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MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 4 p.m., in executive session in

room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Senator Sparkman (subcommittee chairman).

An informal discussion was had with Ambassador John Tuthill, United States Representative to the OECD.

No transcript was taken or record kept at the meeting.

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MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee proceeded into executive session at 11:25 a.m., in room F-53, Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson.

On motion by Senator Sparkman, seconded by Senator Humphrey, the committee approved for report the nominations of Walter Lingle, to be Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development; John L. Salter, to be Assistant Administrator for Congressional Liaison, AID; Herbert J. Waters, to be Assistant Administrator for Material Resources, AID; Franklin A. Long, to be Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Robert Manning, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

The committee approved for report without objection routine promotions and appointments in the Foreign Service.

Senator Humphrey moved that the committee approve for report the bill (S. 2935), To amend the Peace Corps Act. The motion was seconded by Senator Morse. After discussion, the motion carried on a voice vote.

The International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (Executive K, 87th Congress, 1st Session), was approved for report without objection.

The committee discussed, without action, the bill (S. 2818) To promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the purchase of United Nations Bonds.

For record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[There being no further business, the committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

(334)

BRIEFING ON DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA

THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1962

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4 p.m., in room F-53, U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. J. William Fulbright (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Humphrey, Morse, Church, Symington, Wiley, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Denney, and Mr. Tillman of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you this afternoon. You may proceed in your own way.

I might say that I thought the reports from Geneva were quite favorable. It would be very interesting for you to fill in all the gaps.

STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope that we can be on a deep executive basis, because I think the principal thing that I can add would be more in terms of the real atmosphere and some of the details of discussion which have not been reported.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been pretty good about it this year. I think you can trust us.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. There are three points on which I might report to the committee, and then invite questions and comments.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

The first has to do with the nuclear test ban treaty. The President had in his March 2 speech, you will recall, expressed the hope that we could in fact move toward an end of nuclear testing on the basis of a valid effective test ban treaty.

At the very beginning of our discussions in Geneva, it became very apparent that the Soviets were flatly and adamantly opposed to any kind of international inspection or verification within the Soviet Union. In the talks which Mr. Tsarapkin had with Arthur Dean and the British representative, as well as the talks that Lord Home and I had with Mr. Gromyko, it became clear that the Soviets had completely abandoned the earlier discussion which they

themselves had participated in, looking toward control posts and on-site inspection inside the Soviet Union.

We did not accept any of these statements as the last word. As far as the President's March 2 speech is concerned, that matter still remains open. But I must say that nothing that was said in Geneva would lead to any hope or expectation that the Soviets were going to change their position on international inspection inside their own borders.

They kept making the argument that national detection systems were adequate, but they also kept refusing to have or permit any scientific consultation on the issue as to whether existing instrumentation would be anything like adequate for the job. Indeed, this attitude of theirs required clarification, particularly with the unaligned countries who were also at the conference, on the crucial difference between detection and identification, because that is a difference which has not been generally understood publicly here or certainly abroad.

It is quite true that intentionally there are capabilities for detecting a considerable number of what might be called suspicious events, but unless there is a capability of inspection within the Soviet Union, it would be impossible to discover whether these suspicious events were in fact man-made or natural in origin. So that the problem of an effective test ban treaty, which turns upon a degree of assurance, really turns on the possibilities of verification inside the Soviet Union.

SUPPORT OF THE NEUTRALS

We made, I think, considerable headway with the neutrals on this point. The Burmese delegation told us, for example, after they had consulted with other members of the conference, that if there were a private vote cast in the conference on the issue of international verification, the vote would be 14 to 15 against the Soviet bloc, but that we could not expect some of these neutral countries to make public speeches to that effect because of political situations in their own countries, and also because some of them felt that at this disarmament conference they ought to reserve their own positions so that if there is any chance later on for them to be of help toward reaching an agreement, as they put it, they would be in a position to do so.

I think the neutrals, as well as our allies, fully understood the flatness of the Soviet position. But we were under some pressure to make substantial modifications in our own position on this matter for, in effect, propaganda purposes; that is, to crowd the Soviet Union as much as possible into the position where it was rejecting the slenderest and slimmest amount of international inspection. We felt, however, that we had already made concessions on these points, down to the limits of our own security and safety, and it would be much too dangerous for us to make offers in this field which we ourselves were not prepared to accept, particularly since we had no reason to think the Soviet Union would accept any kind of international inspection. We also suspected that additional offers would not really change the view of the public opinion in some of the neutral countries, who would simply be opposed to testing in

any way, shape, or form under any circumstances. But we did have a considerable amount of discussion with those who wanted us to make even more far reaching concessions on this particular point. Senator WILEY. Who were they?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the Indians, the Burmese, for example. Indeed, even the British and Cambodians expressed the hope that we might be able to make additional concessions-not expecting them to be accepted by the Soviet Union, but, as they put it, to improve the political positions in which we might be if tests were resumed.

I think, however, that there was a considerable amount of understanding as to the circumstances of our tests, if we have to resume them, that these would be reluctantly undertaken, that we genuinely wanted a test ban treaty, and that the Soviet responsibil-ity last autumn was very large in opening up again this test competition.

As I say, the President's offer of March 2 remains open, but we have had no indication at all that the Soviet Union is likely to move on this particular point. Mr. Gromyko told me that each Senator CAPEHART. Mr. Secretary, would you yield just a minute? Secretary RUSK. Yes.

ROLE OF THE INDIANS AND BURMESE

Senator CAPEHART. What do the Indians and Burmese have to do with this in the first place? Isn't it purely between ourselves and Russia?

Secretary RUSK. The fact that the Indians and the Burmese are members of the conference puts them in a position

Senator CAPEHART. How do they get in that position?

Secretary RUSK. They were placed in there in the consultations of the General Assembly of the U.N. last August as two of the eight members. Those two, plus Brazil, Mexico, United Arab Republic, Nigeria, and Ethiopia, are additional members of the conference.

Senator, I think your question is quite right in reminding us of one point that we were very much aware of in Geneva. That is, in this particular field, the United States carries a unique and therefore at times lonely responsibility, because it was quite clear, and some of these delegations confessed it, that although they might press us now not to resume testing, they would be the first to be disappointed and the first to move away from us in opinion if the Soviet Union moved ahead of us in this field. So I think there is no misunderstanding on that.

Senator SYMINGTON. In what field?

Secretary RUSK. In this nuclear field. For example, I think the Indians fully understand that from their own point of view, it is not in their interest for the Soviet Union to achieve a substantial breakthrough in the nuclear weapons field.

REMOVING THE ARGUMENT OF ESPIONAGE

Now, the British would like to be able to offer the Soviet Union an inspection system which would involve control posts located outside of the Soviet Union, with an increased number of on-site in

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