This is a declining factor, and it is my hope before I leave that post that there will be nothing left of what you could call aid to Yugoslavia in the abnormal sense. We will have simply normal trade and normal self-respecting relations on both sides with these people. YUGOSLAV TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE Senator HUMPHREY. They are running quite a technical assistance program in Africa, are they not? Or is it just a skeleton? Mr. KENNAN. Well, it is a good deal, yes. They have given credits to these African countries, but not open credits, credits that the Africans can use only for purchase in Yugoslavia. Senator HUMPHREY. I meant technical assistance. Mr. KENNAN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. They built a port for Ethiopia. The CHAIRMAN. How much did it amount to? Mr. KENNAN. I do not know how much it amounted to in dollars. It was a pretty good installation, and it was successful. Senator HUMPHREY. Weren't they doing something in Lebanon? Mr. KENNAN. They are doing something in 10 or 12 countries, I think. The CHAIRMAN. But not aid, trade. Senator HUMPHREY. Technical assistance. Mr. KENNAN. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. For which they are paying. Mr. KENNAN. They are not dollar grants. They do not give anybody any dollars to spend in other countries. The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. They get something in return, isn't that right? FEARS ABOUT COMMON MARKET Mr. KENNAN. They are trying to get goods in return from these African countries. They cannot get as much as they need. Their grave problem is that their natural trading partners, and the only section of the world that can solve their economic problems, is Western Europe, and today they are frightened of the Common Market, and are afraid they are going to be excluded from it. The CHAIRMAN. They are frightened of it? Mr. KENNAN. Yes. They are afraid they are going to be left out in the cold, and they are not going to be able to trade with Europe. The CHAIRMAN. You mean they are going to make an effort to join it? Mr. KENNAN. No, I do not think they will. They are very much in the position that the Swiss and the Austrians and Swedes are in. They do not want to join it but they do not want to be left outside. There are others who are in that position. The CHAIRMAN. Well, aren't we in that position? [Laughter.] Senator HUMPHREY. If we are about through, I want to ask the Ambassador a question completely off the record. [Discussion off the record.] PUBLIC SHOULD BE COUNSELED TO BE PATIENT The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, before we leave, just for a minute, do you have any advice to us other than what you have given? I mean, in addition, do you wish to volunteer any thoughts to us as to this coming year? It is going to be a very critical year, and I hope we do not make any mistakes. Would you like to volunteer any advice to us, as members of the Senate and this committee? Mr. KENNAN. Senator Fulbright, it is not for me to advise you. The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is, too. I asked for it. You do not have to volunteer it. I asked you for it. Mr. KENNAN. I was impressed with the difficulty of the problem that you have as members of this committee standing between American public opinion and its present mood, and the problems of our foreign policy. I can well understand why our people are impatient, a great many of them, and fed up with the sort of thing they have been asked to put up with in recent years. On the other hand, I hope they will be patient just a little longer. I think that things are much worse in Mr. Khrushchev's camp than is generally understood here. It would be tragic, in my opinion, if we were to permit ourselves to provoke a general showdown with the Communist world that would be damaging to both of us at a time when what was needed was only another year or two of patience, and we would find our problem much easier. BAD PUBLICITY FROM JET SALES The CHAIRMAN. I think that is very sensible. Being up for election and being asked questions like this, I am very conscious about what you said about impatience, because these indignation meetings over this jet business broke out just across the border from my State and you cannot imagine the amount of publicity and the amount of letters that this generated. It was most unfortunate not only as far as I am concerned, but for the country, that this thing broke at the time it did. Senator HUMPHREY. What was that? The CHAIRMAN. The jet business. It broke in Texas and the indignation meetings, attended by thousands of people, created a terrible stir in that part of the country. Mr. KENNAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure I answered Senator Symington correctly, but my feeling is no damage was done by the sale of these jet planes. If they had not gotten them from us they would have gotten it from somebody else. But if it upsets people so, and if it is so hard for people to understand, then my feeling is we had better refrain from selling that kind of stuff. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I did the best I could without any knowledge in answering these attacks. I wish I had had your backing in doing it. Senator SPARKMAN. I might suggest that the State Department put out a very nice statement. I found it very helpful in answering. SHOULD LOANS BE EXTENDED? Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think we ought to extend loans through DLF? Mr. KENNAN. I do. I think we ought to support on a reasonable basis maybe about half what we are doing; we ought to support industrial development in Yugoslavia, and I will tell you why. First, because they make excellent use of it, probably better than any country in the world. They have been very serious and very conscientious about using it. Second, because it is important that their rate of growth not fall behind that of the countries to the east of them. YUGOSLAV-EAST GERMAN RELATIONS Senator HUMPHREY. How are their relationships with East Germany? Mr. KENNAN. Well, that is it. They have relations with East Germany. Senator HUMPHREY. How are they not officially? Mr. KENNAN. They hate the East German Government. They do not say so openly, but the third reason is, too, I do not want to leave this field of financing Yugoslav industrialization entirely to the East Germans and the bloc. Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. We appreciate very much your time in coming here, and I agree with your estimates, as far as I know, which are very informed. Mr. KENNAN. Thank you, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. [Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.] THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM [Editor's Note.-As the civil war in Laos moved toward a negotiated settlement and a coalition government, American attention shifted toward South Vietnam, where Communist guerrilla warfare was increasing. On Oct. 11, 1961, President Kennedy sent Gen. Maxwell Taylor and National Security Council deputy Walt W. Rostow on a mission to Vietnam to review the political and military feasibility of deploying U.S. forces. The Taylor-Rostow report proposed a U.S. military commitment to Vietnam to counteract Communist insurgency and to cope with "Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation.' At an NSC meeting on November 15, President Kennedy expressed concern about U.S. involvement in Vietnam and noted the opposition in Congress, but he approved an amended version of the Taylor-Rostow report. A cable notified U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick Nolting that: "President Kennedy, after conferring with General Taylor and carefully considering his report, had decided that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a sharply increased joint effort to avoid a further deterioration in the situation in South Viet-Nam and eventually to contain and eliminate the threat to its independence." By early 1962, U.S. personnel and equipment began pouring into South Vietnam. For further reference, see Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, 1961-1964, S. Pt. 98-185, Pt. 2 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1985).] FRIDAY, JANUARY 12, 1962 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Frank J. Lausche (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Symington, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson. Also present: John P. White, Congressional Relations Office, State Department, Sterling Cattreel, Vietnamese Task Force, State Department, and Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Newhouse of the committee staff. Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Nolting, we will proceed. I think we will have you give us what you think are the important items that we ought to be acquainted with, dealing with our problem in South Vietnam. Will you proceed? STATEMENT OF HON. FREDERICK E. NOLTING, JR., U.S. Mr. NOLTING. Thank you, sir. If I bring up matters that you are not interested in, please ask me questions that you would like me to answer and I will do my best to respond. Senator LAUSCHE. We will have you make your presentation and then the Senators will question you on the various items that they feel they want to explore. Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, Mr. Chairman, I wonder if it might be well to explain to him our procedure so far as the recording is concerned. Senator LAUSCHE. Yes; if there are some matters that you want completely off the record, if you will so state, the reporter will not record what you say. Senator SPARKMAN. The record taken here is not for publication. It is kept locked in our files here in the office for use of the members of the committee. Mr. NOLTING. Then I will be just as frank as I possibly can; tell you everything I know. I haven't a prepared statement. After 9 months I have drawn certain conclusions and I have some rather definite ideas. I think one of them is that we can help the Government of South Vietnam sufficiently, we and other free nations can help sufficiently to keep the Communists from taking it, with one major proviso, and that is that we find a way to cut down on the amount of infiltration of Communist people, arms, and agents into South Vietnam so that it does not become a case of reinfusion of strength as soon as any progress is made in South Vietnam. To put that another way, I think we have a reasonable chance, a good chance of sustaining the independence of South Vietnam, and the uncertain factor is the degree of infiltration from the north. The country itself has determination, I think, the leadership certainly has determination to remain free, and there has been a great deal of courage in the fight to remain free. There is some disorganization. The country is new. It is underdeveloped and it is under attack, and there are a great many problems. I don't blink at those in the least, but I am sufficiently encouraged to think that the move of the United States toward greater support and greater commitment is a wise move in our own national interest. I say this not only, I hope, because I am there in this very small country and, naturally, from that vantage point one sees things perhaps with less than complete objectivity, but because I am also absolutely sure that it is a key to the retention of other Southeast Asian countries. I was very much impressed by the statement made by Tunku of Malaya1 when he was recently in Saigon. We had a long talk, in fact two of them, and he said that if South Vietnam went under he felt it wouldn't be 6 months before the situation in Malaya would be out of hand again as badly as it was 10 years ago, when the long hard campaign to eliminate the Communists—— Senator LAUSCHE. Who told you that? Mr. NOLTING. The President of Malaya. 1 Y. T. M. Tunku, prime minister and minister of external affairs of Malaya. |