WHY THE SOVIETS DO NOT MAKE A DEAL

Senator SYMINGTON. Just to make my point-the scientist I was talking to in the last 48 hours says it is 100 percent not foolproof. In other words, there is no question about the fact, on the basis that we offer, the world goes at their feet someday if they pursue

it.

I read and reread McCloy's article and after all he should know something about it, he was working on it a long time, this apparently is the giving up of his heart and mind and soul to the American people, after leaving the job. What worries me is you have all these reasons why-those four I remember were the four major ones he gave, plus a lot of surrounding comment that would tend to verify those four basics-why is it that they do not make a deal? Some people say it is their innate fear of letting anybody see what they are doing, and so forth and so on. But if McCloy is right, with his premises, it is incredible that they do not make some kind of arrangement, unless they are winning. That was the conclusion.

Secretary RUSK. Doesn't it also, though, work the other way around; that if the scientist with whom you talked within the last 48 hours was right, they should make it fast, the Soviets should make this deal overnight?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, because if they feel that they can proceed undetected, so long as the status quo continues, why should they want to change the status quo?

I asked Bethe in 1958 if the Russians continue to test and we do not, what will happen. He said if they continue to test and we do not, they will overtake us and pass us. But we can catch them. Of course, as they shifted from persuasion to intimidation, they did not worry about whether they would be caught or not.

We have had a great big apprehension on our part, many billions of dollars more for defense. So perhaps they will go underground, if they can get a deal, and learn clandestinely what they thought was necessary to try over, if this fellow is right. His approach on the fusion angle, where you can get your results from these very low yields that all the scientists will agree now, which they did not before-when we started out with this love your neighbor more than yourself philosophy, all the scientists felt that above 5 kilotons and so forth-now that has been very radically changed. I am just wondering if the scientists today are right, that these very low yields will give them what they want. Is that something that has been given consideration?

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield there? I am too thickheaded to follow him. I still do not understand why the agreement would not be to their advantage, if your friend is right, because it would stop our progress, assuming we live up to it. They do not have to live up to it.

Senator SYMINGTON. From a tactical standpoint I agree with you. On the other hand, suppose they analyze it and at the last minute say they will agree to it. We have offered it, and if they do agree to it, they are unblocked, and of course we will go ahead and carry out our agreement.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is the point.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you see what I am trying to get at, Mr. Secretary. I am not trying to be obtuse about it.

Is Mr. Foster back?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

There is one element here. In thinking about the next steps in the race, many scientists advise us that the critical next steps in this race cannot be accomplished solely underground.

Senator SYMINGTON. I agree with that from the standpoint of the position that we have always felt we were strong. But I am talking about the small yield, the neutron bomb potential, 1/100 of the cost for a warhead.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.
Senator CARLSON. I have one or two questions.

FUTURE MEETINGS

Mr. Secretary, at the conclusion of this conference, were plans made for future meetings of this type?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the disarmament conference will continue in session. Mr. Arthur Dean is leading our delegation over there and will go right through with it. It will undoubtedly last for quite a long time.

We do not have for the moment any exact agreement as to how we next consult with the Soviets on Berlin. Mr. Gromyko and I both agree that is the question that we would take up with each other after we have a chance to come back and talk to our governments and allies.

Senator CARLSON. You do not have any plans to go back immediately?

Secretary RUSK. No, although I would be ready to go back to Geneva if there appeared to be a need for it or an opportunity to get something constructive done.

Senator CARLSON. I want to say that I surely admire your patience. I think it must be a most trying and annoying thing to meet with these people. Personally, I do not believe they ever intend to reach any agreement.

The thing that I regret is that they seem to take advantage, or at least get the advantage, in propaganda. I have tried to follow this with the press, and that is all I know about it. I read about it every day as best I could. I think the one headline that I thought must have gone around the world that affects our nation was this: "Russia Resumes Tests if U.S. Tests." It just seems to me that was the propaganda they wanted out of it, and they got out of it, and it puts our Nation in a spot. I have no suggestion how to avoid that, but that is the thing I regret.

Secretary RUSK. I am quite sure, Senator, the rest of the world. has not forgotten the tests of last fall. We did not run into as much of that kind of problem at Geneva with the others as we thought we would.

Senator CARLSON. That is all I have.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a point.

CANNOT YIELD ON INSPECTIONS

First of all, I am very appreciative of your giving us all this time. I want to commend you, as one Senator, for your excellent work under most trying conditions.

This business of inspections is keyed, it seems to me. I have put a lot of time in on this nuclear test business. I do not have any doctrinaire or dogmatic position. I thought the position that the President made had to be made. I thought he made an excellent explanation of it.

I do not think we can afford to yield, Mr. Secretary, on the issue of the international inspection. The main reason I say this is because this Soviet society, highly disciplined, police state-they use the big word "monolithic"-the key to any kind of an understanding with the Soviet Union is to build a mechanism of inspection, observation, and control that can be a substitute for trust. Over a long period of time we have had this mutual distrust, and there has not been too much to relieve it.

Furthermore, if you are ever going to get a general disarmament program that is even worth work and consideration, you cannot rely upon national reporting, or upon inspecting the bonfire, so to speak, namely, that which has been cast off. You have to have the beginnings of some kind of international inspection.

This is one of the reasons that I was willing to take the riskjust expressing my opinion-I am not the negotiator-as a Senator, on a treaty. I would have been willing to go a long way to get the beginning of an inspection system, knowing the risks that this involved, because if we could once get the beginning of an international inspection system, we may unlock the possibilities for something that really is meaningful. I think if we ever make an agreement, that where we do not get the beginning of an inspection system, we have locked ourselves in.

You take even this business of an agreement of no atmospheric testing. While that seems to lend itself to some immediate relaxation of tensions, it does not get at the basic objective, because it still does not provide the means of penetrating-not for the purpose of espionage-the Soviet structure for further verification of any kind of an agreement that you may ever arrive at. I would feel very strongly about this. In fact, I would very vigorously oppose a treaty that did not have an inspection system involved. I think it would be a fraud. I think it would not lend itself to international peace; I think it would encourage tensions. In fact, everybody would be overly suspicious.

WE CANNOT TRUST THEM

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I am sure that is right. I tried my best to make some headway with Mr. Gromyko along this line. We know they won't trust us; they know that we cannot trust themin the sense that no country situated as they and we are will put its future at the disposal of another country.

What we ought to work for would be arrangements which make the element of trust irrelevant. It is like the auditors in a bank. When you balance your books every day, you do not worry about whether the teller is running off with the money every day. If we

could work toward some minimum arrangement so that suspicion could be allayed, and you could have confidence, not necessarily in each other, but in the effectiveness of the system, then gradually over a period of time certain confidence will build up.

I would like to just say this off the record. [Discussion off the record.]

REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Senator HUMPHREY. The other point I wanted to emphasize, if the Chairman will permit it, is this business of continental or regional arms control measures. I am not talking about Central Europe, which is a very delicate problem because of the power structure there. I think ultimately we may very well want to take the diplomatic offensive, not on the basis of trying to come to grips with the Soviets-I do not think they are willing to come to grips right now; I think Khrushchev is going through a big crisis at home, both ideologically and economically, and he is more or less in a position where he does not quite know what move to make. This would be just a personal calculation.

I think that from our point of view, worldwide, it would be good if we could line up some support outside the Soviet bloc, with the non-aligned or with some of our allies, and with the so-called neutrals, to talk about how you reduce armament structures in the Western Hemisphere or in Africa or in Asia or in Southeast Asia, or any other place-just pick places. As you indicated so well here and I can understand your feeling about it, of viewing a cynical group-they say, "This is your problem, you talk about it." In the meantime, they want to arm and increase tensions in areas which could precipitate a struggle between the big powers.

In other words, these little fellows get out here in these back alley fights, and the next thing you know, it is out on the main boulevard with the big fellows. I think the regional or the sectional or continental disarmament proposals may have some real appeal. Secretary RUSK. I hope very much we can find some way to move those along. I am sure that is right, Senator.

But I must say, at Geneva we did not get anywhere with the regional members in this direction.

Senator HUMPHREY. They were in the big ballpark.

Secretary RUSK. Brazil, for example, was interested in a nuclearfree Latin America. This is a free ride for them. It does not require anything of them, because they were not involved in the nuclear business now, but they were not interested in trying to sit down to see what we in Latin America can do about limiting the arms race among ourselves. I suppose one of the reasons is that—we have talked about this in this committee before-it is very likely none of these governments down there is in a position to say to its armed forces, "You have to be cutting down."

Senator HUMPHREY. There seems to be some evidence of that of late.

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the press, I know, is going to ask me questions, as they always do-I have to say something. Would it

be fitting to say that nothing of significance relative to test ban or disarmament fields was achieved, other than a clear understanding of the position?

Secretary RUSK. I think that would be accurate, and that is the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Chalmers Roberts wrote a piece on Berlin. Would it be advisable to say you feel a modus vivendi has been arrived at on Berlin?

Secretary RUSK. I would not say that.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that, you know.

Secretary RUSK. I know he said that, but that was speculation that was not based upon facts or briefing. I think the only thing that one can really point to there is the two governments have agreed to continue the talks, and that itself is worth pursuing, or is to that degree encouraging. But I would not go much further than that, because on the merits of any of these questions, we did not really get any agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. They nearly always ask me whether the Secretary was pessimistic or optimistic. This is a stock question. What would you say?

Secretary RUSK. I would say that when I met the committee before I went over there, I was neither pessimistic nor optimistic, and I seem to come back in the same mood.

The CHAIRMAN. You are neither pessimisite nor optimistic.
Secretary RuSK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But very patient.

Do you feel it was worthwhile? They will ask me that.

Secretary RUSK. I do think it was worth having the Foreign Ministers there for 2 weeks to help get the conference off in a good atmosphere, and to get the work of the conference established. So from that point of view it was worthwhile, and the exchanges with Gromyko were definitely worth having.

The CHAIRMAN. You got better acquainted and you understand each other better, is that right?

Secretary RUSK. We clarified each other's position.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they will ask you, I guess. They may not bother me too much.

Secretary Rusk. I think I will just pass them by, because I passed them by over on the House side. I will tell them it is for the chairman of the committee to comment.

The CHAIRMAN. It is going to be very brief.

[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]