this was a wise thing to do. This has led to their suggesting that SEATO could not function unless there was a change in voting procedure.

There are eight members, and it was suggested that SEATO should act with three-quarters votes, six out of eight. That, to some of the others, did not seem to be wise because they felt the principle of unanimity should be retained. It might be a bad principle in other organizations.

THAIS CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR SECURITY

We have pointed out, we understand the concern of the Government of Thailand. I think if Laos would be as close to the United States as it is to Thailand, I think if we had a border of 1,000 miles with Laos, we would be concerned as, of course, we are-more concerned than we are-as to the possibility of that country not retaining its independence.

We, of course, would not enter into any arrangements which we did not believe would assure a reasonable chance of our maintaining independence. But to the Thais it is much more serious, and so they have wondered whether the SEATO organization gave them sufficient security.

They wondered about their own security, if it would require a full unanimous vote. We pointed out to them that under the Treaty of Manila, there is a Article IV(1) for unilateral action on the part of each member rather than the unanimous action. It states that each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

So we have pointed out that the Manila Pact was, in fact, an agreement of action on the part of countries individually as well as collectively, and that we were bound under the pact just as firmly to take action individually, with or without all of the members of SEATO or with as many of them as care to act. There is no inhibition to act on the part of one country or a group of countries, even if all of them did not function.

INVITATION TO PRIME MINISTER

Now, this has become so important an issue that it was felt by us and also by the government-in the first place by us-that it might be well to ask the Foreign Minister, Mr. Thanat, to come over to this country to have a discussion, with public indication of our interest and concern, to meet the President and the Secretary of State, and that after these discussions were completed over a period of several days, there would be a communique issued. This was what I wanted to put before you, and to get your comments and advice.

The idea would be that this communique would have a certain amount of window dressing, assurances of the United States of friendship and support for Thailand, and a general statement of our confidence in the effectiveness of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Then it would have an important paragraph which would affect the obligations-not affect, but would underline the

obligations-we have taken under article IV(1) to indicate the United States' intention to meet its obligations under this article in case there was an overt Communist aggression. There would also be a statement in this communique that the treaty provided for individual as well as collective action, individual as well as collective obligation, of the parties under this proviso.

OTHER ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN COMMUNIQUE

Then there is concern in Thailand over this question of subversion and guerrilla warfare similar to what we have seen take place in South Vietnam. There is some indication that the Communists intend to engage in that type of aggression in Thailand as well as elsewhere in Asia, and the treaty itself does not specifically provide for that. Therefore, we suggested that we might add a paragraph to or a sentence or two in the communique to the effect that the United States had indicated its concern over indirect aggression such as has taken place in South Vietnam, and therefore it was an indication of the kind of attitude that the United States would take in the event Thailand was subjected to a similar type of aggression. Then, lastly, of course, there would be a further paragraph of general goodwill, which would indicate that both countries would work together to support measures to raise the standard of living and the economic growth of the people of Thailand. That is already included in our bilateral agreement, in our aid agreement.

INTENT IS TO CLARIFY TREATY'S INTERPRETATION

The CHAIRMAN. Is all of this to be in a communique or are these to be revisions of the Treaty of Manila?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This is purely a communique.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I should say that indirect aggression is provided for in the treaty, but under Article IV(2), it requires unanimity of

action.

There would be no intention of changing the treaty, but since this committee had been responsible for its advice to the President in the ratification of the treaty, it was thought by the President and the Secretary of State that we should advise you of this coming visit, and to indicate that there was no change contemplated, but that there was to be a statement which would clarify our interpretation of the treaty. In fact, this is the interpretation that we have always had-I think I am correct, am I not, Mr. Chayes-there never has been any question of doubt?

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, that is true.

Mr. HARRIMAN. But since this is being stated publicly, we wanted to be sure that this committee understood it and had no comment to make.

REASSURANCE REGARDING GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES

The CHAIRMAN. In this paragraph IV(2) you are speaking of it says "threatened"-or "any state which under the provisions of (1) of this article, from time to time is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or

situation which might endanger the peace of the area." Surely that would include these guerrilla activities.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes. It does include that, Mr. Chairman. But I meant to indicate that IV(2) really does require action by the parties to the treaty, because it goes on to say that the parties shall consult immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Consult?

Mr. HARRIMAN. In order to agree upon measures which should be taken for the common defense, and there possibly the rule of unanimity might apply. Therefore, this indication-there would be no commitment, but it was contemplated that this communique would purely carry an inference that since the United States had taken action to be of assistance to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to meet this type of aggression, it could be considered a reassurance as to the attitude of the United States and other countries in this area.

PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How do you interpret Article IV(3) as applied to Article IV(1) on the question of unanimity? It seems that (3) contemplates a unanimous agreement. Under paragraph 1 it specifically says "unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article."

Mr. HARRIMAN. May I ask Mr. Chayes to answer that question? Mr. CHAYES. Paragraph 3 relates to the so-called protocol states. That is, the treaty area included the territory of, designated in the treaty of, member states of the treaty. It was extended by unanimous agreement to the so-called protocol states, which included Laos and South Vietnam.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Also Cambodia.

Mr. CHAYES. Cambodia, that is right.

Paragraph 3 refers only to action taken under paragraph 1 in one of the protocol states. The protocol states were not members of the treaty. Therefore, it was said that when under Article I we acted in one of the protocol states, we had to have the consent of the state in which we acted.

The reference to a state designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this article, referring back to paragraph 1, talks about an attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties, by unanimous agreement, may hereafter designate. It is that any state or territory which the parties may, by unanimous agreement, hereafter designate which is referred to Article III.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So the words "of any state designated as contained in paragraph 3 of Article IV," refer directly to the phrase or clause "which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate," in paragraph 1.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is a direct and sole reference to that particular situation.

Mr. CHAYES. Yes, sir.

HAS THAILAND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE?

Senator AIKEN. Have we already been invited by them, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Have we what, sir?

Senator AIKEN. Have we been invited in? I did not get the first 3 minutes of your remarks.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Thailand is one of the parties to the treaty. She is not a designated state. She is one of the original parties and signatory of the treaty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Mr. HARRIMAN. And this article does not refer to her.
Senator WILLIAMS. But have they invited us in?

Mr. HARRIMAN. This clause 3 refers to the protocol countries, those who are designated, not members. When it comes to action within the country, presumably no action would be taken unlessSenator WILLIAMS. Has Thailand asked for our military assistance?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They have, of course, invited us to participate in self-defense. we have intimate relations with Thailand in helping them with their-we have a MAAG group there, military advisory group. We are helping them with their military training and with their military defenses, so we already are engaged in mutual defense activities in Thailand.

Senator AIKEN. Would Thailand fight among themselves if General Sarit passed on?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I understood the Thai fought very well in Korea, the small units that were there. They have a force of some 90,000 men, that I know of, and they have been of some assistance in training the Royal Laotian Army.

ASSISTANCE VIS-A-VIS LAOS

Senator WILLIAMS. Do I understand they have invited us to enlarge our operations in there now?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is what the discussion is about. They want to make sure that if they are attacked, it will not require a unanimous action on the part of the other seven members of SEATO in order to have the United States act.

This would be a public assurance, in this communique, of assurances which we have given them privately on our legal interpretation of the treaty which was approved by the Senate.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, they want a bilateral assistance rather than depending on this multilateral assistance?

Mr. HARRIMAN. We have been giving them bilateral assistance under our military assistance program.

WOULD OTHER SEATO COUNTRIES ACT?

Senator AIKEN. If they were attacked, what members of the treaty do they expect would hold out?

Mr. HARRIMAN. Yes, they would expect-they would want us to come to their defense at the earliest possible moment.

Senator AIKEN. Unilaterally; they would want us to come unilaterally?

Mr. HARRIMAN. They would want us to come unilaterally. They have more confidence in our ability to be helpful to them than they have in the other countries. They, of course, would want to have as many countries as possible join, but knowing that our military power is greater than the others in that part of the world-

Senator AIKEN. Which other countries would not? Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, and the United Kingdom?

Mr. HARRIMAN. France and the United Kingdom. I do not know, they all might come in, but they do not want to have their security jeopardized by-I should not say jeopardized, but their securitydepending upon the vote of every one of these countries.

NO NEW POSITION IN PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you something. I am not sure I am clear on this.

Does the proposal amount to simply a statement of our interpretation of the existing terms of the treaty?

Mr. HARRIMAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, then, that becomes the basis upon which we would act unilaterally?

Mr. HARRIMAN. It is our interpretation of-it is a statement publicly, really, of what we have consistently said privately for a considerable number of years.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. CHAYES. I should also add that I think Secretary [John Foster] Dulles, in presenting that treaty to this committee, made that pretty clear. I do not think this is a new position. In other words, it is one that has been stated before. He said:

"The agreement of each of the parties to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes"-this is under Article IV(1)-"leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in event an armed attack occurs. Of course, there are a wide range of defensive measures which might be appropriate depending on the circumstances. Any action which the United States might take would, of course, be in accordance with its constitutional processes.'

This is page 4 of the hearings if you have them before you. There at the very beginning it seems to me Secretary Dulles made it clear that action under Article IV(1) was an individual matter with each of the states; each of the states responded in accordance with his own judgment of the situation; whereas, in the following paragraph of his testimony, he discusses the situation of Article IV(2), under Article IV(2), and says:

"The paragraph contains no obligation beyond consultation. The purpose of consultation is to agree on measures to be taken for common defense."

So that contrast was a little

SEATO UMBRELLA EXTENDED BY UNANIMOUS VOTE

Senator SPARKMAN. This is to me a little puzzling statement in that section 1 of Article IV:

"Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any