Also, we are not as fearful as the British are about the public opinion situation throughout the world. They may have some local problems in the United Kingdom, but―by the way, we ought to get this down to the committee-I have just seen a USIA round-up of world reactions, and we are not in any weak position here in terms of world public opinion. So we feel that we must go ahead and get the kind of treaty which would be thoroughly adequate from the point of view of our security, as a basis for any decision not to go ahead with our test program.

REFUSAL OF INSPECTION AND CONTROL

Now, in Mr. Khrushchev's letter to the President, he made it quite clear that they were not going to buy inspection and control as proposed, and his language indicated that they were not going to buy inspection and control on almost any basis. But that, of course, is an absolute fundamental from the point of view of a treaty which would be adequate from our point of view.

Nevertheless, we do need to clarify with the Soviet Union what their attitude is going to be. It is entirely possible that Gromyko will not himself say the last word on this; that he would try to put that question over, because Mr. Khrushchev may want to try that out at a summit meeting.

I doubt very much that we will see any movement of any importance on their side in this field. I could be wrong, but this was discussed thoroughly between the President and Mr. Khrushchev at Vienna, following the most careful negotiation and preparation, on the basis of the April treaty, and there was no indication whatever from Mr. Khrushchev that he was going to abandon this commitment to secrecy in the Soviet Union over such things as a test ban. I think the prediction now would be that they would reject a treaty, that they will try to make maximum propaganda out of our resumption, and that they then, themselves, will go ahead with another round of tests. That would be a candid prediction as far as we can see it at the present time.

SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The third question I would talk to Gromyko about before the meeting opens is Southeast Asia. We feel that either the Soviets are not in control of the Communist side in Southeast Asia, or they are not playing the kind of game that we would expect them to play if they are serious when they say to us, "We want to stabilize the situation and try to reach some sort of a settlement in that area."

I am thinking not so much of Laos at the moment as I am of Vietnam, because in the face of an agreement at Geneva, at the Laotian Conference, that Laos would not be used as an avenue for infiltration into other countries, such as South Vietnam, and in the face of protestations that they would like to get that situation settled down, agents and cadres and personnel and very limited amounts of supplies continue to go into South Vietnam, and the Viet Cong have stepped up the pace of their operations in the last 2 or 3 months.

There are some signs that the Chinese Communist wing of the Communist Party is moving into the ascendancy in Hanoi. It is just possible and this is something we tend to be skeptical about in the West, through long experience-it is just possible that Moscow is losing its influence, its ability to influence that situation.

NO WISH FOR CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM

Senator HUMPHREY. Did you see that story this morning about the Yugoslavs?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I saw that. Whether or not Soviet policy has changed, which I am inclined to doubt, it may be that they have no choices, that they are losing their choices in that situation. But this is one of the things I want to try to sound out Gromyko

on.

We do not expect to or wish to get into any general conference on Vietnam, where there would be proposals made that the Viet Cong be taken into the government and all sorts of things that would start us down the road on which we have been having so much trouble in Laos. If the government forces in Vietnam can maintain the pace of their present activity and initiative, and can sustain the rate of casualties of the present fighting, then we think that the situation can come under control.

BROADER DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Then the fourth point would be the broader question as it affects general and complete disarmament-that is, the broader discussion in the conference would be the general subject of verification, inspection, and control, because if we cannot get some sort of satisfaction on Berlin, on the nuclear test arrangements, on such things as Southeast Asia, and on inspection, I think it is fair to say that there just is not going to be any disarmament. So this is the sort of thing that we are trying to establish.

As I said just before you came in, Senator Humphrey, this meeting will be in two phases: one, a Foreign Ministers' political phase for about 10 days, and then a disarmament conference which would go on after that.

What we need to find out is whether there is an adequate political basis for serious disarmament discussions, and this will be the main purpose within the first 10 days.

Senator GORE. As I understand you, unless there is some satisfactory conclusion reached on the part of our Government in the first phase, the second phase cannot entail serious negotiations.

Secretary RUSK. I did not mean to say, Senator Gore, that there would not be a conference in the second phase. But I would say—— Senator GORE. That was not involved in my question.

Secretary RUSK. Right, I realize that. But I am saying that I would be pessimistic about making any serious headway in the second phase unless we can get some adequate political framework in the beginning.

AVOIDING ANOTHER PROPAGANDA ROUND

This was why the Prime Minister and the President urged that we start off at the Foreign Minister level and have some preliminary talks among the three Foreign Ministers before the meeting started, because we do not want, if we can avoid it, to convert the Geneva Disarmament Conference into just another propaganda round. If we had our choice, and if there is any indication of serious interest on Mr. Gromyko's part, we would be inclined to start off the conference without what the United Nations calls general debate, without a round of big speeches in which everybody tries to appeal to world public opinion and gets himself fixed on particular points, and we have a big argument about the nuclear test resumption on both sides, and things of that sort.

If we are serious about this, we ought to move straight into committee work, straight into quiet and systematic negotiations. I do not think we will succeed. I think Mr. Gromyko is coming there with a big speech in which he will try to unload on us as much as possible, our announced test program. He will undoubtedly-Senator SPARKMAN. You said Khrushchev was coming? Secretary RUSK. No, Gromyko.

In Mr. Khrushchev's letter, he used the words "atomic blackmail." It is interesting that this was the phrase that they threw at us to condemn the Baruch Report. This was the same phrase that they used at a time when we were trying to get an atomic monopoly put into international control. And even then they called it atomic blackmail, you see.

We will be ready for a propaganda fight, if that is what they want. But from our side, we would rather start it off more quietly.

COUNTERING PROPAGANDA ATTACKS

Senator HUMPHREY. I would be interested in how you are going to get ready for it, Mr. Secretary, because one of the things that disturbs me no end is we knew that the Soviets were about ready to have their tests last fall, when they went into that barrage of testing, and we did not have anything ready. We did not have any stooges ready to parade, we did not have any placards out, we did not have any walls painted, we did not have any radio programs, we did not have the French and the British and our allies all geared up to really make something out of it.

Gradually, something built up. But you can rest assured the Soviets, the day we have the first explosion, any American Embassy in any unstable country will be stoned, and mobs will be in the street, and there will be more women's meetings and peace meetings than you can count, and we will be under the most severe propaganda attack we have ever encountered.

I wonder how we are going to combat that. Don't misunderstand me. I think that the decision on testing is proper. I support that decision. But that is only one of the points.

PREFERENCE IS BUSINESSLIKE APPROACH

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think that would be the second chapter of the propaganda battle, that is, to get ready for the actual explosion of an American test.

What I was referring to in my remarks was the debate at Geneva on the proposals and counterproposals on the record. And there we are assuming now that we shall have to make such a propaganda effort, even though our preference is that we start off on a businesslike basis.

You will notice the difference in mood, length, language, in the President's reply to Mr. Khrushchev's letter-simply a short 2- or 3-paragraph letter saying we will talk about these things.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that was most fitting. I appreciate the position of the Government to go right ahead, not worry too much about what is going to be said, only to be prepared for it, and just hew the course.

MATTER HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY PRESENTED

Senator SYMINGTON. With due respect to the Secretary, in the past, it is my opinion that the cockeyed policy we started in the fall of 1956, in our own party, which was embraced later on by the other party-no use in crying over spilled milk, but this matter has never been presented properly to the American people. And we have these scientists, as I said yesterday, who, under the cloak of science, betray our secrets in open speeches. The entire climate of this situation has been so negative to what to me seemed the most solid aspect of all-namely, distrust of the Communists-that I am not at all surprised, frankly, that we were not prepared properly last fall.

I would hope that now that we realize that we cannot trust these people, and that when Mr. Foster goes to this situation, Mr. Secretary, I am more reassured by some of the things you have said this morning than I have been in a long time-that is, that we recognize these people have no faith, they have no concept of honor, they have made us look silly before the world.

We talk about world opinion. I was so delighted to hear what you said about the British. I would just like to see what world opinion has done to hurt the Communists as a result of this betrayal and trickery on their part last fall. Unquestionably, they will do all they can among the soft people over here to promote the fact that they have a right to cheat and we do not.

This whole question of let's stop testing and start again, because we will be able to detect any testing that they do, and then we can start again: the people that put that type of thinking before the American people ought to study Operation Greenhouse, as to just what is entailed in starting hydrogen testing in the atmosphere, from the standpoint of the months and years of preparation that are necessary.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES HAVE SHORT MEMORIES

Secretary RUSK. Well, one of our troubles, Senator Symingtonand this bears on Senator Humphrey's question-is that in a de

mocracy like ours, and in the free world, we have such short memories. That is, people have forgotten our demobilization and our disarmament after World War II. They have forgotten the effort to put the atornic weapon under international control in 1946. They have forgotten why our military budget today is four times what it was in 1946 and 1947.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is the 1946 plan the Baruch Plan?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

These are things that people have to continue to remember in order to understand why we think control is important, and why we have to have assurance and verification on the steps that are taken, and why there is a connection between the possibilities of disarmament and such a question as Berlin. There is an inevitable connection, because if Berlin continues in a crisis state, we are going to have to be prepared for that crisis. And we cannot take on disarmament measures that reduce our ability to take care of the interests of the free world in a situation of that sort.

However, I think we have to continue to work at disarmament, despite these crises, to see if we can make some motion on both trails at the same time. I do think they are related, and that under present conditions, arms themselves do make their own contribution to tension.

FRENCH DECISION TO STAY AWAY

I might just comment very briefly on the attitude of France and Germany, because they are important here.

France, as you know, has announced that they are not going to the Geneva Conference. We had thought for awhile that they would have an observer there, but they have elected not to do that. This seems to be a personal decision on the part of General de Gaulle and is related to his view that great powers ought to talk these things over among themselves, and not have people, the smaller powers, the smaller countries sitting in to take part in discussions of great power problems.

Senator GORE. That has been Khrushchev's line a long time. Secretary RUSK. That has been Khrushchev's line a long time.

NO RESENTMENT SHOULD BE SHOWN

If you did not see it, you might want to look at Mr. Walter Lippmann's column yesterday, because there is a certain element of truth in that. On the one side, General de Gaulle is very much interested in these problems. They have asked us to keep them intimately in touch with what is going on in Geneva, despite the fact that they won't be there. And my guess is that if there is any change of the sort I was talking about earlier in the attitude of Moscow, they would probably join up at some stage in discussing some of these problems.

But we do not wish to show any irritation or resentment or anything of that sort with respect to Paris on this matter. We will miss them there. We could use them there, because we need their support on certain points that will come up there. But General de Gaulle is in an historical climax, as far as France is concerned. He is almost wholly preoccupied with the Algerian problem. And we