the loyal forces and they are more successful in dealing with the Vietcong. Is that accurate in your view? Mr. THOMPSON. I have very little information on it, Senator. What I have heard is from people that have recently come back from there, and there is reason to be encouraged. But it is going to be a long, slow process. The CHAIRMAN. John, do you have anything further? Senator SPARKMAN. Nothing further. I have enjoyed this discussion. STANDING UP FOR WEST BERLIN The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I don't know whether it is accurate to say it is sort of quieting down, that our relations are not as dangerous now as they were a year or two ago. Is that accurate? Mr. THOMPSON. I think that is correct. As I say, they are given to surprises, and they can make a sudden change at any time. But I think, generally speaking, that is what I meant by being hopeful. I think there is much more possibility. The CHAIRMAN. If we can just keep doing successfully what we are trying to do now. Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; of course, one important thing was that he just couldn't believe we would stand up for West Berlin. I think now at least he has some doubts, if he has not been fully convinced. And that was important. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM Senator SPARKMAN. Are they going to have some surprises for us in space exploration? Mr. THOMPSON. I doubt if there will be anything very startling. Again, there is the question of what they do with resources. The strain is on them for other purposes, which means they are not going to have as much to put in this area as they would otherwise. Senator SPARKMAN. I read a very interesting article-I don't know whether it was in one of the local papers-about the buildup of deterrents, one against the other. It said that our ICBM's ought to be maintained at a level that would make Russia feel that we at least had that initial striking power if we wanted to make it, but not so high as to make her think that we were overpowering and likely to trip one off just on purpose. As long as we had an initial striking power, somewhat equal to what Russia had, backed up with that second and third strike, there wouldn't be any danger of atomic war between Russia and the United States. It was a rather interesting discussion. It said that it was certain that Khrushchev did not want a nuclear war, because he realized that would be the destruction of Russia. Mr. THOMPSON. I think this is right. The great problem is miscalculation. That is the thing we have to worry about. Take a thing like Berlin: He might think we wouldn't go down the line, when we would. That is what worries me. Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe that he thinks that we would go down the line in Berlin? Mr. THOMPSON. As I said a moment ago, I think he now has some doubts, whereas before he was convinced we would not. FAILURE TO ATTACK THE BUILDING OF THE BERLIN WALL Senator SPARKMAN. Do you think our failure to attack the building of the Berlin wall might have made him think that we would not stand fast? Mr. THOMPSON. I think, Senator, that his view on this thing is a little bit like ours, that we both are trying to be a little cautious. He took a gamble in doing this. At the same time, I think he didn't want his people-he probably gave them instructions not to shoot. But if we had tried to knock it down, this could easily have gotten out of hand because you can't control the East Germans, and if fighting ever started it would have been hard to stop. Senator SPARKMAN. Why would he have doubts now about our standing fast in Berlin. I thought everything that happened from Vienna down to now has been a very firm declaration of our intention to stand fast, although I have seen reference recently in different articles by different persons about retreating in Berlin. Do you feel that there has been any retreat? Mr. THOMPSON. No; I was talking about the early period, in 1958, when he first started this. He was convinced then we would not fight, and for some time after that. And then I think he was encouraged by some differences between ourselves and our allies, which he exaggerated, probably, but nevertheless it made him believe that we couldn't unite on this problem. I can give you a story about outer space, if you have the time. [Discussion off the record.] RUMORS IN THE SOVIET UNION This has really become a political factor. The Russians now are telling stories by the hundreds, and a lot of them with a little political content. They are all attributed to the Armenian radio. Every Russian can reel off 20 or 30 of these things to you. They spread around. This is something that didn't exist under Stalin, and is a good sign, I think. The CHAIRMAN. Do they allow you any greater freedom than they did when you first went there? Mr. THOMPSON. There is not much change in that. It is about the same. I see more Russians. They will come around more. This exchange program has been a great help in that respect. An American delegation comes over; I usually try to get their Russian counterparts to come to the Embassy. A lot of people have been in many times now, and they feel at ease there. The CHAIRMAN. They talk more freely? Mr. THOMPSON. Yes; it is still pretty restricted compared to what we are accustomed to, but by looking back on what it used to be, it is a great change. Rumors do get around. A lot of them know English. They pick up our English broadcast, even though they are jammed by the Russians. And people not being afraid to talk, rumor spreads all over the country in a very short time. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. MINUTES TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1962 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, The committee met at 2:30 p.m., in executive session, in room F-53, Capitol. Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Carlson. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and others continued the administration testimony on the bill (S. 2996) To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. For record of the proceedings, see the printed transcript. [The committee adjourned at 4:15 p.m.] (381) |