend upon whether the people themselves in South Vietnam have confidence in their government, that it will prevail and so on, isn't that so? That is the key thing, whether or not they have confidence.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would think in the villages it is a question of who can give them protection. They are not well educated. This government is the first one that has attempted to give them education. Their interest is, their first interest is, protection. They want to be left alone to lead their own lives. That is true of the peasants there, as in most countries.

COUPS AGAINST DIEM

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any alternative to Diem that you can think of?

Mr. HARRIMAN. He is the head of the government, and I would not have thought that it was a proper function of the United States to attempt to make and break governments.

There was a coup, you remember, in November of last year, which was an interesting coup. They did not attack Diem himself, but attacked some of the people around him and urged him to make a change in his government. There was no one suggested to take his place.

That coup was put down and, as a result of the very much increased tempo of the guerrilla warfare in the last 18 months, there have been greater security measures taken. Whenever you do execute those measures, there is considerable complaint of those who are affected by it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does he cooperate with our people in these plans for defense, and so on?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I would think it would be fair to say that he gives on the basis of questions of cooperation. On the questions of some of the suggestions we have made, he has not accepted them; others he has. Others are questions of disagreement on timing. I think you would say from what has been stated publicly that there were some proposals that were made-I will be very glad to get that for the committee-proposals that were made for the improvement of the social and economic condition of the country, which he accepted.

Can I put that in the record? It is a statement that was about nine points, I think, that had been accepted.

Now, he is an independent government. I do not think it is quite-it is not surprising that he disagrees with some of the suggestions that are made, both as to the manner in which his military operates and the manner in which he feels he can liberalize his government under the wartime conditions which he is in, and I confess myself I would like to see him liberalize his government more. I think we have to give him a chance to get his country under some basis of peaceful conditions before we become too critical of him.

OUR MONEY IS ON THE WRONG MAN

Senator MORSE. Along the lines of your questioning, Mr. Chairman, you remember when Ambassador Nolting was here, we had a conference with him and colloquy with him about the non-Communists that seemed to be opposed to the head of this government. It would not bother me if all the Communists were against him, but what bothers me is the reports that we get of non-Communists or responsible leaders, some of whom have had to flee the country and have taken up residence in France and elsewhere-that disturbs me, that you have responsible non-Communists who do not have confidence in him.

I do not know what the facts are, and we will ask Dr. Marcy to get them, but we read newspaper clippings yesterday about how he has, in effect, severed relationships with the University of Michigan group because some of those professors have written some critical articles about him. I would like to know what they wrote, and I am going to ask Dr. Marcy to get us a digest of these University